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Editors’ comment
When Umberto Eco pointed to Juri Lotman’s claim: “The opposition 
of exact sciences and humanistic sciences must be eliminated” (Eco 
1990: x) and John Deely (1990: 3) wrote: “For the first time in 
perhaps three hundred years, semiotic makes possible the establish­
ment of new foundations for the human sciences, foundations making 
possible in turn a new superstructure for the humanities and the so- 
called hard and natural sciences alike”, neither meant exactly the same 
thing. However, the search for relationships between living organisms 
and sign processes would belong to several research programs.
This is far from the first time in the history of Sign Systems Studies 
that the ‘biosemiotic turn’ in semiotics has left its marks on these 
pages. Our late and deeply-missed friend and teacher, Thomas A. 
Sebeok, a member of the editorial board of this journal, who passed 
away suddenly at the end of 2001, characterized this ‘turn’ with the 
telling title of his last collection of essays, Global Semiotics. This turn 
is a series of steps encompassing several senses of the word ‘global’, 
the most important being that semiotics can no longer deal exclusively 
with sign systems as if they were wholly self-contained within an 
exclusively human sphere of signification, because this sphere has 
ramifications in the larger world of natural history and embodied 
meaning.
This is “the first year of ‘semiotics without Sebeok’”, as John 
Deely has written. It seems illogical that the influence of one person 
can be omnipresent, passim , particularly in a field as large and diverse 
as semiotics. However, the behaviour of a tiny ganglion in an 
organism can be felt by every single cell, unconsciously as cells are.
The international conference Biology and Linguistics that took 
place in Tartu in February 1978, (organised by biologists and semio- 
ticians of St. Petersburg, Tartu, and Moscow), and the international 
workshop The Linguistics o f Biology and the Biology o f Language in
Mexico 20 years later (organised by Mexican and American linguists 
and biologists),1 — as far as these were from each other (both in a 
periphery, in a sense) — belong to the same trend. A few other 
meetings — in Russia, Denmark, Estonia, and of course in Glottertal, 
Germany, at the beginning of 1990s developed a network of people 
and a research agenda towards a semiotic biology. However, we still 
tend to assume that the series of international meetings under the title 
Gatherings in Biosemiotics, started jointly by Danish and Estonian 
biosemioticians, marks a crucial point in the contemporary history of 
the field (Emmeche 2001).
We have edited the present volume with the aim of giving a more 
detailed picture of this turn in semiotics, showing the diversity within 
the semiotic globe of approaches by the growing community of 
biosemioticians, many of whom were present at the “Gatherings in 
Biosemiotics 1” meeting in Copenhagen, May 24-26, 2001.
At the meeting in Copenhagen, Myrdene Anderson made an in­
formal comment on the title we had chosen for this new series of 
meetings, Gatherings in biosemiotics, a comment that seemed a little 
discouraging at first. She pointed out that the term ‘gatherings’ has 
many connotations in English, one of which alludes to the kind of 
things which might otherwise be called stores, reserves or cache or 
even remains or leftovers. This was not at all meant as an unkind 
remark, in fact Myrdene assured us she appreciated that such a 
connotation should be association with the project. We must admit 
that for our part this possibility was unintentional. However, on 
further reflection it appears that Myrdene may be right that this 
connotation may not be so bad after all.
Everybody who cares to read the papers presented at this first 
Gatherings in Biosemiotics, now assembled and supplemented with 
the additional articles in this volume, must agree that the project of 
finding a strong unified semiotic perspective on the life sciences is 
still in a very initial and explorative phase. In other words, we are still 
fumbling around, gradually assembling pieces of insights from here 
and there, and trying to see how the basic structure might best be 
raised. If we consider biosemiotics to be a new field, it is a field that 
has not yet been decently fenced or cultivated. The scene is still open
12 Claus Emmeche, Jesper Hoffmeyer, Kalevi Kull
1 See http://itzamna.cifn.unam.mx/ComputationalGenomics/history/w98/.
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for creativity at the most fundamental level, what endures and what is 
discarded remains to be seen.
The versatility of approaches taken and the commitment exhibited 
by the speakers were perhaps the main causes for the rather 
unequalled pleasure most or all participants took from being present at 
the occasion of the first gatherings meeting. In addition, many of us 
were pleasantly surprised to find that so many other serious re­
searchers shared our vision, i.e. the vision of a semiotic transgression 
of dominating explanatory strategies in theoretical biology.
Still, the interface between nature and culture remains to be an 
unexpectedly difficult thing.2
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2 We like to see the current issue as a marking of the sexagenarian Jesper 
Hoffmeyer, a leader in the biosemiotic search. [Note added by C. E. and K. K.]
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The chicken and the Orphean egg: 
On the function of meaning and the meaning 
of function
Claus Emmeche
Center for the Philosophy of Nature and Science Studies, Niels Bohr Institute 
Blegdamsvej 17, DK-2100 Copenhagen, Denmark 
e-mail: emmeche@ nbi.dk
Abstract: A central aspect of the relation between biosemiotics and biology is 
investigated by asking: Is a biological concept of function intrinsically related 
to a biosemiotic concept of sign action, and vice versa? A biological notion of 
function (as some process or part that serves some purpose in the context of 
maintenance and reproduction of the whole organism) is discussed in the light 
o f the attempt to provide an understanding o f life processes as being of a 
semiotic nature, i.e., constituted by sign actions. Does signification and com­
munication in biology (e.g., intracellular communication) always presuppose 
an organism with distinct semiotic or quasi-semiotic functions? And, sym­
metrically, is it the case that functional relations are simply not conceivable 
without living sign action? The present note is just an introduction to a project 
aiming at elucidating the relations between biofunction and biosemiosis.
Biology has celebrated some major triumphs in the period beginning 
with Darwin’s publication of Origin o f Species in 1859 all the way up 
to 2001, when newspaper headlines proclaimed that the human geno­
me had now been charted. Now that biology has shown us what life is 
(from a scientific standpoint), what shall we do with biosemiotics?
The biosemiotic project involves looking from a completely diffe­
rent angle at natural biological processes of which, to be sure, we have 
already gained knowledge about through the traditional science of 
biology and the research fields it includes (molecular biology, cellular
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biology, ethology, ecology, neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, etc.). 
From these disciplines, we have now gained an enormous amount ot 
knowledge of living organisms. At the same time, however, there are 
gaping holes in this knowledge. It has a dual nature, i.e. on the one 
hand it comprises a large body of positive facts and theoretical genera­
lizations, even coherent and well-confirmed theories (such as cellular 
theory and evolutionary theory), but on the other hand it takes the 
form of n o n -k n o w le d g e .  The latter applies, in particular, to the know­
ledge we have gained of humans as a species by mapping the human 
genome. This non-knowledge exists at least at two levels.
First of all, there is non-knowledge in the form of holes or white 
blots on the previously existing theoretical map of biological fields 
that may be filled in, possibly in the near future. The hope is that more 
research funds and research hours will be able to fill these holes. 
Obviously, for example, now that we have the complete human 
genome1 we would also like to map out the complete chimpanzee 
genome, since the chimpanzee is our nearest biological relative and 
we hope to gain a better understanding of that kinship. All we need to 
do is begin the task of DNA sequencing a chimpanzee — a major 
undertaking, to be sure, but one that is fully feasible. In this way, we 
can continue doing the same with other species. Even today, we have 
detailed genetic maps of biologists’ favorite model organisms (the 
fruit fly, a nematode worm, the coli bacteria, the yeast cell, and even, 
in part, the mouse).
Secondly, our biological non-knowledge exists at a level on which 
we are approaching the limits of what we can expect to know if we 
simply use existing methods with no breakdown in our theories, i.e. if 
we simply continue placing more small pieces into the existing puzzle. 
With regard to certain questions, if non-knowledge at this level were 
transformed into knowledge, we would probably need to look at them 
through different theoretical glasses or use a different paradigm, in the 
precise sense Thomas Kuhn uses this word. Here, a paradigm is not 
just another theory that may assign a slightly different meaning to the 
concepts that were previously used, but almost another world, at least
The news in 2001 that the human genome has now been charted should be taken 
with a grain of salt, since the picture is hardly complete. Rather, there is a complete
4nQ 7d f  qa!iS’,? < hcOUugh thCy аГе high,y detai,ed‘ For the technical details, see
I ' . . 64 (15 February 2001), a large issue devoted to this topic including 
among other things, the preliminary collection of sketches.
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for the researcher, i.e., a different set of theoretical tasks, some 
different values used to determine what constitutes good questions and 
even for which things a person, as a scientist, can research in the first 
place. It is on this latter level, in particular, that biosemiotics tackles 
the problem, using the following fundamental assertion: The traditio­
nal paradigm in biology — which encompasses a number of 
experimental methods, normal scientific working procedures, neo- 
Darwinism and its mathematical population models, etc. — alone is 
not and cannot be sufficient to answer the following key question:2 
How did meaning originate in biological systems? And what is it (if 
not meaning, i.e. the creation o f signs, and semiotic processes in 
general) that makes biology something special, something that on 
certain points fundamentally differs from the types o f systems studied, 
for example, by physicists and chemists?
Here we shall undertake a thorough examination of the idea of the 
biological creation of meaning as something central to all living things 
by taking a closer look at the way in which people normally answer 
the riddle of what it is about organisms that is special, i.e., we will 
look at the answer provided by “mainstream” biologists or conventio­
nal anti-reductionist biologists such as Ernst Mayr (who did not like to 
see his field, evolutionary biology, reduced to chemistry as applied to 
biology) and compare it to the answer given by leading biose­
mioticians, in the tradition from Jakob and Thure von Uexkiill and 
Thomas A. Sebeok up to biosemioticians such as Jesper Hoffmeyer 
and Kalevi Kull. Let us reveal right away that traditional biological 
understanding3 mentions two crucial characteristics of living systems 
that make them radically different and irreducible to physics and 
chemistry:
2 Jesper Hoffmeyer’s 1996 book (which was discussed in detail in the journal 
Semiotica 120(3/4) (1998), and is a good introduction to biosemiotics) asks this 
question most clearly. A Danish introduction focusing on the status of scientific theory 
in biosemiotics is Emmeche 1997. K. Kull (1999) provides a historical overview of the 
more recent ideological history of biosemiotics.
3 This includes, for example, John Maynard Smith, who has made significant 
contributions to evolutionary theory. See, for example, Maynard Smith (1986, 1999a, 
1999b). The 1999a article attempts to “explain” information functionally. This is not 
the place to discuss why the classical attempts to reduce functional descriptions in 
biology have failed. An introduction to the discussion can be found in Schaffner 
(1993). Maynard Smith’s 1999b article contains a rather lengthy analysis and 
subsequent discussion that would lend itself well to semiotic treatment.
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(1) biosystems (organisms) contain genetic information;
(2) biosystems (organisms) have functions.
The former, of course, is a cryptosemiotic concept, for even here 
biologists admit indirectly that it is necessary to use semiotic concepts 
to describe biological systems. It is just that biologists do not attribute 
any particular significance to this: after all, they typically say, “genetic 
information” is just a metaphor for certain molecular processes that 
are organized in a certain way. Here the biosemiotician steps in and 
interprets the occurrence of such metaphors more realistically, namely 
as a sign that when one apparently cannot understand a key biological 
process, such as the hereditary transfer of traits between generations, 
without having to use informational metaphors, it is probably because 
the processes themselves, for which the metaphors are meaningfully 
used, actually have the nature of semiotic processes — sign pro­
duction, sign transfer, and sign interpretation 4
As we know, the second point — that organisms have functions — 
is particularly well known in biology. No biologist can get by without 
directly or indirectly referring to the (functional) role some part or 
another of the organism plays in the whole organism.^ On the other 
hand, many philosophers and some theoretical biologists, such as John 
Maynard Smith, have speculated that this all-pervasive interest in 
functions is what makes biology different from the science that deals 
with inorganic nature, such as those branches of basic physics that 
only study physical processes.
But do we not run into the concept of function here, too, one might 
ask? Certainly it is not complete nonsense to ask what function solar 
wind has for the earth’s atmosphere? The standard response here is 
that the question is understandable, to be sure, in so far as it can be 
reworded into a question of the causal role a phenomenon such as 
solar wind can conceivably have on earth’s atmosphere as a physical 
system, but to the extent that it can be answered as such — purely 
physically causal — there are nonetheless some significant differences 
between the limited role the concept of function can play in a subject
I have piogrammatically described (as a philosophical position) this semiotic 
t ea ism , w ich such an interpretation expresses, as the opposite of what today would
e ca ed a more social-constructivist interpretation (Emmeche 1988, 1990). 
ппНрг«мпН aSSICal text °"  cor|cept of function that is close to the standard 
(1970) 3m0ng glStS WaS written ЬУ the evolutionary biologist F. Ayala
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such as geophysics or astrophysics and the key role it plays in biology. 
Of course, the difference is so great it is really just a matter of using 
the same term for two different concepts. In physics the assertion or 
question of function (such as the one mentioned above) can be re­
written without loss of meaning to the purely causal6 question of 
direct cause-and-effect contexts in the traditional classical mechanical 
sense, in which a cause precedes an effect in time, but both cause and 
effect exist on the same ontological level, i.e., they are of the same 
nature, as in the example of the relationship between the sun and the 
earth’s climate. This is a matter of material physical processes on the 
macroscale. As shown by the past 30 years of discussions on the con­
cept of function in the philosophy of biology7 it is far more complex 
to state the connection between causality and functionality in biology.
Essentially, the reason for this difficulty is that in biological 
systems there is an inner connection between the informational 
(which, without hesitation, we will call here the semiotic aspect of a 
living system) and the functional aspect. This is a connection that has 
been largely overlooked in the past and we will examine it in greater 
detail now.
Traditional biologists know quite well, implicitly at least, that there 
is a connection between the functional and the informational aspect: 
No organism exists that does not consist of a whole of its parts, 
whereby the parts enter into functional relations with one another and 
with the whole. Even in the simplest conceivable organism, such as a 
simple, free-living cell, this is dependent on the cell’s organizing its 
parts, not exclusively but in part with the help of a genetic memory (a 
semiotic code), which makes sure the (functionally) “correct” parts are 
produced in the cell’s autocatalytic network of processes. In this case, 
it is primarily protein synthesis, whereby without the genetic memory 
a mere jumble of “dysfunctional” proteins that are useless to the cell 
would be produced.
6 Most often, as here, “purely causal” questions are considered to deal with the 
kind of causal context that is most closely related to “effective causality” as Aristotle 
understood it, for example when the cause of the collapse of a wall is said to be the 
energy from the steel ball suspended from the crane. The fact that there is also an 
ultimate or purposeful cause — namely that the wall is to be removed to make room 
for something else — is typically considered secondary.
7 A recent survey of the debate is presented by the editors of the 1998 anthology in 
which Ayala 1970 is reprinted.
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As we know, from a chemical standpoint proteins are a rat er 
normal kind of large molecule (polymers characterized by peptide 
bonds, which combine the individual building blocks, amino acids, 
into long chains). It is one thing, as a chemist, to use chemical theory 
and experimentation to identify a molecule as a protein, and not a 
sugar, a lipid, a nucleic acid, or something else. But it is something 
quite different, as a biologist, to characterize a particular protein as an 
enzyme, or a neuropeptide, or a hormone, or a histone (which is a 
class of proteins involved, among other things, in the packing of 
chromosomes).8 If it is found that a protein is a histone or an enzyme, 
for example, then this is also, in part, a functional description of the 
protein. It says something about the relationship between part (pro­
tein) and whole (the cell as an organism). This is rather banal, as far as 
it goes, and on the concrete level of molecular biology it is nothing 
new, but the semiotic and biotheoretical implications of this fact are 
far-reaching:
As we shall now show, this means \hdX function and sign, both seen 
biosemiotically as phenomena that describe living organisms, are 
directly related to each other, even in the narrow sense, i.e. both 
ontologically and epistemologically, or in other words: both as (onto­
logical) properties of nature and (epistemologically) as conditions for 
our knowledge of nature.
Ontologically, sign and function are related like the chicken and 
the egg: It is a bit absurd to ask which came first, the sign in nature or 
functions in nature: biosemiotically, both arise simultaneously in the 
same lengthy historical process, with the creation of the first
8 “As a biologist”, i.e. by virtue of biological knowledge and competence. 
Obviously, chemists are not excluded from biology or from speaking of functions in a 
biological sense when they describe the function of an enzyme in a metabolic pathway 
(“reaction step”), but when they do so, they are doing it on the basis of biological 
concepts and in the capacity of biologists. Against this argument (concerning the 
difference between a chemical and a biological description of a molecule) one might 
object that in practical research, for example in molecular biology and its 
biotechnological applications, there is no sharp distinction between when a one is a 
chemist and when one is a biologist. This is absolutely correct, but the fact that the 
methods of chemistry and biology are used together here in this interdisciplinary field 
oes not mean that the meaning of any biological concept can be derived, so to speak, 
rom с emical theory. The fact that chemistry and biology have gone a relatively long 
ш а т ° Т  ePlstemic integration precisely in the field of molecular biology (cf. Collin 
same, omofogicaU^speaking116311 ^  °hemical and the biol°g 'cal domains are the
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o r g a n is m s ,  which of course have cellular structures, here on earth at 
least. Of course, a stolid biologist could choose to interpret the 
chicken/egg duality in the light of the biological difference between a 
single-celled and a multicelled organism. In this case, the question of 
the chicken and the egg is not quite so absurd: In this case, from the 
phylogenetic perspective, it is namely the egg that “came first”, since 
we must assume that multicelled organisms (“individuals”) are a (not 
uncomplicated) product of a long evolutionary process (cf. Buss 
1987). But the evolutionary sequence of single-celled and multicelled 
organisms is not the point here at all. The point is, 1): that in our basic 
understanding of what living beings are, we must operate with a 
c o n c e p t  o f  th e  o rg a n ism  that presupposes that the organism is b o th  a 
semiotic phenomenon — a system of sign processes — a n d  a 
functional phenomenon — a whole made of parts, where the parts 
have functions relative to one another and relative to the maintenance 
of the whole, and 2): that these two aspects, the mereological9 and the 
semiotic, are closely linked.
With regard to the organism, as understood not just as a concept, 
but as a real ontological entity, th e  m u tu a l  fu n c t io n a l  r e la tio n sh ip s  o f  
th e  o rg a n is m  a re  s e m io t ic .10 For now, let us stick to single-celled 
organisms and look at a part of the cell, such as an enzyme. It has a 
function of catalyzing a chemical process, let us say, between two 
other molecules (there can be many other enzymatic functions, such as
9 Mereology: the study of parts and wholes, usually refers to a mathematical or at 
least formal theory thereof, such as that of Lesniewski or Goodman; developed by the 
former in the hope of forming an alternative to set theory as a foundation for 
mathematics. For the relationship between mereology and semiotics, see Stjernfelt 
(2 0 0 0 ), although he does not deal specifically with the biosemiotic aspects.
10 One might well ask what knowledge we are actually expressing when we claim 
that the relationships between xi, X2, ... xn as parts of a system Y are “semiotic” . What 
characterizes the non-semiotic relationships of something if we have otherwise adopted 
an almost pansemiotic Peirce-inspired perspective? However, we would be going too 
far here if we took up the question of a “lower semiotic threshold” (which has been 
dealt with in Nöth 2000a, 2000b, and elsewhere); it is sufficient to state that even a 
Peirce-based semiotics need not be pansemiotic (and maintain that any conceivable or 
real relationship in itself has the nature of a sign). For example, purely dyadic 
relationships, which occur in physical processes, have the category of “secondness” 
(sensu Peirce), such as action and reaction. Such processes can be called kinesis, as 
opposed to semiosis, which is of the category of thirdness: a living organism is subject 
to the kinesis of the physical laws of nature, but as an organism it can be understood 
only as a phenomenon of thirdness, i.e. as a semiotic phenomenon that is dependent on 
active signs, “sign action”, sign production, and sign interpretation (Emmeche 1991).
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breaking down molecules into smaller parts, but that is secondary 
here). Of interest here is not the enzyme as chemistry (for example, its 
structural formula seen in isolation or its three-dimensional structure 
seen in isolation), but the circumstance that when the enzyme is found 
in a cell with such and such other molecules, then it “acts” in such and 
such a way, i.e., it reacts with these molecules, thereby acquiring 
meaning to the cell (in this case: to reduce the activation energy 
required to establish a bond, for example, between two other 
molecules that are substrates for the active site on the enzyme, thereby 
increasing the rate of the process).11 In other words, using the enzyme 
cytochrome с as an example, the function of this enzyme is the same 
as the cell’s “structural attribution of biological meaning” to the 
cytochrome с molecule.
What does this have to do with meaning, one might ask? After all, 
it is we who can see that it has meaning (functionality) to the cell. 
Certainly the cell itself cannot understand that? Correct, but we will 
avoid the nominalistic temptation of seeing signs only as something 
that can be of a mental nature (signs in human language or under­
standing). Although the cell does not realize, perceive, or understand 
anything, the cell is still a semiotic system in the sense that it is a
' ' This ‘when X, then T  form is reminiscent of both ‘i f ... then’ in logical inference 
and ‘if ... then’ conditions expressed in connection with physical laws of motion. One 
might believe, then, that there is no difference between physical laws of nature 
expressed as regularities of the form “If a body is dropped above the earth it falls to 
earth with a uniform acceleration” (Galileo's Law of falling bodies) and the causality 
found in the functional relationship in the organism between part and whole, if both are 
merely regularities that can be expressed as ‘if ... then’ conditions. However, this 
empirical interpretation of natural law has been greatly criticized, for example by a 
(Popper-inspired) ‘propensity’ interpretation, which does not hesitate to attribute to 
nature forces, capacities, dispositions, etc. See Chalmers’ discussion in Chapter 14 of 
the new 3rd edition of his theory of science. What Chalmers forgets is that the 
generality of these dispositions (etc.), which are attributed to the individual particles or 
objects, is better understood on the basis of Peirce’s ontology, where generalities and 
forms (including process forms) are real properties inherent in nature: they are 
habits . (I am grateful to Peder Voetmann Christiansen for introducing me to this 
aspect of Peirces philosophy). But even though the physical nature can generally have 
habits and be regularly controlled by “final causation”, it is nonetheless a rather special 
orm of final causation that occurs in organisms, which is related to the history-of- 
symbols nature of the genetic memory in the species’ lineage: DNA acts here as a 
oundary condition (Polanyi 1972), life is complex because these boundary conditions 
are historical (cf. Küppers 1992), and from a semiotic standpoint we could add that 
such boundary conditions or "constraints" are phenomena that have all the 
characteristics of being causes (Juarrero 1998).
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system of meaning with its own autonomous self-catalysing, self- 
organising dynamic — a dynamic, as mentioned above, that is so 
complex as to presuppose genetic memory as a sign system. But the 
important thing here is not so much the latter digital and relatively 
stable DNA code found in the cell’s nucleus in eukaryotic organisms, 
as it is the sign processes of a far more general kind: Saying that 
cytochrome с means something to the cell is the same as saying that it 
has a function. It is not just any molecule. We could very well 
synthesize small proteins and artificially introduce them into the cell. 
They would be without importance or they would be dysfunctional or, 
with certain fortuitous strokes of luck, they would actually fulfil some 
function in the cell.
To say that cytochrome с or any other molecule fulfils a function 
for the cell as an organism (or for multicellular organisms: an organ, 
or an organ part that fulfils a function) is the same as saying that the 
part operates appropriately in the whole (an idea entertained by Kant). 
It is the whole, with its special emergent structure, that establishes the 
framework for this appropriateness and even though the basic laws of 
nature are still in effect (“effective”, or “brute causation”), it is the cell 
as a complex system that manages or shapes the manner in which the 
natural laws operate on the individual parts: the whole operates as a 
constraint, as a limiting condition from the macro level down to the 
micro level, from the whole to the part.
The protein cytochrome с is specific and the biological specificity 
is precisely the difference cytochrome с makes to the cell. After all, if 
cytochrome с had not had precisely this particular form (at least in its 
active sites), it would not bring about the reaction between the 
components with which it interacts. It would be dysfunctional (as it 
can become if the gene for cytochrome с mutates, which can be fatal 
to the cell).12 Cytochrome с mediates precisely this reaction and not all 
kinds of other ones — therein lies its meaning. This “meaning”, in the 
semiotic sense, of the individual enzyme is structural, understood in 
such a way that the cell’s molecules form a system of dissimilarities
12 More precisely, cytochrome с functions as one of the important electron 
transporters in the respiratory chain, which (by oxidative phosphorylation) produces 
the main part of the energy-rich ATP, which is so important to the cell. This is an 
important and general function, as a result of which the overall structure of the 
cytochromes is evolutionarily conserved across species, from bacteria to elephants.
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(like the elements of language in Saussure13), but these dissimilarities 
are not of a mental or immaterial kind. The material elements о t e 
system have a certain agency14 of their own, or a local semiotic 
capacity to act, if you will, and consequently the cell’s molecular 
system of signs is self-organizing and self-interpreting, i e., these 
signs are characterized better by the Peircean concept of sign as sign 
action than by the Saussurean concept of sign as an abstract system of 
differences. To a great extent, the cell is an interpretation system that 
is controlled by what Peirce called “final causation”, the type of 
causation in nature that has to do with organization, habit formation, 
memory phenomena, information, appropriateness and purposeful­
ness, evolution — all phenomena of the category of Thirdness 
(Santaella Braga 1999).15
But epistemologically, too, there are close mutual conceptual 
conditional relations between sign and function, at least within the 
framework of a Peirce-inspired biosemiotics: The assertion here is that 
it is simply impossible to understand the concept of sign, without a 
concept of function (of some kind or another). And, as just indicated, 
the inverse is also true: It is not possible to understand the concept of 
function in biology in general without a good understanding of what 
an organism is and such an understanding presupposes a concept of 
information, whether it be in the slightly superficial molecular biology 
version as (DNA-) sequence information or in a more thoroughly 
thought-out Peircean version, where information is sign. As Bateson 
(1972) said, “information is a difference that makes a difference” (“to 
an organism” implied) and this is ‘straight Peirce’, even though he 
probably would have stated it in a more complex, but more precise, 
form such as “sign (representamen) is a difference that makes a diffe­
rence (interpretant) by making the latter stand in relation to something 
else, namely that to which the sign refers (object)”. We might add:
For a detailed treatment of the relationship between Peirce and Saussure as a 
basis^for biosemiotics, see Emmeche, Hoffmeyer 1991.
This agency or “energy” is an indication that the material itself is active. With 
regard to pioteins it is dictated, among other things, by thermodynamic processes in the 
proteins molecular self assembly, after the protein is synthesized as a long peptide 
chain and folds itself together into what resembles a ball of yarn, for example, although 
it is helped in part by other proteins, particularly the chaperones
“ T l  volum'  of b r to t ic a  127(1/4) Is a special edition on this theme, with
в Г Г Г г .! " ^' “semiotics, including another contribution by L. Santaella 
Braga on Peirce and biology, then and now.
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“Function is the difference that the presence of a part of the organism 
makes with respect to other parts and to the whole”.
The part refers to the whole and can be understood (functionally) 
only within this whole. That is an old mereological insight. When we 
recognize cytochrome с as a part of the organism, we are not just 
interested in a recognition of this protein as a part, similar to the 
recognition that a stone is part of a gravel heap or that 1/7 is a part of 
the rational numbers. It is not the abstract part-whole relationship in 
itself or a physical version of such a relationship that is crucial here. 
The crux of the matter here is that the relationship between the parts of 
an organism and the whole organism is a mereological relationship of 
a particular specific nature: It is also an “intrinsic semiotic relation­
ship”, that is, it is in its very nature semiotic. And, it should be noted, 
its semiotic character is not merely something attributed to it, just as 
our consciousness is not just due to the fact that other people attribute 
consciousness to me, but I am actually conscious and it is part of the 
concept’s sine qua non that being conscious is not derived from any­
thing else.16 Apart from this formal similarity, the intrinsic semiotics 
of the cell has nothing to do with consciousness in the human sense.
We now realize that there must be an internal relationship between 
sign and function, that is to say when the two concepts are used in 
conjunction with organisms and with what are essential features of 
organisms.17 We have also more than hinted at what is meant by 
internal relationship, but let us express it a bit more formally. In the 
philosophical usage of the term, if something, let us call it S, is 
internally related to something else, let us say F, then there is an 
essential property (a sine qua non) of S whereby S is actually linked to
16 It should be mentioned that not all philosophers agree with this: there is an 
important line of demarcation in modern philosophy of mind between those who 
believe that consciousness is an intrinsic property (such as Searle and Nagel) and those 
who more or less behaviouristically try to explain consciousness under the designation 
“the intentional stance”, etc. (such as Dennett).
17 It is not our intention here to discuss essentialism, but the framework of 
evolutionary history assumed here, in itself, places certain limitations on a “full blown” 
essentialism. Essentialism in biology refers to the now abandoned idea that the 
properties of an organism are of two essentially different types: the essential, which 
defines for example whether the organism belongs to the species red clover or white 
clover, and the accidental, which does not have quite the same nature of reality. 
Darwinism disposed of essentialism, for it saw all properties as possessing the same 
degree of reality, and variation was not just something accidental and negligible, but 
the very material on which selection operated.
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F by this relationship, symbolized here by -R-. Thus, S simply wou 
not be S, if it were not related to F in this manner, i.e. if S-R-F were 
not valid. Specifically, it would mean that a sign would not be a sign 
(in the biosemiotic sense) if it were not a sign with a function, which 
normally means “with a function for the organism”. The traditional 
biologist could accept this part of the argument, since it is hardly 
surprising that a process involving information, signals, or signs in an 
organism must serve the best interests of the organism, i.e. it must be 
functional for the organism.
At the same time, however, we would maintain that the relation­
ship is symmetrical, i.e. if S-R-F is valid then so is F-R-S, or in plain 
language, if sign is internally related to function, then function is also 
internally related to sign. A thing would simply not be a function (for 
the organism) if it did not have the nature of a sign. Stated in this way, 
the assertion does not appear to be immediately obvious to the 
traditional biological viewpoint, since it is easy to imagine certain 
functional parts of an organism, without their obviously being signs 
and, as mentioned, biologists do not normally use semiotics as a con­
ceptual tool. What does it mean, for example, to say that the liver of a 
vertebrate animal is a sign? — “Of what?” one might sceptically ask. 
And what have we gained by such an assertion?
Or, with an example from the single-celled level: The Golgi 
apparatus in eukaryotic cells, as seen under the electron microscope, 
looks like a stack of flat bladders (membranes) stacked one on top of 
the other. There are still some dark sides regarding the function of this 
structure, but a picture has developed18 of a membrane structure that is 
linked to the rest of the cell’s transport system, a kind of halfway 
house between the endoplasmic reticulum, where proteins are 
synthesized, and the secretory vesicles, which (in the periphery of the 
cytoplasm, at the outer membrane of the cell) take proteins out of the 
cell by means of exocytosis (membrane fusion). In addition to being 
part of the transport system, the Golgi apparatus performs a bioche­
mical modification of the proteins that are on their way out into the 
surroundings (for example, “ripening” of glycoproteins by removing 
certain oligosaccharides and adding others). Thus, the Golgi apparatus 
clearly has functions for the cell, but why would this make it a sign?
More details can be found, for example, in Alberts et al. 1994.
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Here, the biosemiotician must either sacrifice the idea of the 
internal relationship, in its strong, symmetric form, which means that 
not all biofunctions are or can be interpreted by us as being real signs, 
or the biosemioticean can hold onto the symmetry; protest that we 
should not use an all-too narrow concept of sign, and instead interpret 
the relationship as follows: If a relationship is merely dyadic, or 
merely comprised of dyadic relationships, as indicated by the notation 
F-R-S then, to be sure, the relationship need not have the nature of a 
sign. But if F and S do not stand for just anything, but for function and 
sign, and if, in conjunction with organisms, function is already a 
mereologic relationship, then F-R-S will not formally be a dyadic, but 
rather a triadic quantity: Any biofunction is something (a process or a 
structure) that has meaning for the organism as an interpretant system 
(what theoretical biologist Stanley N. Salthe and others call a “system 
of interpretance”19), and in this broad meaning of the statement F-R-S 
any functional process or structure in a cell is “biologically meaning­
ful”, in that it makes a difference to the cell as a whole, as a system, 
that would be affected immediately (often in a rather fatal direction) if 
the process were blocked or the structure destroyed. Thus, the Golgi 
apparatus and everything at all we can understand in a biofunctional 
sense has the nature of a sign, where “sign” need not be a commu­
nicative sign in the normal sense, but may instead be purposeful 
processes, with the special causal structure these processes have.
But even if biofunctions may be said to have the nature of signs, is 
it not crazy to claim that the Golgi apparatus is a sign that (according 
to the classical definition of sign) “stands for” something else? Yes 
and no. This “stands for” relationship is obviously not a symbolic or 
conventional relationship, but as we know there are also sign process 
forms other than the symbolic. As mentioned, the Golgi apparatus (if 
it is to be understood at all biologically and not just described 
physically and chemically) refers to other structures in the cell and 
here it is the assertion of biosemiotics that this reference relationship 
is triadic. The shape of the Golgi apparatus and the processes that 
occur in it are not of importance to the endoplasmic reticulum and the 
exocytotic vesicles alone. They are important to the cell as a whole. 
The mereological relationship is not just formal, but also causal,
19 Even though Salthe (1998:391) has a broader (physicosemiotic) understanding 
of what can comprise a “system of interpretance” than the biosemioticist, the term is 
applicable here. See also the overview on his homepage at www.nbi.dk/~natphil/salthe/
namely a case of what in some contexts is called ‘‘downward 
causation”.20 It is the whole that “assigns” meaning to the parts. Just 
as a protein is an enzyme only when it works within a meaningful 
whole, the same is true of the Golgi apparatus. Seen in itself, as a 
“pure” spatial structure, it could just as well have been an accidental 
pattern in nature or a bizarre sculpture on the nanoscale (nanoart!). 
But it is the organization of the cell as such that со-defines the 
boundary conditions under which the Golgi apparatus operates. It is 
part of the cell’s quasi-cognitive scheme of protein synthesis and 
transport. It may have a diagrammatic character (which must be the 
subject of a more detailed semiotic analysis at a later time).
Such a biosemiotic understanding of the concept of function can 
also include cases in which the function is not yet known: The 
sequences of DNA (genes) that code for proteins or RNA molecules 
are easily seen as having the nature of signs, but what about the non­
coding parts, such as the repetitive sequences (whose function is not 
known) or other parts of the so-called junk DNA which, as we know, 
forms the bulk of our genome? In this case, the function is not known 
and one might believe that the assertion concerning the internal 
relationship between function and sign applies only to those parts of 
the organism or cell where the function is known. However, the 
sequences mentioned above can be seen as instances, sinsigns,-1 of the 
same type, legisign, i.e. they are sequences of the same pieces of non­
coding DNA found in the previous generation. The way in which 
DNA is copied (template replication) assures the preservation of the 
sequence information and, thus, a simple sinsign/legisign relationship 
(just as a cookie cutter as a general type imparts its shape on each 
individual cookie instance). This is important to the relationship of 
general interest that organisms are internally related to one another 
through bonds of kinship. For example, I am related to my parents, 
since I would not be me if I did not have precisely those parents.
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A person who was apparently identical to me but had other parents 
would not really be me.22
But does everything in the cell have the nature of a sign? This may 
seem a bit hard to swallow for traditional thinking but to the extent 
that we can, first of all, stick to the biosemiotics of living organisms 
and not discuss the possibilities of sign processes in physical nature — 
physicosemiosis23 — and, secondly, identify in organisms the triadic 
relationships and interpret them as instances of the abstract semiotic 
relationships and processes, which Peircean semiotics conceptualises, 
the answer must be “yes”.
One clever person has said that the chicken is simply the egg’s way 
of creating a new egg and there has been no shortage of sociobio- 
logical elucidations of this bit of wisdom. The egg as the active and 
acting, that which uses something else as a functional tool. Or the egg 
as the original, as in the elucidation of stolid evolutionary biology we 
saw earlier.24 But any child knows that chickens and eggs belong 
together, in the same temporally continuing process, whose detailed 
embryological sign functions molecular biologists are still working to 
map out.
Life itself arises from the physical, but it cannot be fully explained 
by the physical from which it has arisen. The ancient Phoenicians, 
Egyptians, Hindus, Japanese, and others believed the world was egg- 
shaped and that the world as we know it was hatched from an egg laid 
by the creator.25 In some myths, including one attributed to Orpheus, a 
bird is seen as the one that lays the mundane egg in the primordial sea. 
If we assume that Orpheus actually existed, then as a poet he certainly 
refrained from asking whether that bird itself had hatched from some 
egg. Modem science, too, refrains from asking certain questions. But 
perhaps we cannot completely let go of the Orphean egg. When it 
comes to fundamental problems in modem biology and natural 
science as well as in general semiotics, there are always some things 
that simply have to be assumed and that refer to one another.
22 This example is taken from Wagner 1999.
23 See, for example, Deely 1990, Salthe 1998, or Christiansen 1988.
24 Or, as an extension of this: the egg as a part of the code duality, which must be 
described in relation to a lineage of organisms within the same species. See Hoffmeyer 
1996.
25 “Egg, the mundane egg” in E. C. Brewer (rev. by I. H. Evans): The Wordsworth 
Dictionary o f  Phrase and Fable [1959], 1970, 1994, published by Cassell & Co.
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Organisms are always pivotal. The Orphean egg is laid by a bird it 
makes a splash, and slowly the dust begins to lift a bit.'
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Курица и яйцо Орфея:
о функции значения и о значении функции
При исследовании связей меж ду биосем иотикой  и биологией централь­
ным является вопрос: связаны  ли внутренне биологическая концепция 
ф ункции и биосем иотическая концепция действий знака? В статье 
биологическая функция (как процесс или его часть, которая имеет
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определенную  цель по отнош ению  к деятельности  и сам оп рои зводству  
организм а как целого) анализируется в связи с поним анием  сем иоти  
ческого (проявляю щ егося в знаковы х действиях) характера ж изн ен ны х 
процессов. П редполагаю т ли сигнификация и ком м уникация в биологии  
(например внутриклеточная коммуникация) всегда какой-либо организм  
вместе с его отдельны м и сем иотическим и или квазисем и оти ческим и  
ф ункциями? И наоборот, разве нельзя даж е пом ы слить ф ункц ион аль­
ные отнош ения без ж ивого действия знаков? Н астоящ ая работа, являясь 
лиш ь введением  к более ш ирокой тем е, ставит своей целью  разъяснение 
взаим оотнош ения меж ду биоф ункциям и и биосем иозисом .
Kana ja Orpheuse muna: 
tähenduse funktsioonist ja funktsiooni tähendusest
Uurides biosemiootika ja bioloogia vahelisi suhteid on keskse aspektina 
küsitud: kas bioloogiline funktsiooni kontseptsioon on seesmiselt seotud bio- 
semiootilise arusaamaga märgi toimimisest, ja vastupidi. Artiklis analüüsi­
takse bioloogilist funktsiooni (kui protsessi või osa, mis omab teatavat ees­
märki organismi kui terviku toimimise ja taastootmise suhtes) seoses aru­
saamaga eluprotsesside semiootilisest (märkide toimimises avalduvast) 
loomusest. Kas tähendustamine ja kommunikatsioon bioloogias (näiteks raku­
sisene kommunikatsioon) eeldab alati organismi koos eraldiseisvate semioo­
tiliste või kvaasisemiootiliste funktsioonidega? Ja kas, vastupidi, on nii, et 
funktsionaalsed suhted pole üldse mõeldavad ilma märkide elava toimi­
miseta? Käesolev töö on vaid sissejuhatuseks laiemasse teemasse, mis taotleb 
selgitada biofunktsioonide ja biosemioosi vahelisi suhteid.
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Abstract. In the paper an attempt is made to treat the basic concepts o f 
biosemiotics and semiotics o f culture in a wide intellectual context. The three 
leading paradigms of the current intellectual discourse are distinguished, 
which could be conventionally designated as “classical” , “modern” and 
“postm odern”: Peirce’s semiosis stands for the classical, Umwelt for the 
m odem and semiosphere for the postmodern semiotic space.
I must start with an apology: although several biological and philo­
sophical terms and constructions will be discussed, my paper is related 
to neither of those fields. One of the reasons is that I am a complete 
ignoramus in biology and allergic to philosophy. Thus, I will focus on 
the perspective of cultural semiotics, analysing the mentioned pheno­
mena from the aspect which is close to Michel Foucault’s archaeology 
of knowledge (Foucault 1970, 1972).
Before treating Jakob von Uexküll’s Umwelt, we should briefly 
consider the intellectual context, where this concept appeared (so-to- 
say the Umwelt of Umwelt). In Darwinist world-view the key concept 
was environment: organism, life, evolution are its derivatives. It can 
be understood as if there was an environment, where an organism 
happens to be (the most exciting word in this sentence is to happen — 
one should not think that life exists outside the environment, because 
environment itself produces life). So, in the beginning was the 
environment. The Darwinist conception was an organic product of the
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mentality of the given era: analogically, Newton’s physics treats the 
relationship between object and space, Marxist philosophy the 
relationship between social system and social environment. Moreover, 
such paradigm seems to be fully natural so far and in correspondence 
with the common sense. Anyway, until now it has been the basis for 
most critical remarks towards the Yuri Lotman’s conception of semio­
sphere. Even the classical cybernetics proceeds also from the same 
idea. The key question for Norbert Wiener was the adaptation of the 
system with its environment (but at the same time, through the 
mechanism of feedback the system could actively influence environ­
ment as well).
In such perspective Jakob von Uexkiiirs Umwelt seems to be 
completely strange and extravagant: for him primary is organism 
which produces its Umwelt; everything has its own Umwelt according 
to its specific measures (Uexkiill 1928). One could pass Uexktill’s 
conception as the eccentricity of a provincial semidiletant, but we can 
find here certain interesting parallels with other fields. Here it would 
be sufficient to mention Einstein’s cosmology and Heidegger’s philo­
sophy. For Einstein, time and space are not basic and independent 
entities, to what matter has come somehow. Time-space is the function 
of the matter, and that applies to Heidegger as well: not the existence 
is “located” in time and space, but it creates them itself (I mean here 
above all Sein und Zeit and his works in the field of art philosophy, as, 
e.g., Die Frage nach dem Ding; Heidegger 1993, 1976).
I would like to point out that we are not dealing here with just 
terminological differences — we cannot just replace environment with 
Umwelt; the difference between these notions is not even conceptual, 
but paradigmatic: a completely different idea of life, organism, evolu­
tion, biology itself evolves —  biology becomes a discipline of 
semiotic cycle, since it can be shown that in the conception of Umwelt 
inevitably appears the problem of meaning.
Yuri Lotman’s cultural semiotic works initially proceeded from the 
paradigm which is very similar to that of Uexkiill’s. In the function of 
organism he had text, the analogy of Umwelt was context. Unlike 
earlier linguistic and semiotic ideas (e.g. Saussure’s and Jakobson’s) 
the context for Lotman does not precede text, being its preliminary 
condition, but, vice versa, text produces its context in the widest 
sense, including all the participants in the communicative act (Lotman
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1982, 1990; M. Lotman 2000). But it seems that such extreme parado­
xically (cf. the circumstance that an author does not create text — text 
creates an author) did not disturb Lotman: he does not conceal it, but 
tries to make it even stronger.' In his late works he formulates the 
conception of semiosphere, the basis of which is so-to-say the crisis of 
identity: for its own existence every semiotic entity (sign, text, mind, 
or culture as a whole) needs the other. It applies to the synchrony as 
well as diachrony: sign, text, culture can exist only among other signs, 
texts, cultures and they must be preceded by other signs, texts, 
cultures.
In his earlier works Lotman formulates the three most important 
functions of text, reason, and culture. These are: (1) communicative, 
i.e. the transmission of already completed messages (it is important 
here for an author to know how to formulate his message adequately 
and for a reader to know how to understand it adequately); (2) 
memorial; (3) creative: the production of new messages. In his late 
works it reveals that it is impossible to carry out any of these functions 
without the other. Although Lotman refers here, on the one hand, only 
to Ilya Prigogine and, on the other hand, to Kant and Leibniz (Lotman 
1997; Prigogine, Stengers 1984), another intellectual context is 
obviously here even more important — so-called dialogical school. Of 
course, Mikhail Bakhtin’s ideas were always essential for Lotman, but 
here it would be perhaps more useful to refer to Martin Buber, as well 
as to Emmanuel Levinas, especially, since he was not familiar with 
their works (particularly with the latter one’s). In my opinion, Buber 
and Bakhtin were more profound thinkers, but I would like to deal 
here with Levinas, since he is philosophically more accurate. Levinas 
shows that there is a mistake in Heidegger’s system: an isolated 
existence is not possible in ontological, as well as in existential level: 
for its own existence an existent needs the other. Meeting the other
1 Somewhat similar conclusions were also made by French structuralists Roland 
Barthes and Michel Foucault, who declared the death of the author. The difference 
from Lotman’s conception was not only conceptual, but, above all, psychological. For 
French scholars the history of culture is primarily a constant decrease, creation is 
consumption (cf. above all Georges Bataille’s “Literature and evil”; no wonder that a 
creation kills its creator; Bataille 1990). For Lotman, it is rather a myth of Galatea: 
Pygmalion does not have to die.
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becomes crucial event for existence, or more correctly, it evolves just 
then (Levinas 1976).
But here, inevitably, a question arises: who is the other? If we 
approach him with certain presentiments, suppositions a priori, etc, 
then it would be not a real meeting, but projecting qualities, 
experiences, etc of one’s own. A real meeting would be possible only 
if we were dealing with an internal readiness to meet absolutely the 
other (i.e. also with somebody for whom it would not be meeting or 
event at all).
I would like to make a remark here. On the occasion of Levinas we 
are not dealing with only intellectual, but as well with psychological 
boldness, since his conception was formed during the war, when he 
was a German prisoner, and published in 1947, when he knew that all 
his relatives in Lithuania were terminated namely by those who were 
not willing to meet the other. But even this experience and perhaps in 
the first place this experience decided his firmness. What Levinas 
intends to say here is that we live in the world without guarantees and 
meeting the other is always not only risk, but deadly risk, but it is the 
risk, which is existentially important for us (it is not accidental that 
meeting with the other is on Levinas’ occasion preceded by death). 
Even if we do not agree with Levinas in so-to-say conceptual level, we 
must appreciate his intellectual courage.
Nevertheless, Levinas’ phenomenological language which seems 
to be mighty and adequate enough to define the existential necessity of 
the existence of the other can not in principle transmit the content of 
meeting. In order to that we must return to Buber, who summarized it 
with a simple phrase: “you and me”. As Emile Benveniste showed, 
such words as “me”, “you”, “here” and “now” differ from usual words 
which signify objects not because they are different words, but 
because they belong to a principally different sign system. Benveniste 
tried to mark this differentiation by using such terms as semiotics and 
semiology, as well as speech and language. Namely, deictic words are 
the ideal form of semiotics of speech, differently from semiotics of 
language which is oriented towards objects and situations (Benveniste 
1966). It is a very important differentiation, although in my opinion 
not quite adequate: deictic signs belong to the field of speech as well 
as symbolic ones. But here is another aspect which was overlooked by 
Benveniste: we are not dealing here just with speech (i.e., e.g., with
Umwelt and semiosphere 37
monological speech), but necessarily with dialogue. Beyond the 
situation of dialogue deictic words are just meaningless.
For Buber and Bakhtin “me” and “you” appear to be the products 
of dialogue and dialogue turns out to be an existential notion: without 
“you”, who is in dialogue with “me”, there is no “me” either. (Buber 
1970, Бахтин 1975, 1998). Therefore, “me” and “you” are not 
constants, but variables; although for him also the participants of 
dialogue are indivisible entireties.
The participants in a dialogue are not impartial personages — 
“they”, but “you” and “me”, i.e. the only adequate sight to a dialogue 
is from inside. As for such words as “you” and “me”, then their 
peculiarity is that they do not mean anything a priori, they have no 
significatum at all. “You” are the one, whom “I” call “you” and “I” 
am the one for whom “you” are “you”. This situation can not be 
interpreted in terms of deterministic logic, since we are dealing here 
with an obvious paradox: “you” are the precondition of “my” 
existence, i.e. “you” must exist before “me”. At the same time “you” 
fully depend on “me”. Hence Buber makes a conclusion of existential 
essence of dialogue. Buber and Bakhtin relate space to dialogue. The 
space of dialogue does not exist a priori, it is being created in the 
course of dialogue.
One of the most important special features of Tartu semiotic school 
is that simple semiotic systems are not treated as prime elements, from 
which more complicated systems are formed, but vice versa: elemen­
tary semiotic systems are abstractions, simplicity means here simpli­
fication. From the viewpoint of semiosis, semiosphere as a whole is 
the initial unit which is divided into simple subordinate systems. In 
this respect Tartu semiotics differs in principle from Peirce’s 
semiotics, the centre of which is (single) sign and its qualities; sign in 
Tartu semiotics is not something which has been given immediately, 
but the product of analysis.
While originally the conception of secondary modelling systems 
(as the name itself reflects) at least potentially enabled to treat natural 
language as an initial system, then Yuri Lotman in his works of the 
1980s treated the verbal, so-called usual communication as a 
polyfactorial multilingual activity. In this sense each verbal text as 
well contains several messages which have been created in different 
languages. Minimal pair of languages would be what Lotman called
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(not quite accurately) symbolic and iconic; the first of them is 
described by the grammar of natural language, the other by rhetorics. 
Rhetorics for Lotman is, first of all, a tool for translating (visual) 
images into verbal text. In the case of a narrative text also the narrative 
structure as a specific language must be added here. But it would be 
incorrect to assume that the logical structure of language, images and 
narrative are primary entities which exist before language and beyond 
text. Imagological structure depends not only on the imaginable 
objects, but as well on the language to which they have been coded. 
The same applies as well to narrative (Lotman 1992).
Every act of communication includes an element of dialogue, 
translation and creativity, whereby dialogue begins already in the 
addresser, the speaking subject is not elementary from the commu­
nicative aspect. Even the translation inside the human brain comes 
close to artistic translation.
Thus, semiosphere is not just new concept, but as Umwelt 
demands new paradigm, new logic, which is based not on deter­
minism, but on dialogue.
We can summarize the whole thing with the following schema 
(which is, of course, schematic):
cosm ology: N ew ton E instein Prigogine
life: environm ent umvvelt sem iosphere
philosophy: H egel/M arx H eidegger B uber/B akhtin
discourse: “classic” narrative “m odern’’ narrative dialogue
Classic narrative is based on causal and temporal relationship; modem 
abandons causality as well as temporality, and as a result, e.g., a 
spacial form (described by Joseph Frank 1963) evolves (e.g., James 
Joyce and Marcel Proust).
We might add to this (schema) dissenting ideas of truth: it is a 
priori in Newton's world, relative in Einstein’s world, and, e.g., in the 
paradigm of analytical philosophy it is better not to speak about truth 
at all, but to avoid falsehood and nonsenses: one could reach truth 
through the combination of unfalse sayings. And finally, in dialogical 
logics truth is not only a posteriori, but cooperative as well: it arises in 
dialogue and can be preserved only in the environment of dialogue, 
i.e. every petrified formulation is deadly for truth.
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Umwelt и семиосфера
В статье делается попытка анализа базовых понятий биосемиотики и се­
миотики культуры в контексте интеллектуальных стратегий. Выделяются 
три ведущих интеллектуальных дискурса современности, условно обозна­
чаемые как “классический”, “модерны й” и “постмодерный” : пирсовский 
семиозис маркирует классическую  трактовку семиотического пространст­
ва, Umwelt Я. Ю кскюлля —  модерную, семиосфера —  постмодерную.
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Omailm ja semiosfäär
A rtiklis tehakse katse käsitleda b io- ja  kultuurisem iootika baasm õ iste id  laias 
in tellektuaalses kontekstis. E ristatakse kolm  juh tiva t parad igm at nüüdisaegses 
in tellektuaalses d iskursuses, tinglikult võiks neid  täh istada  kui “k lassikaline” , 
“m odernne” j a  “postm odernne” : Peirce’i sem ioos täh istab  k lassikalist 
sem iootilist ruum i, U m w elt —  m odernset, sem iosfäär —  postm odernset.
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Abstract. The concept of semiosphere coined by Lotman in analogy of 
Vernadsky’s biosphere can be considered as a starting point for the new model 
in the semiotics of culture that enables us to conceptualise the human culture 
in its great diversity, as well as a certain single system as a part of this 
diversity. Present article will clarify some points o f dissonance between 
Lotman and Vernadsky, as well as consider the dual influence of Vernadsky 
and Prigogine on the workings of the semiosphere in relation to the cultural 
dynamics. As a conclusion, the article entertains the idea that if we take the 
comparison with Vernadsky a bit further, the concept o f semiosphere could be 
reinvented rather as a main transformative force of the (human) environment.
Introduction
The title of the article is motivated by the fact that the concept of 
semiosphere introduced by Yuri M. Lotman, and the dynamics of its 
development reflect the influence of the two theories of chemistry: the 
biogeochemistry of VI. I. Vernadsky and the theory of dissipative 
structures proposed by Russian-Belgian scientist Ilya Prigogine and 
Isabelle Stengers. We will consider the dual influence of Vernadsky 
and Prigogine on the workings of semiosphere in relation to cultural 
dynamics. As a conclusion, we propose the idea that if we take a 
comparison with Vernadsky’s theory of biosphere and its transition 
into noosphere a bit further, the concept of semiosphere could be 
reinvented as the main transformative device of the human 
environment. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the concept of
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semiosphere coined by Lotman in analogy of Vernadsky s biosp 
can be considered a starting point for the new model in the semi 
of culture that enables us to conceptualise the human culture 
great diversity, as well as a certain single system as a part о 
diversity.1
Metaphor of biosphere in the concept of semiosphere
Lotman suggests that biosphere is “the totality and the organic whole 
of living matter” (Lotman 2000: 125) and by analogy he formulates 
the definition of a semiosphere as a “semiotic continuum” (Lotman 
1984: 6), a heterogeneous space, enclosed in itself, that is in constant 
interaction with other similar structures. The points of contact between 
different systems (which in their own turn are part of a heterogeneous 
space of a higher order) enable the emergence of new meaning (i.e. 
the deviation from the algorithm of the given system).
Thus, analogy with Vernadsky enabled Lotman to formulate the 
position that counts for the general mechanism of cultural semiosis: 
“the unit of semiosis, the smallest functioning mechanism is not a 
separate language, but the whole semiotic space of culture in 
question” (Lotman 2000: 125). It also implies that any semiotic 
system presupposes the existence of at least two different participants 
that are at once similar and different. In conclusion, the definition of 
semiosphere entails the notion of asymmetry (dissymmetry) and 
heterogeneity in the semiosphere, the notion of boundary, and an 
assumption that any text is preceded by another text (for Vernadsky 
multiplication is not a single act of reproduction but a sequence of 
what he calls the Redi principle: omne vivo e vivum)2 as well as the
It can be argued, however, that the ideas inherent to the concept of semiosphere 
are recognisable in Lotman’s thought already in 1960s. The evolution and paradoxes of 
these ideas are analysed in Lotman (2001).
In his letter to Uspensky, written in 1982, Lotman testifies: “Once in our seminar 
in Moscow I was brave enough to declare my belief that a text can exist (i.e. it can 
socially be recognized as a text) if it is preceded by another text, and that any 
developed culture should be preceded by any other developed culture. And now I find 
Vernadsky s deeply argued idea with great experience of investigation in cosmic 
geology that life can arise only from the living, i.e. that it is preceded by life” (Lotm-m 
1997: 630; English quotation in Kull (1999: 120-121).
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priority of the semiotic space in relation to the single acts of commu­
nication.
Directly related to the workings of biosphere is also the concept of 
semiosphere proposed by Jesper Hoffmeyer (1997). Yet we must draw 
a clear distinction between the two notions. The semiosphere proposed 
by Hoffmeyer is biosphere: semiosis coincides with the processes of 
life,3 whereas for Lotman, a semiosphere is an abstract space of 
semiosis, of texts and languages. A further distinction between the two 
theories is related to the structure of the semiosphere: as we already 
saw, Lotman’s semiosphere can be considered only on the background 
of other similar structures, and that we can grasp a semiosphere as a 
semiotic system itself consisting of several semiospheric structures. 
Hoffmeyer, however, clearly states that:
We already have the excellent term ‘Umwelt’ to designate the subjective 
aspect of the [semiotic] niche, and I would therefore recommend that we 
reserve the term semiosphere as a designation for the totality of semiotic 
processes going on at our planet. In this way, the term will remain related to 
well-known terms such as hydrosphere, atmosphere, or biosphere. And there 
will be only one semiosphere on Earth. (Hoffmeyer 1998: 470)4
Despite the fact that Lotman refers to Vernadsky, his use of the term 
biosphere has several remarkable differences as compared to 
Vernadsky’s concept. We can only guess that the reason lies in the 
fact that Lotman used Vernadsky’s concept rather as a working 
metaphor that enabled him to formulate his own ideas about the global 
semiotic sphere. Yet, the clarification of these differences may shed 
some new light on the concept of semiosphere as well.
The modem usage of the term ‘biosphere’ begins with Eduard 
Suess, a professor of palaeontology and geology at the University of 
Vienna. However, his view is somewhat ambivalent and can be 
interpreted in two ways: either the biosphere is the sum total of living 
organisms; or it is a geosphere, created and organised by the processes
3 Hoffmeyer even goes so far as to say: “[F]rom a biosemiotic point of view, the 
biosphere appears as a reductionist category which will have to be understood in the 
light of the yet more comprehensive category of the semiosphere.” (Hoffmeyer 1997: 
934)
4 The further elaboration of the two semiospheric concepts on the background of 
the concept of Umwelt see Kull (1998). See also Yates (1998) for the discussion about 
semiosphere and biosphere in Hoffmeyers concept.
of life. Teilhard de Chardin uses the term ‘biosphere’ in the first sense 
(Levit 2001: 53-54). Lotman’s remarks indicate that he also ten s to 
rely on this interpretation. However, for Vernadsky, a biosphere is a 
“self-regulating system that embraces both the totality of living 
organisms (living matter) and their environment [my italics K.K.] 
to the extent it is involved in the actual processes of life, that is, 
including the troposphere, the ocean, and the upper envelopes of the 
earth crust” (Levit 2001: 57).
Vernadsky first used the term in 1911, after he had met Suess in 
Vienna, to denote the object of biogeochemistry that deals with atoms 
and their chemical properties in life processes, focusing on the 
“cyclical processes of atom exchange between living matter and inert 
matter in the biosphere” (Vemadski 1977: 111). The processes of 
atom migration are also a fundamental source of change in the 
biosphere. According to the principles of biogeochemistry formulated 
by Vernadsky, the evolution in the biosphere is an irreversible process 
that proceeds “in the direction of increasing the level of self-regulation 
and stability” (Levit 2001: 61). One of the basic methods to achieve 
this is “to increase the intensity and the complexity of biogenic 
migration of atoms” (Levit 2001: 65), i.e. the basic determinant in the 
evolution of the biosphere is the growth of the atom exchange caused 
by the life processes.
According to Vernadsky, by the beginning of the 20th century, 
biosphere had reached in its evolution a transitional period from 
biosphere to noosphere. In this stage, the central stabilising force 
would not be living matter but human thought, more precisely, 
scientific thought. In this respect, the latter is a function of the 
biosphere and thus a geological phenomenon. Therefore, in noosphere, 
the functions of the biogenic energy created by living matter would be 
taken over by “the energy of human culture” (Vemadski 1977: 95) — 
a term coined by Vernadsky to denote the transformative force created 
by the activity of human mind.
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Organisation of living matter and the structure 
of the semiotic space-time
In the introduction we stated that based on Vernadsky, we can 
establish semiosphere as the main transformative force of the human 
environment, instead of yet another synonym for “ ‘culture’ in one of 
the three hundred senses of the latter” as Sebeok concludes, asking 
“whether anything of substance has been gained by Lotman’s 
substitution of his glittering, kindling locution for the overburdened 
traditional nomenclature” (Sebeok 2000: 532).
Indeed, Lotman’s concept aims to grasp the totality of human 
culture as, in his view, Vernadsky’s notion embraces the totality of 
living matter. Thus, as we already noted, Lotman ignores the aspect of 
inert matter in the organisation of Vernadsky’s biosphere. As a 
consequence, it renders the semiospheric model of culture pan­
semiotic or, rather, pan-textual5, cutting it off from the “inert” yet real 
space human beings inhabit (in opposition to the “abstract space” of 
semiosphere [Lotman 1984: 6]). We have to consider semiosphere 
only in the context of other semiotic formations: “in reality no semio­
sphere is immersed in an amorphous, ‘wild’ space, it is in contact with 
other semiospheres which have their own organization (though from 
the point of view of former they may seem unorganised)” (Lotman 
2000: 125).
Yet the vital points of consonance Lotman finds in Vernadsky in a 
way presuppose the coexistence as well as a sharp distinction between 
living matter and inert matter. Ignoring the distinction made by 
Vernadsky in his concept of semiosphere, Lotman also fails to take 
into account the fact so fascinating for Vernadsky: that living matter 
in biosphere is embedded in its environment, yet it is clearly distinct 
from it from either structural or energetic point of view so far as to say 
that it constitutes an independent space-time that functions according 
to the laws of its own and that yet reconstitutes the whole of the 
biosphere, i.e. including the inert environment. Here an explanation of
5 Pan-semiotic is the term used in the context of pragmaticist semiotics to describe 
the aspirations to subsume a semiotics of culture, or just plain semiotics, under a 
semiotics of nature, or biosemiotics [ ...]” to give way “to a unified doctrine of signs 
embedded in a vast comprehensive life sciences” (Sebeok 2000: 533). Sometimes, the 
term semiobiosphere or biosemiosphere is used in this context (respectively, Ponzio, 
Petrilli 2001; Merrell 2001).
Vernadsky’s notion of the state of space is needed before we can 
proceed.
Vernadsky borrowed the term from Curie, stating that the space is 
structured not only according to the laws of geometry, but it also has 
different physical states that are characterised by the symmetry in the 
system. The state of space in the inert matter is completely describable 
in terms of the Euclidean geometry. Molecular dissymmetry of living 
organisms, however, defies the description in terms of the geometry; 
as a result, the space of living organisms is different from the space of 
inert matter. The dissymmetry of the space in living matter conditions 
also the asymmetry in time and thus the processes related to living 
matter are irreversible (Vemadski 1977: 133; see the further analysis 
of Vernadsky’s space-time theory in Levit 2001: 17-32). Directly 
related to the asymmetry of the space-time of the living matter is the 
so-called Pasteur-Curie principle: “Dissymmetrical effects can be 
brought about only by a dissymmetrical cause” (Vernadski 1977: 129, 
133; quoted in English in Levit 2001: 20), i.e. for the dissymmetry to 
occur, it presupposes a space whose organisation is also dissym­
metrical.
Thus, the important features of living matter in the biosphere are: 
1) it is clearly distinct from inert matter in the biosphere; 2) it is 
characterised by dissymmetry in its state of space; 3) it is subject to 
the Redi principle that life must precede life as well as to 4) the 
Pasteur-Curie principle that dissymmetry presupposes dissymmetry; 
5) the processes in biosphere, related to the living organisms, are 
irreversible (because of the dissymmetric properties of the space-time 
of living matter).
As we saw above, the evolution of biosphere is directed towards 
“increasing the level of self-regulation and stability”, whereas the 
central stabilising force is the transformative energy produced by the 
living matter. Life has spread through the biosphere during a process 
of gradual adaptation whose limits are unknown but are increasing 
with time (Vernadsky 1998: 103, 118). Now we confront a new factor 
in the evolution in biosphere:
Man, in particular, being endowed with understanding and ability to direct his
will, can reach places that are inaccessible to any other living organisms.
Given the indissoluble unity of all living beings, an insight flashes upon us.
When we view life as a planetary phenomenon, this capacity o f Homo sapiens
cannot be regarded as accidental. (Vernadsky 1998: 118-119)
46 Kaie Kotov
Semiosphere: a chemistry> o f being 47
Semiosphere and the transition into noosphere
Although Vernadsky did not use the term noosphere until 1936, the 
previous paragraph from The Biosphere, originally written in 1925, 
certainly gives an idea of the concept. The rise of civilization is a 
geological necessity, its continuous development is related to the 
dissymmetry of time in living matter whose function is scientific 
thought; according to Vernadsky;
A civilization of ‘cultural humanity’ (being a form of a new geological force 
created in the biosphere) cannot disappear or cease to exist, for it is a great 
natural phenomenon corresponding historically, or more correctly, geolo­
gically, to the established organization of the biosphere. Forming the 
noosphere, the civilization becomes connected through all its terrestrial roots 
to its terrestrial envelope (biosphere), which has never happened in the 
previous history of mankind to a comparable degree. (Vernadsky 1977: 33; 
English quotation in Levit 2001: 77)
Noosphere, therefore, is not a layer in thie biosphere but it is the 
biosphere, where the central role belongs to the “energy of human 
culture” (Vernadsky 1977: 95), to the “scientific thought”.6 Given 
Lotman’s notion of biosphere, it is not surprising that he clearly denies 
the similarity between semiosphere and noosphere. He states that “we 
must be cautious not to confuse the concept of semiosphere with the 
term noosphere, which is a stage in the evolution of the biosphere [...] 
The existence of noosphere is material and spatial, it encompasses a
6 Teilhard’s concept of noosphere is probably more familiar in the west. Above we 
referred to Teilhard’s concept of biosphere as an aggregate of terrestrial living 
organisms. In the same vein, Teilhard’s noosphere is a “thinking layer” (Teilhard 1967: 
2 0 2 ), one more envelope around and over the biosphere, its appearance marking not 
the next stage in the evolution of the biosphere but the rise of the split between the 
intelligence and its material matrix leading to the death of the Earth. “However 
convergent it be, evolution cannot attain to fulfillment on earth except through a point 
of dissociation.” (Teilhard 1967: 300). Therefore, noosphere is only a transitional stage 
in the further development of supreme consciousness, “the end of all life on our globe, 
the death of the planet, the ultimate phase of the phenomenon of man” (Teilhard 1967: 
300). For Vernadsky, scientific thought is a function of the biosphere, thus inseparable 
from it and it cannot in any way overcome biosphere. So it must emphasised that 
Lotman relies solely on Vernadsky; even if he acknowledges the abstract nature of the 
semiosphere, he does not mean that semiosphere could overcome biosphere or Earth in 
a singular point, where human culture, “mankind, taken as a whole, will be obliged 
[...] to reflect upon itself at a single point” (Teilhard 1967: 315).
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part of our planet, whereas the space of semiosphere is of an abstrac 
kind” (Lotman 1984: 6).
However, as we elaborate the comparison between Lotman an 
Vernadsky further, we could re-establish the semiosphere as a 
function of human thinking, the main transformative force of the 
human environment that could be in complete accordance with the 
living matter, stated by Vernadsky as a definitive source of trans­
formative energy in biosphere with its specific space-time characte­
ristics. According to Lotman, semiosphere is characterised by a 
specific structure of space and time whose organization is established 
through the workings of the semiosphere itself and it is through this 
transformative activity that Lotman partially comes to terms with the 
“outside” reality: “The outside world in which human being is 
immersed in order to become culturally significant, is subject to 
semiotisation, i.e. it is divided into domains of objects which signify, 
symbolise, indicate something (have meaning), and objects which 
simply are themselves” (Lotman 2000: 133).
This is obviously largely due to the idea of the specific space-time 
of living matter expressed by Vernadsky.7 Thus, for Lotman 
“conscious human life, i.e. the life of culture, also demands a special 
space-time structure, for culture organizes itself in the form of a 
special space-time and cannot exist without it. This organization is 
realized in the form of the semiosphere and at the same time comes 
into being with the help of the semiosphere” (Lotman 2000: 133). 
Thus, the relation between semiosphere and non-semiotic reality is 
partially established through the semiotic activity of human culture 
upon the surrounding, non-semiotic environment. Yet it is through this 
activity that the environment is semiotised and therefore transformed. 
Therefore we could state that the abstract sphere of texts and 
languages, semiosphere is the main transformative device o f the 
(human) environment8 In this respect Lotman comes very close to the
As noted by Alexandrov, “Lotman’s use of Vernadskii can be seen as a valid 
attempt to locate human culture within a narrative continuum that includes the natural 
world” (Alexandrov 2000, 342).
As stated by Ivanov (1998: 792): “The task of semiotics is to describe the 
semiosphere, without which the noosphere is unthinkable. Semiotics is the discipline 
that has to help us to orientate in the history.” He also elaborates the idea that artistic 
texts form a part of the defence mechanism of the noosphere (Ivanov 1991). Therefore 
it is not only the internal methodological demand of the distinct disciplines engaged
idea of “semiotics as a post-modern recovery of the cultural 
unconscious” expressed by Deely (2000).
Chance and necessity in the semiosphere —  
a thermodynamic metaphor
The concept of semiosphere offers first of all a spatial description of 
culture, even if it encompasses the dynamics of relationships between 
its substructures or its relation to other similar structures. When we 
seek the aspect of time in the specific space-time of the semiosphere, 
we face the process of history. It is here that Lotman turns to the 
thermodynamics of the systems far-from-equilibrium, more speci­
fically, to the theory of dissipative structures by Ilya Prigogine, but, 
first of all, to his book Order out o f Chaos co-authored with Isabelle 
Stengers. What seems to be of central importance for Lotman, from 
the point of view of cultural dynamics is that Prigogine and Stengers 
reveal the stochastic and the lawful, chance and necessity as two sides 
of the same coin.
The second law of thermodynamics states the arrow of time 
determined by the growth of entropy. Yet the law only applies to 
closed systems near equilibrium: in open systems that exchange 
matter and/or energy with their environment, entropy appears to be the 
source of order through the mechanism Prigogine and Stengers 
describe as “order through fluctuations”.
As we saw above, the dialogic mechanism responsible for the 
generation of new meaning in semiosphere presupposes at least two 
semiotically different participants. We can conclude that the system is 
able to engage in dialogic processes only if its structural identity is 
established. Now we come to the notion of semiotic individuality, 
inherent in the concept of semiosphere, that presupposes, according to 
Lotman, the notion of border and certain amount of homogeneity, i.e. 
semiosphere as a semiotic individuality consists only of one code, one 
language. Therefore, it is “closed” system in a sense that it is 
distinguished from and cannot have contact with non-semiotic or alien 
semiotic systems. However, we must remember that the homogeneity
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with individual texts and systems, but the social applications of semiotics that render 
semiotic as the science about semiosphere vital (Ivanov 1998).
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of semiosphere is conceivable only insofar as we stick to the se 
description of the given system.
Semiosphere comes to terms with the “outside” (semiotic or non- 
semiotic) reality only through the process of semiotic transformation, 
alien reality is semiotised and therefore the process of transformation 
presupposes the process of translation. According to Lotman, this 
transformation occurs only on borders of semiospheres, which are at 
least double-coded systems of translation filters. Therefore, border 
determines both the identity of the system as well as allows it to come 
into contact with its environment: to receive outside messages, new 
information. However, translation mechanisms of each culture also 
determine its stability or vulnerability in relation to outside influences: 
according to Prigogine and Stengers in open systems additional flow 
of energy and/or matter can disturb the initial thermodynamic 
equilibrium of the system. In the course of the process, system can 
reach a state far-from-equilibrium when the whole system is extremely 
sensible both to the fluctuations (disturbances) within the system as 
well as to the influences from the outside environment.
Depending on whether the size of the initial fluctuation region lies 
below or above some critical threshold the fluctuation either is 
repressed or spreads through the whole system. In either case the basic 
mechanism of the process can be understood in terms of com­
munication: “the faster the communication takes place within the 
system, the greater the percentage of unsuccessful fluctuations and the 
more stable the system”9 (Prigogine, Stengers 1984: 187). The 
mechanism of communication is also at work in the amplification of a 
single fluctuation through the positive feedback. As a result, the 
fluctuation can break the initial organisation and take the system to the 
bifurcation point where the future development of the system can take 
several directions, yet it is impossible to determine the path finally 
taken: the system can either dissolve or reach a new organisation of a 
higher order. As it appears, “the more complex the system is, the more 
numerous are the types of fluctuations that threaten its stability” 
(Prigogine and Stengers 1984: 188) — and the more complex must be 
the communication mechanisms within the system10.
. * This 4uote refers to something we could probably call a thermodynamic 
definition of socialisation.
The structures of such higher order are called dissipative structures by Prigogine 
and Stengers because it takes more energy to keep their structural stability. Here&we
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In the point of bifurcation, the stable system of cause-and-effect is 
broken, and it is here that we can see the stochastic and lawful, chance 
and necessity as the two sides of the same coin: in the history of the 
system periods of stable evolution alternate with periods of rapid 
growth and qualitative leaps. Lotman (1999b, 1999c) develops the argu­
ment on the background of the history of human culture, noting that 
the bifurcation points are those moments in history when the tension 
between contradictory poles reaches its highest point and the whole 
system is taken out of balance. In these moments, neither the beha­
viour of individuals nor the masses is predictable. We must conceive 
the curricula of history not as a trajectory, but as a continuum that may 
be resolved in a multiple ways: these are the moments of revolutions 
or rapid social upheavals. As Lotman remarks: “It is not coincidental 
that exactly in these moments words, speech, and propaganda become 
historically significant” (Lotman 1999b: 134). In retrospect, the choice 
made seems determined and chance becomes necessity.
Prigogine and Stengers (1984: 176) also point out that “near a 
bifurcation, fluctuations or random elements play an important role, 
while between bifurcations the deterministic aspects would become 
dominant”. Thus, under certain circumstances, “the role played by 
individual behaviour can be decisive” (Prigogine, Stengers 1984: 
176). The choice of the possibility actually realised depends on chance 
but even more on the consciousness of the subjects involved in the 
process. Therefore it is not accidental that at these exact moments 
everything said or silenced acquires a particular historical relevance.
We referred to the role of semiotic borders in cultural systems: 
during the historic upheavals or longer periods of destabilisation, it is 
often the outside influence that will lead processes to some kind of 
resolution. The process of autocommunication will eventually stabilise 
the cultural order with new codes and new hierarchies. However, in 
case when two systems are relatively similar translation filters may 
fail and the element of alien culture may enter given culture unnotice- 
able. Thus the process of creolisation will begin that may lead to 
further cultural homogenisation. Such processes are also noticeable in
can also see a certain parallel between Prigogine and Stengers and Vernadsky 
according to whom the evolution of the biosphere was directed towards the increase of 
the energy needed to maintain the stability of the system (in addition, we could draw 
certain parallels between Vernadsky’s notion of living matter and the notion of active 
matter proposed by Prigogine and Stengers).
Estonia during the 1990s up to the beginning of the 21st century in the 
confrontation of ‘nostalgic revolution’ of the monolithic nationa 
values with cultural diversity and the policy of multiculturalism.
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Conclusion: a chemistry of becoming
An analogy with Vernadsky enabled Lotman to formulate the position 
that counts for the general mechanism of cultural semiosis: the notion 
of asymmetry (dissymmetry) and heterogeneity in the semiosphere, 
the notion of boundary, and an assumption that any text is preceded by 
another text as well as the priority of the semiotic space in relation to 
the single acts of communication. The asymmetry of the substructures 
of the semiosphere provides a necessary condition for the dialogue 
that is a basic mechanism of any semiotic act; whereas the basic 
source of meaning generation, i.e. the source of possible fluctuations 
in the system breaking its algorithm, is the heterogeneity of the 
different elements in the system. The points of contacts between the 
elements (“semiotic monads” [Lotman 1999a]) made possible by the 
structure of semiotic border enable the emergence of new meaning. 
Therefore the heterogeneity of every cultural system is the source of 
instability as well as the condition for the (exponential) growth of 
information in the system. In his recent article (Prigogine 2000) 
Prigogine entertains the idea of a networked society that has emerged 
as a result of the recent developments in information technology, he 
also makes a remark: “I feel that there is some analogy between the 
present evolution towards the networkes society and the process of 
self-organization I have studied in physics and chemistry” (Prigogine 
2000: 893). Semiospheric model could be seen as a powerful device 
that could help cultural theory come to terms with the complexities of 
the information society with its further notions of “hyper”, “multi”, 
and “inter” (cf. Kotov 2001).11
In a way we could even conceive of hypertextuality as a more general charac­
teristic of the conceptual system of the human culture whose ambitions in knowledge 
building are closely related to the system of libraries (cf. O ’Donnell 1998). A remark 
made by fantasy writer Terry Pratchett goes in vein with the meaning-creational 
potential of the hyper-interaction of different texts within the semiosphere: “Books 
shouldn t be kept too close together, otherwise they interact in strange and 
unforeseeable ways.” 0
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It could be argued that the notion of semiosphere was inherent to 
Lotman’s thought already in the 1960s. Nevertheless, the reliance on 
either Vernadsky or Prigogine and Stengers implies a certain moral 
stance whose core might be described as the recognition of the 
transformative force of the sign processes: either in the constitution of 
specific space-time or at the moments of conscious decision-making. 
Its theoretical stance implies a never-ending semiosis, whose basic 
mechanism is a dialogue between structurally different systems, the 
mechanisms of mutual translation that are the source of new meaning, 
but also of instability in the system. In this context, semiosis is both 
the stabilising as well as the destabilising mechanism of the (human) 
universe.
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Семиосфера: химия существования
П онятие сем иосф еры  у Ю рия Л отм ана м ож но считать исходны м пунк­
том новой модели анализа в сем иотике культуры. К онцепция, сформу­
лированная по образцу биосф еры  В ладим ира В ернадского позволяет 
рассм атривать культуру, с одной стороны , во всем ее разнообразии , с 
другой же, каждую  отдельную  систем у как часть этого разнообразия На 
оф ормление концепции сем исф еры  кроме теории  би осф еры  В ер­
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надского сущ ественны м образом повлияла и теория диссипативны х 
структур И льи П ригож ина, и настоящ ая статья как раз пытается 
рассм отреть влияние обеих теорий на концепцию  Л отм ана. К ром е того 
описы вается, каким образом  с помощ ью  модели семиосф еры  можно 
описать культуру инфоэпохи, которая постоянно преобразовы вает себя 
и свою  среду.
Semiosfäär: olemise keemia
Juri Lotm ani sem iosfääri m õistet võib pidada uue kultuurisem iootilise ana- 
lüüsim udeli lähtekohaks: V ladim ir V em adski biosfääri m õiste eeskujul 
form uleeritud kontseptsioon võim aldab vaadelda ühelt poolt kultuuri kogu 
tem a m itm ekesisuses, teiselt poolt aga iga üksikut süsteem i osana sellest 
m itm ekesisusest. Sem iosfääri kontseptsiooni kujunem ist on lisaks V em adski 
biosfääri teooriale olulisel m ääral m õjutanud ka Ilya P rigogine’i dissipa- 
tiivsete struktuuride teooria. K äesoleva artikli üks eesm ärke on vaadelda 
nende teooriate koosm õju Lotm ani kontseptsioonile. Teiseks heidam e valgust 
sellele, mil m oel sem iosfääriline m udel võim aldab kirjeldada infoajastu 
kultuuri, m is pidevalt kujundab üm ber end ja  om a keskkonda.
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Abstract. The explosive growth over the last two decades of neuroscience, 
cognitive science, and “consciousness studies” as generally conceived, 
remains as yet unaccompanied by a corresponding development in the es­
tablishment of an explicitly semiotic understanding of how the relations of 
sign exchange at the neuronal level function in the larger network of psycho­
logically accessible sign exchange. This article attempts a preliminary foray 
into the establishment of just such a neurosemiotic. It takes, as its test case and 
as its point of departure, recent discoveries from the neurobiological research 
on viuso-motor transformations and on the widespread cortical phenomena of 
selectively tuned, single-neuron response to argue for a vision of “inter- 
subjectivity” whereby the ens rationis arising as a function of the neuronal 
semiosphere may be abstracted, constructed, and shared mutually across 
agents.
Introduction
Empathy, asserts Hoffmeyer (1996), holds the semiotic antidote to the 
alienation engendered by the conflation of our organic code duality 
into narrative agent duality. “Lacan’s reflection theory holds the key”, 
he posits, as “the mutual empathy between mother and child provided 
the protection necessary to cope with the unleashing of the awful 
isolation inherent in the idea of not” (Hoffmeyer 1996: 133). Such 
empathy, continues Hoffmeyer, must be felt and not just reasoned into
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existence —  “the child must, therefore, be capable of empat izmg 
with ‘the other’ even before it can talk” (ibid: 132).
Yet at what point in the organization of a semiotic system, it may 
reasonably be wondered, does the ability to “empathize take place? If 
intersubjectivity is, at it appears to be, a prerequisite for language use 
(and not vice-versa), how many orders of pre-linguistic, biosemiotic 
interpretation must a creature experience before the dynamic relata of 
“se lf’ and “other” become robust enough to be brought into relation 
with each other so as to result in something as seemingly subtle and 
abstract as intersubjective identification?
Theorists as diverse as Lacan (1977), Bourdieu (1977), Vygotsky 
(1978) and Tomasello (1999) all attribute the emergence of inter­
subjective experience in humans (which manifests most commonly at 
between nine to twelve months of age) as the logical endpoint of an 
accumulative process of socialized objectification —  i.e., the 
epiphanal and irreversible realization that one, too, is an “object” as 
well as a “subject” of experience. According to this view, social 
forces, primarily through language use, finalize irreversibly the 
invariant self-splitting and objectification of the (presumably) primal 
“unity” that nature has endowed —  the autonomous locus of 
experience or self.
But does not this picture of the emergence of objectivity (by which 
agents are then supposed to reason syllogistically to intersubjectivity) 
leave us bumping up again —  even way down here in the primal 
semiotic —  against a fundamental dualism between an incorrigibly 
dichotic “se lf ’ and “other?” Moreover, does not such symbolic and 
syllogistic reasoning (“x  is у  to me, therefore I must be у  to x”) pre­
suppose both linguaform conceptual reasoning as well the very 
intersubjectivity it is supposed to engender and explain?
For even allowing for the legitimacy of such socio-centric pro­
posals as W ittgenstein’s (1953) assertion that meaning is a function of 
use or Vygotsky’s (1978) notion of personhood arising out of dia­
logue, it would be impossible to imagine what fundamentally 
organizing principles would allow such dialogic meaning-building and 
system-building to occur in the first place, were it not for our 
particular situatedness “always already” in a pre-linguistic, super- 
oidinate meaning-building system of biosem iosis. It is this biological 
network ot sign relations and organization, I will argue, that, at 
sufficiently complex levels of organization and recursivity, provides
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for the mutual intelligibility of shared experience that is the necessary 
prerequisite for socialization, language use, and the ability to negotiate 
and to co-construct meaning to take place.
Thus, given that some common ground of lived, non-verbal 
experience must bind agents in a mutually intelligible system of 
relation and signification before anything like entry into a symbolic 
world (such as may be collaboratively constructed through language 
and through the communal exploitation of intersubjective identifica­
tion) can occur —  what invariant biological mechanisms and vehicles 
for sign exchange in human beings, we may ask, constitute the like­
wise lived em bodim ent of this experiential “common ground?”
A candidate mechanism that is currently being considered among 
researchers in the field of the neurobiology of cognition is a class of 
cells located deep within the brain called “mirror neurons”. These 
neurons —  which are located in an area of the brain long associated 
with both motor control and with language use —  instantiate 
congruent neural firing patterns both during one’s own performance of 
certain highly specific, goal-oriented activities, as well as when one is 
witnessing passively those same sets of activities being performed by 
someone else.
This article thus attempts a threefold purpose: (1) to argue for the 
necessity of applying to such traditionally formulated research 
findings an explicitly neurosemiotic perspective, (2) to provide a 
condensed overview of the majority of mirror neuron research extant 
in the manner that it is presented in the neuroscience literature itself, 
and (3) by way of illustrating the potential explanatory benefits of 
applying (1) to (2), to challenge the prevailing notion in the field that 
the phenomenon of intersubjectivity made possible by the mirror 
system is the result of rational, deliberative convergence (i.e. — 
agents matching others’ external display with their own internal 
representations and reasoning syllogistically to arrive at a similarity 
relation).
I will be argue, rather, that the neuroscience data on mirror neuron 
activity suggests instead that intersubjectivity p er  se may be the 
natural, pre-reflexive result of a biosemiotically emergent process — 
and that one’s own unitary lived experience of a neurally primitive 
motor representation that is mutual across agency provides the 
fundamental iconic grounding upon which both subsequent “se lf’ and 
“other” representations are hypostatically abstracted.
On the necessity of establishing
th e  d isc ip lin e  o f  n e u r o se m io t ic s
Commenting on Krampen’s proposal to establish the investigation into 
phyotsemiotics a decade earlier, John Deely, in 1991, termed 
“surprising...the fact that twenty years elapsed between Sebeok’s 
statement on the dimensions of semiotics [issued in 1968] and the 
concrete advancement of such a proposal” (Deely 1990: 98). Equally 
if not more surprising, perhaps, is the fact that a full decade and a half 
after the publication of Patricia Churchland’s (1986) groundbreaking 
Neurophilosophy, and despite the explosive growth over the last 
quarter century of neuroscience, cognitive science, and “consciousness 
studies” generally conceived, an explicitly semiotic approach to neural 
information processing is as yet nowhere to be seen.
Conspicuous most notably by its absence at a time when current 
neurobiological research findings are being profitably explored in 
terms of dynamic systems theory (Kelso 1995; Port, Gelder 1995; 
Clark 1999), developmental systems theory (Weber, Deacon 2000) 
and even neurophenomenology (Maturana, Varela 1988; Varela et al. 
1991; Gallagher 1996, 2001; Thompson 2001; Zahavi 2001), the 
establishment of a specifically Peircean neurosemiotic is as long 
overdue as it is inexplicable, particularly in light of certain otherwise 
irresolvable paradoxes, mysteries, category errors and confusions that 
have plagued discussions of the relations of brain states to mental 
entities since the time of Descartes’ infamous cogito.
Accordingly, the use of explicitly semiotic terminology has been 
and remains assiduously avoided in the practices and explanations of 
traditional Western science in general —  a stark methodological 
rebuttal to Hoffmeyer’s proposal that intelligence lies “not in the sign, 
but in the interpreting body [... and thus] the exploration of this inner 
semiosphere ought to be the aim of modem biology” (Hoffmeyer 
1996: 125). Such a systematic exploration remains still yet to be 
undertaken a full 300 years after Locke’s call for the formulation of an 
explicitly semiotic science o f  representation  —  “the signs the mind 
makes use o f ’ (Locke 1959: 461).
Nowhere is this disinclination more evident and, perhaps, more 
curious, than in mainstream Western neuroscience, wherein the very 
terms central to its whole agenda —  terms such as “signal”, 
response”, “message”, “communication”, and “command” —  are
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understood by its practitioners as mere metaphoric shorthand denoting 
mechanistic, asemiotic configurations and processes.
Yet as the research we will be reviewing in this article amply 
illustrates, the explanatory power of traditional reductionist and 
mechanistic hypotheses “breaks down” in cognitive neuroscientific 
endeavors earlier and more critically than in, say, classical Newtonian 
physics —  where for everyday, non-technical purposes, the problems 
of “meaning” and of “knowing” are not central to the stated endeavor.
“Messages” are thus “sent”, “received” and “acted upon” in the 
mechanistic explanations of traditional neuroscience —  but the 
question of “who” (or “what”) experiences, systematizes, understands 
and acts upon the aggregation of these “messages” and their “infor­
mation” at the level o f  the integrated organism  is either acknowledged 
as an perpetual mystery (“association cortices” are sometimes invoked 
as a kind of deus ex machina in hypotheses about human mentation, as 
if brute congregation alone was somehow sufficient for con­
templation —  a presumption whose veracity has been disproven 
repeatedly by five decades of experiments in computer science) —  or 
is summarily dismissed as a fallacy of epiphenomenalism (...and is 
thus “dismissed”, paradoxically, by the “epiphenomenon” it sets out to 
refute)! What is missing from these otherwise highly successful 
theories of biological sign transmission, then, is a correspondingly 
coherent theory of biological sign meaning.
Here, as elsewhere, perhaps the single greatest obstacle to the 
articulation of such a theory is the persistent and colloquial reduction 
of the biologically rich category of “sign” to its by no means repre­
sentative instantiation in human symbolic consciousness as something 
that is thought to be, in its essence: mentalistic, conceptual, psycho­
logical or linguistic. Signs p er  se, of course, are by necessity none of 
these things, nor could the very possibility of sign use itself ever be 
grounded in those relations. Yet because sign relations and sign 
activities make possible such powerful sym bolic relations within those 
aspects of human beings’ lived experience that are mentalistic, 
conceptual, psychological and linguistic (aspects that are by no means 
exhaustive of that lived experience), the everyday conflation of sign 
use with psychological processes precludes any rational explanation of 
how biological activity can be sign activity prior to its subsequent 
incorporation in a system of psychologically processed events.
This unfortunate conflation of “sign” with “symbol” exacerbates 
an already too dichotic understanding of the relationship of mind to
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brain, relegating all sub-psychological processes to biologic mecha­
nism and idealizing all psychological processes to the realm of 
immateriality. Across such an ontological divide, one cannot reason­
ably talk about erecting bridges —  one can only chalk out the lines of 
demarcation and become resigned to taking sides.
Such artificial balkanization of experience, however, poses acute 
problems for the explanations of traditional cognitive neuroscience. 
Accordingly, an interesting kind of “double-talk” often characterizes 
its literature. Thus we find that it is hardly heterodox within the 
discipline to speak of the living activity of neuronal cells as a series of 
‘signals’ (never “signs”), whose individual purpose is ‘communi­
cation’, whose aggregate function is ‘information processing’, whose 
distal ‘object’ is some external or internal stimuli, and whose (proper 
significate?) ‘effect’ is, in fact, a multiply mediated response to 
multiply mediated stimuli. C.S. Peirce, we may assume, would have 
found this neuronal arrangement evocative.
Unfortunately, the abiding fear of anthropomorphization that 
attaches to an inadequate understanding of semiotic theory has made 
the use of explicitly neurosemiotic terminology anathema to the 
theorists of traditional neuroscience. Such fear is, of course, both 
counterproductive and unwarranted, for the role of the neuro- 
semiotician —  like the role of the cognitive neuroscientist —  is not to 
“anthropomorphize” the individual activity of communally mindless 
neurons but to understand how the communal activity of individually 
mindless neurons actively anthropomorphizes, in a very “minded” 
fashion, us.
To begin examining this process at (or near) its beginning, then, let 
me first attempt to illustrate how even a cursory acquaintance with the 
evolution of the basic circuitry which comprises the human brain and 
nervous system reveals the inherently sem iotic  nature of the 
specialized neuronal cell, as that evolution (and those cells) are 
depicted schematically by one of the pioneers of modem neuroscience 
in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Stages in the semiotic evolution of the nervous system. (A) The motile cell 
of a primitive sponge responds to surface contact directly with a reciprocal wave of 
contraction. Feeling, being and doing are unmediated at the level of the organism. 
(B) The contractile function in the more evolved sea anemone has now been 
segregated into two specialized elements: (r) is a non-contractile sensory receptor 
cell that is acted upon directly by forces in the environment, but is itself wholly 
incapable of acting upon that environment and its forces in return. Mediation occurs 
as stimulation of the external environment’s stimulation of (r) triggers the muscle 
contractile element (m), allowing (m) to act directly upon an environment that it is 
incapable of directly receiving input from. (C) Further mediation occurs in the sea 
anemone as a motor neuron (g) is interposed between the non-contractile sensory 
cell and the non-(extemally) sensory muscle element. This motor neuron neither acts 
upon the external environment nor is acted upon it. Rather, its relation with that 
environment is wholly mediated by the polar elements of the network of which it is 
a part. (D) Mediation increases exponentially with the evolution of the vertebrate 
nervous system. The far majority of communicating cells (the inter-neurons) now 
connect directly neither to sensory nor to effector cells, but exclusively to other non- 
extemally interactional, intercommunicating cells. (Illustration adapted from Ramon 
yCajal 1911, via Llinas 2001.)
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Mediation, as indicated in Figure 1, is the order of the day or t e 
one hundred billion neurons that (along with the glial ce s t at 
support them) constitute the primary physical architecture of exactly 
one individual human brain. For each one of these 100,000,000,000 
living cells receives input from, sends output to, is modified by, and in 
turn modifies up to 1000 of its neighboring neurons directly and 
untold millions of its neighbors distally in an ongoing mediation 
process whose activity must be measured in milliseconds. Thus, it has 
been pointed out that the number of total possible interactive con­
nections between the neurons of a single human brain far exceeds the 
number of particles (1079) thought to comprise the known universe 
(Edelman, Tononi 2000). Of these interactional possibilities, the ratio 
between the statistically average 1 million motor neurons, 10 million 
sensory neurons, and 100 billion intemeurons is a mediation-heavy 
1:100,000:10.
Yet despite the fact that neuronal cells are specialized into a far 
greater variety of subspecies than are any other cell type in the animal 
body, the vast majority of all neurons are comprised of four distinct 
loci and at least two distinct varieties of incontrovertible sign- 
exchange. These are, in the most elementary terms of traditional 
neuroscience, the electrical input, integrative, and conductile signals 
by which each individual neuron receives, processes and acts upon 
digital activation information (at the loci of the dendrites, cell body, 
and axon, respectively) and the chemical output signal by which each 
neuron communicates the highly variable results of this information 
processing to its neighbor through the analog release of neurotrans­
mitters into the synaptic cleft (at the loci of the synaptic terminals).
An extraordinarily simplified —  though still, I think, helpful —
description of the gross mechanics of intemeuronal “communication”
runs like this: minute changes in the ion gradient diffusing down the
living neuron’s cell membrane result in a voltage change relative to
the outside environment which, upon reaching threshold, produces an
electric current which then stimulates the neuron’s own synaptic
terminals to release chemical neurotransmitters into the synaptic cleft.
This, in turn, modifies the ion gradient that will diffuse down the cell
membrane of the neurons whose receptors comprise the adjoining half
о t at synaptic cleft, which results in a voltage change, etc., etc. until
at some point in the process the circuit is completed or the threshold 
state is not reached.
What is apparent, I hope, even from this one hundred word bare- 
bones description, is the critical realization that the processes of 
neuronal communication —  far from conforming to the electrical 
conduit model proper to computer programming or to electrical 
engineering —  constitute, rather, a paradigm example of the semiotic 
interrelation known as “code-duality” (Hoffmeyer, Emmeche 1991, 
Hoffmeyer 1996).
That “code-duality” is, indeed, the organizing principle enabling 
neuronal communication becomes apparent when one considers that 
the environmental surround that each neuron is situated in (and with 
which it interacts with most directly at the site of the synaptic cleft) is 
a Heraclitian world of ever-changing chemical and molecular inter­
action and constitution, whose analog representation  (what neuro­
scientists call its “synaptic potential”) is constituted by whatever 
unique configurational state that environment is in at the moment of 
synaptic (which is presumed to be quantal) release. Conversely, the 
electric current generated within the neuron and which travels down 
the axon (referred to, semiotically enough, as an “action potential”) as 
a result of this analog release possesses all the attributes of a purely 
digital code: it is either wholly present or wholly absent, its amplitude 
is not variable, it does not decay over time or distance.
Most critically: analog synaptic potentials generate digital action  
potentials which generate analog synaptic potentials which generate 
digital action potentials. This ongoing process of semiosis wherein the 
interactive, consequential interplay between digital and analog cell 
activity constitutes new signs and new information at every nodal 
(synaptic) point is, I believe, the starting point upon which the 
establishment of a discipline of neurosemiotic must be built.
This is very much not the currently popular model of neuronal 
information processing wherein a presumably unitary “bit” of “infor­
mation” is literally in the signal of the action potential in the same 
way that the analog action of a human finger hitting a letter key on a 
computer keyboard is “in” the micro-pulse of digital electrical current 
that results ultimately in the appearance of that letter on a computer 
screen. Such a model, no matter how complex, will never be able to 
account for the phenomenon of how or where (or, Turing forbid, by 
“whom”) the digital representations of analog experience are 
ultimately read. For while our computer models already come with 
meaning-using, sentient beings built into the network of sign-
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exchange (the programmers and the end-users), our brains —-  un er 
the asemiotic interpretation of neuronal communication an est one 
posit the infinite regress of homunculi within homunculi within 
homunculi —  do not.
Thus it is still very much understandably the case that contem­
porary neuroscience, so incredibly adept at discovering and describing 
the physio-mechanical aspects of biological sign-exchange, yet lacks 
even one generally accepted, much less fully explanatory, theory of 
the very principles by which the emergence of mental representation 
from neuronal electro-chemical signal transduction is even possible, 
much less actually accomplished. Neuroscientist Eric Kandel, in the 
most recent edition his seminal Principles o f Neural Science, states 
both at its outset and at its conclusion that despite the exponentially 
increasing brain research literature extant, “the neural representation 
of consciousness and self awareness [... remains] biology’s deepest 
riddle” (Kandel et al. 2000: 16).
“After all,” continues Kandel, “to study the relationship between a 
mental process and specific brain regions, we must be able to identify 
the components of the mental process that we are attempting to 
explain” (ibidem). I maintain throughout this article that it is precisely 
because of contemporary neuroscience’s refusal to identify and to 
include the sign as one of the “components” to be investigated in the 
emergence of even the most primitive of mental representations, that 
the most semiotically sedimented and emergent representation of 
all —  that of the “consciousness” of a subjective, internally referential 
“s e lf ’ —  has been averred to be incorrigible by some philosophers 
(Horgan 1999, McGinn 1999), and has earned David Chalmers’
(1996) definitive appellation as “the hard problem” of consciousness 
and mind.
For if, as these philosophers have repeatedly asserted, mental 
representation itse lf  follows laws incommensurable with the laws of 
physical systems —  and if the material objects of the world likewise 
entertain no efficacy in the causation of mental events —  then the 
problem of how a representational consciousness as such can arise in a 
physical system (without recourse to a “ghost in the machine”) truly is 
incorrigible.
In Peircean semiotics, however, we find a way out of this impasse 
with the twin recognition that: (1) ‘representation’ —  as well as the 
capacity for signification  of which representation is but a p a r t__is not
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a process originating from, nor exclusively the domain of, the human 
mind and that (2) the nature of such ‘representation’ in a specifically 
human psychological context does not reduce to a linear, unitary 
process whereby one presently existing state or thing (such as the rich, 
subjective experience of “pain”) isomorphically “stands for” or 
corresponds to one other presently existing state or thing (here, the 
neuronal event “С-fiber stimulation”) and so on down the line in the 
manner of a graphical computer interface until at last one reaches the 
static, underlying, and finally causal “program code” —  but that 
‘representation’ is a fundamentally creative process of interactionally 
achieved, massively co-constructed mediation across networks of 
relation (CP 4.3)1 in a complex, open system which ultimately allows 
the human organism to transcend the brute indexicality of physically 
present, coextensive and discrete relata and to participate interactively 
across its own organizational levels —  levels which include the 
intrinsically dynamic elements of neuron, body, sign and world.
The totality of this systemic and incessant sign activity we reify as 
“mind”. An ongoing, dynamic process of sign-exchanging cells 
embedded in sign-exchanging brains embedded in sign-exchanging 
bodies embedded in sign-exchanging worlds, the eternal interplay of 
self-organization and symmetry-breaking that characterizes the 
moment-to-moment experience of this recursively interactive system 
constitutes, in a very real sense, the very essences of “knowing” and 
of “the mind”.
Properly seen, body, brain, mind and cell are but levels of the same 
one endlessly interacting complex system —  and if we can view or 
treat them as distinct, it is more a testament to our own particular 
species-specific Lebenswelt —  or the culture of what Terrence Deacon
(1997) calls sym bolic reference —  whereby we conceptually carve 
out of the sensory plenum of experience, elements of quality or 
iconicity (firstness), elements of relation or indexicality (secondness), 
and elements of synthesis or mediation  (thirdness) (CP 1.378)."
1 CP here refers to Peirce (1931-1935); the numbers correspond to book and 
paragraph, respectively.
2 Of the more prominent neuroscientists working in the field today, three in 
particular — Terrence Deacon (1997), Gerald Edelman (1994, 2000) and Antonio 
Damasio (1994, 1999) — all explicitly advance the notion that “representation” in the 
body and in the mind exists as a process as opposed to as an entity or as a collection of 
neuronal and/or mental particulars. Yet while all three of these scientists acknowledge 
“representation” as the recursive self-organization of interactions emerging out of,
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In the Peircean conceptualization of brain activity that wi e 
arguing for, experience dependant and dynamically^ re-entrant neu 
ronal activity  constitutes (to paraphrase Colapietro s analogy wit 
language) “the [indexical] process in which paths are blazed from t e 
object to the sign to the interpretant” , whereas consciousness or 
subjective awareness constitutes “the [symbolic] process in which 
these paths are traversed” (Colapietro 1989: 19). Under this 
conception, the very biological semiosis that manifests the multitude 
of local electro-chemical sign-exchange into the global functional 
organization of our biological ‘selves’ finds its explicitly symbolic 
realization (through its active embodiment in a community of other 
sign-users) in the conceptual semiosis that manifests itself as our 
mental ‘selves’. This opens up the way towards a dynamic view of the 
self that is a t once iconic, dialogic and triadic.
Such a triadic understanding of the interrelationship between sign, 
object and interpretant is long overdue in the disciplines devoted to 
the explication of “human consciousness,” both in the often overly 
idealistic and immateriality-oriented social sciences, as well in the 
correspondingly reductionist and mechanistic neurosciences of 
cognition —  although it is primarily to the latter that this article will 
address itself. For against the long-held neural conduit metaphor — 
wherein “information” flows through the circuitry of neurons in much 
the same way as electricity flows through a computer motherboard 
(i.e. —  in ways in which neither the signal nor the vehicle of its 
transmission are understood to be themselves interactive participants 
in the creativity of semiosis) —  the massive data collected over the 
last half century regarding experience-dependent dendrite growth, 
milieu-responsive axon branching, epigenetic neural self-organization 
and the ongoing plasticity of synaptic weighting (Kandel et al. 2000) 
reveals the neural systems of living beings to be precisely what both 
its outward physical appearance and Sebeok’s general theory of 
semiosis suggests that it would be: neither a carbon-based telephone 
exchange nor a peptide-bound motherboard for transporting bytes of 
pre-encoded data for the utility of some distal “user” —  but a living,
embedding, and becom ing them selves em bedded again within other interactions (for 
Edelman, on the neuronal level; and for D am asio, on the neuroanatom ical), only 
eacon explicitly  iecogn izes and acknow ledges that the very processes whereby 
representation em erges, is exchanged, and causes other representations to em erge ad 
infinitum, is essentially  an em bodiment o f  the sem iotic triadicity o f  Peirce.
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interactive, massively re-entrant semiotic web, the history of whose 
organization incorporates its past, is active in the present and extends 
outwards to the future —  “a web of experience woven out of signs and 
used to catch various objects in our Um welt for the sake of our 
survival and flourishing” (Colapietro 1993: 179).
Thus, in its capacity to free us from a purely dyadic ontology of 
neuronal sign processes consisting only of signals and their carriers, 
the naturalistic re-introduction of sign-objects, sign-interpretants and 
sign vehicles into the provenance of neurobiology allows us to 
transcend the Sausserian dyadism underlying the assumptions of much 
contemporary neuroscience, whereby mental activity m is “signified” 
by the presence of neural activity n. Such an assumption presumes, of 
course, that the elements of “signifier” and “signified” are somehow 
dichotic and discrete and may thus be correlated only “con­
ventionally” or “arbitrarily”. This is, obviously, an exceedingly 
curious position for any study of biological organization to take, and 
has resulted in a neural nominalism  which is far more ubiquitous in 
the literatures of neuroscience and consciousness than is generally 
remarked upon.
For until such time as researchers working in the mainstream of the 
brain sciences understand that neural activity is sign-activity and until 
such time as theoreticians conversant with the laws and properties of 
semiotic interaction can contribute to that understanding by dispelling 
once and for all the ingrained popular misconception that sign activity 
means mental activity performed by a psychological agent, the serious 
collaborative dialogue between neuroscience and biosemiotics will 
remain forever stillborn.
Bearing this last point in mind, though not expecting any overnight 
paradigm shifts in the fields of either biosemiotics or cognitive 
neuroscience, I would nonetheless like to attempt something of a 
preliminary rapprochem ent between these two fledging disciplines —  
each of which has much to offer the other and each of which, I 
believe, are investigating much the same phenomena —  by applying 
an explicitly biosemiotic perspective to the findings of traditional 
neuroscience in an effort to illustrate the mutual enrichment to be had 
by both fields via the incorporation of such a neurosemiotic.
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Evolutionary and ontogenetic tuning of neurons 
for selective response
The fact that both individual neurons and the networks of which they 
are a part can be selectively “tuned” by evolutionary and by onto­
genetic experience (i.e. —  that they “take habits” in the Peircean 
sense)3 was postulated most famously by Donald Hebb in 1949, and 
has been demonstrated conclusively since by Palm (1982), Grey and 
Singer (1989), Tsumoto (1992), and Perrett et al. (1982, 1989, 1990), 
among a multitude of other researchers.4
Kobatake and Tanaka’s (1994) work on feature recognition at the 
level of the single neuron is representative of a vast corpus of research 
into the tendency for certain individual neurons to become exclusively 
selective or “tuned” to respond to highly specific (and even individual) 
colors, shapes, movements and particular biological stimuli such as 
fingers, faces and mouths (Livingstone, Hubei 1987; Perrett, et al. 
1989; Hubei 1988; Kandel et al. 2000; Zeki 1993, 1999). A striking 
example of this neuronal “taking of habits” is illustrated in Figure 2.
Sensorimotor neurons —  neurons that mediate both one’s per­
ception and one’s effecting of the external world —  likewise 
demonstrate high degrees of specificity, as the automaticity with 
which any conditioned response or sustained deep learning (such as 
speaking a language, driving an automobile or playing a musical 
instrument) will immediately attest. In practice, the massively ac­
cumulating data on the learning, planning, storage and exponentially 
recursive “feed-forward/feedback interaction” of motor action 
sequencing and synchronization “schemas” all but explicitly acknow­
ledges the sem iotic  components inherent in such deeply interactive 
patterns of organization.
Gibson’s (1950) widely influential notion of “motor affordances”, 
for example, holds that the recognition  of the shape of an object and
3 Such adaptive, spontaneous “tuning” through habituation, o f  course, is also at the 
basis o f  connectionist, or neural networking, m odels o f  information processing, self­
organization, and learning, many o f  which attempt to build into m echanical systems 
the Hebbian postulate o f  experience-driven cell networking and self-assem bly. For an 
excellent overview  and discussion o f  the shortcom ings and potentials o f  connectionist 
and other AI/A L research, see Em m eche 1994, and Levy 1992.
4 See, for exam ple, the Face R ecognition Research H om epage at 
http://ww w.cs.rug.nl/~peterkr/FACE/face.htm l for just a partial listing o f  the hundreds 
o f researchers currently working in this particular sub-field.
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its physical “opportunities for interaction” (its curves, protuberances, 
angularity, etc.) by a set of selectively tuned sensory neurons is what 
“triggers” (in the mechanistic terminology acceptable to contemporary 
neuroscience) a correlated  set of selectively tuned motor neurons to 
produce a corresponding reach and grasp (Gibson 1950, Arbib 2002).
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Figure 2. Selectively tuned single neuron response. Recordings made off of a 
single neuron in the inferior temporal cortex reveal selective responsivity to the 
critical features of face recognition (a, b, g). Incomplete or inverted images (c, d, 
e, f, h) failed to activate the neuron to firing threshold. (From Kobatake and 
Tanaka, 1994.)
Habituation of this type, I wish to argue, has at is basis signification, 
the process whereby detection of a certain stimulus in a living
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organism comes to elicit a specific response. On the neurona eve , 
such detection is far from straightforward, as the neurons where such 
“selective tuning” have been found to occur may be buried deep 
within multiply embedded networks and pathways which, in turn, 
themselves have been organized both evolutionarily and through 
ontogenetic experience via the habituated detection, response and 
learning of contingent causalities —  or, as one might reasonably say, 
semiotically.
Significantly, recent research in the neurobiology of vision, 
especially the groundbreaking work of Semir Zeki (1993, 1999) 
demonstrate conclusively that sensory percepts such as visual images 
are not so much “received whole” from pre-given incoming photon 
impulses as they are semiotically and co-constructively “built” across 
heterogeneous and massively intercommunicating brain areas. Thus 
we find that sensory signification per se is intimately bound up with 
motoric processes of bodily and environmental interaction in an 
ongoing process of semiosis that cuts across the sub-systemic 
distinctions of brain, body and world.5
Semiotically, this organizational network of visual relations is only 
to be expected, as the evolution of the eye itself rests upon the 
evolution of a cell which has, over eons of interaction, been tuned to 
respond selectively to a range of photon configurations in the 
surrounding environment —  a selectivity that ranges on the level of 
the single neuron from gross (light detection, wavelength perception)
5 Hoffmeyer (1996) asks how we are to determine where an “individual” starts (or 
ends!) in an organism that is itself composed of millions of other individual cellular 
organisms. Clark (1996, 1999) in turn, argues that the situating the activity of “mind” 
exclusively in brain (and not in body and in “world” as well) creates a misleading 
dichotomy that has been the bane of cognitive science. Hutchins (1995) further 
unlooses the bounds of inquiry by arguing that cognition per se is distributed across 
brain, body and world, while Jarvilehto (1998) finally, questions the validity of 
positing any body-world distinction at all. Thus, the issue of mereology, as Stjernfelt 
(2000) and Kull (2000) have recently pointed out, is one which any comprehensive 
semiotic investigation is going to have to ultimately confront.
On the neurobiological level, I will be proposing in a future paper that one 
felicitous way of dealing with such questions may be via an extension of Hofstadter’s 
(1979) notion of “self-organizing modularity” which finds its neurobiological 
counterpart in Edelman and Tononi’s (2000) notion of neuronal “functional clusters” 
and their “dynamic core hypothesis” — the neural version, in effect, of Bateson’s 
“difference that makes a difference” — that accounts for the emergence of relatively 
discrete entities from a plenum of recursive interaction. °
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to extremely fine-tuned (individual shapes, movement trajectories, and 
even highly specific faces, fingers, mouths and hands). Such cells in 
the aggregate interact with a vast distribution of other selectively 
specialized cells in the human brain to actively co-construct or “build” 
a visual image that is not the product of brute mechanical reception 
and transmission, but of semiosis.
Even more recent findings regarding the neurobiology of visyo- 
motor transformations strongly suggest that at least part of the 
semiotic and empathic grounding out of which the very experience of 
intersubjectivity emerges may lie in the activity of a certain class of 
selectively responsive neuronal cells having both sensory and motor 
capabilities and that have been evolutionarily tuned to instantiate a 
congruent neural firing pattern both during one’s own execution of 
highly specific, goal-oriented, object-manipulating activities (grasping, 
tearing, biting) as well as during one’s mere passive observation of 
those exact same activities being performed by someone else.
The discovery of these so-called “mirror neurons” in humans a 
little over five years ago may have profound implications not only for 
our understanding of the sub-personal architectonics of empathy and 
intersubjectivity, but for a fundamental reappraisal into the continuing 
viability of any neuroscience of consciousness and mind “asemioti- 
cally” conceived. It is thus first to a discussion of the mirror neuron 
research findings and then to a critical examination of the paradigms 
in which these findings are currently embedded and interpreted that 
we now proceed.
A brief research history of mirror neurons
Confirmation of a mimetically oriented observation/execution system 
in the brain took place in 1996 during the course of a 15 year-long 
investigation into the neural substrates for hand and mouth movement 
in macaque monkeys begun by Giacomo Rizzolatti and his colleagues 
at the University of Parma, Italy in 1981 (Rizzolatti et al. 1981).
Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, and Fogassi’s seminal 1996 article Pre­
motor cortex and the recognition o f  m otor actions summarized much 
of the preceding decade’s research on the response properties and be­
havioral modulation of mouth-related neurons in the macaque, 
emphasizing in particular the discovery of Pellegrino et al. (1992) of a
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subset of rostral ventral premotor (F5) neurons critical to the processes 
of visuomotor transformation, neurons which Rizzolatti et a . were 
later to distinguish and to taxonomize as c a n o n ic a l  and mirror 
neurons.
Research by Kurata and Tanji (1986), Petrides and Pandya (1994), 
and Sakata et al. (1992) offer convergent evidence to Rizzolatti and 
his colleagues’ discovery that ventral premotor area F5 contains orga­
nizations of neuronally assembled m otor schem as for the execution of 
highly specific hand movements in its dorsal area and for the 
execution of highly specific mouth movements in its ventral area. The 
neurons that comprise these assemblies have both motor (efferent) and 
sensory (afferent) properties and appear to discharge selectively to 
visual information received from the anterior intra-parietal sulcus 
(AIP) rostral to the oculomotor region of the lateral intra-parietal area.
Afferent discharge of the canonical neurons, it was discovered, 
occurs at the presentation of particular 3-D objects when there is a 
match between the object’s “affordances” (those features of an object 
relevant to interaction, such as cavity, curve and protrusion) and the 
type of hand or finger grip encoded for by the neuron. Efferent 
discharge of canonical neurons occurs during particular goal-related 
hand movements such as holding, grasping and manipulating objects 
with either hand or mouth and many of these discharges are specific 
for particular types of hand prehension, such as precision grip, finger 
prehension, etc. “Taken together,” claim Rizzolatti et al. (1996a: 131), 
“these data indicate that AIP and F5 form a cortical circuit which 
transforms visual information on the intrinsic properties of objects 
into hand movements that allow the animal to interact appropriately 
with objects”.
Rizzolatti et al. (1996a) corollary discovery was that F5 in the 
macaque also contains a subset of sensory-motor neurons that 
discharge congruent neural firing patterns both during the actual 
execution of certain goal-directed hand and mouth movements, as well 
as during the passive witnessing of those exact same hand and mouth 
movements whenever they are performed by someone else.
Rizzolatti and his collaborators christened this newly discovered 
class of neurons m irror neurons and discovered that in order to be 
triggered, these neurons require an interaction between an agent and 
an object of a goal-directed action. The simple presentation of objects, 
or their manipulation in “meaningless” or non-goal directed ways by
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hand (whether witnessed or performed) will not evoke the neuron to 
discharge (ibidem).
In this now widely-cited series of original experiments, depicted in 
Figure 3, the macaques were presented with three experimental 
conditions —  first, observation of the experimenter’s specific grasping 
action upon an object followed by their own execution of that same 
specific action; secondly, observation of the experimenter grasping the 
same object using a slightly different grasping configuration or using a 
pliers that duplicates the original grasp upon the object, followed by 
their own repeated performance of the original object-grasping action; 
and third, performing the original action in darkness (i.e., —  without 
the accompanying observation of the object or of their own hand). 
Individual action potentials were recorded off of single neurons using 
tungsten micro-electrodes through the dura (which was left intact) 
simultaneous with videotaping of the behavioral events.
As the histograms of single neuron activation demonstrate, 
activation of the mirror neuron is unique to specific agent-object, goal- 
directed events (a series of control experiments were performed which 
ruled out interpretations that this phenomenon was the result of food 
expectancy, motor preparation for food retrieval, associative training, 
or reward). In fact, subsequent recordings taken off of a nearby but 
different F5 mirror neuron in the same monkey, depicted in Figure 4, 
show that this mirror neuron did not discharge at all to the agent- 
object interaction configuration that selected for exclusively by its 
neighboring neuron (c), whether executed or observed. Rather, this 
mirror neuron discharged only during others’ display o f —  and one’s 
own execution of —  counterclockwise but not clockwise rotations of 
hands that were grasping food (Rizzolatti et al. 1996a).
The discovery of highly selective brain circuitry oriented to goal- 
directed, agent-object interaction in monkeys —  circuitry which on 
this early level of neuronal organization is activated identically by 
observation and experience —  led to their investigation for a similarly 
mimetic observation/execution “matching system” in humans.
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Figure 3. Experimental evidence for the activity o f mirror neurons in the maca­
que. Please see text for details. (Illustration adapted from Rizzolatti et al 1996a)
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Presenting evidence based on cytoarchitectonics, electrical stimu­
lation studies and sulci embryology, Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) offer 
convergent evidence to studies indicating that Area F5 in the macaque 
monkey brain finds its functional and anatomical homologue in the 
Broca’s area (Brodmann areas 44 and 45, the so-called “language 
production area”) in the human brain (Galaburda, Pandya 1992; 
Passingham 1993; Bonin 1944).
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Figure 4. Extreme mirror neuron specificity. Details in text. (Illustration from 
Rizzolatti et al. 1996a).
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Noting that both monkey and human precentral sulci deve op pre- 
natally from the two separate primodia of the superior fronta su cus 
(SF) and the inferior frontal sulcus (IF), sharing many homologous 
functional and anatomical frontal lobe areas as a result. Rizzolatti et 
al. (1996b) used positron emission tomography (PET) to localize areas 
where increases in uptake of radioactive fluro-deoxyglucose are most 
pronounced in the human brain during object observation, grasping 
observation and grasping execution.
The findings of this study revealed that significant uptake increases 
(reflecting enhanced neural activity and a measure of increased local 
work load) during grasping observation does indeed take place in the 
posterior part of the left inferior frontal gyrus, site of the rostral-most 
part of the Broca’s area.6 This finding accords with recent PET studies 
indicating that —  far from being limited to control of the oro-facial 
and oro-laryngeal musculature necessary for speech production — the 
human Broca’s area also plays a crucial role in motor association 
(Dronkers et al. 2000) and in the pre-planning and execution of 
organized sequencing of hand movements as well (Bonda et al. 1994).
Following up on Rizzolatti et al. (1996a) suggestion that the mirror 
neuron system responds “holistically” to socially embedded actions 
(and not merely to the discrete elements of movement) in both the 
monkey and the human brain, Decety et al. (1997) and Grezes et al.
(1998) devised an elegant series of experiments wherein human 
subjects were scanned by positron emission tomography in order to 
map the differences in brain activity between the observation and the 
execution of goal-directed, and of similar but non-goal-directed, 
movements of the human hand.
In all conditions of observation and execution, mirror neurons in the 
human Broca’s area responded just like macaque mirror neurons in 
F5 —  that is, they activated only during goal-directed action-object
6 It is important to note here that two years earlier, a sim ilar PET experiment was 
performed during object inspection, m ovem ent observation, and motor action 
“im agining” (D ecety et al. 1994). Presenting observers with a computer-generated
schem atic o f  a hand —  rather than an actual b iological hand __ this experiment
reported som e activation in the premotor area during the motor action “imagining” 
condition, but neither significant premotor nor frontal activation during movement 
obsei-vation. R izzolatti et al. (1996a: 138) cite this study as supportive o f their 
hypothesis that “non-biological stimuli are ineffective in exciting F5 mirror neurons 
[accounting for why, in the above experiment] the cortical matching system  was not 
activated.”
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observations or executions, and did not, significantly, during obser­
vation or execution of the object-less, non-goal-directed hand gestures 
with which the subjects had no semantic understanding or associations.
Similarly, Strafella and Paus (2000) confirmed the discovery of 
Fadiga et al. (1995) that the simple witnessing of someone else’s hand 
movements increases motor-evoked neuronal activity in the hand 
muscles of the passive witness, This, in turn, offers yet more conver­
gent evidence to the brain imaging studies of Grafton (1996) and 
Iacoboni et al. (1999) demonstrating increased activation of the 
ventral premotor cortex at the Broca’s area during passive observation 
of the hand movements of another.
Finally, the de facto  “semiotic” mirror neuron experiments of 
Iacoboni et al. (1999) at the UCLA Brain Mapping Institute were the 
first to test for the response of motor and pre-motor mirror neurons to 
artifactual sign presentation, as well as to the mere observation of 
motoric hand and finger sequencing.
In these experiments, subjects were required to observe and then to 
imitate motor actions in response to what were designed to be iconic, 
indexical, and symbolic cues. In the first condition, iconic stimulation, 
an animated hand was displayed on a computer screen. The index or 
the middle finger of the hand was lifted at random, and the subject 
was instructed to imitate the movement with his or her own right 
hand. The second condition presented a somewhat more indexical 
stimulus. A static hand was displayed on the screen, and its index or 
its middle finger was marked at random with a prominent black “X”. 
The instruction to the subject was to lift the corresponding fingers of 
their own hand in response to the pattern of stationary but marked 
fingers on the screen. In the third condition, no images of hands at all 
were presented. Rather a gray rectangle was presented and a solitary 
symbol —  in this case, the letter “x” —  appeared on the left or right 
side of it at random. The instruction was to lift the index finger if a left 
“x” appeared and the middle finger if a right “x” appeared. Iacoboni 
and his colleagues found, not surprisingly, that mirror neuron 
activation was greater during the iconic observation and execution 
condition than during the indexical or symbolic.
Additionally, Iacoboni et al. (1999) used functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) to pursue the question of how individuals 
equipped with such automatic observation/execution mirroring mecha­
nisms in the brain, may preserve a sense of se lf  during action obser-
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vation, given the existence of a shared motor-neural pattern which is 
activated identically by self-execution and by other-observation.
The researchers found, perhaps not surprisingly, that reafferent 
proprioceptive signals from the parietal operculum feedback 
between the organism and its ongoing interaction with its object — 
modifies the reception of the input from Broca’s area, embedding the 
signals from the mirror neurons into the larger integration of brain 
activity of which these signals are but one constituent.
Constructing representema: 
the sign vehicle of the eye
Having now reviewed, in the determinedly asemiotic manner of the 
neuroscience literature itself, some of the major neurobiological 
research findings of the last half decade, how are we to begin the 
application of an explicitly Peircean semiotic to the dissipative 
electrochemical activity of these intercommunicating neurons? More 
critically, having seen how selective response properties may become, 
over evolutionary and ontogenetic time, exclusively “associated” with 
objects and activities that these neurons themselves will never directly 
experience or “see”, is there yet any reason to believe that the 
organization of this activity constitutes anything other than an electro­
chemical “bucket brigade”, a transfer of streaming brute ion configu­
rations that receive their semantic “meaning”, if at all, only at the 
“input/output” (sensory' and motor) “ports” of the self? Conversely, is 
it reasonable to assert that that the organization of this densely inter- 
communicative neuronal semiosphere itself partakes in no way of the 
organization of sign-activity that constitutes ‘consciousness’ and the 
“meaning”-making mind?
If we understand sem iosis to be an organizing principle of all 
manner of sign-exchange, then the operational processes enabling 
signification  from receptor cell to intemeuron to effector cell and the 
processes enabling signification across the meta-systems of biological 
organization (cell, pathway, network, organ, system, body proper) and 
across levels of awareness (network signification, body signification, 
mental signification) reveal themselves as systemic parts in a lawful 
interactive continuum —  a view of mind and body that allows us to 
transcend the intransigent dualism of a contemporary neuroscience
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“which performs its analysis with an axe, leaving as the ultimate 
elements, unrelated chunks of being” (CP 7.570).
To understand, then, how the objects of consciousness are related 
to the sign-exchange activity of the neuronal semiosphere, we need 
first to understand how the signs of the neuronal semiosphere relate to 
each other as well as to the objects both of consciousness and of the 
external world.
We thus begin our explicitly semiotic investigation into the 
neuronal signification process as virtually all biological investigations 
must at first begin —  that is to say, in media res. The phenomenon 
under investigation is already always “in full swing” and in our pre­
liminary attempts to fix the points of the process under investigation, 
it would be fundamentally antithetical to attempt to determine a priori 
whether and to what extent any given neuronal activity is functioning 
within its web of dense relations “iconically”, “indexically”, “symbo­
lically”, or —  as is most likely —  multiply and variously in the 
manifold of different spatio-temporal networks of which virtually 
every neuron is a part.
Situated within this web of neuronal interaction, the relata of 
semiotic interaction —  as everywhere, are in no way ontologically 
“fixed” —  icons, indices and symbols do not exist in neuronal 
semiosphere as entities p er  se, but only as any given instance of 
neuronal activity (whether in isolation or as part of a larger, transiently 
existing or stable configuration) is “taken” to be so through the 
interpretant (or significate effect) of its particular instantiation.
Thus, activity whose distal object might be some perturbation 
outside the body is, through the vehicle of the sensory sheet, inter­
preted as a sign variously (that is: iconically at one point, indexically 
at another, symbolically at yet another) throughout the resulting 
cascade of intemeuronal activity. For “first of all and most radically, a 
sign is neither a thing nor an object but the pattern according to which 
things and objects interweave to make up the fabric of experience” 
(Deely 1990: 55).
The research on the neurobiology of vision discussed above 
demonstrates the validity of this neurosemiotic understanding most 
compellingly: the eye, like the entirety of the sensory sheet, is a sign- 
vehicle, the proper significate effect of whose cell by cell activity is 
not brute “interpretation” in the dyadic sense (3 x; x = y), but an entire 
cascade of top-down and bottom-up, context-dependant and context-
creating semioses across levels of interpretative and meta-interpreta-
tive activity and systems.
“The object seen” (no less than the concept “the s e lf ’) exists not as 
a unitary given “presented” to consciousness in the manner of 
computerized information exchange, but is instead a rich construction 
of internally biological, externally physical and historically situated, 
conceptually-mediated elements none of which enjoy a privileged or 
autonomous causality in structuring or determining the resultant 
symbol which is then “presented” “seen” or “brought to mind.”
Biologically, then, objectification (and the “object world” which 
the activity of objectification brings forth) is thus a product of the 
processes of signification and not the other way around. Deely 
articulates this subtlety most incisively when he reminds us that “an 
organism does not deal with pure sensations, it deals with objects; and 
objects are sensations organized according to the nature, wants, 
needs, and desires o f  the organism havitig the sensations” (Deely 
1999: 10, emphasis mine).
This object in Peircean terminology is the immediate object — “the 
Object as the sign itself represents it, and whose Being is thus 
dependent upon the representation of it in the sign” (CP 4.536) and is 
the built object of neuronal sign-exchange, providing “objects” (and 
therefore relata and future grounds) of semiosis for all of the internally 
sequestered processes of an inherently mediated and cloistered 
nervous system (processes including, but by no means limited to, 
symbolic “consciousness,” “ideation” and “awareness” at its farthest 
upper reaches). It is related to its dynam ical object — “which is the 
Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign to its 
Representation” (CP 4.536) —  through its situation in the history of 
an organism ’s evolutionary and ontogenetic experience.
Brion (1999) captures the essence of the sign’s relation to its 
dynamical object in terms that are deeply resonant with the research 
findings of evolutionary and developmental neurobiologists:
Because the sign does not stand for the object ‘in all respects’, then the sign 
abstracts from the object. ‘To abstract from’, however, entails selection. 
Selection entails choice. Choice requires criteria o f selection. Criteria of 
selection necessarily rest on values. That is, the relationship o f the sign to the 
object is value-determined. Thus, the Ground carries out its function as the 
locus of [signification] —  when it is suffused by —  a set o f values (Brion 
1999: 4 5 )
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Neurobiologically, these “values” —  for survival and for thrival — 
operate as the biases and selection pressures driving neuronal organi­
zation (Damasio 1994; LeDoux 1996; Deacon 1997; Schumann 1997; 
Edelman, Tononi 2000). Such organization, in turn, constitutes the 
primary sign-exchanging network that not so much “links” —  as 
makes semiotically continuous — the external and the internal milieus.
Thus, deep within the interactive tangles of the dense neuronal 
semiosphere, we can seen how the semiotic object of neuronal activity 
may be best understood not as some pre-given entity of the outside 
world miniaturized and made eternal by the video camera of experience, 
but “that specific item within its context to which all interpretants [or 
significate effects] of that sign are collaterally related” (Savan 1976: 16). 
With this notion in mind, and to gain a fuller appreciation of how a 
semiotic understanding of the mirror neuron research described above 
may fundamentally challenge our understanding of the nature of inter­
subjectivity, we must next turn to an examination of certain of the 
relations that these “built” objects can stand in through reference to their 
own activity as signs.
Constructing representema: The sign vehicle of the I
Theorists of the embodied mind (Varela et al. 1991; Allott 1992; 
McNeill 1992; Hutchins 1995; Armstrong et al. 1995; Clark 1996; 
Goodwin 1998) remind us that our biology crucially determines our 
way-of-being in a largely biological world. Our highest-order cate­
gories and concepts themselves, claim Lakoff and Johnson (1999), are 
but conflations of our sensorimotor experience, and because we as 
human beings are embodied the way we are, there are perceptual and 
conceptual categories that we must —  and others that we may not — 
share with other each other and with other species. It is hardly 
controversial to assert, then, that perception and conception thus are 
inextricably and bidirectionally linked.
Moreover, human brains are remarkably unfinished creations at 
birth (Deacon 1997; Kendel et al. 2000) and among the perceptions 
which serve as input for our earliest conceptual schemata (and their 
attendant neuronal self-organization) are the ongoing symbolic 
interactions —  what Bourdieu (1977) calls the habitus —  of a reality 
which both begins as and which then artifactually reifies itself into a
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system of ever more generative signs. “By being included in the 
process of behavior,” writes Vygotsky, “the psychological tool [which 
is the artifactual vehicle of the sign] alters the entire flow and structure 
of mental functions” (in Wertsch 1981: 137).
Taking it as axiomatic, then, that cultural transmission and genetic 
inheritance together orient the individual towards a cognition of 
negotiated meaning in an ecology of dialogic signs, we can situate the 
deeply internalized, seemingly ubiquitous concept of “se lf’ as a 
product of the uppermost sym bol level of our “biological inner semio­
sphere.” This is a level which, by definition, includes and yet exceeds 
(in abstraction and in semiotic freedom) the supporting iconic and 
indexical levels of the never-ending sign-exchange activity mediating 
cell, brain, body and world.
Such activity and its resulting properties of causation are non- 
linearly interactive across levels of organization — and in their 
interdependent creation of the symbol known linguistically as the 
“self,” the cultural sign-exchange and the biological sign-exchange 
exist in intimate symbiosis. “S e lf’ is thus an emergent process of 
nested iconic, indexical and symbolic localization: it is the carving out 
of experiential boundaries inherent in the differential causalities of 
interaction —  Bateson’s “difference(s) that make a difference” — 
both on the level of cell network architectonics a well as on the level 
of what Terrence Deacon (1997) refers to as our virtual and symbolic 
selves.
For just as Zeki’s (1993, 1999) vision studies indicate that our 
visual “representations” emerge as complex co-constructions of mas­
sively distributed, non-linear processes of interaction which culminate 
in — but in their constituent parts no way fully constitute — the 
experienced visual image, so too, does our far more semiotically 
sedimented sense of “se lf’ emerge from constituent iconic, indexical 
and symbolic interactions none of which alone contain the full, rich 
sense of “se lf’ so familiar to our symbolic consciousness. Precisely 
like a visual representation, this mental representation isn’t “given” — 
it is built.
So, too, I will argue that in reference to the mirror neuron data, the 
richly constructed symbolic concepts of “s e lf ’ and  “other” in their 
fullest, subjective phenomenological senses require the full 
hierarchically referential complement of icon, index and symbol for
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their realizations, a complement which may be formalized ontologi­
cally as being, relation  and law.
We have also seen that in order to determine what “kind” of sign 
any given neuronal sign activity constitutes, we need to ascertain how 
that neuronal activity functions as part of its particular representational 
process. I thus propose that on the neuronal level, as everywhere else, 
the iconic distinction —  not necessarily between a fully semiosic 
“se lf’ and “other,” but simply between any given discrimination being  
x and not being x —  underlies and supports all ascending distinctions, 
as more increasingly complex hierarchies of organization necessarily 
rely on preceding ones for their realization and support.
Like Heidegger’s Dasein, however, the “what” (as opposed to the 
“that”) of firstness is inaccessible and remains so until such time as it 
is brought into the system of relations capable of indexicalizing or 
symbolizing it —  at which point, of course, it can no longer be 
apprehended “in itself’ —  which is simply to say “in isolation” from 
the referential system, the system of ongoing semiosis.
Similarly, I wish to argue, the fully seismosic “se lf’ (the self that 
can know itself as “a se lf’) is likewise inaccessible except through its 
realization in a vast web of living, semiotic interaction. Because the 
self is comprised of —  and thus cannot exclude —  the being, relations 
and laws of its own situational historicity, of its constitutive relations, 
and of its physical embodiment, these relations constitute the very 
vehicles by which experience of “the world” and experience of “the 
self” must be navigated and thereby known.
Self-representation — the representation of “a se lf’ to a self, even 
before the further mediation of linguaform awareness —  is 
accomplished through a massively collaborative interaction of sign- 
exchange across countless nodes of mediation between cell, brain, 
body and world. Neuronally, biologically and symbolically, “se lf ’ is 
therefore cumulative, not prim al —  an achievement, not a given. It is, 
at its utmost minimum, the mediation or bringing into relation of a 
sign (iconic self) with another sign (“indexical s e lf ’) whose operation 
of semiosis upon it result in what Peirce calls the “mere vicinity” of 
the egocentric symbol “I” (CP 4.69).
Thus again do we find the ‘objects’ of the inner semiosphere to be 
a nexus of collaterally related interpretants, corresponding to what 
Edelman and Tononi (2000) regard on the neuronal level of organi­
zation as ‘dynamic functional clusters’. Yet, this does not mean that
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the often maligned “first person view” that results is either an 
“illusion” or a category mistake. Rather, it is a fa c t of neuronal, bio­
logical and semiotic organization. As the philosopher Thomas Nagel 
(1986) so eloquently reminds us, there is a particular and singular, 
nonlinguistic perspective “from here” .
What is important to remember, however, is that even our most 
seamless, immediate and apparently monolithic perspective is, in fact, 
a built perspective. For, just as on the symbolic level, dialogic 
relations of action  (“x does y”) and interaction (“x does у to z”) 
characterize the long, post-natal process of human differentiation and 
individuation, so too on the upwardly organizing neural level, do 
specifically iconic patterns of neuronal activity (reflexes, fixed action 
patterns, selectively tuned single neuron response) become repeatedly 
associated in their co-occurrence with still other iconic patterns of 
neuronal activity, forming indexical relations which join these icons 
together into networks of functional relation (Pulvermuller 1999; 
Edelman, Tononi 2000; Llinas 2001), —  the lawfulness of which 
forms the basis of proprioceptive “self-awareness” and ultimately of 
the symbolic order.
Neurosemiotically, the ceaseless interaction of these recursive 
iconic, indexical and symbolic levels of organization provide the 
substrate for the emergence of a meta-system propensity towards 
“thirdness” —  a propensity which, in our species, finds its apogee in 
language and in the communal manipulation of publicly negotiated 
and therefore multiply perspectival signs. It is at this point in its 
organization that the internally “realized” self —  what we now see as 
the fully dynamic and triadic self (both in its relations with others and 
in its relations with its own levels of organization) — comes into its 
own.
The proposal is thus made to consider the “se lf’, both neurobiolo- 
gically and in its semiotic multiplicity as a being that is simulta­
neously and interactively iconic, dialogic, and symbolic. I have argued 
that to equate the “se lf’ as coterminous with biological proprio­
ception, with the first-person perspective, or with a node in a social 
matrix is to impoverish the conception of “s e lf ’ by several significant 
orders — for the self to be a self must be all of these at recursively at 
once and more. The full “se lf’ as we understand it in our daily lives, is 
a dynamically determined self at every moment and the relations of 
which it is inextricably a part (itself, other, language) are likewise
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dynamically and perpetually co-construed. It is therefore as much a 
product of social interaction as of neurotransmission, for both the 
interpersonal and the extrapersonal aspects of this self are deeply 
rooted in a massively non-linear, re-entrant ecology of signs.
This is why, in undertaking the establishment of a discipline of 
neurosemiotic, it is all the more critical to distinguish the various 
levels of sign activity, lest we are misled, on the one hand, to positing 
an eliminativist reductionism that dismisses some of the most vital 
aspects of our being (such as ‘se lf , ‘consciousness’ and ‘inter­
subjectivity’) as merely epiphenomenal or even downright illusory (a 
dismissal we may subsequently dismiss as “the illusion illusion” or 
“the fallacy fallacy”) —  or, on the other hand, to conflating what is 
proper only to the milieu of linguistic, socially mediated, symbolic 
interaction to the brute iconic and indexical significations taking place 
on the level of the somatic or neuronal cell.
Convergence versus emergence theories 
of intersubjectivity
Merleau-Ponty writes in The Prose o f  the W orld , “The spectacle 
begins to furnish itself a spectator who is not I but who is reproduced 
from me. How is it possible? How can I see something that begins to
see?”
It would appear that in their conceptualization of the mirror neuron 
system as ‘an observation/execution matching system,” the majority 
of neuroscientists currently examining this phenomenon are indeed 
conflating iconic, indexical and symbolic levels of semiosis, inadver­
tently smuggling down onto the neuronal level processes proper to the 
cultural and the symbolic, or, conversely, reducing what should pro­
perly be understood as the emergent phenomenon of “intersubjectivi­
ty” down to the computational level of an internal asemiotic algo­
rithm.
To take just two examples: Gallese and Goldman’s (1996a) 
“mirror simulation theory” as well as Rizzolatti and Arbib’s (1998) 
“primitive dialogue theory” advance the notion that “theory of mind” 
(i.e. — the recognition that the mentation of others is similar to, but 
distinct from, one’s own) is instantiated by the mirror neuron system’s 
matching one’s own executed actions with the witnessed actions of
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another. Such “matching,” whether in monkey or in human, is 
supposed to “automatically” result in the cognitive event articulable 
as: “Agent P ’s action is similar to mine, therefore Agent P and I are 
similar.”
Leaving aside the homuncular problematic inherent in such 
asemiotic “matching” of a present and a non-present event (events of 
“witnessing” and “doing” which are, moreover, experientially dis­
junct), I maintain that such convergence theories of intersubjectivity 
assume the very higher-order relational and symbolic capabilities that 
the existence of the mirror system proposes to explain. Mutuality, 
under these conceptions, arises after enacted self-with-object inter­
actions and observed other-with-object interactions have been 
syllogistically and symbolically compared.
For not only reasoning from syllogism, but even the very ability to 
put one’s own experiences into such symbolic relations, I would 
argue, presupposes higher-order categorization and inferential abilities 
unlikely to be found at such an early order of neuronal organization. 
Rather, I will argue that the value of the selectively tuned, single 
neuron mirroring response to human cognition in general is the 
provision of a neuronal iconic grounding that is both organizationally 
prior to —  and mutual to —  the subsequent system representema of 
the fully semiosic “se lf’ and “others.”
In Figure 5, schematic (A) depicts the reasoning common to the 
convergence theories regarding the role of the mirror response in 
enabling intersubjectivity. Here, the physical similarity of neuronal 
response allows a comparative “matching” to take place whereby 
agents compare their own inner experiences of witnessing and of 
performing certain actions, and realize that these two inner experien­
ces are similar. A preliminary computation (not shown) sets up the 
premises from which a subtractive deduction (in brackets) of pheno­
menological differences essentializes the relata into a comparison of 
the actions (A) of self (S) and other (O). This comparison is then 
syllogistically analyzed (for no other analysis would result in the 
desired outcome) and as a result of the analysis, the certain degree of 
similarity between self and other is experienced.
Neurosemiotics 89
О (< > =) s
(S = Self О = Other A = Action i = Function)
Figure 5. Convergent versus emergent theories regarding the role of mirror 
neuron response in enabling intersubjectivity.
The odd combination of computationalism and hidden anthropo­
morphism apparent in the above description is something that is not at 
all uncommon in contemporary neuroscientific conjectures regarding 
the manner in which mental events come to be experienced.7 What is
7 Thus, while present considerations of space and scope force me to limit the 
discussion of the rest of this paper to a consideration of how the iconic function of the 
mirror neuron tuned response to specific interaction per se (that is, without 
consideration as to the identity of the agent of such interaction) may underlie our most 
symbolic concepts of “self’ “empathy” “intersubjectivity” and “other minds”, 
correspondingly ‘intractable’ problems regarding secondness and thirdness that plague 
traditional discussions in the literature of cognitive neuroscience will obviously benefit 
by the application of a Peircean neurosemiotic, as well.
Secondness and relations of indexicality appear to underlie the so-called ‘binding 
problem’ (the question, briefly, of why the red is never dissociable from the apple on 
which it appears), while it is precisely the thirdness of symbols which accounts for the 
so-called ‘hard problem’ of consciousness, which is no more than the ‘problem’ of 
how a world of iconic and indexical relations ( ‘neuronal activity’ in the degenerate 
information processing sense) could ever result in a world of rich, phenomenological, 
subjective experience.
Needless to say, I will be addressing these very two complex and demanding 
issues explicitly in the future. For the purposes of this article, however, it suffices for 
me to draw the distinction between iconic, self-exhaustive relationships that I believe 
characterize selectively tuned neuronal response (such as found in mirror neurons) and 
the kind of “yet computational” view of neuronal activity whereby the activity itself is
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of much more concern to us here is the extraordinarily “weak” picture 
of “intersubjectivity” that is being offered. “Intersubjectivity” under 
this conception is not something deeply felt nor experienced, but a 
logical concept or idea which is calculated and, through the objecti­
vism of deductive reasoning, imaginatively “arrived at.” Its inherent 
efficacy, then, would be as an “abstraction” which one could then 
choose to act upon or to ignore. This, of course, is in stark 
contradiction to the experimental results. Mirror neuron response is 
immediate and involuntary —  neither reasoning nor decision making 
is implicated in the response.
Figure 5 (B) is a schematic depiction which illustrates that an 
em ergent view of the same cause-effect relationship is at once more 
complex and yet more straightforward. It is straightforward in its 
insistence that the iconic recognition of “Action A” (or, indeed, of any 
selective and exclusively “tuned” response) is stable, immediate and 
primary and does not need to be calculated through a logic of deduc­
tive reasoning to be “arrived at” —  rather, in its function as an icon, it 
is the very ground  upon which calculations and logical reasoning are 
enabled to take place, via its provision of a consistently bounded 
relatum. It is more complex in its insistence of multiply additional 
layers of sedimentary semiosis before the subsequently emergent 
relata of “se lf’ and “other” are robust enough to be so distinguished 
(i.e. —  to function in further instances of semiosis as icons of their 
own).
Following these distinctions to their logical conclusions throws 
into sharp relief the differences between a neuroscience that is 
semiotically conceived and one that is not. Let us expand upon these 
last two points, then, by way of our conclusion, in order to more 
explicitly illustrate how a neurosemiotic conception of “self and 
other” “iconicity” and “intersubjectivity” may fundamentally 
transform our present understanding of phenomena such as mirror 
neuron activity as well as to open up future neuroscientific research 
agendas in directions yet precluded by an intransigently asemiotic 
conception of the relationship between neuronal sign-exchange and 
the activity of an embodied yet symbolic mind.
not seen as an organic, living system but as lifeless engineering-variety “information” 
which a larger living system uses to, paradoxically, “know” itself and its world.
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Iconicity in the tuned response
We have seen how on the neural level, iconicity is “built” through 
experience both evolutionary and ontogenetically and provides the 
foundation for the massively re-entrant cascades of still further iconic, 
indexical and symbolic sign activity that virtually define “mind” in 
both its most “private” and in its most “distributed” sense —  which is 
to say, in both the subpersonal and in the extra-personal ccology of 
signs.
Thus, regardless of the surrounding (“upstream” and “down­
stream”) neuronal activity of which it is necessarily a part, we can 
justifiably establish selectively tuned single neuron response —  such 
as evident in face recognition and in the mirror neuron response —  as 
a ground for iconic activity in the Peircean sense of firstness, that one 
place predicate  or ‘raw qualitative experience’ which delineates its 
object as that object (and no other) and which, upon being brought 
into relation with any other than itself, provides the polarity and brute 
relata whereby indexical relations (and, ultimately, symbolic relations 
of thirdness) can then take place.8
“Anything whatever”, Peirce reminds us, “ be it quality, existent, 
individual or law, is an Icon of anything, in so far as it is like that 
thing and used as a sign of it” (CP 2.247).
For iconicity, “is not based on some prior ground of physical 
similarity [i.e. — it is not a matching relation], but in that aspect of the 
interpretation process that does not differ from some other interpretive 
process...it is the base on which all other forms of representation are 
built [and] the bottom of the interpretive hierarchy” (Deacon 1997: 
76).
Taborsky (2001) refines this subtle distinction even further when 
she writes: “This first state of being is not non-relational, but is rather,
я Note that in our discussion of iconicity, we are not positing the primal 
experiential iconic relationships of the neuronal system, which must have certainly 
happened at — and indeed, what must have engendered —  the earliest points of its 
own prehistorically semiotic development, but icons (and indices and symbols) that are 
functioning as such in the particular instances of semiosis under investigation. Thus, 
the fact that the iconic response selective to “x and only x” at the site of the “tuned” 
single neuron may itself be the result of local iconic, indexical and even symbolic 
relational activity “upstream” (as, in fact, is both concluded by the neurobiological 
research ancl predicted by the semiotic of Peirce) in no way changes nor diminishes its 
function as an icon upon which further semiosis may then legitimately take place.
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the state of being-in-a-relation without the capacity to refer to that 
relation. It is completely internal and is present, being such as it is, 
while utterly ignoring everything else, is positively such as it is (CP 
5.44)” (Taborsky 2001: 5). It is precisely this iconic firstness of 
selectively tuned, mirror neuron response that provides the ground for 
the subsequent hypostatic abstraction  (of “se lf ’ and “other” upon the 
ground of mutually selfless and otherless action qua action iconicity) 
to take place.
Because mirror neurons distinguish action succinctly but agency 
not at all, the neurally primitive experience instantiated by either the 
execution of an action by oneself or the observation of that same 
action by another functions iconically within the context of the 
neuronal semiosphere, and is represented congruently in the mirror 
neuron system as simply the presence of a specific action, A. 
Iconically, A thus equals A [/] (that is: A is A for all and any agents) 
p rior  to the later integration of indexical som atic representations into 
the still larger sym bolic  organization of “consciousness” and “se lf’.
Construed thusly, being  —  that A is and therefore cannot not be — 
is mutual across agency before the ontogenesis of a linguistic and 
biologically higher-order “se lf’. Differentiation between A[s] and A[o] 
comes both logically and organizationally later under this hypothesis, 
for as is almost certainly the case in the many hard-wired reflexes in 
humans and in other animals —  evolution builds in a good many 
automatic response systems to ensure that a necessary-for-survival 
strategy is faithfully and unerringly passed on.
M irror neuron research, rightly construed, demonstrates that not 
only language, but also actions themselves constitute a “public” 
domain upon which and out of which the “subject se lf’ is at least 
partially constructed. Thus, there is no fully cognized “self” to speak 
of that does not take the actions of others as the fabric from which 
itself is weaved. Indeed, Pierce reminds us that to maintain that “I am 
altogether myself and not at all you” constitutes a “metaphysics of 
wickedness” (CP 7.570). “Others” are in a sense in us and in our 
actions from the start.
Neurosemiotics 93
The neurosemiotic emergence of self from other
For the majority of theorists working in the field traditionally con­
ceived cognitive neuroscience, however, the notion that the human 
“subject” is not coterminous with biological individuality and that 
“neither selves nor neighborselves [are] anything more than mere 
vicinities”(CP 4.69) may be seen as heresy at best and utter lunacy at 
worst. Yet from a neurosemiotic standpoint, this assertion is 
unsensational.
“Immediate feeling is the consciousness of the first; the polar sense 
is the consciousness of the second; and synthetical consciousness is 
the consciousness of a third or medium,” writes Peirce (CP 1.382). 
But it is important to distinguish here between the polar sense —  
“something that cannot properly be conceived...for conceive it is to 
generalize [and therefore] is to miss altogether the hereness and 
nowness which is its essence” (CP 8.267) —  and the fully semiosic 
relata of the symbolic “se lf’ and “other” .
The dialogic and triadic nature of our upwardly organizing self, we 
have seen, allows our organism to literally construct (realize) a “se lf’ 
that is made at least partly out of the internalized actions of others —  
actions which are internalized on the neuronal level via mirror system 
interactions, the nature of which are intersubjective by definition, as 
part of what mirror neuron pioneer Vittorio Gallese (2001) calls our 
“subpersonal architecture” .
“S elf’ and “other”, in the final analysis, are sign relations that 
actively construe each other. And thus the argument is made from a 
neurosemiotic standpoint that the most significant contribution of the 
mirror neuron system to human cognition is not the “reasoning,” 
dualistic conceptual orientation that representation is mutual between  
agents —  “my representation of x and your representation of x occur 
similarly in both of us, therefore you and I are similar” —  but, rather, 
the inherently neurosemiotic orientation that intersubjectivity —  
mutuality itself —  is an iconic, and therefore in some sense a-priori 
property of representational experience within agents —  whereby “my 
existential and iconic experience of x  is mutual to both my symbo­
lically integrated experience of myself and to my symbolically 
integrated of you”.
The sameness of “se lf’ and “other” here is quantitative (the same 
one) rather than just qualitative (the same as). Empathy and self­
preservation are thus deeply, inextricably, biologically bound. And in 
this we might reflect at last that in our capacity as sign-using 
creatures, we don’t primarily reason to intersubjectivity but 
rather (as the history of our species all too often attests) —  “reason” 
may be one of the strategies by which we move away from it. For at 
the mirror neuron level of organization, the distinction between seer 
and doer, action and reaction, identity and alterity is —  like the 
“reflection” one finds oneself presented with in front of a full length 
mirror —  a distinction which is impossible to maintain. Witnessing 
and performing, “se lf’ and “other”, are thus not higher-order 
behaviors which converge upon the organizationally primitive and 
biosemiotically prior mirror system —  rather, they are but two of the 
results, products and “proper significate effects” which ultimately 
em erge from  it.
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По ту сторону своего и чужого: нейросемиотическое 
проявление интерсубъективности
Хотя нейробиология, когнитивные науки и “исследования разума” в 
течении последних двух десятилетий бурно развивались, до сих пор это 
не сопровождалось таким же развитием в области семиотического 
понимания исследуемых явлений. Д о сих пор неизвестно, каким образом
10 Available:
http://www.library.utoronto.ca/see/SEED/Voll-l/Taborsky-Journall.html.
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знаковые связи на уровне нейронов воздействуют в более широкой сети 
психологически более доступных знаковых связей. Данная статья 
пытается очертить возможности подобного подхода именно к нейро­
семиотике. В качестве пробного материала и точки отправления исполь­
зуются последние открытия в нейробиологии: визульно-моторные пере­
ходы и ответные реакции отдельных селективно настроенных нейронов. 
С этой позиции по поводу “интерсубъективности” утверждается, что 
ens rationis проявляется как функция нейро-семиосферы, которая может 
абстрагироваться, конструироваться и взаимно делиться между аген­
тами.
Teispool oma ja võõrast: 
intersubjektiivsuse neurosemiootiline ilmumine
Nagu üldteada, pole närviteaduse, kognitiivse teaduse ja “teadvusuuringute” 
plahvatusliku arenguga kahe viimase kümnendi jooksul siiski tänini kaasne­
nud samasugust arengut nende valdkondade poolt uuritavate nähtuste semioo­
tilisel mõistmisel. Senini pole teada, kuidas märgiseosed neuronite tasandil 
saavad toimida psühholoogiliselt ligipääsetavate märgiseoste laiemas võrgus­
tikus. Käesolev artikkel püüab olla esialgseks lähenemiseks just säärasele 
neurosemiootikale. Oma proovimateijali ja lähtepunktina kasutame viimaseid 
avastusi neurobioloogiliste uuringute vallas: visuaal-motoorseid üleminekuid 
ja üksikneuronite valikuliselt häälestatud vastureaktsioone, mis on laialt­
levinud kortikaalseks nähtuseks. Sellelt lähtekohalt väidetakse “intersubjek­
tiivsuse” kohta, et ens rationis ilmub kui neuraalse semiosfääri funktsioon, 
mis saab abstraheeruda, konstrueeruda ja toimurite vahel vastastikku jaotuda.
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Abstract. This paper discusses recent research on humanoid robots and 
thought experiments addressing the question to what degree such robots could 
be expected to develop human-like cognition, if  rather than being pre­
programmed they were made to learn from the interaction with their physical 
and social environment like human infants. A question of particular interest, 
from both a semiotic and a cognitive scientific perspective, is whether or not 
such robots could develop an experiential Umwelt, i.e. could the sign 
processes they are involved in become intrinsically meaningful to themselves? 
Arguments for and against the possibility of phenomenal artificial minds of 
different forms are discussed, and it is concluded that humanoid robotics still 
has to be considered “weak” rather than “strong AI”, i.e. it deals with models 
of mind rather than actual minds.
Even readers with no interest whatsoever in the scientific and philo­
sophical study of artificial intelligence (AI) might have noticed the 
following: Back in 1968, in Stanley Kubrick’s movie 2001 — A space  
odyssey, it was the spaceship’s board com puter HAL whose intelli­
gence exceeded by far that of his human collaborators. Now that we 
have actually reached the year 2001 the appearance of AI in popular 
culture has taken a significantly different shape. In Steven Spielberg’s 
recent movie A. I. (based on a treatment of Stanley Kubrick, who died
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before he could produce the movie himself), it is the humanoid robot 
David, looking very much like any ordinary little boy, who exhibits 
not only human-level intelligence, but also develops human feelings 
(or at least convincingly appears to do so).
Obviously there is a huge gap here between the science fiction and 
the actual science facts. Neither computers like HAL nor robots like 
David have been built or could be built within the foreseeable future. 
Nevertheless it might be worth pointing out a couple of parallels to 
actual AI research. From its inception in the mid-1950s AI, as well as 
the rest of the cognitive sciences, was dominated by the so-called 
com puter m etaphor fo r  mind, which stated that cognition is compu­
tation and the relation between mind and brain/body the same as 
between computer software and hardware. Accordingly, an under­
standing of mind was sought not at the level of the body, which was 
considered just an implementation —  which happens to be carbon- 
based in the case of humans, but could as well be silicon-based in the 
case of computers —  but at the level of implementation-independent 
representations and algorithms. That means, given the right program, 
i.e. the program used by the human mind, a computer like HAL could 
indeed have a human mind.
This view has been strongly contradicted by, among others, Searle 
(1980) who in his famous Chinese Room Argument compared a 
com puter’s processing of internal symbols/representations to a non- 
Chinese-speaking man’s processing of Chinese symbols according to 
formal rules without grasping any of the semantics. In both cases, 
Searle argued, the symbol processing might very well be meaningful 
to observers, but it cannot possibly be or become intrinsically 
meaningful to the processor itself. Hence, computers might very well 
be powerful tools in the study of cognition, a position Searle referred 
to as weak AI, but they could not be actual minds themselves, a 
position he referred to as strong AI. Searle (1980) did, however, not 
conclude that strong AI in general, i.e. the building of artificial minds, 
was impossible, but only that computer programs are the wrong 
approach due the fact that they lack a number of “causal powers”, 
including perception, action and learning.
Since the late 1980s increasingly many cognitive scientists, to 
some degree following Searle’s ideas, have emphasized the impor­
tance of “embodiment” and “situatedness”, i.e. interaction of cognitive 
agents with their environments (e.g. Varela et al. 1991; Clark 1997;
Clancey 1997; Pfeifer, Scheier 1999). AI has been one of the driving 
forces in this development, shifting much interest from computers to 
robots or so-called autonomous agents, and from the study of internal 
knowledge representation to sensorimotor processes and the way they 
shape cognition. One of the insights gained (or regained) was that the 
mind is in fact not largely independent of the body, but in fact strongly 
determined by it. Not surprisingly, Uexkiill’s concepts of U m welt and 
Merkwelt have been adopted by a number of AI researchers and 
cognitive scientists (e.g., Brooks 1986, 1991; Prem 1996, 1997, 1998; 
Clark 1997; Sharkey, Ziemke 1998; Ziemke, Sharkey 2001; Ziemke 
2001). Brooks (1991), for example, writes: “as von Uexküll and others 
have pointed out, each animal species, and clearly each robot species 
with its own distinctly nonhuman sensor suites, will have its own 
different Merkwelt”. For AI research striving to model human 
intelligence this has radical consequences: Clearly, if cognition is 
dependent on body and sensorimotor capacities, then the only way to 
achieve or study human-level or human-like intelligence in artefacts is 
to equip them with human-like bodies and sensorimotor capacities, i.e. 
to build humanoid robots.
There are by now a number of projects which have taken this 
approach, such as Brooks’ well-known Cog project (Brooks et al. 
1998) or Kozima’s Infanoid project (e.g. Kozima, Yano 2001). Both 
Cog and the Infanoid are upper-torso humanoids, i.e. roughly human- 
size robotic torsos equipped with stereo-vision heads, arms and hands 
with degrees of freedom roughly similar to those of human bodies. 
However, obviously this only solves part of the problem. Even if a 
(human-like) body nowadays by many is considered a necessary  
condition for a (human-like) mind, it could hardly be a sufficient one. 
The remaining question is, roughly speaking, how to get a mind “into” 
the body. Both of the above projects aim to let their robots undergo 
some kind of artificial ontogenesis in physical and social interaction 
with their environment. Both also particularly emphasize the inter­
action with human caregivers, based on theories of social learning in 
infants (e.g., Vygotsky 1978; Tomasello 1999). That means, Cog and 
Infanoid are supposed to acquire or develop sensorimotor and cogni­
tive capacities, and ultimately a mind, in some kind of long-term 
interaction similar to the ontogenesis of human children (note, how­
ever, that it is only the software, not the hardware/body, which deve­
lops). Taking this approach to the extreme, one might argue like
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Zlatev (2001: 155) that such “robotogenesis could possibly recapitu­
late [human] ontogenesis, leading to the emergence of intentionality, 
consciousness and meaning” in robots.
The question whether or not a (humanoid) robot could indeed 
develop/have a (human-like) mind, including a (human-like) pheno­
menal Umwelt, has recently occupied a number of researchers in 
cognitive science and semiotics (e.g., Emmeche 2001; Nöth 2001; 
Sharkey, Ziemke 1998; Ziemke, Sharkey 2001; Ziemke 2001; Zlatev 
2001). The question what exactly the semiotic status of such a robot 
would be apparently has no simple answer. Traditionally, semiosis has 
often been considered to necessarily involve living organisms. Morris 
(1946), for example, defined semiosis as “a sign-process, that is, a 
process in which something is a sign to some organism”. Similarly, 
Jakob von Uexküll considered signs to be “of prime importance in all 
aspects of life processes” (T. von Uexküll 1992), and made a clear 
distinction between organisms, which as autonomous subjects respond 
to signs according to their own specific energy, and inorganic 
mechanisms which are heteronomous (cf. Nöth 2001; Ziemke, 
Sharkey 2001).
Nowadays, the distinction between organisms and mechanisms 
seems less clear. Computers are commonly considered to be at least 
involved in semiotic processes. Sebeok, for example, writes (in 
personal communication cited by T. von Uexküll 1982) that “the 
criterial feature of living entities, and of machines programmed by 
humans, is semiosis”. Andersen et al. (1997) have argued in detail that 
computers/programs, when it comes to semiosis, fall somewhere in 
between humans and conventional mechanisms, but that they ultima­
tely derive their semiotic “capacities” from the interpretation of their 
designers and users. The major difference, they argued, was that living 
systems are autopoietic, i.e. self-creating and -maintaining, whereas 
machines are not (cf. Nöth 2001; Ziemke, Sharkey 2001). Hence, their 
“tentative conclusion” was that “the difference between human and 
machine semiosis may not reside in the particular nature of any of 
them. Rather, it may consist in the condition that machine semiosis 
presupposes human sem iosis and the genesis o f  the form er can be 
explained by the latter” (Andersen et al. 1997: 569, emphasis added). 
Similarly, Nöth concluded his discussion of whether or not robots 
have an Umwelt as follows:
Needless to say, a machine, in spite of a certain autonomy in its agency, can 
never be said to have its ultimate goal within itself. The objectives o f a 
machine have always been established from outside, namely by the engineer 
who designed it and the user who switches it on and off. Thus, the robot’s 
ultimate framework o f reference, its final causality, is elsewhere, and thus the 
resulting semiotic process is alloreferential. (Nöth 2001: 696-697)
However, many would argue that in the case of robots which self- 
organize and develop in long-term interaction with their environment, 
independent of their human designers, it is simply not the case that the 
genesis of robosemiosis can be (fully) explained with reference to 
human semiosis. The “problem” that makes it difficult, at least at a first 
glance, to make a sharp distinction between living organisms and 
today’s adaptive robots (also commonly referred to as artificial life), is 
that the latter nowadays have a number of the qualities/properties of the 
former. Ziemke and Sharkey (2001), for example, discussed in detail 
that three properties which Jakob von UexkUll (1928, 1982) considered 
unique for organisms (adaptation/growth, use of signs, centrifugal 
construction) can to some degree also be found in today’s robots. 
Similarly, Nöth (2001: 695-696) identified “four reasons why robots 
interact in the same way with their environment as organisms do” which 
“support the argument that not only organisms, but also robots have an 
Umwelt in [von] Uexküll’s sense”: (a) both robots and organisms have 
an Umwelt (or in fact Merkwelt) in the sense that, limited by available 
senses/sensors, they can only sense part of their physical environment; 
(b) both process environmental stimuli selectively; (c) both can have 
“internal representations of their Umwelt”; (d) both are equipped with 
perceptual organs/modules and effector organs/modules.
Given these similarities between robots and organisms, arguments 
for the possibility of robot minds cannot easily be dismissed. Zlatev, 
for example, sees “no good reason to assume that intentionality is an 
exclusively biological property [...] and thus a robot with bodily 
structures, interaction patterns and development similar to those of 
human beings would constitute a system possibly capable of meaning” 
(Zlatev 2001: 155). In more detail, Zlatev’s elaborate proposal for the 
development of a robot mind1 is based on the following cornerstones:
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(*) sociocultural situatedness: the ability to engage in acts of communication 
and participate in social practices and ‘language games within a 
community;
(*) naturalistic embodiment: the possession of bodily structures giving adequate 
causal support for the above, e.g. organs of perception and motor activity, 
systems of motivation, memory and learning; [...]
(*) epigenetic development: the development of physical, social, linguistic 
skills along a progression of levels so that level n+1 competence results 
from level n competence coupled with the physical and social 
environment. (Zlatev 2001: 161)
In the case of a robot that actually fulfilled all of the above criteria it 
might indeed be difficult to justify why exactly it should not be 
considered to have a human-like mind and Umwelt. It might very well 
pass what Hamad (1989, 1990) called the Total Turing Test, i.e. its 
behavior, including both symbolic capacities (as tested in the original, 
purely language-based Turing test) as well robotic, i.e. sensorimotor, 
capacities, might become indistinguishable from that of a human. 
Nevertheless, according to Nöth (2001), it is just a man-made 
machine, lacking own goals and thus only capable of “alloreferential” 
semiotic processes (cf. above quote). Nöth’s argument, as well as our 
own arguments coming to similar conclusions (Sharkey, Ziemke 
1998; Ziemke, Sharkey 2001; Ziemke 2001), might seem counterintui­
tive, as can be demonstrated with the following thought experiment 
(in fact an extension of Zlatev’s (2001) thought experiment). Let us 
assume you buy some future version of Cog or Infanoid, now 
equipped with legs, etc., so it does actually look like a child (perhaps 
even as much as Spielberg’s fictitious humanoid David). Let us 
further assume that the robot learns, e.g., through language games (cf. 
Zlatev 2001) to refer to your family, your dog and objects in your 
house by their proper names. Could we really say, as Nöth (cf. above 
quote) seems to argue, that its language use and all other semiotic 
processes are alloreferential, i.e. the words have no intrinsic meaning 
to the robot itself, but they are only meaningful to you and your 
family? What if the robot, unknown to you, played with the neigh­
bor’s children and learned new words and phrases from them, or 
possibly even went to school? Finally, what if eventually it could pass 
the Total Turing Test? Is there really any good reason to assume that 
such a robot should not be able to develop own intentionality and 
intrinsic meaning?
Well, there are in fact a couple of good reasons, and here are some 
of them. Firstly, although the above robot seems to possess at least 
some form of the “causal powers” that Searle (1980) pointed out as 
missing in computer programs (cf. above), i.e. perception, action and 
learning, the Chinese Room Argument (CRA) still applies to it. As Cog 
and Infanoid (cf. above), the robot consists of hardware and software. It 
has a physical body and a computer program, or perhaps a number of 
programs, controlling it. Each of these programs is of exactly the type 
Searle (1980) argued to be incapable of intentionality due to their 
computational nature,2 and their embedding in a robot (the sö-called 
robot reply) is exactly what he rejected as making no difference whatso­
ever. It should, however, be pointed out that, of course, not everybody 
agrees with Searle in this point (see, e.g., Hamad 1990; Zlatev 2001).
Secondly, despite a certain convergence of science fiction and 
philosophical thought experiments, it should be pointed out that the 
above is indeed just a thought experiment. Its technical feasibility 
does in fact seem more than questionable. The idea that a humanoid 
robot could develop a human mind and Umwelt, just because its body 
is to some degree human-like and thus might be able to, e.g., receive 
similar visual input and have similar possibilities of, e.g., manually 
grasping objects, seems to reduce the body to some kind of input- 
output interface to the world. Robot bodies are, however, in many 
ways extremely different from living bodies, in particular human 
bodies, and thus unlikely candidates for supporting the same kind of 
phenomenal mind/Umwelt. In particular, robot bodies (hardware) and 
control systems (software) are not at all integrated the way living 
bodies are. Robot bodies do, for example, not grow. Furthermore, 
Ziemke and Sharkey (2001) argued in detail that robots lack endo- 
semiosis and therefore also lack what T. von Uexküll et al. (1993) 
referred to as the neural counterbody, formed and updated in our brain 
as a result of the continual information flow of proprioceptive signs 
from the muscles, joints and other parts of our limbs, and thus giving 
rise to the experience of the living body as the center of our subjective 
reality. That means, even if you believe that such a humanoid was 
capable of exhibiting human-like behavior and having a phenomenal
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Umwelt, exactly what reasons are there to believe that the Umwelt 
would  be human-like?3
Does this mean that artificial minds (in the strong sense) are 
impossible? Of course it does not. Our conclusion from the first above 
argument is just like that of Searle (1980), that AI might very well be 
possible, but not with central cognitive processes implemented as 
computer programs, i.e. purely formally defined systems. The con­
clusion from the second above argument is that, taking embodiment 
seriously, and taking the bodily differences seriously, (a) humanoids 
are due to the lack of integration between body and software unlikely 
to be able to exhibit human-like behavior, and (b) even if they could, 
they would still be unlikely to do so with a human-like mind.
As discussed in detail elsewhere (Sharkey, Ziemke 1998, 2001; 
Ziemke, Sharkey 2001; Ziemke 1999, 2001), we believe that the key to 
understanding mind is to understand the autonomous and autopoietic, 
i.e. self-creating and -maintaining, nature of living systems (Maturana, 
Varela 1980). Autopoietic systems have a natural (rather than a 
metaphysical) kind of intentionality or aboutness in the sense that they 
are autonomous unities concerned with assimilation/dissimilation of 
material from/into their environment for the purpose of self-mainte­
nance and survival. Living systems are also far more integrated than the 
above humanoids in the sense that their ontogenesis does in fact start 
from a single cell from which they grow in a centrifugal fashion (Uex- 
küll 1982; cf. Ziemke, Sharkey 2001; Ziemke 2001). Hence, a more 
natural route towards artificial minds would be the attempt to create 
artificial autopoietic systems (cf. also Boden 1999). This would be very 
unlikely to result in systems even remotely similar to humans, but it 
would avoid the somewhat dualist/functionalist approach of building a 
hardware body and then trying to make it develop a software mind.
In sum, it has been argued here that robots, as long as they are 
allopoietic machines consisting of “dead” hardware bodies and com­
putational control programs, will not be able to develop intrinsic 
meaning or autonomy by means of some kind of artificial ontogenesis 
as envisioned by Zlatev (2001). The sign processes embedding living 
systems into their environment, on the other hand, as well as their
3 Elsewhere we have discussed in detail the relation to the case of Clever Hans 
(Sharkey, Ziemke 2001).
ontogenetic development, are intrinsically meaningful to themselves 
due to their autopoietic, self-creating and -maintaining nature.
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О эпигенезе у роботов и организмов: может ли 
у человекоподобного робота развиться 
человекоподобный Umwelt?
Статья рассматривает новейшие исследования, связанные с человекопо­
добными роботами, и мыслительные эксперименты, занимающиеся 
вопросом, до какой степени у подобных роботов может развиться 
человекопободное сознание, если вместо запрограммированности начи­
нать их обучать как детей, посредством общения со своей физической и 
социальной средой. Особенно интересен вопрос (как в семиотической  
так и когнитивно-научной перспективе), может ли таким образом у 
роботов выработаться основанный на опыте Umwelt, т.е. могут ли знако­
вые процессы, в которых они участвуют, стать внутренне значимыми 
для них самих? Рассматриваются аргументы как за, так и против 
возможности разных форм искусственного интеллекта и делается вывод, 
что область человекоподобных роботов нужно считать скорее “слабым” 
чем “сильным искусственным интеллектом”.
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Tähenduse epigeneesist robotitel ja organismidel: 
kas inimsarnasel robotil võiks areneda 
inim(sarnane)-omailm?
Käesolev artikkel käsitleb uuemaid uurimusi inimsamaste robotite vallas ning 
mõtte-eksperimente, mis tegelevad küsimusega, mil määral seesugustel 
roboteil võiks eeldatavasti areneda inimsarnane teadvus, kui ette program- 
meerituse asemel panna nad õppima —  suhtlemise kaudu oma füüsilise ja  
sotsiaalse keskkonnaga, nagu inimlapsed. Iseäranis huvipakkuv küsimus (nii 
semiootilisest kui ka kognitiivteaduslikust perspektiivist) on, kas seesugustel 
roboteil võiks areneda kogemuslik omailm, s.t kas märgiprotsessid, milles nad 
osalevad, võiksid saada neile enestele sisem iselt tähenduslikuks? Käsitletakse 
nii poolt- kui vastuargumente tehisvaimu erinevate vormide võimalikkuse 
suhtes ning järeldatakse, et inimsamaste robotite valdkonda tuleks pigem  
pidada “nõrgaks” kui “tugevaks tehisintellektiks”.
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Abstract. The concept of intrasemiotics designates the semiosis of the 
interpenetration between the biological and psychological autopoietic systems 
as Luhmann defines them in his theory. Combining a Peircian concept of 
semiosis with Luhmann’s theory in the framework of biosemiotics makes it 
possible for us to view the interplay of mind and body as a sign play. The 
recently suggested term ‘sign play’ pertains to ecosemiotics processes 
between animals of the same species stretching Wittgenstein’s language 
concept into the animal world of signs. With intrasemiotics there is an inner 
interplay. Lorenz in ethology has used the concept of motivation, and Uexküll 
the concept of tone, mostly describing the outgoing effect on perception and 
the reactions on perception. One could view intrasemiotics as the interplay 
between Lorenz’ biologically defined motivations and Freud’s Id, understood 
as the psychological aspect of many of the natural drives. In the last years of 
development of his theory Lorenz studied how emotional feedback can intro­
duce just a little learning through pleasurable feelings also into the instinctive 
systems because, as he reasoned, there must be some kind of reward going 
through instinctive movements, thus making the appetitive searching beha­
viour for sign stimuli possible. But he never found an acceptable way of 
modelling motivation in biological science. A cybersemiotic model may 
combine these approaches, defining various concepts of thoughtsemiotics, 
phenosemiotic and intrasemiotics, combining them with the already known 
concepts of exosemiotics, ecosemiotics, endosemiotics to an approach which 
studies the self-organising semiotic processes in living systems.
Introduction1
Peircian semiotics is specific from other semiotic paradigms in that it 
not only deals with intentional signs of communication but also encom­
passes non-intentional signs such as symptoms of the body and patterns 
of in-animate nature. Peircian semiotics breaks with the traditional 
dualistic epistemological problem of first order science by framing its 
basic concept of cognition, signification, on a triadic semiotic philo­
sophy. The triadic semiotics is integrated with a theory of continuity 
between mind and matter (synechism ) where the basic three categories 
(.Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness) are not only inside the per- 
ceivers mind, but also in the nature perceived. This is connected to the 
second important ontological belief in Peirce’s philosophy, namely 
tychism  that sees chance or chaos as a basic characteristic of Firstness. 
This is finally combined with an evolutionary theory of mind (agapism) 
where mind has a tendency to take habits in nature. Chaos or chance is 
seen as a First, which is not to be explained further (for instance by 
regularities). It is the basis of habit taking and evolution. The chaos of 
Firstness is not seen as the lack of law as in mechanicism and 
rationalism, but as something full of potential qualities to be manifested 
individually in Secondness and as general habits and knowledge in the 
dynamic objects and semiosis in Thirdness (Peirce 1992). This is the 
deep foundation of Peirce’s pragmatism. As a result of the initiative of 
Thomas Sebeok in biosemiotics, Peirce’s semiotics is now interpreted 
as covering all living signifying systems. Cybersemiotics is seen as a 
generalisation of biosemiotics using, among others, Niklas Luhmann’s 
work for further development.
Luhmann’s triadic autopoietic systems
Luhmann has generalised the autopoietic concept of Maturana and 
Varela (1980) to also comprise psychological thinking systems and 
socio-communicative systems. He views psyche as a silent inner
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1 The present article sums up and develops the ideas published in recent works 
(Brier 2001b , 2001c), and com bines these with a m otivational theory o f Brier (2000). 
Further, a visual model o f  the theory, inspired by Hermann H esse’s The Glass Bead 
Game, is developed, com bining writing and sym bolic visualisation to create a 
condensed expression o f the theory.
Intrasemiotics and cybersemiotics 115
system, a closed system of perception, emotions and volitions. A 
special linguistic system has to be created for communication to 
happen. Communication is again an organisationally closed system: 
only communication communicates. Social systems are communica­
tive systems with human bodies and minds as surroundings.
To Luhmann (1995), communication is a sequence of selections, 
namely of (1) information, (2) utterance, and (3) meaning. The two 
first have to be made by what we traditionally call ‘the sender’, the 
last one by the receiver. The receiver chooses the understanding of the 
signs produced, and then one could say that a message is produced 
when the receiver says something that the sender chooses to under­
stand as a confirmation of understanding of the intention of the 
sender’s first message. Finally, in a fourth selection the message is 
connected to present practice.
Although his view of information is partly based on Shannon’s 
concept, it differs from it in that Luhmann does not believe in its use 
outside human social communication. The information concept 
functions as a quantitative aspect within a meaningful human context. 
Further he combines the information with the aspect of utterance and 
meaning. Luhmann stresses that both the sender and the receiver have 
to make their choices to produce a meaningful message. Information is 
choices related to subject matter, utterance is choices pertaining to the 
way to say something, and meaning is the choices of interpretation of 
the listener of the human context. It is especially in the social com­
municative construction of meaning that Luhmann’s theory connects 
to semiotics. In the following I will reformulate it from a cyber- 
semiotic viewpoint.
The cybersemiotic view
One way to understand our inner mental world is to see it as a way of 
representing our bodily interactions with the environment through the 
constructions of a felt signification sphere. In this way, an individual 
point of view” as a center of cognition, interest, and interpretation is 
created. What Spinoza calls conatus, self-value and self-interest in 
preserving the individual’s and species’ self-organizing structure, is 
basic to living systems’ ability to signify. But this individual signifi­
cation sphere is again perturbed by the species specific social inter­
actions starting with mating, rearing of the young, competition for 
hunting territory, hierarchy in the group, co-operation in food 
gathering and hunting. These social interactive activities first generate 
sign games and, later in evolution, in humans, language games.
The construction or development of meaningful and informative 
messages has as a prerequisite autopoiesis, signification and conatus/ 
motivation/intentionality. It is only within this triad that the selections 
of information, utterance, and meaning are possible. I think that 
Luhmann’s theory has problems producing a concept of meaning that 
relates deeply to the flesh, blood, and life (conditions) of biological 
systems and to the existential conditions of human consciousness. 
Here, pragmatic language philosophy, like W ittgenstein’s language 
game theory and Lakoff and Johnson’s embodied cognitive semantics 
as combined with ethology, all seen within Peirce’s semantic frame­
work (Brier 2000), tell us that signs as concepts and classifications 
arise in our embodied biological and social “life forms”. From our 
inner world we express our bodily experiences in social relations.
Viewed in this way, Luhmann’s (1990) three autopoietic systems are 
all needed to create meaning of a message and one needs the sign 
concept to understand their interaction. One way of getting out of the 
impasse of Luhmann’s functionalism, where the role of body and mind 
in the production and meaning of social communication has not been 
adequately grasped by theory, is to view the interpenetration between 
the three organizationally closed systems semiotically. Signs acquire 
meaning where the systems interpenetrate. Interpenetration is Luh­
mann’s term for the interplay between the biological autopoiesis, the 
psychic closure and the socio-communicative system with its own clo­
sure at the social level. We can conclude that sign and language games 
arise on the basis o f the interpenetration o f the autopoietic systems.
Meaning is then seen as generated by the interpenetration of the 
systems. For example, language is a part of the socio-communicative 
system, but it does not really get a meaning before it interpenetrates 
with psychic system and gets to indicate differences of emotions, 
volitions and perceptions ‘putting words’ on our silent inner being. 
But our cognitive, emotional and volitional qualities would only have 
a weak connection to reality if they were not connected to the survival 
of the living systems’ organisation as a body in its interacting with the 
environment’s differences in the development of a signification sphere 
in the evolution of the species.
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Biosemiotics and metaphor theory have argued extensively for the 
importance of embodiment in semiosis (Brier 2001a). I have tried to 
show the connection between the biosemiotic (ethologically based) 
concept of motivation and the motivational concept of embodied 
cognitive semantics (Brier 2000). With the help of Figure 1 ,1 showed 
that ethology and embodied metaphor theory both have discovered 
that the conception of a sign as standing for something for somebody 
in a particular way is controlled by some releasing mechanism that 
connects motivation, perception and behavior/action into one systemic 
process as already Jakob von Uexküll (1957) described in his Funk­
tionskreis and, which Heinz von Foerster refers to as perceptual eigen­
values. Instinctually, the actual IRM (Innate Release Mechanism) is 
chosen through the urge coming from a specific motivation. This is 
again based on biological expectancies and vital needs, like for food 
and mating. I argue that the linguistic motivation that Lakoff and 
Johnson claim to control the ICM (Idealised Conceptual Models) have 
connection to the biological motivations in many instances. This is 
obvious in a much-used example where a woman classifies a man as a 
bachelor, and therefore as a potential mating partner. It is our bio- 
psychological embodiment that ties these relations together.
The analysis of Lorenz work showed that a phenomenological- 
emotional concept was necessary to understand the production of 
meaning. I want here to point out that this is consistent with Peirce’s 
placing of feeling as an attribute of Firstness.
Knowledge systems thus unfold from our bio-psycho-socio- 
linguistic conscious being. Their function is to help us to orient 
(ourselves) in the world and act together in a fruitful way, but they do 
not explain us to ourselves. I here see Peirce’s view, that we cannot 
split the concepts of mind and matter from the beginning, as a very 
sound and a profound basis for further analysis. I do not see any good 
reason why the inner world of cognition, emotions and volition should 
not be accepted as just as real as the physical world as well as our 
cultural world of signs and meaning. Finally to both the spiritualist 
and the materialistic, embodied life, even with only one cell as the 
body, has to be a basic part of, or a component of constructing a 
reality. We are thinking in, or maybe even with the body. The psyche 
and its inner world arise within and between biological systems or 
bodies. With Peirce one may say that there will always be some kind 
of psyche in any kind of biological autopoietic and code dual system.
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Still, a partly autonomous inner world of emotions, perceptions and 
volitions, only seems to arise in multi-cellular chordates with a central 
nervous system. Lorenz (1973) argues that such a system with 
emotions and experiences of pleasure is necessary for animals to have 
appetitive behavior, searching for the objects or situations that can 
elicit their instinctual behavior and release the motivational urge built 
up behind it. This is qualitatively different from how reflexes function 
on a signal, which is a proto-semiotic informational level. The sign 
function of instincts is on a genuine semiotic level.
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Figure 1. Shows the relation between linguistic motivation and instinctive 
motivation in animal behavior by relating animal and human signification through 
a biosemiotic framework combining knowledge from ethology and embodied 
cognitive semantics. It is suggested that although animals do not have language 
games, they have sign games. Semiosis is thus going on in two different levels in 
animals and humans. But in both cases it is embodied and basic biological 
motivation has a role to play although other forces (cultural) are additional 
influential on the linguistic level. The figure points to the similarity between the 
ethological concept of IRM (innate release response) and the cognitive semantic 
concept o f ICM (idealized cognitive model) as postulated structures guiding 
motivational attention and ideas of iconicity. The figure is quoted from (Brier 
2000) where further explanation is to be found.
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I consider the contribution of cybersemiotics as mainly being the 
clearing up of the metaphysical background of both cybernetics and 
semiotics to make it possible to place cybernetics and semiotics in 
relation to each other, especially in their modem versions of second 
order cybernetics and autopoiesis theory on one hand, and as bio­
semiotics on the other. Cybersemiotic has further accepted the concept 
of motivation and embodiment as an important part of the biosemiotic 
communication concept. As argued above, embodiment and motivation 
are seen as important common aspects between the sign games of animals 
and the language games of humans, thus integrating biosemiotics with the 
cognitive-semantic embodied metaphor theory of Lakoff and Johnson, 
and with the elder Wittgenstein’s language philosophy.
Luhmann’s theory of the human socio-communicative being 
consisting of three levels of autopoiesis can be used in cybersemiotics 
to distinguish between (1) the languaging (Maturana) of the biological 
systems, which is the coordination of coordination of behaviors 
between individuals of a species on the reflexive signal level, (2) the 
motivation driven sign games of the bio-psychological systems and, 
finally, (3) the well driven language games level of the self-conscious 
linguistic human in generalized media of the socio-communicative 
systems. A semiotic understanding has thus been added to Luhmann’s 
conception, and his theory is placed in the Peircian triadic meta­
physics. This leads to formulation of a number of new distinctions and 
concepts.
Intrasemiotics
It is obvious that what we call language games arise in social contexts 
where we use our mind to coordinate our willful actions and urges 
with fellow members of the culture. Some of these language games 
are then about our conceptions of nature, filtered through our common 
culture and language. But underneath that, we also have emotional and 
instinctual bio-psychological sign games (Brier 1995). These function 
for humans as unconscious paralinguistic signs such as facial mimics, 
hand movement gestures and body positions with an origin in the 
evolution of species-specific signification processes in living systems.
Simultaneously, we have also an internal communication going on 
between our mind and body. In Luhmann’s version it is something
120 S0ren Brier
different from what Kull (1998) calls psychosom atics, as it is not a 
direct interaction with culture but only with the psyche. On the other 
hand it is not only endosem iosis. The terms endosemiosis and exo- 
semiosis were probably both coined by Sebeok (1976: 3), endose­
miosis denoting the semiosis, which takes place inside the organisms, 
and exosem iosis being the sign process that occurs between orga­
nisms. Endosemiosis became a common term in semiotic discourse 
(see Uexküll et al. 1993), meaning a semiotic interaction at a purely 
biological level between cells, tissues and organs. Nöth and Kull 
(2000) introduced the term ecosemiotics, specifically for the signifi­
cation process of non-intentional signs from the environment or other 
living beings that takes a meaning for another organism that is, for 
instance, hunting. Thus a sign signifying an organism as a suitable 
prey is not intentionally emitted by the organism preyed on, and is 
therefore rather endosemiotic than ecosemiotic. What can we then call 
the internal semiotic interaction between the biological and the 
psychological systems?
The interaction between the psyche and the linguistic system I call 
thought sem iotics. This is where our culture through concepts offers 
us possible classifications of our inner state of feelings, perceptions 
and volitions. These, in their non-conceptual or pre-linguistic states is 
not recognized by conceptual consciousness, I call phenosemiotic 
processes. For short I just call them phenosemiosis.
As the interactions between the psyche and the body are internal 
bodily, but not pure biological as in endosemiotics, I call the semiotic 
aspect of this interpenetration between the biological and the psycho­
logical autopoiesis intrasemiotics. These different names are coined to 
remind us that we deal with different kinds of semiotics. In the future, 
we have to study more specifically the way semiosis is created in each 
instance.
Today we know that there are semiotic interactions between the 
hormone systems, the transmitters in the brain and the immune system 
and that their interactions are very important for the establishment of 
the autopoietic system of second order, which a multicellular 
organism constructs. Its parts are cells that themselves are autopoietic 
systems and these are again on a new level organized to an autopoietic 
system. But we do not know very well what the relations are from our 
lived inner world of feelings, volitions and intensions to this system. It 
seems that certain kinds of attention on bodily functions, such as
imaging, can create physiological effects in this combined system. As 
mentioned above, this is partly carried by different substances that 
have a sign effect on organs and specific cell types in the body 
(endosemiotics). We also know that our hormonal level influences our 
sexual and maternal responses. Fear turns on a series of chemicals that 
change the state and reaction time of several body functions, and so 
on. This is a very significant part of the embodiment of our mind, but 
intrasemiosis seem to function as a meta-pattern of endosemiotic 
processes. For example, our state of mind determines our body posture 
through the tightness of our muscles. There is a subtle interplay 
between our perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and bodily state, working 
among other things through the reticular activation system. There is 
still a lot we do not know about the interaction between these systems.
The nervous system, the hormonal system and the immune system 
seem to be incorporated into one big self-organized sign web. Now, 
the autopoietic description of living cybernetic systems with closure 
does not really open for sign production per se , and semiotics in itself 
does not reflect very much about the role of embodiment in creating 
signification. Thus, the cybersemiotic suggestion to solve this problem 
is that signs are produced when the systems interpenetrate in different 
ways. The three closed systems produce different kinds of semiosis 
and signification through different types of interpenetration, plus a 
level of structural couplings and cybernetic ‘languaging’, as Maturana 
and Varela (1980) call it.
The autopoiesis theory underlines that two interpenetrating 
systems are closed black boxes to each other. But Maturana points out 
that interpenetration develops over time to a coordination of co­
ordination of behavior that he calls languaging. By then reciprocal 
structural coupling has formed between the two systems where signs 
can be produced and exchanged. Maturana’s concept of languaging 
seems to be the bio-psychological connection between two individuals 
in a social species. But it is not the sign and/or language game as such; 
it is the cognitive coupling that is the coordination necessary for 
communication to develop as a signification system with its own 
organizational closure. I would, therefore, suggest that we distinguish 
between languaging and sign games at the level between reflexes and 
instinctual movements. The perception eliciting reflexes is indepen­
dent of motivation, whereas the perception of sign stimuli is 
motivation-dependent, which leads into the instinctual sign games.
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Ethologists would here point to how certain instinctual movements 
become ritualized and get a release value for instinctive behavior as 
‘sign-stimuli’. As Lorenz (1973), in his last period, realized that 
emotions had to be connected to the performances of instinctual 
movements to create the motivational urge of appetitive behavior, we 
here have criteria to distinguish between the two levels. We here see 
how the connection between signs and internal or phenomenological 
understanding is constructed. Lakoff (1987), and Lakoff and Johnson 
(1998) have shown how this basic mechanism of bodily meaning can 
be extended by the workings of metaphorical processes to encompass 
socially and culturally produced signs.
Based on ethology and biosemiotics it appears that our cognition 
manifests itself as embodied semiosis, motivated in our biological 
social interest that is a powerful creator of structure and meaning in 
our signification sphere. Most animal behavior is —  like much of our 
linguistic categorizations and use of metaphors —  considered to be 
unconscious. Still ethologists had to realize that motivation is not a 
physiological concept (Brier 1992, 1998), emotional experiences are 
connected to the perception and behaviors with an instinctive basis.
Sign games are developed into language games through evolution 
and in the life of the infant human. As we are born and grow into 
human social communication the psyche is perfused with signs. Our 
mind is infected with language and we become semiotic cyborgs or 
what we call humans. We are in this view born as animals with a 
capacity to construct this interpenetration between the psychic and 
socio-communicative systems, creating internal interpretants that are 
meaningful to us because of the mutual structural couplings of 
languaging established in evolution.
Meaning is seen in biosemiotics, cognitive semantics, autopoiesis 
theory and ethology as embodied. But with the new cybernetics and 
Uexkiill, I suggest that embodiment is thought of as much broader 
than only the structure of the nervous system, or even the integration 
of the neurotransmitter, the hormone and the immune systems through 
reaction to common sign substances that they secrete. As Fogh 
Kirkeby (1997) suggests, we should look at the body-mind or the 
body-thought as a complex phenomenological dynamical system, 
including the construction of the environment and the other (body- 
mind) systems that make it possible for signification to appear.
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Realising that a signification sphere not only pertains to the 
environment, but also to the perception of other members of the 
species in cultural and proto-cultural behaviour as well as to 
perceptions of own mind and body hood, I use a little ‘eco’ as a prefix 
to the signification sphere, when it is the aspect of it pertaining 
especially to non-intentional nature and culture outside the species in 
question. Both in in-animate nature, in other species and in cultural 
processes, we can observe differences that signify meaning to us, 
although never intended by the object where we will sum up the 
concepts developed so far).
A cybersemiotic model for biosemiotics
I conclude the article by putting the mentioned and new developed 
concepts together in a rather complicated model. By symbolically 
placing the concepts on, between and outside the various parts of the 
human body I am visualizing the difference for instance between 
levels of semiosis and signalling, exosemiotic and internal semiotic 
processes. The meaning is to provide a visual overview for those that 
like this. Those that only see simplifications and limitations in models 
like this can just skip it.
See Figure 2 for an overview of the cybersemiotic concepts built 
up so far. On the left side we see only the cybemetic-autopoietic- 
functionalistic described processes. In the middle we see the commu­
nicative aspects or the exosemiotics between two organisms. On the 
right we then look at the intemal-semiotics of the organism. Finally to 
the far right we look at the organism’s perceptual connections to the 
environment, creating its signification sphere. With Nöth and Kull 
(2000) we call this signification aspect ecosemiotics.
Ecosemiotics focuses on the part of our language that is about how 
all living systems represent nature in signification spheres, ending 
with language games in culture. Cybersemiotics points out that the 
basis of these eco-language games is the eco-sign games of animals, 
combined with a signification sphere (originally called ‘Umwelt’ by 
Uexküll), created through evolution. Further, these are based on an 
intricate interplay between the living system and its environment, 
establishing what Maturana and Varela call structural couplings. The 
signification sphere is a workable model of nature for this living
system that as a species has existed and evolved through millions of 
years. This is also true for the human species, indicating that our 
language has a deep inner connection to the ecology of our culture. 
Any existing culture is a collective way of making a social system 
survive ecologically. As such, the cybersemiotic theory of mind, 
perception and cognition is a realistic one, but not a materialistic or 
mechanistic one. It builds on an inner semiotic connection between 
living beings, nature, culture and consciousness carried by the three 
Peircian categories in a synechistic and tychastic ontology in an 
agapastic theory of evolution delivering a philosophy going beyond 
the dualistic oppositions between idealism (for instance in the form of 
spiritualism) and materialism (for instance in the form of mechanism).
Based on the concept relations in figure 2 we can go back to figure
1 and now see that the linguistic motivation must be placed in the area 
of thought-semiotics where our internal non-linguistic phenosemiotic 
processes of mind meet with the concepts of language and imbue them 
with inner meaning. Whereas the animal motivation stems from the 
intrasemiotic area where the endosemiotic processes of the body cells 
meet with the phenosemiotic processes of mind and awareness. The 
cybersemiotic model thus provides a conceptual framework, in which 
these different levels of motivation can be represented and 
distinguished (in a way that was seemingly not possible in the earlier 
three different frameworks of biology, psychology and socio-culture). 
Thus by viewing meaning in an evolutionary light as always 
embodied, and seeing the body as semiotically organized in Peirce’s 
triadic worldview, where mind as pure feeling is Firstness, a 
transdisciplinary framework can be constructed that supersedes some 
of the limitations of the earlier divisions of subject areas. This was my 
goal, when I started these quests in the early eighties, when the depth 
of the problem of motivation in ethology dawned upon me. This gives 
us hope that the cybersemiotic development of biosemiotics can con­
tribute to an inter- and transdisciplinary semiotic theory of infor­
mation, cognition, communication and consciousness.
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CYBERSEMIOTICS
AUTOPOIESIS
EXO-
SEMIOTICS
INTERNAL
SEMIOSIS
ECO-
SEMIOTICS
Figure 2. The cybersemiotic model classifying different types of semiosis and 
proto-semiotic processes. The semiotic language here is symbolic not iconic. Thus 
localization of the processes has nothing to do with the actual bodily locations as 
the head, for instance, is also a part of the biological autopoiesis, and has endo- 
semiotic processes. To limit the complexity, I have placed most of the cybernetic- 
autopoietic concepts on the left person and all the semiotic ones at the person to 
the right. But all concepts concern both persons. Each person is placed in a 
signification sphere. When these are combined through socio-communicative 
autopoietic language games a common signification sphere of culture is created. 
The vertical gradient is symbolically referring to basic biological processes as 
lower or more basic than linguistic conscious processes. Underneath language 
games is the biological level of instinctually based sign games, and under that, the 
cybernetic languaging game of the coordination of coordination of behavior. The 
higher levels are seen as depending on the function of the lower. The autopoietic 
view is seen as describing functionality and the semiotic meaning producing and 
exchanging processes. To get the concepts explained you will have to refer to the 
articles text. If, from this model, we go back to Figure 1, we can now place the 
linguistic motivations in the area of thought semiotics and the animal motivation 
in the intra-semiotic area.
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Интрасемиотика и киберсемиотика
Концепция интрасемиотики указывает на семиозис при взаимопро­
никновении биологических и психологических автопойэтических сис­
тем, как это определяется в теории Луманна. Комбинирование в рамках 
биосемиотики пирсовской концепции семиозиса с теорией Луманна 
делает возможным рассмотрение игры разума и тела как игры знаков. 
Недавно предложенный термин “игра знаков” указывает на экосемио- 
тичсские процессы между особами одного вида, распространяя таким 
образом витгенштейновскую концепцию языка на знаковый мир живот­
ных. В этологии Лоренц использовал понятие мотивации, а Юкскюлль 
понятие тона, описывая выделяющееся влияние перцепции и связанные 
с перцепцией реакции. Интрасемиотику можно рассматривать и как 
связь между биологически определяемой мотивацией у Лоренца и 
понятием Id Фрейда, понимая это как психологический аспект многих 
естественных стремлений. В последние годы своей жизни Лоренц 
изучал, каким образом эмоциональная обратная связь может 
посредством приятных ощущений в определенной степени вызывать 
переход выученного в систему инстинктов. Он утверждал, что инстинк­
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тивные движения должны сопровождаться каким-либо поощрением, что 
привело бы к возникновению прочной связи между поведением, 
связанным с поисками пищи и определенными знаковыми стимулами. 
Но он так и не нашел подходящий модус для описания мотивации в 
биологических науках. Киберсемиотика может объединить эти подходы, 
дефинируя разные концепции семиотики мышления, фено- и интра- 
семиотики и комбинируя их с уже известными концепциями экзо-, эко- 
и эндосемиотики для подхода, изучающего самоорганизирующие про­
цессы в живых системах.
Intrasemiootika ja kübersemiootika
Intrasemiootika kontseptsioon osutab sem ioosile bioloogiliste ja psühholoo­
giliste autopoeetiliste süsteemide põimumisel, nii nagu seda määratleb Luh­
mann oma teoorias. Kombineerides biosemiootika raames Peirce’ i semioosi 
kontseptsiooni Luhmanni teooriaga, saab võimalikuks keha ja vaimu 
vastasmängu vaatlemine märgimänguna. Hiljuti väljapakutud termin ‘märgi- 
mäng’ viitab sama liigi isendite vahel toimuvatele ökosemiootilistele protses­
sidele, laiendades nii Wittgensteini keelekontseptsiooni loomade märgimaa- 
ilmale. Etoloogias on Lorenz kasutanud motivatsiooni mõistet ja Uexküll 
tooni mõistet, kiijeldades pertseptsiooni väljaulatuvat m õjuja pertseptsioonile 
osakssaavaid reaktsioone. Intrasemiootikat võib vaadelda ka seosena Lorenzi 
bioloogiliselt defineeritud motivatsiooni ja Freudi Id-i vahel, käsitledes seda 
kui mitmete looduslike ajede psühholoogilist aspekti. Oma teooria viimastel 
arendamisaastatel uuris Lorenz, kuidas emotsionaalne tagasiside võib meel­
divate tundmuste kaudu teataval määral põhjustada õpitu kinnitumist 
instinktide süsteemi. Ta väitis, et instinktiivsete liigutustega peab kaasnema 
mingit tüüpi hüvitis, mis võimaldaks toiduotsimisega seonduva käitumise 
kinnistumist teatavatele märgilistele stiimulitele. Kuid ta ei leidnudki vastu­
võetavat teed kirjeldamaks motivatsiooni bioloogiateadustes. Kübersemioo­
tika võib need lähenemised ühendada, defineerides mõttesemiootika, feno- 
sem iootika ja intrasemiootika erinevaid kontseptsioone ning kombineerides 
neid juba teadaolevate eksosemiootika, ökosemiootika ja endosemiootika 
kontseptsioonidega lähenemiseks, mis uurib iseorganiseeruvaid protsesse 
elussüsteemides.
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Back to the science of life
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Abstract: We give a survey of epistemological and ontological approaches 
that have left traces in the 20th-century biology. A common motive of most of 
them is the effort to incorporate biology into the realm of physical sciences. 
However, such attempts failed, and must fail in the future, unless the criterion 
for what science is becomes biologically oriented. This means broadening the 
realm of classical natural sciences, incorporating at least part of the thesaurus 
of the “humanities”. We suggest three mutually complementary candidates for 
further development in this direction: modular biology, the hermeneutics of 
the living, and the semiotic disciplines.
In the bitterness o f  their victory over  
their clerical opponents, [ the b io log is ts] 
have made the m eaninglessness o f  the 
universe into a new dogma.
Dyson (1979: 249-250)
Recently, we have witnessed a number of strange terminological 
shifts, where the subject of particular science becomes confounded 
with the science itself. Thus psychology means both mental pheno­
mena and the science studying them, a piece of fine organic chemistry 
was needed when life originated on the planet, and the same holds for, 
say, physiology, ecology, botany, or even biology as such. But 
observing that a plant is growing is not biology yet, nor speaking 
about one’s feelings and thoughts is psychology. The scope of a
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special science is alw ays more limited than its subject. Life is not only 
biology, mind is not the same as psychology.
This does not mean that special sciences deal simply with a mere 
subset of traits characteristic for their subject. An established science, 
if creative , will also create new phenomena appropriate for the current 
set of paradigms held at the time. Monoclonal antibodies, inbred 
clones of mice, or a single species of protein in a test tube are 
constructs of a special science —  biology. Such constructs, and 
models based thereon, may provide extremely efficient tools, models 
and maps, enabling description and understanding of certain aspects of 
reality. However, any model —  scientific or otherwise —  is no more 
and no less than a caricature of the real world, and we should remain 
aware of the limits of its validity. Paradoxes and inconsistencies 
between a model and observation may indicate either a principal fault, 
or a mere transgression of the limits of model applicability. As Sidney 
Brenner (1997: 36) noted, Occam’s razor should always be 
accompanied by Occam’s broom —  to sweep the cut bits under the 
carpet. A substantial part of model formulation concerns defining the 
borders of the carpet —  i.e. the part of world where our models make 
sense.
Within the realm of natural sciences, biology has always held a 
strange position. Not all features of the living could be forced to meet 
the stringent measures of “hard” science, as exemplified by classical 
physics. It is not because spontaneity, evolution of complex systems, 
historicity, or even meaning were absent from the non-living realm. It 
is because during the last three centuries, modern science had chosen 
to ignore such appearances as mere epiphenomena of “real”, objective, 
fully knowable causal laws acting in the background. For biology, 
however, the task to meet such criteria was even harder than for other 
experimental sciences: evolution and ontogeny always tended to 
escape any general rules. Here we shall try to show how various 
schools of biological thought try to negotiate the paradox.
Besides such “physicalist” attempts, there always existed a 
respectable tradition of philosophical thinking that pinned down those 
properties of the lived world (Lebenswelt) which resist “collapsing” 
into the schemes of physical sciences and “biology” derived thereof.
In this article we shall treat briefly some of the numerous 20th-century 
attempts to found biology in a way which would respect specificity of 
the living realm, yet take advantage of the methodological armoury of
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“hard” sciences. All such attempts represent different ways of 
projecting the teeming realm of the living onto a kind of map, or better 
grid or matrix, containing limited number of dimensions and therefore 
methodically manageable. The examples chosen are mostly balancing 
on the edge between turning life into physics, or jumping out of the 
physical world altogether. This “living on the edge” is, of course, 
inherent to the very realm of life (Kauffman 1993). However, 
depending on the factors taken into account, it can project into 
substantially different conceptions of the “science of life”. All of them 
necessarily carry a burden of some sort of bias. Depending on what 
axes were selected for the projection, we obtain different models of 
life, often incompatible, at least to some respects, with other models.
As an alternative, we give in the second part a short survey of 
biosemiotics, as we understand it. In the third part we attempt to 
formulate outlines of another two “grids” which we consider to be 
best fitted, at present, for understanding the realm of the living, 
namely modular biology and hermeneutics of the living (undoubtedly 
charged with their own biases).
1. Physicalism
We use this somewhat ugly term to encompass all the worldviews 
based on the conviction that all natural phenomena are subject to 
eternal, immutable laws. In biology, there have existed several great 
schools of physicalism, differing in how they were able to treat the 
historical dimension of life. We will proceed from mechanicism and 
its branch through biological structuralism, vitalism and organicism, 
to biology as understood by two contemporary authors: Mae-Wan Ho 
and Stuart A. Kauffman. We will discuss the extent to which the 
explanatory scheme of these branches relies to objective existence of 
immutable, once-for-all given laws (objective in the sense “existing 
out there”, not merely “agreed by peers”), compared to free 
exploration and invention within the space of meanings.
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Mechanicism
A mechanism is a projection of the world into the geometrical space. 
Making use of a device —  mechanical or not —  means understanding 
causal interdependencies of its parts, i.e. being in principle able to 
characterize them by a set of (simple) mathematical equations. It 
should be stressed that mechanical functioning could never be 
reconciled with historicity, introduced by evolution. The clockwork 
functioning of the world was the leading idea in natural sciences up to 
the end of the 19th century. This ethos began to crumble with the 
onset of modem physics and mathematics. Moreover, hand by hand 
with mechanism always goes the question after its creator.
Owing to trifles of history, the mainstream biology has remained 
the stronghold of mechanicism long into the 20th century. This, 
surprisingly, persists despite the fact that biologists fully acknowledge 
evolution as the principal formative force shaping the realm of the 
living. The uneasy compromise was helped by extreme reductionism 
ending in atomism, both chemical (molecular behaviour) and con­
ceptual (contemporary evolutionary genetics). It is true, the argument 
goes, that at the macroscopic level we observe intentionality, free will, 
historicity and the like, but all these are nothing but epiphenomena 
safely grounded in the mechanical behaviour of molecules — i.e. 
something fully predictable from the initial and boundary conditions. 
Yet chance may enter at this level, be it genuine chance, measure of 
our ignorance, or some tricks implemented from the quantum world. If 
we, however, succeed to set such appearances, which are felt as 
disturbances, aside, or if we succeed to suppress them experimentally, 
we should end up essentially with predictable, truly objectively 
accessible world. All phenomena at the macroscopic scale of both 
space and time can be explained as causal consequences of either 
elementary mechanical movements, or genetic instructions read and 
executed blindly by mechanical protein contraptions.
Contemporary mechanistic thought in biology is characterised by 
two pillars: (1) molecular biology as taught by Jacques Monod (1979), 
and (2) sociobiology epitomized by the name of Edward O. Wilson 
(1998). Yet even in such strongholds of mechanicist thinking we can 
follow a strange —  albeit rarely reflected —  shift away from hard 
science and towards semiotics. Monod introduced the concept of 
gratuity, which, by all measures, cannot be acknowledged as
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belonging to chemistry. It is rather a description how molecules 
become symbols. The nature of molecules as chemical entities sud­
denly plays only a marginal role: they serve as a mere medium to store 
or deliver meaning. Sociobiology, in turn, gave birth to memetics, 
which parts even with the last bonds of the causal molecular world 
and becomes a free game of symbols (Dawkins 1989; Blackmoore 
2000). By these and similar moves even the mainstream of biology 
may have transgressed its own horizon long ago.
Biological structuralism
Structures, the central concept of (biological) structuralism, can again 
be viewed as a kind of reduction —  projection —  collapse of the 
multi-dimensional space onto a construct. This time it is not the 3D 
Cartesian space of the mechanicists. Instead of invariant molecules 
and kinetic laws, invariance is supplied by implementations of 
structures into the lived world (see, e.g., Webster, Goodwin 1996). 
Evolution and morphogenesis is viewed as a result of lawful (i.e. in 
principle, as in the previous case, fully knowable) transformations of 
ever-existing and unchangeable structure. The structure is a system of 
relationships that always has existed, and its transformation proceeds 
according to fixed rules (although this does not mean that transfor­
mations themselves are given in advance —  only the rules are conser­
vative, not the outcomes). Knowledge of rules of (trans)formation 
allows one to analyse the order of formations of things, and the 
principal task is to find these rules.
Structuralism also stresses the relationship between the whole and 
its parts: a thing is to be understood not as a single fact or term, but as 
a totality, and only as such it has any meaning. Its parts gain their 
meaning only from their position in the whole structure. If we succeed 
in deciphering the nature of the relationships between the parts and the 
whole, we get a model of a given structure. Such a model will become 
a formal analogue of all models organized by that structure; thus it 
makes it possible to unify even domains which, at first sight, have 
nothing in common (for example various mathematical theories). In 
science, the structuralist approach is an attempt to overcome —  or 
better, complement or correct —  explanations based on the reduction
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to the molecular level. Each level of description becomes the basic 
level with its own structural laws.
It is important to realize that the system of transformations — in 
the structuralists’ interpretation, is closed ; it develops and becomes 
enriched because of inherent rules that are independent of outside 
influences. At the same time it does not allow the structure to 
transgress the limits pre-set by rules. Novelties may appear only if 
they have always been virtually present as potentials of the structure. 
Historical events, i.e. trajectories of the system in time, cannot change 
the rules —  otherwise no structured space would exist, but only a kind 
of eternal flow akin to the Heracleitan River. From a postulate of the 
self-sufficiency of a structure it follows that a structure can be totally 
known in itself, without any need to refer to elements outside the 
structure.
In a closer view, the very notion of virtual presence brings about 
problems. “Virtual presence” is not objective: the structure is a mere 
point in the space of possibilities. This space is teeming with 
possibilities, also mutually exclusive ones, in a kind of superposition. 
Structuralists tend to stress that any decision, selection or interpre­
tation results in a collapse from this space into a single solution, thus 
revealing a preexisting attractor. But we might ask whether the system 
of transformations could not be open, endlessly creating new 
possibilities —  and new structures.
Structuralism, as physics and as molecular biology, is seeking what 
is timeless, fixed, and constant: the grammar and the vocabulary of 
a given language or of a given phenotype. Evolution and morpho­
genesis become a system of fixed and lawful (i.e. objectively 
decipherable) transformations where no contingency is allowed. We 
end with a kind of rational morphology supported by mathematics.
The aim is thus similar to that of physicalism. However, in contrast 
to mechanicism, structuralism has no ambition to reduce biology to 
physics. Biological phenomena stay in their own “causal domain’ 
(Havel 1996), without reference to other domains of description. 
Physics is attractive because it supplies examples (analogies) how to 
build a rational taxonomy without any need for history. To disclose 
such an order for the realm of living beings should be — according to 
structuralism —  the principal goal of all biologists. Hence, biology 
should break away from the flaws of historicity and finally transform 
itself into a true science worth of physicalists’ criteria.
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The vitalists’ endeavour (here we present mainly views held by one of 
its main protagonists among the biologists, Hans Driesch (1905, 1914, 
1929)) was also to encompass the phenomenon of life into the body of 
physical science. Vitalism is a conviction that life processes are 
autonomous, i.e. understandable only in the context of the living, not 
from some “simpler” levels, such as that of chemistry. But these 
autonomous processes, themselves, are also governed by a fully 
describable principle(s). Life, as a property of a living body, is in no 
way the result of physico-chemical events, but rather a ruler of those. 
This, however, does not mean that spontaneity or even free will 
should be allowed for.
The vitalists therefore felt a need to find and define principles 
controlling vital processes; they always stressed that such principles 
should be expressed as measurable variables, being in simple 
mathematical relations to magnitudes already known. Thus, the 
priority was, again, to discover simple laws that govern life, i.e. to 
broaden the realm of physics to be able to embed life more completely 
into it. This quest can best be demonstrated by their rejection of 
Darwinian theory: they held that introducing historical contingencies 
into pure science was unacceptable!
Driesch, as one of the pioneers of experimental embryology and 
discoverer of regulatory processes in early embryos, centres his efforts 
on the explanation of regeneration. To understand such phenomena, 
one has to presume the existence of harmony (causal, structural or 
functional) and purposiveness in organisms. His aim was to prove this 
assumption.
When in the 1920s it became obvious that vitalism had become 
depleted of explanatory potential and dogmatic, i.e. of no practical use 
in experimental science, the term organicism  was coined instead in the 
1930s (Bertalanffy 1960). Its aim, again, was to explain the obvious 
fact of emergent properties of complex systems, encountered on the 
way from a “lower” level of description to a “higher” one. This tamed 
form of vitalism survived in developmental biology for the rest of the 
century and, according to Gilbert and Sarkar (2000) will also have 
much to say in the century coming.
Perhaps it will, but we do not see much difference between the 
organicist statement “Different laws are appropriate for each level of
Vitalism and organicism
description”, and the vitalist “There are life-specific laws”. In our 
opinion, the controversy —  often very heated —  between mecha- 
nicism, vitalism and organicism could perhaps have been resolved on 
a purely terminological ground. Not much will change if we, instead 
of proposing “autonomous laws of the living realm”, speak of 
expanding physics and chemistry in order to accommodate life, 
pointing to generally accepted instances of such previous expansions, 
such as the whole area of organic chemistry. Moreover organicist 
statements can also easily be applied to any complex dissipative 
system, which means that they do not provide the answer to the basic 
question: “W hat is the difference between the living and the non­
living?” Is our understanding sharper if we speak of information, 
com plexity, or structure without having clear idea of the meaning of 
such words?
The anxiety not to leave the Cartesian world “where the laws of 
chemistry and (Newtonian) physics rule” is, in our opinion, con­
demned to failure. If biology, psychology and similar areas of human 
knowledge are to become sciences with a status similar to physics, 
they ought to abandon their vain attempt to confine biology into the 
Cartesian space and do what physics did several decades ago: 
transcend it.
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“Enlightened physicalism” of M.-W. Ho:
Introducing the concepts of quantum physics
One possibility how to do this may be encompassing, at last, the 20th 
century developments in physics. Quantum physics has turned the 
traditional question after material structures upside down and started 
to ask after the structure of matter, opening thereby perspectives 
unavailable to classical physics. Surprisingly, few biologists took this 
challenge seriously. Mae-Wan Ho in her earlier works (see, for 
example 1993, 1994) makes a serious attempt to describe living 
beings in terms of self-structuring fields. Inspired by the Fröhlich 
theory of resonance (see, for example, Р о ко ту  1995), she sees living 
beings as coherent systems synchronized through many levels of 
organization.
According to Ho, organisms can be characterised by high-effi- 
ciency energy transfers with minimum losses. She interprets this fact
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as evidence that energy transformations in living beings are of a 
different order from those described by standard chemical kinetics. 
The latter are defined for reactions in homogenous space involving 
very high numbers of molecules, and characterized by quantities based 
on the averaging of states of large numbers of particles (temperature, 
concentration, free energy, entropy, etc.). Such quantities, however, 
cannot be defined for the interior of living cells —  they have no 
meaning there, because the space within the cell is highly structured. 
Evidence for the presence of elaborate —  almost crystal-like —  order 
within living things is seen in the observation that live cells, unlike 
dead ones, exhibit optical polarization. This means that cells do not 
contain anything like homogeneous solutions (see also Hess, Mik­
hailov 1995, 1996, or any current textbook, for support of this notion; 
compare also the concept of evolution based on non-ergodicity in 
Kauffman 2000).
In such a highly ordered space, huge numbers of molecules (of the 
order of 1020) interact in a coherent (i.e. coordinated, nonlocal) 
manner, ensuring extreme efficiency of energy transfers. Ho assumes 
that the coherence present in organisms is quantum in nature, and 
interprets living beings as highly coherent systems, interconnected 
through many spatial (10“1°-10 l m) and temporal (10-14-1 0 7 s) orders. 
Although she is far from providing conclusive evidence for the 
involvement of quantum phenomena, we believe that her introduction 
of quantum physics concepts into biology represents a hopeful way of 
transcending the mechanistic worldview.
“Enlightened physicalism” of S. Kauffman:
Introducing history
Stuart A. Kauffman (1993, 2000), in contrast to concepts discussed 
above, fully recognizes the creativity and historicity of the physical 
realm. He started with modelling the dynamics of very complex 
systems, and showed that such systems have an inherent property of 
becoming self-organized and evolving. He therefore maintains that, in 
evolution, order (structure) will establish itself “for free”, in spite o f  
natural selection. From the mathematical world of models Kauffman 
made a decisive step to the physical world and attempted to find laws 
that would govern the evolution of a non-ergodic world. Kauffman’s
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key concept is the autonomous agent, defined as an entity able of self- 
reproduction and of performing work cycles —  i.e. canalising the flow 
of energy. An autonomous agent, in addition, can act on its own behalf 
in the sense that it evolves towards maximizing the efficiency of both 
these essential functions. Obviously, any living being belongs to the 
category of autonomous agents. What, however, should the properties 
of a physical system be for it to be able to act on its own behalf, i.e. to 
become an autonomous agent? Such a system must be able to increase 
its own organization.
But this is not the end of the story: autonomous agents are busy 
manipulating the surrounding world in order to maximize its diversity, 
co-constructing thereby a biosphere: “Biospheres persistently increase 
the diversity of what can happen next” (Kauffman 2000: 4). The 
configuration space of a biosphere cannot be defined in advance.
It does not, however, mean that biospheres are heading towards 
chaotic and unlimited diversity. Reaching out and making a living 
means making sensible choices from the space of possibilities created. 
We stress the word choices as an opposite to necessity imposed by 
natural selection: informed choice is unthinkable without the 
historical, experiential, hermeneutical dimension.
Kauffman tried to decipher lawful properties behind co- 
constructing biospheres, and he suggests the tentative 4th law” of 
thermodynamics. “As an average trend, biospheres and the universe 
create novelty and diversity as fast as they can manage to do so 
without destroying the accumulated propagating organization which is 
the basis and nexus from which further novelty is discovered and 
incorporated into propagating organization” (Kauffman 2000: 85).
Is this vitalism? If we take Driesch as a reference, the answer is no. 
There is, in Kauffman, no sign of the stiff physicalism so typical of 
Driesch. Quite the opposite is true: Kauffman focuses on creativity, 
spontaneity of the living. But how to name this quality “scienti­
fically”, formulate a concise theory, develop testable hypotheses and 
appropriate methods for their testing? In other words, how to define 
laws for non-ergodic evolving physical systems? In this sense 
Kauffman’s views may be very close to those of the American 
semiotician C. S. Peirce, who hundred years before Kauffman stated 
that “natural laws are acquired habits”.
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Biosemioticians maintain that, in contrast to inanimate matter which 
can be characterized by causal processes (action and reaction), the 
essence of the living is in semiosis, manipulation with symbols. 
Whereas “natural laws” represent generalizations about natural 
processes, helping to arrange the original heterogeneity under a small 
number of simple and homogeneous rules, the process of semiosis 
leads towards greater heterogeneity, elaboration, i.e. evolution 
(compare with the evolution of Kauffmanian biospheres above). 
Biosemiotics is an abstraction from the (causal) physical world, and 
focuses itself to a universe perfused with signs, where organic wholes 
participate in a never-ending interpretative process. The principal 
terms of biosemiotics are meaning and understanding, and the 
processes that create them. We consider crucial the following thesis, 
with all its reminiscences of vitalism or organicism:
The world is material, but all matter is organized into forms and these again 
can be further organized. There are qualitative differences between these 
organized forms. What exists are not just fundamental particles, energetic 
fields, and their organization: Reality has during its evolution become 
organized into characteristic primary levels (the physical, biological, psychical 
and social). Entities at higher levels possess emergent properties, some of 
which are ontologically irreducible to lower level properties. (Also called 
material pluralism or irreductive physicalism). Semiotic phenomena may be 
characteristic of some, but not necessarily all levels. (Emmeche 1997: 96)
We come to the view of an unfolding semiosphere (Hoffmeyer 1998) 
not incompatible with the visions of Kauffman or even those of 
Teilhard de Chardin (1956). All living beings participate, as 
experienced entities, in this process:
[...] we can say that when life, and thus natural selection, emerged inside the 
Earth system we had already passed beyond the secure sphere of physics into 
the sphere of communication and interpretation. In this sphere the dynamics of 
history (evolution) changed and began to become individualised, so that each 
little section of history became unique and henceforward no big formulas 
could be erected covering the whole process. Organic evolution is narrative 
rather than lawlike [...], and if quantification is wanted, it should be searched 
not at the level of genetics, but at the level of the constrained thermodynamic 
system framing organic evolution. (Hoffmeyer 1997: 365; our emphasis, A. 
M. and F. C.)
2. Biosemiotics
140 Anton Markos, Fatima Cvrckovä
Semetic, instead of genetic, processes and interactions are considered 
the driving force of evolution. Emmeche (1997) even hopes that the 
biosemiotic effort will lead towards the integration of semiotics, 
biology and physics, and thus to the comprehension of emergence of 
new orders of complexity.
3. Perspectives
Examples above illustrated what were the problems biology has been 
struggling with for the past century. Biological field theory, 
structuralism, epigenetics, general systems theory, organicism and 
many other theories attempting the holistic or top-down approach in 
science, all remain somehow suspicious from the point of view of 
“true”, prosperous, reductionist science. Biosemiotics, on the other 
hand, has completely left the realm of natural sciences.
The objective for the 21st century is clear: either to conclude that 
some aspects of life’s appearance simply cannot be subdued to the 
scrutiny of objectivist biology as we know it today, or to create a 
concise holistic theory of life, broadening thus the realm of biological 
science.
In the following part of our essay we shall attempt to outline two 
methodological (or epistemological) approaches that, to our opinion, 
may show some promise in relation to the second option mentioned: 
modular biology and hermeneutics.
Modular biology: 
resurrecting classical genetics
The term module can refer to a very heterogeneous set of entities. It 
can be applied to functional units in genomes —  e.g. exons that can 
shuffle between the genes, thus increasing functional variability of 
encoded proteins (Patthy 1995). It can also represent autonomously 
developing units in ontogeny (Gilbert et al. 1996). However, here we 
shall focus mostly on the concept of modules as structural, regulatory, 
or functional units within cells (Hartwell et al. 1999), although some 
of the conclusions may apply also to the developmental, and even
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genomic, understanding of modules. What is common to all three 
conceptions mentioned is that modules serve as a kind of archetypal 
“scaffolding” for explication, i.e. forming some phenotypical trait. 
The scaffolding is relatively stable as to its internal relations. Its 
existence is a necessary condition for building the trait in question, but 
the trait itself cannot be derived  from the existence of the scaffolding. 
What, then, comprises a module? Some of the Hartwellian modules 
are identical to previously recognized multiprotein complexes, such as 
the ribosome. Such entities could be, at least in principle, isolated in 
vitro and subjected to detailed chemical and physical analysis that 
would optimally lead to a 3-dimensional model of the corresponding 
molecular machinery. Others correspond to known regulatory or 
signal transduction pathways, such as protein kinase cascades and 
transcription regulation circuits involved in cell cycle regulation, 
hormone response and other cellular processes. In a general case, it is 
not spatial localization but functional relations what decides whether 
a particular molecule belongs to a particular module. In extreme cases, 
molecules belonging to the same module might never co-exist in the 
same cell! As a rule, modules are more likely to be discovered by the 
“old-fashioned” methodical apparatus of classical genetics than by 
high-tech 21st century biochemistry alone, although they can, of 
course, be studied also by biochemical and molecular methods.
However, results of such studies, interesting as they undoubtedly 
are, do not contribute much to the understanding of relations between 
modules themselves. When studying these relations, we treat modules 
as black boxes, characterized only by their inputs and outputs. (For an 
alternative approach to the analysis of intracellular processes in terms 
of a network of relations —  not between modules, but between 
molecules, see also Kanehisa 2000).
Indeed, if we aim towards understanding the basis of the 
extraordinary diversity and plasticity of life, we may that find the 
structure of the network of inter-modular relations matters more than 
the intra-modular processes. Modules themselves appear to be 
surprisingly conserved, comprising a kind of “basic toolbox” or a set 
of standardized blocks from which diverse bodies are built. What we 
observe as differences between modules in different lineages are more 
like dialects than different languages. Modules can become 
interconnected with other modules in a variety of ways, thus enabling
new combinations of intracellular regulations or ontogenetic path­
ways.
The conservative character of modules could be due to the 
necessity for horizontal communication between distant genealogical 
lines. This supposition is fully relevant at the level of the genetic code 
(note that the whole transcriptional and translational mechanism is a 
module par excellence) —  especially in bacteria and archaea. Frequent 
and extensive genetic exchange across the bacterial world calls for a 
universal and conservative genetic language. To explain the 
conservation of modules by the necessity of horizontal transfer would, 
however, be quite challenging. The lineages represented by recent 
eukaryotic species tend to be well, if not hermetically, isolated. 
Horizontal exchange might have some importance immediately after 
speciation in so-called hybridization chains where great chunks of 
genetic material can move from species to species by interspecific 
hybridisation.
Another possible justification for a language of modules may be 
symbiosis: its existence will allow the partners to “understand” (or 
manipulate?) each other to differing extents. It is not that important 
whether the partners exchange their genetic material (mitochondria, 
chloroplasts) or not (lichens, ciliates, parasites). Such higher-order 
phenotypes require intimate interconnections between the regulatory 
systems of the constituting species. The establishment of multifarious 
symbiotic associations is typical in the biosphere, and the existence of 
a universal modular language undoubtedly makes it easier. It may 
even appear that symbioses (even in spite of the risk of parasitism) are 
advantageous in evolutionary terms, to the extent that there is 
a pressure to maintain the universal language in spite of genetic 
isolation.
Perhaps the most popular (and best known) example of a module, 
both in the Hartwellian and in the developmental sense, is the system 
of Hox genes. Chromosomal location of these genes is collinear with 
the body axis and their function corresponds to morphological 
modules which can be recognized on the body, such as segments (for 
a review see e.g. Davidson 2001). The products of homeotic genes, 
conserved throughout the metazoan kingdom, thus assign an “address” 
to the body structures. Incorrect addressing caused by incorrect 
functioning of the homeotic coding leads to so-called homeotic 
mutations, when structures appropriate to one type of segment appear
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at incorrect, ectopic sites. Many other regulatory modules are of such 
archetypal nature, for example systems specifying the dorsoventral 
axis in animals, the proximal-distal axis of appendages, the establish­
ment of boundaries between body compartments, neurocranium, or 
left-right asymmetry. Similar archetypal regulations can be found also 
in plants.
Also another aspect of the project of modular biology, formulated 
by Hartwell et al. (1999), deserves attention in our context. The 
authors explicitly point to an obvious analogy between the processing 
and integration of multiple environmental and external signals by a 
(modular) cell on one hand — and analogous tasks performed by the 
metazoan nervous system on the other. As a result, they arrive to a 
rather shocking question: are there any modules that would 
correspond to a cellular equivalent of our nervous system?
If we accept this analogy and all conclusions it could lead to, we 
cannot but accept that, one day, cell biology may have to embrace the 
whole arsenal of methods, approaches and theories worked out in the 
long centuries of the study of diverse aspects of human nervous 
system. And there is no reason to stop at methods developed in the 
realm of neurobiology and related “nearly exact” sciences: biology has 
to be open to input from the humanities as well.
On the first glance, such an idea may appear preposterous, 
unacceptable and absurd. However, from a closer perspective the same 
objections could be raised against the previously sketched mechanistic 
models underlying most of traditional biology, as they are based on 
the rather immodest assumption that man-made devices are adequate 
models for understanding the world around and within ourselves.
Hermeneutics of the living (or better by the living): 
Interpretation everywhere
Taking the data of “standard” biology and re-interpreting them in the 
light of hermeneutics may be a good example of such an approach 
(Markoš 2002). In other words, we can view a living body as if it were 
a reader of texts, endowed with internal history (that of an individual 
and/or of a lineage). It masters a natural language, with understanding 
the meaning through word-by-word instructions as well as through 
cues, contexts, game of words, memory, communication with others,
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etc. In short, the hermeneutic approach considers any living being as if 
endowed with abilities analogous to human consciousness.
As an example, take the gene —  protein level of description. Here, 
genes play the role of dictionary entries, whereas proteins represent 
words that could appear in various grammatical forms, and, together 
with other proteins, constitute a plethora of predicates. The cell uses 
all this to weave a texture of temporal and spatial expressions, which 
reflect its context in the world.
A multicellular body can also be taken as an expression, where 
differentiated cells (including the extracellular matrix) are elements of 
syntactic and semantic relations. The dictionary would not be genes 
but whole modules (for example signalling cascades). In this 
metaphor, ontogeny is a species- (or genus-, phylum-, etc.) specific 
explication  of a very old and conservative text shared by the greater 
part of, or even all, living beings. Like any explication, this too is 
subject to “cultural”, historical shifts in course of evolution. A 
species-specific understanding of the genetic script is then an analogy 
to culture —  specific understanding of, say, holy writ or the law 
codex. In this species-as-culture analogy, all the appearances of 
members of a species (morphology, behaviour, etc.) are results of 
habits acquired in course of historical contingencies. It follows that 
the causal bond “genetic inscription —» body appearance” is far from 
being strict.
The deciphering of a code in DNA is often taken as a historical 
milestone: the existence of a digital code was, and is, felt as a 
warranty that all what is really important can, and indeed is, 
unequivocally written down in a string of symbols —  bases. But there 
are two facets of the problem. First, it is true that digital information 
can be unequivocally copied within the realm  of the digital. But it is 
often forgotten that it cannot be simply copied when transferred into a 
realm of the analogue, i.e. into the realm of bodily structures. This 
transition alw ays requires interpretation (Gadamer 1989). The inter­
pretation act is never a simple decoding as in case of transcription, 
translation, or transforming digital magnetic track into a text page on 
the screen (or a printer). Interpretation is always based in previous 
experience of the individual, species, lineage, an experience that goes 
back to the very beginning of life. Any interpretation is a historical 
singularity that will change the run of the world. To adapt the
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terminology of S. Kauffman, autonomous agents, by performing 
interpretation acts, bring the world into the adjacent possible.
In this respect, we are already entering the realm of ontology, the 
ontology of hermeneutic circle as laid out by M. Heidegger —  or as 
outlined by modem physics in a somewhat different flavour (although 
non-physicists rarely appreciate this). However, even the physicists’ 
world does not encompass the semiotic dimension yet. Adoption of 
the hermeneutic and semiotic methods by natural science would, 
hence, mean a decisive step towards biologisation o f  physics, centring 
sciences in biology —  a bold parallel to the already accomplished 
biologisation of chemistry by development of organic chemistry and 
biochemistry.
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Назад к науке о жизни
Статья предлагает обзор эпистемологических и онтологических подхо­
дов, оставивших свой след в биологии XX века. Общее для всех них 
стремление —  соединить биологию и точные науки. Попытки эти не 
удались и им суждено провалиться и в будущем, пока критерии, на 
основании которых определяется статус науки, не станут биологически 
ориентированными. Это означало бы расширение классической сферы 
наук о природе, путем присоединяя к ним хотя бы части понятийного 
аппарата “гуманитарных наук”. Предлагаем три взаимодополняющих 
друг друга возможных кандидата для дальнейшего развития в этом 
направлении: модулярная биология, герменевтика живого и семиоти­
ческие дисциплины.
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Tagasi eluteaduse juurde
Artikkel annab ülevaate epistemoloogilistest ja ontoloogilistest lähenemis­
viisidest, mis on jätnud jälje 20. sajandi bioloogiasse. Ühine motiiv enamikule 
neist on püüe liita bioloogia ühte täppisteadustega. Seesugused katsed on 
siiski ebaõnnestunud, ja ebaõnnestuvad ka tulevikus, kuni kriteeriume, mille 
alusel määratletakse, mis on teadus, ei ole muudetud bioloogiakeskseks. See 
tähendab klassikaliste loodusteaduste sfääri laiendamist, ühendades nendega 
vähemalt osa “humanitaarteaduste” mõistestikust. Esitame kolm vastastikku 
üksteist täiendavat kandidaati selle suuna edasiseks arendamiseks: modu- 
laame bioloogia, elusa hermeneutika ja semiootilised distsipliinid.
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Abstract. Synthesizing important research traditions in information theory, 
structuralist semiotics, and generative linguistics, at least three main types of 
semiotic indeterminacy must be distinguished: Kolmogorov’s notion of 
randomness defined as sequential incompressibility, de Saussure’s principle 
of contingency of sign which ensures the possibility of translation between 
different sign systems, and Chomsky’s idea of indefiniteness in generative 
mechanisms as a requirement for the explanation of semiotic creativity. These 
types of semiotic indeterminacy form an abstract system useful for the 
description of concrete sign processes in their syntactic, semantic, and 
pragmatic dimension. In his philosophical reflections on modern biology, 
Jacques Monod used the conceptual opposition chance versus necessity to 
analyse several phenomena of indeterminacy (especially in molecular 
biology). The biosemiotic approach to life permits to apply the suggested 
system of semiotic indeterminacy on these phenomena.
Larvatus prodeo
The semantic field of indeterminacy is of great importance for modem 
science. Without notions like randomness, contingency, indefinite­
ness, probability, and undecidability, it would be impossible to formu­
late central findings of logic, information theory, semiotics, quantum 
physics, biology, sociology, etc. So this semantic field extends across 
the borders between natural, structural, and cultural sciences.
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Biosemiotics can profit from an intense reception of the multi­
farious explorations of indeterminacy in modem science. Systemati­
cally, it is necessary to build up an abstract system of different types 
of semiotic indeterminacy that can be applied to the analysis of 
concrete sign processes. Historically, the philosophical reflections on 
modem biology that were made in the so called “French school of 
molecular biology” (Fantini 1988: 14) are rich in interesting ideas for 
the biosemiotic exploration of indeterminacy.
A close reading of Jacques Monod’s Le hasard et la necessite 
(Monod 1970) shows that Monod reflects on three different kinds of 
hasard  which can be co-ordinated within the semiotic dimensions of 
syntax, semantics, and pragmatics (1). These types of indeterminacy 
should be defined with the help of information theory, structuralist 
semiotics, and generative grammar, respectively (2). I have to con­
centrate on the first two types, randomness and contingency (2.1 and 
2.2), and can only hint at some aspects of the third type, indefiniteness 
(3).
1
At its first publication in 1970, M onod’s Le hasard et la necessite has 
stirred up a heated debate about the philosophical premises and 
consequences of molecular biology. In the centre stood Monod’s 
thesis that life results from a very improbable event (Monod 1970: 
62). I do not want to reanimate the great hubbub that arose around this 
special kind of tychism and its existentialistic looks. Instead, I propose 
to analyse the use of the expression hasard in Monod’s natural 
philosophy because here, semiotics can show its relevance to theoretic 
biology.
The conceptual structure underlying the use of the expression 
hasard  in M onod’s natural philosophy consists of three main ele­
ments.
Monod encounters the first type of indeterminacy in the primary 
structure of proteins. This structure is built up as a sequence of amino 
acids the order of which is au hasard  (Monod 1970: 127): if the linear 
succession of 199 amino acids in a chain of 200 is well known, no rule 
exists to predict the last one. This kind of unpredictable structure I 
will call random.
The second type of indeterminacy shows up in M onod’s discussion 
of the genetic code. He comes to the following conclusion: it seems to 
be very probable that this code is chimiquement arbitraire  (Monod 
1970: 182), because no stereochemical reason can be given for the 
selection of a certain codon in the DNA to codify a certain amino acid 
in the primary structure of a protein. This kind of missing motivation I 
will call contingent.
Naturally, Monod does not intend to say that the biosynthesis of a 
protein is an ad hoc process when he underlines the importance of 
randomness and contingency. On the contrary! According to Monod, 
the highly invariable primary structure of a protein results, directly or 
indirectly, from the whole history of the biosphere. But exactly 
because of this thoroughly historical causality, it is impossible to 
decipher the biochemical function of a protein from its primary 
structure (Monod 1970: 128f). We can state the same in respect to the 
contingency of the relation between an amino acid and its encoding in 
the DNA: in a diachronic perspective, the concrete sign functions 
result from historical processes which cannot be fully specified only 
with the knowledge of their end-products. Analogously it must be said 
that even in a synchronic perspective, the knowledge of the chemical 
structure of the codons on the one hand and of the amino acids on the 
other hand is not enough to deduce the whole mechanism that 
connects these two sides. This third kind of a posteriori I will call 
indefinite.
For Monod, these three types of indeterminacy are primarily no 
reflections of the limits of biological knowledge but inhere in the 
ontological structure of life itself (Monod 1970: 148ff). The sequence 
of amino acids in a protein is random, the codon for an amino acid is 
contingent, and the functionality of a protein is indefinite. In the light 
of Monod’s natural philosophy, a possible semiotic exploration of 
these phenomena of indeterminacy would by no means be an analysis 
of biological discourse but a research directed towards the objects of 
biology.
The next step in such a semiotic exploration must define the no­
tions of randomness, contingency, and indefiniteness in more formal 
terms. The distinction between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics 
provides us with a useful framework hereto.1 For the purpose of
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Cf. Cariani (1998) on the distinction between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics 
as a general framework for biosemiotics.
analysing Monod, I propose the following definitions of these 
semiotic dimensions that differ from the classical ones of Charles 
Morris (1938), insofar as their conceptual base is the Hjelmslevian 
notion of the sign function as a relation between different semiotic 
planes (Hjelmslev 1993).2
A sequence of semiotic objects is investigated syntactically when 
neither the possible inner sign functionality of the elements of the 
sequence nor possible sign functions between this sequence and other 
ones are considered. The main abstract syntactic characteristic of 
semiotic objects is the order in which their elements follow one after 
the other. Information theory is mostly interested in this one-sided 
linearity.
Semantically, the connections between different semiotic planes 
are decisive. These relations can be registered in the single elements 
of one sequence as sign functions between a form of expression and a 
form of content. But sign functions can also be described between 
different sequences, whether they are internally sign-functional or not. 
The main abstract semantic characteristic of semiotic objects is their 
functionality. Structural semiotics has focused on these biplanar 
phenomena.
When the generation of semiotic objects is scrutinized, their 
pragm atic  dimension comes into play. Such an exploration should be 
directed towards the interplay of syntax and semantics. The main 
abstract pragmatic characteristic of semiotic objects is their processual 
quality. Generative grammar is an important example of this kind of 
research although the name of this theory seems to designate only 
syntactic studies. But generative grammar describes one special 
semiotic competence as a capability to build up syntactically ordered 
sign functions so that this process works like an interface between 
expression plane and content plane (Chomsky 1988).
The three notions of indeterminacy found in Monod’s natural 
philosophy can be mapped onto the semiotic dimensions of syntax, 
semantics, and pragmatics.
The randomness of the primary structure of proteins is of syntactic 
form: only the linear order of the chain of amino acids is involved in 
the statement that the question after the 200th element in the primary
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2 Cf. Chebanov (1999) for another biosemiotic use of glossematics.
structure of a protein cannot be answered only with the knowledge of 
the previous 199 elements.
Contingency is a semantic phenomenon: the chemical structure of 
a DNA codon cannot be inferred from the chemical structure of the 
encoded amino acid and vice versa. So there are two different planes 
(a plane of expression manifested by the DNA sequence and a plane 
of content manifested by the primary structure of the protein3), and no 
motivation for the specific connections between their elements in 
terms of one plane or the other can be found.
Indefiniteness is pragmatic indeterminacy. The knowledge of the 
two planes of the sign function between the primary structure of a 
protein and the encoding in the DNA is not enough for specifying 
either all the processes that build up the linearity of the protein and of 
the encoding, or all the processes that lead to the biplanarity of the 
sign function, both in a diachronic or in a synchronic perspective. And 
exactly this is meant by indefiniteness.
2
It is necessary to fix the still loose coupling between M onod’s types of 
indeterminacy and the three semiotic dimensions. In the following, 
this will be done for randomness and contingency. Andrei N. Kolmo­
gorov’s information-theoretic concept of randomness cannot only 
sharpen Monod’s description of syntactic indeterminacy but will also 
help to indicate the limits of information-theoretic models for biolo­
gical phenomena (2.1). Thereafter, the structuralist concept of the sign 
is applied to analyse Monod’s semantic indeterminacy. In the semiotic 
tradition, Ferdinand de Saussure’s principle of arbitrariness of sign 
and Roman Jakobson’s postulate of universal translatability are the 
main references hereto (2.2).
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In Hjelmslevian semiotics, the expressions expression and content are “arbitraere” 
(Hjelmslev 1993: 55). They are used only to distinguish terminologically between the 
two planes contracting a sign function. Therefore, it would be equally possible to write: 
a plane of expression manifested by the primary structure of the protein and a plane of 
content manifested by the DNA sequence.
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2.1
The decisive idea for defining indeterminacy on one semiotic plane 
comes from the information-theoretic work of Kolmogorov that 
meanwhile developed into the theory of algorithmic information.
To define the randomness of a sequence of semiotic objects, first 
of all it is necessary to introduce the notion of the complexity of such 
a sequence. The Kolmogorov complexity of a semiotic sequence is the 
length of the shortest program that could produce the sequence in 
question as an output of an abstract automaton (like a universal Turing 
machine). The sequence is random  when its complexity is approxi­
mately equal to its length. In the view of Kolmogorov, randomness 
means that we practically cannot compress a sequence by its algo­
rithmic representation because a random sequence shows no or only 
negligible inner regularities. In comparison with the bit-length of such 
regularities, the program generating them would be describable with 
decisively fewer bits (Kolmogorov 1969).
M onod’s example of syntactic indeterminacy is a paradigm of 
randomness in the sense of Kolmogorov complexity. That the 200th 
amino acid in the primary structure of a protein cannot be predicted 
even when the first 199 amino acids are well known, is only a more 
concrete way of saying that there are no algorithmically compressible 
regularities in the primary structure.
But Kolmogorov complexity not only permits a formalization of 
syntactic indeterminacy. In a meta-theoretic perspective, this concept 
can also be used to disprove M onod’s assumption that he has shown 
the impossibility of finding some regularities in the primary structure 
of a protein (Monod 1970: 127). Here, we have to employ an in­
completeness theorem of the computer scientist Gregory J. Chaitin 
who has developed the theory of algorithmic complexity into a pro­
sperous meta-mathematical discipline.
Chaitin’s incompleteness theorem indicates the following limit of 
information-theoretic reasoning: the proposition that a sequence has a 
Kolmogorov complexity greater than a certain fixed value cannot be 
proved in a formal axiomatic system with a Kolmogorov complexity 
smaller than this value (Chaitin 1974).4
4 More precisely: a formal axiom atic system  with K olm ogorov com plexity greater 
than К  plus a constant (dependent on the automaton that im plem ents the system) is 
needed to generate the set o f  all theorems stating that a sequence has Kolmogorov
The drastic consequence of this theorem for M onod’s philosophy 
was drawn by Bernd-Olaf Küppers. The assumed impossibility of 
disproving the randomness of the primary structure of a protein is 
itself unprovable in the framework of a formal system that has a 
Kolmogorov complexity smaller than the one of the primary structure. 
Küppers argues that to find by chance in the set of more than 2 
possible sequences the right one that proves as a codification of a 
formal system the randomness of another sequence with Kolmogorov 
complexity К , is very improbable (Küppers 1990: lOOff). A second 
way to formulate this improbability goes as follows. The chances to 
find an algorithm as a formal model for the evolution of a primary 
structure are very small because the sequence in question may be 
supposed as of tremendous complexity when described on the level of 
specification necessary to include algorithmically every kind of 
known natural law that could generate regularities in the sequence. It 
follows again that for all practical purposes, the construction of a 
formal system with the necessary complexity for a proof of random­
ness of primary structure is not feasible.
2.2
Küpper’s meta-theoretic critique of Monod is not the consequence of 
an information-theoretic a priori but of a natural a posteriori: when 
the complexity of a system has grown in its history, it is conceivable 
that the randomness of its initial state could be deduced from its 
description at a later time. The more it is amazing that one important 
application of Kolmogorov complexity on the object level of biology 
follows an information-theoretic a priori reasoning.
Chaitin’s struggle for an algorithmic theory of evolution based on 
Kolmogorov complexity shows the impossibility of reducing the 
evolutionary process to syntactic processes. Even in a very simple 
model of evolution proposed by Chaitin, he must introduce a semantic 
criterion through the backdoor: syntax is not enough.
Chaitin describes a computable sequence of rational numbers 
leading in the infinite limit to an uncomputable infinitely complex 
number called Omega as an “abstract example of evolution” (Chaitin
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complexity N (for all N smaller than or equal to K) and of all theorems stating that a 
sequence has a Kolmogorov complexity greater than К (Chaitin 1974: theorem 4.3).
1988: 317). Chaitin’s Omega number is the famous halting probability 
of a universal Turing machine. Alan Turing has proven in 1936 that 
this halting probability is not computable (Turing 1936): it is a 
random real number with infinite Kolmogorov complexity. So Omega 
can be seen as the limit of a computable sequence of rational numbers 
that converges to Omega uncomputably slowly.
It is not surprising at all that the rational numbers in this sequence 
will have an ever increasing Kolmogorov complexity. What Chaitin, 
however, is interested in, is the complexity of the first К  bits of each 
of the rational numbers because at some time the Kolmogorov 
complexity of these first К  bits will not fall under the threshold value 
of К  bits.
How is the sequence of rational numbers converging to Omega 
built up? Chaitin constructs the Mh approximation of Omega as 
follows: “One merely considers all programs up to N  bits in size and 
runs each member of this finite set of programs for N  seconds on the 
standard universal Turing machine. Each program К  bits long that 
halts before its time runs out contributes measure 2~K to the halting 
probability Omega” (Chaitin 1988: 317). A non-syntactic criterion is 
present here at a very important position: every program N bits in size 
has the chance to run N  seconds on the universal Turing machine. This 
cannot be justified in pure syntax; the time limit is of pragmatic 
nature: we cannot wait till infinity for the halting of a program.
For biosemiotics, there is more to get out of Chaitin’s algorithmic 
model of evolution. In its finite version, a computable infinite se­
quence of strings with a fixed length of N  bits is determined as an 
approximation to Omega. Then, there exists a time t after which the 
strings will not alter any more. These strings have a Kolmogorov 
complexity not less than N  bits because they cannot be computed by 
any program shorter than N  bits in less than t seconds. Chaitin remarks 
that in some respect the N  bits of information of the strings generated 
at time t and later “are coming from t itse lf’ (Chaitin 1988: 318). 
These N  bits are simulating the first N  bits of the halting probability 
Omega, and the time t encodes the information about how long we 
have to wait till seemingly knowing them.
Information-theoretically, such a source of normally not accessible 
information is called an oracle (Chaitin 1977). This diviner has a 
genuinely semantic function. It connects a syntactic sequence (like a 
string of TV bits in Chaitin’s finite model for evolution) to another one
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(like the first N  bits of the halting probability) that cannot be com­
puted anyhow from the first sequence. But this first sequence can act 
as an expression of the second one so that the second sequence is the 
content of the first one. In Chaitin’s evolutionary model, this sign 
functionality really strikes the eye: the first sequence is computable, 
the second one is uncomputable, so the second sequence cannot be de­
duced from the first one, but the first sequence can stand for the 
second one when we have established the time t as a non-syntactic 
criterion.5
Ferdinand de Saussure has recognized the absent mutual deducibi­
lity of two nevertheless connected planes as the essence of the sign. 
Although the exact meaning of de Saussure’s first sign-theoretic 
principle, l ’arbitraire du signe (Saussure 1967: 100), has been and 
still is the object of an intense debate in semiotics, I think that the 
Danish glossematician Niels Ege has correctly analysed de Saussure’s 
notion of contingency 6 He distinguishes two perspectives on the sign. 
Seen from the outside, a sign is presupposing a whole system of signs 
and vice versa, so in this respect a sign, as an element of a semiotic 
system, is not contingent. But seen from the inside, the relation 
between a given expression and a given content is not motivated by 
either plane and, therefore, is contingent in the sense of de Saussure 
(Ege 1970: 26).
From this double perspective, it is possible to recognize another 
version of de Saussure’s insight into semantic indeterminacy. In his 
essay On linguistic aspects o f translation, Roman Jakobson (1971) 
formulates a principle of universal translatability. Understanding a 
sign, means to be able to translate it into another sign not necessarily 
of the same semiotic system but also of other such systems. Therefrom 
does not follow that there normally exists a one-to-one correspon­
dence between both signs. But when we permit, for example, different 
lengths of the involved sequences, we can say that what is semiotic, is 
translatable.
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s Here, Küpper’s conjecture: semantic structures are syntactically random (Küp­
pers 1996: 2130, is within reach. In a semiotic way, it should be formulated as follows: 
syntactic sequences entering a sign function are Kolmogorov random with respect to 
each other.
I use the term contingency rather than arbitrariness because of Lacan’s right 
criticism of the second expression (Lacan 1975: 23, 32, 41).
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In respect to the sign function, de Saussure’s principle of con­
tingency designates the same semiotic fact as Jakobson’s principle of 
translatability: a sign is translatable because its inner relation between 
an expression and a content is contingent in spite of the determination 
of the sign by its semiotic system; and the relation between an expres­
sion and a content establishing a sign is contingent because the resul­
tant sign is translatable from one semiotic system into another.
3
By showing itself as translatability, contingency is the main semantic 
premise for the growth of semiotic freedom (Hoffmeyer 1996). To 
discuss this evolutionary process in-depth, it seems necessary to look 
upon its pragmatic dimension. What biosemiotic insights can we await 
here that go beyond those in the syntactic and in the semantic dimen­
sion?
Our description of pragmatic indeterminacy in Monod’s natural 
philosophy has shown that we have to search for an answer by 
scrutinizing the processual indefiniteness in the generation of syntactic 
and semantic structures. For biosemiotics, the main theoretic reference 
for this kind of research is evolutionary theory. In a Darwinian frame­
work, we should await important hints especially from the subtheory 
of natural selection because there, the very historicalness of evolution 
must be explained (Maynard Smith 1993: 42).
Abner Shimony has underlined that the theory of natural selection 
has no general principles of its own which could not be derived from 
propositions of the evolutionary subtheories of variation and heredity 
(Shimony 1989). Stripped bare to their respective formal structure, 
variation means the exchange of an element at one position in a 
sequence that does not necessarily imply any functional relation to 
another sequence, whereas inheritance p er se designates a functional 
relation between different sequences. Now Shimony writes,
I construe the neo-Darwinians as trying to say meta-theoretically that the 
evolution o f the biosphere, subsequent to the establishment of the genetic 
code, is governed by the principles of heredity and variation and the laws of 
physics, and is constrained by biological and environmental boundary and 
initial conditions, but not constrained otherwise: within these constraints let 
happen what happens. (Shimony 1989: 229; emphasis by Shimony)
If we accept this description, then for biosemiotics the neo-Darwinian 
research program is a conceptual experiment upon the radicalization 
of pragmatic indeterminacy. Why radicalization?
Pragmatic indeterminacy was defined as the unsurmountable in­
definiteness of forms possibly occurring in the generation of syntactic 
and semantic structures. And the background of definiteness with 
which this indefiniteness contrasts, consists of the syntactic and the 
semantic dimension, their indeterminacies included. If selection, as a 
pragmatic phenomenon, is the process of establishing syntactic and 
semantic structures, and if Shimony is right to see selection as a result 
of variation, inheritance, and some boundary conditions, then prag­
matics is nothing else than the interplay of syntax and semantics in 
certain contexts. With respect to the three types of indeterminacy, this 
means that pragmatic indefiniteness occurs when syntactic random­
ness and semantic contingency meet under certain conditions. No 
further pragmatic constraints on such events should be awaited; or, as 
Monod has put it, pragmatic indeterminacy is essentiel (Monod 1970: 
149).
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Три типа семиотической неопределенности 
в философии современной биологии Моно
Синтезируя важнейшие исследовательские традиции в теории инфор­
мации, структуралистской семиотике и генеративной лигвистике, нужно 
различать по крайней мере три главных типа семиотической неопре­
деленности: понятие слуайности у Колмогорова, дефинированное через 
несократимость последовательностей; принцип арбитрарности знака у 
Соссюра, делающий возможным переводимость между разными знако­
выми системами и принцип индефиниции генеративных механизмов 
Хомского, что является предпосылкой семиотической креативности. Эти 
типы семиотической неопределенности составляют абстрактную сис­
тему, которую можно использовать при описании конкретных знаковых 
процессов в синтаксическом, семантическом и прагматическом измере­
ниях соответственно. Анализируя в своих философских работах разные 
феномены непоределенности (особенно в молекулярной биологии), Жак 
Моно пользовался концептуальным противопоставлением между  
случайностью и необходимостью. Биосемиотический подход к жизни 
позволяет при изучении этих феноменов использовать предлагаемую  
систему семиотической неопределенности.
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Semiootilise määramatuse kolm tüüpi Monod’ 
kaasaegse bioloogia filosoofias
Sünteesides olulisi uurimistraditsioone informatsiooniteoorias, strukturalist­
likus semiootikas ja generatiivses lingvistikas, tuleb eristada vähemalt kolme 
peamist tüüpi semiootilist määramatust: Kolmogorovi juhuslikkuse mõistet, 
mis on defineeritud järgnevusliku koondamatuse kaudu, de Saussure’i märgi 
suvalisuse põhimõtet, mis võimaldab tõlgitavust erinevate märgisüsteemide 
vahel, ja Chomsky generatiivsete mehhanismide indefiniitsuse ideed, mis on 
semiootilise loovuse seletamise tingimuseks. Need sem iootilise määramatuse 
tüübid moodustavad abstraktse süsteemi, mida on võimalik kasutada konk­
reetsete märgiprotsesside kirjeldamiseks vastavalt süntaktilistes, semantilistes 
ja pragmaatilistes mõõdetes. Oma kaasaegse bioloogia ainelistes filo soofilis­
tes käsitlustes on Jacques Monod kasutanud kontseptuaalset vastandust 
juhuslikkuse ja paratam atuse  vahel, analüüsimaks mitmeid määramatuse 
fenomene (iseäranis molekulaarbioloogias). Elu biosem iootiline käsitlusviis 
lubab nende fenomenide puhul rakendada väljapakutud sem iootilise määra­
matuse süsteemi.
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Where bonds become binds: 
The necessity for Bateson’s interactive 
perspective in biosemiotics
Peter Harries-Jones
Department of Anthropology, York University,
Ontario, M3J 1P3, Canada 
e-mail: peterhj@yorku.ca
Abstract. The paper examines important discrepancies between major figures 
influencing the intellectual development of biosemiotics. It takes its perspec­
tive from the work of Gregory Bateson. Unlike C. S. Peirce and J. von Uex­
kiill, Bateson begins with a strong notion of interaction. His early writings 
were about reciprocity and social exchange, a common topic among anthro­
pologists of the time, but Bateson’s approach was unique. He developed the 
notion of meta-patterns of exchange, and of the “abduction” of these meta­
patterns to a variety of other phenomena, in both biology and in game theory. 
Later, Bateson’s concept of ecology o f mind, the product of interactive pheno­
mena, was modified by a non-purposive cybernetics. Biosemiotics has yet to 
adopt Bateson’s interactive stance, which is absent from Peirce’s approach to 
communication, of Uexkiill’s functional cycles, and of Hoffmeyer’s discus­
sion of the relation between culture and environment. Rather than pursuing 
notions of appropriate “subjectivity” through changed ethical response to eco­
logical conditions (Hoffmeyer’s discussion of empathy), the paper discusses 
the advantages of an approach that continues to focus on conditions of para­
dox and pathology. Specifically, Bateson’s resolution of the relation between 
culture and environment arises from situations of blocked communication 
where ecological bonds become binds.
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Introduction
The central importance of Gregory Bateson’s ideas to the new bio­
semiotics, specifically to the writings of Claus Emmeche and Jesper 
Hoffmeyer cannot be disputed. The following concepts in the writing 
of Emmeche and Hoffmeyer are references directly drawn from 
Bateson: the conceptualization of difference as a “difference that 
makes a difference”; the refutation of mind and body as Cartesian 
duals in which “mind” lies in a hierarchical and therefore superior 
position to “body” ; code duality, a distinction between analogue and 
digital coding in which analogue coding cannot be reduced to digital 
coding and vice versa; the importance of this for a better under­
standing of adaptation, as currently —  orthodox neo-Darwinian mole­
cular biology —  conflates the two and attributes them holus-bolus to 
the activity of “the gene”; the notion of consciousness as a switch; the 
importance of disentangling notions of consciousness and human 
intentionality from a framework of control, specifically control over 
the environment; the notion of “the pattern which connects” as a 
methodological and epistemological project which overcomes the gap 
between culture and environment; the role that inter-subjective play 
among animals, and hence prototypical instances of “deceit” and 
“trust”, has for our understanding of the origins of the linguistic 
distinction “not” (rather than the conventional notion that bodily 
gestures generated this communicative distinction). Emmeche has 
remarked that Bateson emerges as a “full-blown semiotician” (Em­
meche 1999: 291n).
As a source of inspiration for the new biosemiotics and eco­
semiotics, Bateson takes his place alongside C. S. Peirce and J. von 
Uexkiill. Unlike the latter, Bateson begins his analysis from a different 
starting point, that of interaction rather than “subjectivity”. As this 
paper will explain, Bateson’s starting point is crucial if and when 
biosemiotics (and/or ecosemiotics) begins to include aspects of social 
relationship within the “life of signs” and must do so when it engages 
the issues of culture and environment. Culture embodies not only 
signs but signifiers and interpreters in relation to each other. So far 
discussion of this aspect of culture in biosemiotics has been minimal.
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Communication: Inter-subjectivity and monologue
Neither Peirce nor Uexkiill rejected an inter-subjective perspective. 
Indeed, the later writing of C. S. Peirce took up inter-subjective 
themes and as Oehler remarks Peirce’s tendency to conceive “subjec­
tivity” inter-subjectively gets stronger towards the end of his life 
(Oehler 1987: 11). Nevertheless, Peirce reached his concept of signi­
fication initially as a result of a phenomenological analysis of the 
dialogue situation. Thus the communicative process and distribution 
of relations between speaker and hearer were marked as if signifi­
cation in communicative activity followed from conversational dialo­
gue with oneself. While Peirce is able to transform Kant’s “transcen­
dental subjectivity” to intentions of a speaker in actual communicative 
situations, he did not analyze communicative situation itself in terms 
of social variance of speakers. Peirce’ theories of reality assumed ideal 
communicative groups. As a result the translation of Peirce from 
philosophical discourse to social discourse is difficult and requires 
commentators bold enough to re-align Peirce’s vocabulary in order to 
bring it into sufficient correspondence with more sociological 
thinkers. One interesting attempt is made by Wiley who, in conjoining 
Peirce with his contemporary, George Herbert Mead, expands upon an 
implicit notion of “I” in Peirce’s writing and translates it as the sub­
jective “self’ in order to place it in relation to G. H. Mead’s thoroughly 
social conception of “me” as the self-in-society (Wiley 1994).
J. von Uexkiill’s writing is further removed from social processes. 
In fact he confines his writing to cellular and inter-cellular sign 
systems, on the one hand, and sign systems in which animals in their 
environment appear as “meaning-utilizers of meaning carriers in their 
environment” (T. von Uexkiill 1987: 175). He thought of biological 
sign systems as “natural codes” which, unlike culture specific codes, 
were “innate”. If culture specific situations were dialogical, biological 
sign processes were based on “monologue”. Uexkiill’s discussion of 
functional cycles demonstrates what he means by ‘monologue’ for —  
using sender-receiver terminology —  the receiving function and the 
function of transmitting came together in such a way in a “functional 
cycle" that the biophysical receptors of an organism are “receivers”, 
while the operative biophysical effector following such “reception” 
are “transmitters”. There is, therefore no dialogue between senders 
and receivers in “functional cycles”, and no self-reflexiveness during
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sending and reception. As T. von Uexküll states, the system or class of 
signs which a human observes and talks about is therefore very diffe­
rent to, perhaps in opposition to, the class of signs of the organism 
under observation.
As with many biologists, J. von Uexküll believed that the proto­
type of sociality among human groups was language. And while the 
use of language is clearly inter-subjective, nevertheless “the schemata 
(private character of signs) which we have formed during our life are 
inter-subjectively identical only in the most general outlines” (T. von 
Uexküll 1987: 161). Hence J. von Uexküll proceeds to investigate 
private character of “the exchange of signs”, schema in “a subjective 
universe” both among humans and more particularly between humans 
and animals. Biosemiotics is urged to continue to examine the 
“subjectivity” of organisms in relation to environment. Thus:
In order to make the concept of semiotics valuable for both biology and 
medicine we must examine what it means [to undertake an examination of 
how] all signs that can be exchanged between living systems as well as 
between these and their surroundings... the signs that an observer of life sys­
tems registers are in the first place signs with which he interprets the events he 
himself has observed. However since the living systems he has observed are 
themselves interpreting their own surrounding, he must interpret their 
interpretations whereby these systems decipher their environment [...] We 
must , as meta-interpreters, try to reconstruct the interpretation that points the 
way for the paramecium in its surroundings. (T. von Uexküll 1999: 650-651)
Nevertheless, meta-interpreters of living systems derive a large 
proportion of their perceptions and cognition from the social world of 
which they are a part. Biological scientists today, even of paramecium 
in their surroundings have a hard task convincing their public that 
their observations are entirely “value free”.
Bateson’s interactive stance
While some sociologists, especially in the period 1920-1940 looked 
for the prototype of human sociality in language, the tradition ot 
sociology, certainly of anthropology, is heavily weighted towards the 
proposition that the roots of human sociality are to be found in social 
acts rather than languaging. The social enactment of signification,
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rather than the mere ability to signify provides the rudiments of 
“bonding” in social exchange. Bateson follows this trend though much 
of his later writing about human sociality provides a study of the 
adverse effects of “bonding”, the “double bind” that can lie within 
social bonds, and binds in ecological interactions as well. The diffe­
rences between Bateson and Uexkiill on the issue of the “subjectivity” 
of the organism, and of the position of observers reporting upon 
“subjectivity” and “feedback” are therefore important.
As an interactionist Bateson argued that “Mind”, subject, self, as 
with the many forms of subjectivity and individuality so pervasive in 
western scientific thinking, was not “in” the head, but always derived 
from the interactions of self with other and self with system. And this 
understanding must be fundamental to participatory observation, 
whether of humans or of animals or of the human-animal world. With 
regard to any issue of intelligence and observation, Bateson, consis­
tently wrote against the idea of a single located space of explanation. 
He thought that such a framework of explanation always to led to 
error. In the realm of human beings, many of the problems in ap­
proaching mind and self in sociology, anthropology and linguistics 
arose from the way each discipline presumed that the internal mind of 
individual selves was a starting and ending point for their inves­
tigation. The same was true of animal intelligence. Uexkiill is evi­
dently no exception to discussing animal intelligence, perception and 
communication from the vantage point of the individual organism. 
Perhaps this is why Bateson does not refer to him in his own writing, 
though he must have known of Uexkiill’s opposition to Darwinian 
interpretations of evolution. Bateson’s own method was of double 
description and never that of single description, that Newtonian 
dimension which always located “se lf’ or “mind” in a single space. 
For Bateson mind is “no-thing”. It is empty. It exists only in its ideas 
and these again are no-things. And an idea is what mind makes of it, 
in its communicative interactions, namely an example of something or 
other (Bateson 1978: 9).
Bateson always started analyses with interaction between indivi­
duals, and never with the single individual. The unit of analysis, 
reciprocal communicative interaction, belonged to neither individuals 
per se but rather reflecting rules of relationship between the commu­
nicating partners. Senders and receivers were, of course, connected in 
some physical manner to each other, for all communication requires a
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material carrier, but the communicative content drawn from physical 
connection was at another, less important level of meaning than that 
drawn from the rules of the relationship existing between the com­
municators.1 Among humans, any messages must be interpreted pri­
marily from the rules of the relationship existing between individuals; 
in the animal world this included such phenomenon as predator and 
prey, a “dog chasing a hare”.
There are, perhaps, three periods of his investigation of inter- 
subjective interactions. In each period Bateson tended to look not only 
at single interactions but at patterns of interactions and meta-patterns 
of those interactions in a dynamic context. In other words from the 
beginning of his career in the 1920s Bateson developed a meta-level 
focus in his discussion of social interactions. This was most unusual in 
social psychology and of anthropology both of which continued from 
the 1920s to the 1970s to derive explanation from empirical data of 
observed interactions, mostly through small group research or ethno­
graphic study of small communities. Kurt Lewin’s field theory of 
social psychology, to which Bateson was attached during the 1940s 
and 1950s, was an exception. In their studies of community, social 
anthropologists re-constructed empirical observations of ritual acts 
involving, for example, sacrifice of animals and plants. It was within 
this re-written “structure” of social relations, the anthropologists 
depiction of ordered relations that individual observations of ritual 
acts took on an overall coherence as a belief system.
In Bateson’s Australasian period of fieldwork, that is to say his 
research prior to World War П, Bateson looked at aspects of 
reciprocity or gift exchange in the middle part of the Sepik River of 
New Guinea. He argued that patterns in gift giving ought not originate 
from direct observation of individual gift giving p er se, but from a 
more dynamic aspect in which variance in the cycles of cumulative 
interactions the main focus. He argued that observed reactions of
1 Bateson even believed that symbolic interactionists like George Herbert Mead 
who investigated the meaning of symbols told only half a story of the relation between 
social action and communicative reflexivity. G. H. Mead’s concept of roles and role- 
taking did indeed describe a social “reaction of reaction”, but Mead never considered a 
meta-patterning of the dynamics of exchange in role-taking, which would have resulted 
in the investigation of “I know that you in your role are taking account of me in my 
role” allied to analysis of the rules of the relationship i.e. “what are the social 
conditions of role-taking in the first place?” Bateson and his colleagues at Palo Alto 
undertook such analyses.
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villagers to a receipt of a gift, yielded information about “the reaction 
of reactions” to gift giving. Rather than reporting a simple empirical 
outcome of how individuals engaged in acts of exchange vis-ä-vis one 
another, an anthropologist should concentrate on how these “reactions 
to reactions” generate exchange cycles. In turn, this leads to a con­
sideration of the changes which cumulative interaction brings about 
within exchange cycles.
Thus, long before postmodernism, Bateson was arguing that the 
dynamics of such exchange cycles would only become apparent 
through a “reflexive take” on empirical fieldwork data. As the obser­
ver’s reflexive take shifts to the dynamics of interaction and its 
characteristic cycles, the patterns of interactive dynamics in the cycle 
of exchange would reveal evidence that empirical treatment of data 
would ignore, possible runaway effects of cumulative interactions, for 
example. Bateson termed this study of meta-patterns of exchange 
“schismogenesis”, for, at the point that runaway occurs, initial patterns 
of reciprocity become transformed into vicious circles and are broken- 
up. He argued there were cultural preferences for particular interaction 
sequences, hence cultural preference enters into particular forms of 
runaway, unless that culture enacts procedural rules to prevent the 
occurrence of vicious circles (Rogers 1981: 235ff). In addition, he 
argued that there was cultural preference for particular forms of inter­
active sequences between individuals and/or groups which prevented 
runaway effects and that this pattern of cultural preference was a 
striking outcome of the embeddedness of interaction sequences in 
cultural relationships. He presented a comparative case study based on 
his research in New Guinea and in Bali.
His meta-pattern perspective permitted Bateson to pursue the 
notion of the “universality” of reciprocity or exchange in a very diffe­
rent manner from other anthropologists. Instead of writing about the 
universality of reciprocity and the way a common underlying structure 
of reciprocal exchange enters into all types of human social relations, 
he began to “abduct” his investigation of cumulative interactions of 
reciprocity” in a variety of contexts, such as comparing gift-giving 
with the diplomacy of armaments races. Later these included studies 
of cumulative interactions in game theory, the prisoner’s dilemma for 
example, and in families who have one member diagnosed as 
schizophrenic.
During his years elaborating cybernetic thinking, 1945-68, Bate­
son discussed interaction in cybernetic control systems, where 
oscillations produced not only runaway but also an alternative phase, 
that of the dampening down of feedback cycles. The pattern of binds 
in reciprocal exchange that needed to be studied Bateson noted, 
emerged from an understanding of the sort of oscillation that meta- 
patterns of interactivity displayed. He also enlarged upon his key 
concept that phenomena which people believe occurs inside the head, 
are part of a broader pattern of communicative interactions that 
includes social relations between people. Important meanings arose 
recursively, in feedback between individuals and those with whom 
they had intimate social relationships. Always a description of the 
“reflexive take” of people in interaction was required, before meaning 
could be interpreted in any communicative setting. The other 
important feature was that such descriptions of “reflexive take” should 
occur at various levels of interaction, one mapping upon another, so, 
for example, evidence about the injunctive or normative aspects of 
social relationships between people which gave overall context to their 
communication should be placed against evidence about the content of 
signification: metaphor, imagination etc.2
In the last ten years of his life Bateson carried these ideas forward 
into his “ecology of mind”, his most lasting contribution. An ecology 
of mind requires that we must come to an understanding of living 
systems as part of own life-process, while at the same time recog­
nizing that our own self-hood is part of that larger whole. Clearly this 
cannot be accomplished through so simple a method of description as 
describing as series of “needs” in a located space. Indeed, Bateson’s 
initial objections to the methodology of one of the founding fathers of 
anthropology, Bronislaw Malinowski, was that Malinowski, in 
arguing about human social exchange, reduced “the social” in social 
activity to the biology of “needs”, and Malinowski’s depiction of 
“functional cycles” elaborated upon this reductionism.3 1 do not know
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2 Much of the way in which Bateson revised cybernetics cognitive modeling of 
“control” as an aspect of located information is covered in my own book A Recursive 
Vision: Ecological Understanding and Gregory Bateson  (Harries-Jones 1995) and in 
the book by Steve Heims, The Cybernetics Group (Heims 1991). Hoffmeyer a lso  refers 
to Bateson’s objections to control assumptions.
3 Objections among anthropologists to Malinowski’s “functionalism” a theory 
which proposed, inter alia, that all significant phases of cultural activity could be seen 
as an expansion of the biology of needs was widespread even before World War II.
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of any Bateson reference to the “functional cycles” of J. von UexkUll, 
but it is reasonable to assume that his same objections would hold.
Ecology of mind
Because of the inherently social nature of communication, it is 
possible to step outside of the content of inter-subjective communi­
cative interactions and adopt a mode of interpretation that is logically 
above, or “meta” to the events initiating the communication. In other 
words, it is possible to discuss human communication at the level of 
the rules about responses to messages, and even discuss meta- patterns 
of messages among communicants. This may be difficult, but family 
therapists following in the footsteps of Gregory Bateson accomplish 
this all the time, clarifying how inappropriate pattern and rules of 
communication create disturbance in meaning among the communi­
cators. The problems of interpreting meta-communicative patterns in 
ecological situations are far more difficult. The rules of human- 
environment exchange are very uncertain, so strictly speaking there 
can be no “meta” “meta” perspective, in the sense of a perspective 
derived from “above” immanent conditions of exchange in human- 
environment relations. This, perhaps is a reason for so many cultures 
adopting a transcendental spiritual rather than immanent ecological 
perspective of their relations to their environmental surround.
Comprehending the ecology of living systems, requires, even more 
definitively than the study of communicative interaction among 
human beings, a concerted focus on both the difficulties and the 
possibilities of reflexive interaction with “nature”. In one of Bateson’s 
most amenable articles, “The pattern which connects”, his sophisti­
cated approach invokes all manner of interpretative forms at various
Subsequently the criticism entered into introductory texts in anthropology. Bateson 
was always careful to be as positive as he could about Malinowski’s achievements in 
published articles. In his private correspondence Bateson was scathing. An interesting 
exchange about Malinowski is contained in the correspondence he had with Meyer 
Fortes, and Bronislaw Malinowski himself, in and around November, 1935 [SPEA- 
Margaret Mead Collection, Library of Congress, Bateson Correspondence Box 01]. It 
is also of interest that Bateson’s primary objection to Karl Marx was that Marxian 
political theory built itself upon a premise of human needs. The concept of “needs” as 
an explanatory premise, Bateson would argue later, introduced a confusion in logical 
types i.e. it was an abstract generality which required contextual unravelling.
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levels of perception that might aid us to develop meta-perspectives: 
logical distinctions, aesthetic appreciation and their embodiments — 
shapes, forms and relations in their symmetries and in their modu­
lation. There are always empirically observed connections in the 
morphology of a living creature, he reminds us, always patterns of 
bilateral symmetry and serial homology within a growing organism 
which can be readily observed The pattern which connects the crab to 
the lobster, the orchid to the primrose, me to you, are less obvious, for 
the pattern which connects these embodiments to each other are meta­
order connections, based on similar relations between parts and their 
interaction within some ecosystemic whole. Finally there is a third 
level, meta-meta-connection (not to be confused with Peirce’s notion 
of Thirdness) which is even more difficult to grasp. Here a com­
parison between the interaction of crabs and lobster must be compared 
with the comparison between men and horses, and all of us to the 
amoeba. It is these sorts of third level patterns of connection that we 
must try to grasp in the understanding of how humanity fits its own 
idea of self-hood into a larger whole of interactive interconnection of 
living systems. The question is not simply one of meta-interpretation 
of homologies in organisms but a comparison of patterns of patterns 
of interactive similarities and differences. “The pattern which con­
nects is a meta-pattern. It is a pattern of patterns. It is that meta-pattem 
which defined the vast generalization that indeed it is patterns which 
connect” (Bateson 1978: 9).
In his final years of writing Bateson addressed himself to the topic 
of how we should develop a recursive epistemology able to think 
about such interconnections. In one of very his last papers Bateson 
pursues this point with regard to the differences between the logic in 
syllogism, that is the logic of empirical science, and tautology in 
nature. The latter he terms the logic of Barbara, and invokes the 
phrase “men are grass” in order to explore the tautology, i.e., tauto­
logy in the sense of mutual connectedness. He explores the meta­
phorical sense, juxtaposition of signs in the Barbara tautology, but 
behind the metaphor “men are grass” Bateson invites us to look at 
ecological circumstance. Humanity adapts to, and alters grass, through 
human agricultural practices. In fact the most cursory research reveals 
that the “men-grass” bond has been fundamental in the evolution of 
human beings and history of cultures. A broad ecological view of this 
pattern is that grasses have domesticated our species. As a con­
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sequence of species domestication the grasses are among the most 
successful organisms on Earth. The most productive plants for human 
beings have been those with edible seeds —  grasses such as com, 
wheat, rice and barley. Today cereal grains provide some two third’s 
of humanity’s intake, directly and through grain fed livestock, and 
occupy about half of the world’s arable land. Yet modem crops are 
utterly dependent on a human agricultural infrastructure that feeds and 
waters them, protects them from pests and looks after their germ 
plasm (Bright 1998: 35-36). Successful bonds yield enormous mutual 
benefit, yet as Bateson points out, these very same bonds can also lead 
to relational dilemmas, both in human beings and in the natural world. 
Misunderstanding the significance of reciprocities in exchange and 
their mutual causality can threaten survival.
Culture and environment: The Hoffmeyer triangle
In his organizing diagram in Signs o f Meaning Hoffmeyer seeks to 
untie western dualistic approaches to three fields of inquiry (Figure 1). 
The first approach is that of psycho-somatic dualism —  duals raised in 
cognitive science and elsewhere that separate mind and body, mental 
activity from bodily activity. The second field of inquiry he unties is 
that of biology and semiotics, the dualism arising because biology 
predicates its analyses on the overwhelming determinism of inner 
nature, while one aspect of inner nature, the capacity to communicate, 
has come to be analysed in another discipline through “external” 
investigation of “languaging” and/or signification. Hence a prevailing 
dualism between inner nature and outer nature. The third field of 
inquiry he discusses is the dualism between culture and environment. 
Here Hoffmeyer argues that ecologists keep on splitting the world up 
into two distinct sectors, the natural and the cultural, thereby 
upholding several illusions that alienate human beings from nature 
(Hoffmeyer 1996: 43). He seeks to repair this dualism through an 
analogical extension of “subjectivity” in so far as the capacity for 
"subjectivity” in human culture can lead both to “empathy” for 
animals and other living organisms, and that empathy is in turn linked 
to the “ethical status” of animals and other living forms. The ethical 
debate within human culture is essential, Hoffmeyer states, in order to
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keep reviving “our existential need to empathize with other umwelt 
builders in this weird and wonderful world” (Hoffmeyer 1996: 141).
CULTURE
1) Environm ental sphere
2) Psychosom atic sphere
3) Biosem iotic sphere
Figure 1. Hoffmeyer’s “Lost Connection”, or how biosemiotics mediates between 
humanity’s outer and inner nature and between culture and nature (from 
Hoffmeyer 1996: 96).
The dualism Hoffmeyer seeks to overcome lacks the congruence of 
his other two cases. There are both differences in respective time 
periods of cultural formation and of formation of environmental 
conditions, and in their respective oscillation and rates of change. 
Hoffmeyer acknowledges that the operational aspects of memory, 
learning and forgetting are far more plastic in the realm of culture — 
as a result of language —  than they are in the biophysical environ­
mental realm of evolution, and that the patterning of code-duality in 
the two instances is therefore, not the same. There is a difference, yet 
the difference between the two does not yield a dualism.4 The crux of
4 As I report in my own book, Bateson noted there were differences between 
culture and its evolutionary environment in that the level of genetic constraint in 
evolution had no parallel in culture. While genetic adaptations can affect levels of
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Hoffmeyer’s argument is that though our individual life stories be­
come divorced from our genetic history, “N ot one but two stories are 
being enacted in the human body and consciousness” at the same time 
(Hoffmeyer 1996: 133; italics in original).
To support his argument, Hoffmeyer discusses how evolutionary 
growth of language and self-consciousness in Homo sapiens has 
enabled human beings to break out of their own subjectivity and 
enabled them to share one large common Umwelt. He observes in the 
passage cited above how the common bond of speech increased the 
capacity of humans to empathize with animals and other living species 
and prepare humanity for the current “ethical drama of the human 
race”. He calls for a profusion of semiotic niches in which humans 
relate to the “subjectivity” of other living creatures. In an earlier 
passage he states that “The spoken word has endowed the semiosphere 
with its very own self-referential vertical semiotic system [to comple­
ment horizontal semiosis of interconnections]. A new code duality has 
emerged and with it the dynamic basis for a totally different kind of 
evolution: cultural history” (Hoffmeyer 1996: 112). The problem is 
that Hoffmeyer talks here and elsewhere of “culture” and cultural 
history in a universal sense, though concepts examined are really a 
presentation of European cultural premises, specifically the premises 
of western science. Evolutionary appraisal of his key notions, “sub­
jectivity” and “human empathy” is especially prominent, following a 
tactic frequently used by western science (until recently by western 
anthropology as well) in order to depict the existence of cultural 
predisposition. There is no need to evoke evolutionary sequences to 
investigate inter-subjectivity towards nature. There are many cultural 
examples open for inspection and which give detailed evidence as to 
how humans develop empathy towards nature. The conundrum is that 
such cultural examples are supported by traditional ecological know­
ledge and not supported by western scientific knowledge.
levels of constraint among populations, culture “has no level of control between 
individual learning and the level of population”. Culture cannot alter the homoeostatic 
bias of individual learning in the manner that genetic control at population level can 
alter the homeostat of the phenotype (Harries-Jones: 1995: 258). Among other things, 
lack of such constraints feeds potential for runaway in learned ideas. Perhaps we could 
add to this distinction by noting that while genetic constraints operate through the 
process of division and replication of an unbound state, the expansion and contraction 
of ideas evoked in a reflexive process is somewhat different from genetic conservation 
or mutation.
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A good place to start is with the Australian Aborigines. Here there 
are a profusion of semiotic niches in which humans relate to the 
“subjectivity” of other living creatures all the way from interpretations 
of the Dreaming to anecdotal stories drawn from the lives of 
individuals (Rose 2000). Among the Yarralin, a band of Australian 
Aborigines, human beings are indeed regarded as being close to other 
placental mammals. It is dingo, the Australian wild dog, that is taken 
to be the true marker of the boundary between humans and other 
living creatures, or “what humanity would be if humans were not what 
we are” . The reason given for their cultural preference for dingo is that 
humans are like no other animals in so far as the shape of their 
genitals is concerned. Clearly humans are not like Australian mar­
supials. Male kangaroos have their testicles and penis back to front 
from a humans perspective. Female kangaroos also have a pouch, 
human females do not.
Rose brilliant and sensitive account of the Yarralin centres around 
how Yarralin form their knowledge of boundaries between humanity 
and other living systems. Yarralin feel that they interpret very 
differently from the way that white Australians interpret the same 
evidence. And indeed they do. In the case of Yarralin, knowledge is 
indeterminate, it is not immediately gained through experimentation, 
and always subject to contextual revision in discussion among 
members of a social unit. The process of determining meaning is one 
of testing many meanings in a seeming free-for-all until some form of 
consensus is reached in the social unit and then “it is finished”. There 
is redundancy to account for and there are countless reciprocities to 
pay attention to and interpret. Moreover “just as other beings’ actions 
elicit response from human beings, so also human actions elicit 
responses from other beings [...][Yarralin believe] other species are 
watching us, reacting and responding” (Rose, 2000: 228)5.
5 Rose’s evidence is a clear break with Hoffmeyer’s arguments about human 
Umwelt exhibiting graded “subjectivity”. Hoffmeyer’s thesis is that “The more 
anthropoid its [the character of the animal’s] umwelt, the greater our empathy with it” 
(Hoffmeyer 1996: 140). Animal characteristics, behaviour and anatomy are rarely 
graded outside European cultures the way they are within it. Ours tend to follow the 
Linnaean categorization. As the Yarralin show, other cultures give animals and the 
living world very different symbolic qualities and shapes than those which European 
cultures perceive. Before we became human, the Yarralin say, we had genitals like 
dogs: “Women had a vulva stuck out the back and men had a penis that was attached 
up the belly, and when they mated they became stuck together the way that dogs do
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Rose’s evidence for Yarralin belief and the dynamics of their 
knowledge system is strongly related to Yarralin social interaction. 
She argues that in a total cultural system, its “totality” created by the 
social boundaries between white Australians and black Aborigines. 
Testing the veracity of events occurs and fades away within the 
dynamic interplay of communication and interpretation among 
Yarralin themselves. In this respect, nothing external is drawn into to 
the local culture or its knowledge system, though as a result of this 
social rejection of the external Aboriginal knowledge survives.
The knowledge system of western ecologists is also characterized 
by an inward looking social circle. As Bateson argued, any change in 
cultural ideas requires breaking, or reform of, social bonds in addition 
to a shift in levels of semiotic interpretation. Social bonds, not primary 
biological dispositions such as the capacity for sympathy and lan­
guage, are the primary injunctive for human beings and social bonding 
cannot be abstracted from belief preference and appraisal of know­
ledge. The dominant idea discussed in Bateson’s “The cybernetics of 
self’ (Bateson 2000: 309-337) is that the “se lf’ must be conjoined 
within a different social grouping in order to achieve a different 
epistemology. Bateson pointed out that the paradoxes of life from 
which extrication is so difficult always lead back to binds of relation­
ships.
In his discussion of ecosystems, he suggests how modem day 
science alters the reciprocal bonds between humanity and nature in 
such a way that science drives nature mad. His example was the 
"death” of Lake Eire and the case of the St.Clair River next to Detroit 
spontaneously bursting into flames in the 1960s. Rather than consider 
how “empathy” for environment might relate in such a case to an 
individual’s stance on his or her ethical responsibilities for environ­
ment, Bateson’s resolution was to foster understanding of recursive 
epistemology, and of the dynamic interaction where bonds become 
binds . His premise was that faulty human thinking about nature will 
always return to stab humanity in the back. Therefore our primary 
methodology should be that of the uncovering of non-awareness of 
recursion in human-nature bonds and a further understanding of how
I j people used to get stuck together for days, even weeks. The dingo called in 
doctors to fix us up. The bat cut a new vulva, and put a mussel there to keep it from 
closing up again. Bower bird (Chlamydera nuchalis) was the doctor for the men. He 
put the penis at the proper place and positioned the testicles correctly” (Rose 2000: 48).
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this state of affairs locks —  in cumulative errors of interpretation. A 
grappling with paradoxes, as they emerge, should be a primary means 
through which we investigate this problem. Since Bateson’s death the 
paradox of “sustainable development” has provided an empirical 
example.
Conclusion
This paper has considered various aspects of Bateson’s work and 
shown how they are predicated upon interaction rather than “sub­
jectivity” . In his early work, his examination of patterns in gift giving 
in human exchange lead him to an understanding of cumulative 
interactions within exchange cycles, which in turn revealed the 
presence of vicious circles and the presence or absence of feedback. 
Though Bateson borrowed from C. S. Peirce, particularly Peirce’s 
methodology of abduction, he did not endorse Peirce’s pragmatics, 
almost certainly because of the phenomenological framework of 
Peirce’s methodology. In addition, while Bateson clearly supported 
Peirce’s triadic logic, Peirce’s discussion of the dialogical in commu­
nicative situations was, to a large extent, monological. Without 
understanding feedback properties at different levels, the one “meta-” 
to the other, Bateson believed one could not explain social dilemmas 
that arise in learning and other aspects of communication.
The type of feedback prevalent in J. von Uexküll’s discussion of 
“functional cycles” is also monological rather than interactive. 
Uexküll’s concept of Umwelt has been open to different sorts of 
interpretation. One argument is that “no animal ever takes up the role 
of an observer” (T. von Uexküll 1987: 162). Objects in the animal 
world are “only objects on which they are dependent as a result of 
biological needs (e.g. hunger) and which disappear from their 
surrounding world as soon as the need has passed”. If so, then the 
operation of functional cycles must also be of a categorically different 
type of feedback than those predicated on the information principles 
of cybernetics. Another argument supporting J. von Uexküll is that 
animals are indeed “cognitive observers” . One interpreter suggests J. 
von Uexküll’s depiction of the relation of organism (as subject) to 
environment is in the form of a hermeneutic circle. A relationship ot 
complementarity is struck between the Umwelt and the inner world of
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the organism through the organism’s ability to form a “cognitive 
model” of its Umwelt, or, to use Uexkiill’s expression, there is a 
counter-structure between the organism and its environment as carrier 
and receiver of meaning (Nöth 1999). Bateson would not support 
either justification, the one because functional cycles are not cyber­
netic, the other because his own interactionist perspective catego­
rically rejected hermeneutic interpretation.
In Bateson’ terms, a bond is something beyond straightforward 
investigation of semiotic ties of a paramecium in its surroundings, or 
even of bonds identified through investigation of signs exchanged 
between organisms in living systems. Bateson emphasizes instances in 
which bonds have become binds, and these always involve mistakes in 
interaction. As Bateson argued, non-resolution of binds always 
threaten survival. For this reason I suggest that the link between 
culture and environment depicted in the third leg of Hoffmeyer’s 
triangle of biosemiotic enquiry is best represented in the form of a 
Möbius strip. That is to say, there is a “twist” in the join between the 
two terms culture and environment and that this “twist” designates a 
series of paradoxes in cultural and environmental interaction, each of 
which sensitizes us to the cumulative non-resolution of mutual causal 
reciprocities. Finally, closing the dualism between culture and en­
vironment requires careful use of the concept of culture, and the use of 
empirical evidence drawn from “cultures” in the plural rather than a 
supposed universal “culture”, since theories of knowledge are them­
selves culturally specific.
References
Bateson, Gregory 1978. The pattern which connects. CoEvolution Quarterly 18: 
4-15.
2000 11972]. Steps to an Ecology o f Mind. Chicago: Univesity of Chicago 
Press.
Bright, Chris 1998. Life Out o f Bounds: Bioinvasion in a Borderless World. New  
York: Norton for the Worldwatch Institute, 
tmmeche, Claus 1999. The Sarkar challenge to biosemiotics: Is there any 
information in the cell. Semiotica 127(1/4): 273-293.
Hames-Jones, Peter 1995. A Recursive Vision: Ecological Understanding and 
Gregory Bateson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Heims, Steve 1991. The Cybernetics Group. Cambridge: MIT Press.
180 Peter Harries-Jones
Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1996. Signs o f  Meaning in the Universe. (Trans. Barbara 
Haveland). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Nöth, Winfried 1999. Ecosemiotics and the semiotics of nature. In: Taborsky, 
Edwina (ed), Semiosis, Evolution, Energy: Towards a Reconceptualization of 
the Sign. Aachen: Shaker Verlag, 73-87.
Oehler, Klaus 1987. An outline of Peirce’s semiotics. In: Krampen, Martin; 
Oehler, Klaus; Posner, Roland; Sebeok, Thomas A.; Uexkiill, Thure von 
(eds.), Classics o f  Semiotics. New York: Plenum Press, 3-19.
Rogers, L. Edna 1981. Symmetry and complementarity: Evolution and evaluation 
of an idea. In: Wilder, Carol; Weakland, John (eds.), Rigor and Imagination: 
Essays from  the Legacy o f  Gregory' Bateson. New York: Praeger, 231-252.
Rose, Debbie B. 2000. Dingo Makes Us Human: Life and Land in an Australian 
Aboriginal Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Uexkiill, Thure von 1987. Sign Theory of Jakob von Uexkiill. In: Krampen, 
Martin; Oehler, Klaus; Posner, Roland; Sebeok, Thomas A.; Uexkiill, Thure 
von (eds.), Classics o f Semiotics. New York: Plenum Press, 147-179.
—  1999. The relationship between semiotics and mechanical models of explana­
tion in the life sciences. Semiotica 127(1/4): 647-655.
Wiley, Norbert 1994. The Semiotic Self. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Когда связи становятся связующими: о важности 
интерактивного взгляда Бейтсона для биосемиотики
В статье подвергаются анализу различия в подходах разных автори­
тетов, чья интеллектуальная деятельность повлияля на развитие био­
семиотики. При выборе точки зрения автор исходит из работ Грегори 
Бейтсона. В отличие от Пирса и Юксюолля Бейтсон начинает с понятия 
интеракции. Его ранние работы касались взаиозависимости и комму­
никации —  центральных тем в работах тогдашних антропологов. Но 
подход Бейтсона все же выделялся своей уникальностью. Он создал 
теорию о метамоделях социальной коммуникации и об их “абдукции” в 
разные феномены как в биологии, так и в теории игр. Позже Бейтсон на 
базе концепции экологии духа  (которая является выражением феномена 
интерактивности) разрабатывал нецелевую кибернетику. Биосемиотика 
еще не приняла интеракционный подход Бейтсона —  он отсутствует в 
коммуникационных исследованиях Пирса, в функциональном круге 
Юксюолля и в рассуждениях Хоффмейера об отношениях между куль­
турой  и природой. Вместо того, чтобы исходить из понятия “субъектив­
ности”, которая якобы возникает при изменении этического отношения 
в соответствии с экологической обстановкой (рассуждение Хоффмейера
о эмпатии), статья выделяет подход, который сосредотачивается на 
состояниях пародокса и патологии. Точнее, точкой отталкивания при
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анализе отношений между культурой и природой у Бейтсона является 
состояние блокированной коммуникации, где экологические отношения 
становятся связующими.
Kui seosed muutuvad siduvateks:
Batesoni interaktiivse vaate olulisusest biosemiootikale
Artikkel analüüsib olulisi erinevusi nende autoriteetide seisukohtade vahel, 
kelle intellektuaalne tegevus on mõjutanud biosemiootika arengut. Vaate­
nurga valikul lähtutakse Gregory Batesoni töödest. Erinevalt C. S. Peirce’ist 
ja J. von Uexküllist, alustab Bateson interaktsiooni mõistest. Ta varajased 
kirjutised puudutasid vastassõltuvust ja sotsiaalset kommunikatsiooni —  
keskseid teemasid tolleaegsete antropoloogide hulgas —  kuid Batesoni lähe­
nemine oli siiski unikaalne. Ta lõi teooria sotsiaalse kommunikatsiooni meta- 
mustritest ja nende “abduktsioonist” mitmesugusteks teisteks fenom enideks 
nii bioloogias kui mänguteoorias. Hiljem arendas Batesoni kontseptsiooni 
vaimu ökoloogiast (mis on interaktiivsuse fenomeni väljenduseks) edasi teist 
järku küberneetika. Biosemiootika pole veel Batesoni interaktsioonilist 
lähtekohta omaks võtnud —  see puudub nii Peirce kommunikatsiooni- 
käsitluses, Uexkülli funktsiooniringis, kui ka Hoffmeyeri arutluses kultuuri ja  
looduse suhete üle. Selle asemel, et lähtuda kohase “subjektiivsuse” mõistest, 
mis tekkivat eetilise suhtumise muutumisel vastavaks ökoloogilisele olu­
korrale (Hoffmeyeri arutlus empaatiast), tõstab siinne artikkel esile lähe­
nemist, mis jätkuvalt keskendub paradoksi ja patoloogia seisunditele. Täpse­
malt, Batesoni lähtekohaks kultuuri ja looduse suhete analüüsimisel on 
blokeeritud kommunikatsiooni seisund, kus ökoloogilised seosed muutuvad 
siduvateks.
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Abstract. This paper describes the semiotic approach to organism in two 
proto-biosemiotic thinkers, Susanne K. Langer and Hans Jonas. Both authors 
develop ideas that have become central terms of biosemiotics: the organism as 
subject, the realisation of the living as a closed circular self, the value concept, 
and, in the case of Langer, the concept of symbol. Langer tries to develop a 
theory of cultural symbolism based on a theory of organism as a self-realising 
entity creating meaning and value. This paper deals mainly with what both 
authors independently call “feeling”. Both authors describe “feeling” as a 
value-based perspective, established as a result of the active self interest 
manifested by an organic system. The findings of Jonas and Langer show the 
generation of a subject pole, or biosemiotic agent, under a more precise 
accent, as e.g. Uexkiill does. Their ideas can also be affiliated to the 
interpretation of autopoiesis given by the late Francisco Varela (embodied 
cognition or “enactivism”). A synthesis of these positions might lead to 
insights how symbolic expression arises from biological conditions of living.
Art is the surest affidavit that feeling, despite its 
absolute privacy', repeats itself in each 
individual life. It is not surprising that this is 
so, for the organic events which culminate in 
being felt are largely the same in all o f us, at 
least in their biologically known aspects.
Susanne K. Langer (1967: 64)
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Ideas for a biosemiotic approach to organism, as they have been 
elaborated in the last ten years or so (Emmeche, Hoffmeyer 1991, 
Hoffmeyer 1997, Kull 1999), often show affinities to concepts of 
earlier thinkers, some of them biological “holists” . This has best been 
shown by Sebeok (1976) for the case of Jakob von Uexkiill, who by 
now has become a classic of biosemiotics. My paper is meant as 
another attempt to discover “proto-biosemiotic” thinking in the 20th 
century.
Hans Jonas and Suzanne K. Langer have produced influential 
biophilosophical theories from the 1950s into the 1980s (Langer) viz. 
the 1990s, Jonas 1973, 1992, Langer 1953, 1967-1982, 1979). Both 
have developed a range of ideas in their works which touches the 
theoretical outset of biosemiotics. They (1) conceive of the living as 
an embodied, material system, they (2) stress its active self realization, 
they (3) see the living organism as a subject, they (4) conceive of the 
encounter of this subject with the world as indirect or mediated, hence 
creating value (in Jonas 1973: 87) words) or vital import (as Langer 
1953: 32 puts it). These ideas culminate in Langer into (5) the insight 
that expressiveness has to be considered as strongly a basic aspect of a 
living being as functional adaptation (for a review of the differences 
between Langer und Jonas cf., e.g., Lachmann 2000: 148n64).2 The 
qualities mentioned above for both authors are best characterised by 
describing the organism as “feeling”.3 This term, which is somewhat 
mirrored in other concepts which see the living basically as “desire” 
(Barbaras 1999) or, in a more technical angle, as “need” (Kull 2000), 
tries to radically view the living being as a subjective agent, creating 
meaning from its needs to cope with the surrounding world, with the 
other. The concepts of “feeling” as Jonas and Langer have elaborated 
them thus might offer some insights into the subjective dimension 
created by organic experience.
1. Introduction
2 There is a number of authors who independently developed notions of a proto- 
biosemiotic approach to organism, notably Helmuth Plessner (1928), F. J. Buytendijk 
(1958), Adolf Portmann (1948, 1960), and Kurt Goldstein (1933, 1934). An oblique 
affinity also exists with Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. In his Phenomenology of 
Perception Merleau-Ponty has heavily drawn on the works of Goldstein (Lachmann 
2000: 157n 12).
3 The term “feeling” goes back to William James (1890).
Related ideas can also be found in the version of autopoiesis theory 
developed by the late Francisco Varela (not identical with the first 
account of autopoiesis given by Maturana and Varela, 1980). Indeed, 
although Varela himself always declared that he was not a 
semiotician, his work touches some important points of biosemiotics. 
In his late works Varela tried to overcome the solipsistic dangers of 
early biological constructivism and developed a view of embodied 
cognition which he called “enactivism”. Varela wanted to understand 
the genesis of selfhood by interactions between autopoietic entities 
and the external world. In his treatment of the concepts of subjective 
agency and of biological relevance, and meaning, he prepares ideas 
which might help a possible synthesis into a “biosemiotic paradigm” 
(Varela 1991, Varela et al. 1991, Weber, Varela 2002).
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2. Jonas: Feeling and the “mother-value” of all values
Hans Jonas stems from a phenomenological background. In his 
attempts to overcome the subject-object dualism (also called the two 
cultures) of modem science Jonas started to develop a, as he called it, 
a “biological philosophy”. In the centre of his theory of biology stands 
metabolism. For Jonas, a living system is nothing more than the 
identity of the process that arranges material compounds into a form. 
Hence, metabolism is the crucial point of encounter between matter 
and order, not just energy production. Form arranged by metabolic 
processes (which in return are the form’s structure) is constant, 
whereas substance, the mere molecules, rather are an accidental 
agglomeration of matter that may pass through various living forms. 
For Jonas (1992: 21), an organic
wholeness is self-integrating in active realization, [its] form is not result but 
cause of the dynamic arrangements of matter, and hence the process at the 
same time is the form. By this central aspect of its functioning metabolism can 
very well be considered as defining quality of life: every living being does 
have it, no entity which is not living does have it. (Jonas 1973: 83)4
All translations o f Jonas’ texts are by the author, as there is no official English  
translation. Although the work which was published in Germany 1973 as Organismus 
und Freiheit was a translation from the earlier book “The phenomenon o f  life” (1966),
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In the architecture of the metabolic process, Jonas sees prevailing a 
certain tendency to complex systems, a kind of “order for free” 
(Kauffman 1998). Self-ordering brings forth structure, but also a first 
duality in the living. As a metabolic process, form becomes in a way 
autonomous from matter,
[...]  the difference between substance and form, which is a pure abstraction 
when applied to inorganic entities, becomes a real distinction. This implies a 
complete inversion of the ontological relationship: Form has become an 
essential quality and substance has become an accidental quality. (Jonas 1973: 
125)
Metabolism, and with it the living system as it is, are always open to 
breakdown. Because the living system is dependent on matter to carry 
on, its autonomy is restricted to the necessity of incorporating and 
metabolising pieces of matter. This is what Jonas calls “dependent 
independence” —  a paradox that deeply marks the living, which is on 
one hand related to itself, on the other to the exterior.
Jonas’ description of metabolism reminds of Varela’s idea of a 
circular self-closure. A short look at it may clarify Jonas’ position. For 
autopoiesis theory, the process of the living consists in bringing forth 
this proper process. Autopoieis, particularly in its reformulation by 
Varela in the 1990ies, is concerned with the process of creating an 
autonomous identity (Varela 1991). This identity stands in a dialecti­
cal relation to the exterior, or other. The living being is thriving on the 
other, but also endangered by it. Living is ended not when the 
compounds are changed, but when the process of automaintenance is 
disturbed:
An autopoietic system is organized (defined as unity) as a network of pro­
cesses of production (synthesis and destruction) of components such that these 
components: (i) continuously regenerate the network that is producing them, 
and (ii) constitute the system as a distinguishable unity in the domain in which 
they exist. (Varela 1997: 75)
From this definition, we can better understand the importance of the 
metabolic model in Jonas’ description of the living. The organism is 
continuously concerned with itself. It tries to keep up metabolic
Jonas had revised the translation and partially rewritten it (Jonas 1973: 3f). Transla­
tions o f  other German sources, if  not marked otherw ise, are also by the author.
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coherence in the face of changing matter. From this concern, a certain 
perspective is arising as an interest of the organic system in itself. This 
establishment of an identity is a basic process of the living. It happens 
not by revising physical laws for particle-interactions in applying 
them in a special way to organism, nor by imposing an extra­
mechanical entelechy. The organism creates a subjective pole in its 
attempt to maintain autonomy over the matter flowing through it. It is 
structuring matter in the process of self-realization to maintain itself as 
this very process.
Subjectivity arises as a kind of ontological complement to the 
material auto-production an organism continuously is concerned with. 
Subjectivity hence is not just found in human conscious intentionality. 
It is rather at the ground of any behaviour emerging from the biotic 
outset. Subjectivity is the expression of the fact that a living system is 
concerned with itself. Because life is continued existence against the 
weight of matter there is a subjective perspective emerging in a living 
system. This is the perspective of concern: a living system is trying to 
keep itself up against influences and disturbances. Already basic 
forms of life therefore might have a subjective perspective as a result 
of their existential need:
The difference between environment and world is the surplus o f  signification 
which haunts the understanding of living and of cognition, and which is at the 
root of how the self becomes one... There is no food significance in sucrose 
except when a bacterium swims upgradient and its metabolism uses the 
molecule in a way that allows its identity to continue. This surplus is 
obviously not indifferent to the regularities and texture (i.e. the ‘laws’) that 
operate in the environment, that sucrose can create a gradient and traverse a 
cell membrane, and so on. On the contrary, the system’ s world is build on 
these regularities, which is what assures that it can maintain its coupling at all 
times. (Varela 1991: 86, emphasis by the author)
Lite is a fragile, precarious principle. Life is not an unlimited success- 
story, because it is a processual tendency on substantial matter. This 
permanent instability is the door where the semiotic germ enters the 
thinking of Jonas: because negation of the living is always possible, its 
simple existence must always be self-affirmation. Simple existence 
must be an approvement, a “Yes to m yself’ to be able to continue. For 
Jonas, this reflexive movement is the generator of basic value:
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The fundamental point of departure is that life says ‘Y es!’ to itself. In 
wishing to continue it declares itself as a value [...] May we thus say that 
mortality is the narrow door through which value —  the thing addressed by 
‘yes’ entered the otherwise indifferent universe? [...] Feeling is the primary 
condition for something to be ‘worth the effort’. Something gains reality only 
as a given for feeling and as the feeling of that given. The mere presence of 
feeling, whatever may be its kind, is infinitely superior to it total absence. 
Thus, the ability to feel as it came about in organism, is the mother value of all 
values. (Jonas 1992: 87-88)
Jonas here particularly stresses the self reflexive tendency of matter. 
But he also pays attention to the dependency on an “other”, always 
given and probably as basic and as important, and present in the very 
core of a biological entity via code-duality of soma and genes, 
formulated by Hoffmeyer (1997). To understand the organism’s 
necessity to succeed in a surrounding world, Jonas integrates a deep 
rooted dialectics in his view of living beings: The self-making self has 
to survive in a world characterised by an “other” . In the antinomy of 
form and matter found in the metabolic principle of life itself this 
other-reference becomes a first order phenomenon. Hence, and this is 
most important, Jonas goes radically farther than a cybernetic account 
oriented at the circular model of the feedback loop. Indeed he 
criticizes heavily the cybernetic model for its reduction of animal 
nature to a dyadic structure with perception and motility as the two 
moving factors,
whereas in reality it is composed of the triad o f perception, mobility and 
feeling. Feeling, more basic than the two other potential, and rather linking 
them, is the animal translation o f the basic tendency, that is at work already 
from the undifferentiated, pre-animal stage on, in the continuous realization of 
metabolism. (Jonas 1973: 185-186)
Feeling thus is the in te rp re ta n t  necessary to make up a biosemiotic 
entity. Feeling that rises from the intrinsic teleology of organism 
which Jonas is calling here “basic tendency” is the te r tiu m  com para-  
tio n is  that links the c a u sa , perception, with its effec t, mobility. Such a 
causality is a teleological, not a mechanical one. (As Varela and 
Weber, 2002, have argued, the process of the living establishes an 
in tr in s ic , or real teleology as a deep feature of the organism). The 
causation is guided by a self who follows the “mother-value of all
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values” as a final raison d ’etre, a self which is longing for existence 
and for further unfolding.
This is what Jonas calls the subject-pole created by the living 
organism. Feeling always brings forth an interior dimension, or rather, 
interior, or self, unfold as feeling. What is felt, is felt by this rudi­
mentary “self’. What is felt is felt as self, and Self is only possible via 
feeling. Feeling is the presence of intrinsic teleology, its manifestation 
as a motivation of behaviour in its most basic sense.
3. Langer: Feeling and vital import
Susanne Langer started as a philosopher of logics in Whiteheadian 
style and then turned to a more holistic viewpoint. Langer has mainly 
been recognized as a philosopher of art. This judgement certainly does 
not pay enough justice to her work, particularly in the late volumes of 
Mind (1967-1982). Langer has worked on a theory of cultural 
symbols, but she has derived her semiotics from a theory of organism, 
or, as she called it, “living form”.
Langer has become known for her distinction of discursive —  
logical — and presentative symbols. For Langer all symbols are 
mental concepts. A discursive symbol thus is a conceptual expression 
of an idea. A presentative symbol, though, is a conceptual expression 
of lived existence. Langer believes that there is a common ground of 
experience shared by humans and other organic beings. As “symp­
toms” (Langer 1953: 25), expressive gestures, postures, colourings 
and other embodied signs, this lived experience is constantly and 
spontanously expressed by all organisms, humans and animals alike. 
A presentative symbol wields the spontaneous embodiment of a 
symptom into a “felt concept”. Presentative concepts hence are 
integrating biological and cultural semiotics. On the forefront of this 
semiotics Langer deals with a concept of “feeling”.
A presentative symbol for Langer signifies a concept of “felt life”, 
or rather, as she would have it, expresses “felt life” . In her eyes, art
Drittens schließt diese Transzendenz Innerlichkeit oder Subjektivität ein, die alle 
in ihrem Horizont vorkommenden Begegnungen mit der Qualität gefühlter Selbstheit 
durchtränkt, wie leise ihre Stimme auch sei. Sie muß da sein, damit Befriedigung oder 
Vereitelung einen Unterschied macht” (1992:26). Jonas (1953) also uses the term 
‘Emotion’.
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symbols are always presentative symbols, hence are semiotically 
expressive of feeling. Art reaches farther than the discursive sphere 
and has its roots in the region of our organic foundations. Art there­
fore can illustrate organic experience, and vice versa, organic expe­
rience can explain certain regularities in art. Both have a common 
source in a general expressiveness of life. This thesis could not be 
very popular in the fifties, where Langer was elaborating it in Feeling 
and Form  (1953), but it might lead us to certain insights in organic 
semioses. In her transition from art semiotics to biosemiotics Langer 
is guided by the question
what new empirical knowledge of the morphology of feeling can we derive 
from its image in works of art, and what light can this knowledge throw on the 
unfelt processes of life and the emergence of feeling, animal mentality, human 
experience and mind? (Langer 1967: 74).
What does the term “feeling” mean for Langer? In her eyes, all 
organic beings on the one hand are pure matter, on the other hand 
lived experience. Biological processes are one aspect of an interwoven 
identity of physiological and intentional aspects. Life can not be 
different from matter. Thus, there has to be a kind of “forgotten side” 
of the material setting: Feeling is the manifestation of the biological 
theatre in a special perspective. “What is felt is a process, perhaps a 
large complex of processes, within the organism” (Langer 1967: 21).
But who feels? Langer tries to overcome the problem with the term 
“phase” . “Being felt” is a phase of biological processes. “A phase is a 
mode of appearances, and not an added factor”, she says, not a 
“product of neural impulses, but [...] an aspect of their occurence” 
(Langer 1967: 30). Like the red glowing of a heated metal is not exter­
nal to it, but an inevitable aspect of its energy-rich state, feeling (to the 
“inside”) and expressivity (to the “outside”) are new phases of the 
living. The semiotic aspect is an emergent property of complex 
autopoietic systems. Being felt is a phase in which only organic 
systems appear. It is a shift to an emergent property that has not been 
contained in the sum of the parts —  “constituents of one kind, brought 
together in a special combination, may seem to produce a new 
ingredient which is, however, a phase of their own occurrence” 
(Langer 1967: 21).
Unlike Jonas, who is focusing on the structuring function of 
feeling in perception of the world, Langer concentrates deeper on its
Feeling the signs 191
particular structure, once it has emerged from the movements of 
organic acts. Feeling turns those processes into experience which are 
functioning “inside”. Feeling displays the meaning those processes 
have for the concrete realization of the living. What shape does it 
have? Langer speaks of
forms of growth and of attenuation, flowing and stowing, conflict and 
resolution, speed, arrest, terrific excitement, calm, or subtle activation and 
dreamy lapses. (Langer 1953: 27)
Feeling thus is mirroring what happens to the organism in its self- 
realization. Feeling is the meaning which external influences and the 
biological reactions to them have. “All external stimuli, that have 
effects on an organism affect the matrix, i.e. the organism as a whole, 
and through it motivate reactions [ ...]” (Langer 1982: 90). In this view 
the living being is seen as a more or less autonomous centre reacting 
by its own laws. Langer herself expresses an affinity to the concepts 
of general systems theory (Lachmann 2000: 153). But she is going 
farther, as Jonas does: The living system —  as Langer says: the 
matrix— becomes an active agent: “Every distinguishable change, 
therefore, arises out of the matrix, and emerges as an act of an agent, 
for such a vital matrix is an agent” (Langer 1967: 322).
Consequently, the model of organic causation for Langer is not 
linear, or mechanical. It is rather parallel to the teleological causality 
we have in Jonas. Langer prefers to view an external trigger as a 
"motivation” (Langer 1967: 283) acting on a subject rather than a 
stimulus inducing causally a response:
The only way an external influence can produce an act is to alter the organic 
situation that induces acts; and to do this it must strike in a phase of ongoing 
activity, in which it is immediately lost, replaced by a change of a phase in the 
activity. (Langer 1967: 283)
'Motivation” is a term also Buytendijk (1958: 28f) uses for the same 
reasons as Langer does. Buytendijk thereby comes close to Uexkiill’s 
biosemiotic insights. Indeed Langer even refines her view by 
discussing Uexkiills Umwelt-concept. She does so without touching 
explicitly semiotic grounds. But we can state that the intrinsic 
teleology of the self-realising organism we discussed above might be 
used as a common denominator to describe an organism in semiotic
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terms. This relation sees also Lachmann (2000: 154n9) who refers to 
Maturana.
Every organism for Langer is composed of acts: small, circular 
processes joining to larger tissues of organic events and hence forming 
the “matrix” of the living as a reflexive system of circular acts (Langer 
1982: 90). Langer’s theory of organic acts therefore is a process 
theory of the living, as observes Lachmann (2000: 157). But in 
Langer’s view, rather than being a (metaphysical) character of 
cosmos, processual reality stems from the way living subjects bring 
forth their reality. Langer hence offers a biological application of 
Whitehead. It is the organism who realizes the primacy of form over 
matter. What Whitehead conceives of as a metaphysics is, seen 
through Langer, the shape which the world gains by and through our 
organic makeup.
The act-model allows to make an abstraction from the basic 
biological level. Langer is speaking of the dynamics of life more in 
general, probably due to her inspiration by Whitehead. In a way 
Langer occupies a middle position halfway between process thinking 
and Jonas’ views. Langer explicitly rejects the cosmological optimism 
stemming from Jonas’ belief that feeling accompanies every process 
in organism. She even criticizes him for designing a “biological 
cosmos”. Her theory is more general but lacks the plausibility of a 
generic account of the semiotic nucleus from the lack of the living. 
But also in Langer’s work we can find an approach to the pheno­
menon of meaning which is based on considerations about the genesis 
of values. Langer holds that organisms perceive the meaning of 
situations according to their physiological needs:
[ ...]  the primary characteristics which animals see are values, and all the 
qualities of form, color, shape, sound, warmth, and even smell, by which we 
would naturally expect them to recognize things, enter into their perceptual 
acts only as [ ...]  values for action. (Langer 1972: 55)
This view reminds of Jonas. But speaking about values, Langer first 
and foremost analyses Uexküll’s Umweltlehre. For Langer, all orga­
nisms have to cope with the existential values of situations they 
encounter in their surrounding worlds. The values of those encounters 
depend on the organism’s biological structure. Value is thus shared by 
all organic beings in a common conditio vitae (Weber 2001a). On the 
other hand, Langer is emphasizing the difference of the ambient
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worlds of different species. Value differs according to taxonomic and 
even individual particularities: according to a specific and unique 
Bauplan. Following the “mother-value” of all values, the drive to 
exist, existential values create a vast range of meaning and signi­
ficance. Feeling translates the biological meaning of a value which has 
been encountered into a subjective perspective: The value of a 
situation becomes manifest as feeling: “More and more, then, 
behaviour — the acts of an organism as a whole in relation to 
extraorganic conditions —  comes to be guided and developed by 
feeling” (Langer 1967: 425).
According to each kind of organism, particular classes of values 
are modified into qualia or even, in humans, into mental concepts. 
Categories arise from these particular classes of value. But value 
precedes modal discrimination: value lies before the splitting of our 
perception into colours, tones, smells or touches. All these senses 
might have an existential dimension lying deeper than their qualia. 
This is a view which might help explain synaesthesia: Different 
sensory modes mean the same on a basic level concerning survival. A 
sharp tone and a sharp knife might have a common effect on organic 
feeling. As studies show, animals and children categorize apparently 
far-lying objects according to value. E.g. a baby learning to speak may 
call the brush, the broom and the dog’s fur alike, because it touches 
them with the same sensation (this is an observation I made with my 
son). Eleanor Rosch (1978) has done landmark studies on this topic, 
followed by many others (Varela et al. 1991). Natural categorization 
thus yields a kind of natural, or “primary” metaphor (see Lakoff, 
Johnson 1999: 56). Symbols act via these basic categorization: 
symbols enact identical values that have the same “import” as their 
referents, existing in reality.
Langer beliefs that the values which the human organism expe­
riences viz. brings forth are reflected in art. All great art, as she likes 
to put it, is an approach to organic feeling. The significance of music, 
e.g., lies in its “vital import”, in its relevance to the dynamism of 
subjective experience. Art for Langer always rests in contact with the 
organic base: “Art is the creation of forms symbolic of human feeling” 
(Langer 1953: 40). As the feeling of organic acts itself does, formal 
elements in a work of art show features as dynamism, swelling, rest, 
tension, peace. For Langer, these features have the same existential 
value as can be encountered in organic experience.
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In Langer’s eyes, organic feeling becomes somewhat transparent in 
human expressivity. But the access we have to the biotic layer, to the 
origin of our values, is never a direct one. We cannot tell by intro­
spection what feeling the signs is like. W e have to make the detour via 
artistic expression and so we must to substitute an embodied 
experience by another. Because of its organic source, there may 
always be ambiguity in the symbolization of feeling. Because “vital 
import” is reaching far beyond conscious semioses, it might always 
contain the ambivalences and even contradictions of pure vital 
dynamism:
The same feeling may be an ingredient in sorrow and in the joys of love. A 
work of art expressing such an ambiguously associated effect will be called 
‘cheerful’ by one interpreter and ‘wistful’ or even ‘sad’ by another. But what 
it conveys is really just one nameless passage of ‘felt life’, knowable through 
its incarnation in the art symbol even if the beholder has never felt it in his 
own flesh [...]  Even the artist need not to have experienced in actual life every 
emotion he can express. It may be through manipulation of his created 
elements that he discovers new possibilities of feeling, strange moods, perhaps 
greater concentrations of passion than his own temperament could ever 
produce, or than his fortunes have yet called forth. (Langer 1953: 374)
Due to its origin in value, and its intermodal nature feeling is 
projected in art as a quality, and not as a mental concept. Works of art 
exhibit the morphology of feeling, not by resting on conventional 
iconography, but by what Langer calls “living” or significant form—a 
form that does not convey a content but has an effect by transporting a 
certain value:
There is a kind of quality that different colours, or even a tonal form and a 
visual one, may have in common; even events may have the same quality, say 
o f mystery, of portentousness, of breeziness; and a word like ‘breeziness’ 
bespeaks the qualitative similarity of some moods and some weathers. Homer 
refers to the ‘wine-dark-sea’, although Greek wine is red, and the 
Mediterranean is as blue as any other sea water. But the translucent blue in the 
curve o f a wave and the glowing red in a cup of wine have a common quality 
[...] This quality is the projected feeling. (Langer 1967: 106)
For Langer significant form is an articulate expression of feeling. By 
reflecting the “verbally ineffable and therefore unknown forms of 
sentience” (Langer 1953: 39) the symbolization of feeling is a crucial 
factor of culture as the self-understanding of man. Via symbols felt
Feeling the signs 195
organic experience can become accessible for others. Art is a means of 
intersubjectivity, a genuine path of interbeing. The gesture exists 
between the bodies as a gesture of living form betw een, inter the 
subjects. This might also contribute to explain furthermore the often 
stressed similarities between art and child’s play. In both there are 
gestures, expressions of possible existence established in the virtual 
space beyond limited subjects. A theory of subjectivity would have to 
draw largely on this field (cf. the now classic critique by Helmut 
Schelsky 1958 on Uexkiill).
These thoughts might help to see why Langer declares that “art is 
the objectification of feeling, and the subjectification of nature” 
(Langer 1953: 81). Artistic symbols express feeling in the same way 
as living form does. Their “felt tensions” can be apprehended only if 
their whole organic background is implied by their appearance. That is 
why for Langer every work of art has to seem ‘organic’ and ‘living’ to 
be expressive of feeling. (Langer 1967: 103). More recently, Gernot 
Böhme (1997) has coined the term Geste der Natürlichkeit, “gesture 
of naturalness”.
Artistic form is acting as a sign on the same expressive level as 
organic form. That is what Langer means when she speaks of “living 
form”. The gesture displayed by a work of art must convey the feeling 
which is provoked by the work’s signifie when it is encountered in 
reality:
But just because the created appearance is all that has organic structure, a 
work shows us the appearance of life; and the semblance of functional unity 
is indispensable if the illusory tension pattern is to connote felt tensions, 
human experience (Langer 1953: 373). In creating an emotive symbol, or 
work of art, the creator does articulate a vital import which he could not 
imagine apart from its expression, and consequently cannot know before he 
expresses it. (Langer 1953: 389)
The relation between biochemical dynamics and organic feeling is of 
the same type as the relation between form and expression in a work 
of art. Both are expressive by means of their underlying vital 
dynamics. Expression hence is a symbol of its vital meaning, be it in a 
work of art or in a living body. As I have shown elsewhere (Weber 
2001b), this relation equals the relation classically applied to the 
tension between body and soul. It is a symbolical relationship,
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symbolical in a strong sense: the symbol is not a convention but an 
expression of an underlying necessity.6
4. The “conditio vitae” : From vitality to expression
These observations about the biological way of meaning creation 
might give some interesting hints for a semiotic theory of expressivity. 
Expressivity, as observed by Langer, the generation of meaning which 
refers to the inner perspective of an organism, could be an important 
feature of a theory of organism and of nature. Because expressivity is 
linked to form, like in works of art, this fact re-introduces an aesthetic 
aspect in the theory of organism. This formal, morphological or 
aesthetic aspect has not always been absent from biological thinking. 
Few examplary thinkers out of many more are Aristotle, Goethe and, 
more recently, Portmann.
Another most influential philosopher who saw a nexus between 
aesthetic thinking and the living organism was certainly Kant. In his 
famous reflections in the Critique o f  Judgement Kant tried to explain 
why a transcendental subject is capable of certain judgements about 
empirical objects in the world. Two circumstances were equally 
enigmatic for Kant: the possibility of aesthetic judgements and the 
possibility of teleological judgements —  whether an object is alive 
and which criteria have to be adopted for a definition of the living 
organism (Lenoir 1982: 29).
Kant never solved the enigma (even if it was him who had con­
tributed to complicate it a lot). Kant finally postulated a “happy 
chance” to reconcile the (empirical) natural manifoldness and the 
(ideal) faculty of judgement (Kant, Critique o f  Judgement, p. xxxiv). 
A biosemiotic approach based on “vital import” might provide some 
more answers. In the living organism, form is correlated with identity,
6 This interpretation bears some similarities with Theodor W. Adorno’s theory of 
art and the relation to an aesthetics of nature he sees (Adorno 1973: 115f). Cf. also 
Dieter Henrich’s (2001) work on “Art and Life”, where he explains the import of art in 
a delicate analogy with the momentum of subjectivity, though in solidly keeping to a 
rational theory of (human) subjectivity.
7 This is the point where Goethe disagreed: For him, man could intuitively see, or 
rather “feel” the underlying laws of vital form in natural things, making them 
symbolical for our own existence, and even beautiful.
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the struggle to keep up identity is mirrored in form and manifest in the 
subjective perspective of feeling. Lived or intrinsic teleology and 
aesthetics seem to come into a close junction that should merit further 
attention. Langer observes:
If it could be shown that the forms of reason, or ‘laws of thought’, are forms 
of perception exemplifying larger laws of vital process, the ‘happy accident’ 
of ‘reasonable’ forms in nature, that Kant regarded as the basis o f aesthetic 
pleasure, would not look so arbitrary as it did to him. (Langer in Lachmann 
2000: 135n25)
Rather, we can add now, these forms might be expressive of the 
conditio vitae underlying organic existence. Beauty in organism is not 
arbitrary, nor a mere “happy chance”. It is a necessity.
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“Чувствуя” знаки: природа значения в биологической 
философии Сюзанны К. Лангер и Ганса Ионаса
Статья рассматривает семиотический подход к организму в работах двух 
протобиосемиотических мыслителей. Оба автора развивают концепции, 
которые стали центральными в современной биосемиотике: организм 
как субъект, реализация живого как закрытая циркулярная “самость’’, 
концепция ценности, а у Лангер —  и понятие символа. Лангер развивает 
теорию культурного символизма, исходя из организма как самореали­
зующейся системы, которая создает как значение так и ценность. Данная 
статья сосредотачивает внимание главным образом на явлении, которое 
оба автора называли “чувство” (feeling). Они описывают “чувство” как 
основывающуюся на ценности перспективу, которая создается актив­
ным “самоинтересом” в органической системе. Результаты Ионаса и 
Лангер показывают формирование полюса субъекта или биосемиоти- 
ческого агента точнее, чем, например, у Юксюолля. Их идеи можно 
связать и с “автопойезисом” (телесное узнавание или энактивизм) 
позднего Франциско Варелы. Синтез этих разных позиций может при­
вести к пониманию того, каким образом символические выражения 
вырастают из биологических условий жизни.
“Tundes” märke: tähenduse päritolu Susanne K. Langeri ja 
Hans Jonase bioloogilises filosoofias
Käesolev artikkel vaatleb semiootilist organismikäsitlust kahe eel-biosem ioo- 
tilise mõtleja —  Susanne К. Langeri ja Hans Jonase —  töödes. M õlemad 
autorid arendavad kontseptsioone, mis on praeguses biosem iootikas saanud 
keskseiks: organism kui subjekt, elusa realisatsioon kui suletud tsirkulaarne 
ise”, väärtuskontseptsioon ja Langeri puhul ka sümboli mõiste. Langer 
arendab kultuurilise sümbolismi teooriat, lähtudes organismist kui ennast 
realiseerivast süsteemist, mis loob nii tähenduse kui väärtuse. Käesolev  
ariikkel puudutab peamiselt nähtust, mida mõlemad autorid on nimetanud 
tundeks”. Nad kirjeldavad “tunnet” kui väärtusest lähtuvat perspektiivi, mille
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loob aktiivne enese huvi orgaanilises süsteemis. Jonase ja Langeri tulemused 
näitavad subjekti pooluse ehk biosem iootilise toimuri kujunemist täpsemini 
kui näit. J. v. Uexküll seda tegi. Nende ideid võib seostada ka arusaamaga 
autopoeesisest hilise Francisco Varela mõttes ( ‘kehastunud äratundmine’ või 
‘enaktivism ’). Sääraste arusaamade süntees võib viia mõistmiseni, kuidas 
süm bolilised väljendused pärinevad elu bioloogilistest tingimustest.
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Human/animal communications, 
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Abstract. The article compares the research programs of teaching symbolic 
language to chimpanzees, pointing on the dichotomy between artificial lan­
guage vs. ASL, and the dichotomy between researchers who decided to 
establish emotional relationships between themselves and the apes, and those 
who have seen apes as instrumental devices. It is concluded that the experi­
ments with the most interesting results have been both with artificial language 
and ASL, but with strong affiliation between researchers and animal involved 
in the experiments. The experiments on talking apes are not so much experi­
ments in psycholinguistics (how far can animal learn human language) but 
wonderful experiments in the communities o f  communication between human 
beings and great apes.
Ever since the sixties, American psychologists have been involved in 
one of the most interesting scientific adventures of the second part of 
the 20th century: to teach a symbolic language to chimpanzees in 
order to make them able to communicate with human beings. (1) In 
the first part of the article, I give a short synthetic presentation of these 
research programs through two pillars: the dichotomy between 
artificial language vs. ASL, and the dichotomy between researchers 
who decided to establish strong emotional relationships between 
themselves and the apes, and those who have always seen apes as 
instrumental devices. I show that the experiments with the most 
interesting results have been both with artificial language and ASL but 
with strong affiliation between researchers and animal involved in the 
experiments. (2) Then, I suggest that unlike what has always been
said, these experiments on talking apes are not so much experiments 
in psycholinguistics (how far can animal learn human language) but 
wonderful experiments in the communities o f  communication between 
human beings and great apes. Indeed, for the first time in the history 
of the world, animals (humans) have tried to build up communities 
whose only goal is to seriously communicate with another species. (3) 
In the third part of the paper, I analyse this situation in the context of 
the evolution of communication and I try to think human language not 
as a property that puts the human being apart from other living 
creatures, but as a property that makes human beings able to better 
communicate with non human living creatures. In conclusion, I 
analyse the reasons for which this situation is of great importance for 
proper thinking on the evolution of communication and biosemiotics.
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1. Some introductory remarks on the evolution 
of communication
Evolution of communication and language have usually been thought 
of either from a strict phylogenetic point of view or from a pure 
cultural point of view. Marc Hauser (1996) wrote a classical work on 
the topic of the phylogenetic evolution of communication through 
comparative psychology and ethology of communication, but by the 
very topic of his book Hauser restricts himself to treat the commu­
nicative abilities of a number of species which he sees as significant, 
particularly among primates and birds. Questions of plasticity of 
communication are quite neglected as is the possible history of such 
communicative systems which ornithologists have observed it in the 
form of so-called dialects among birds. Also interspecific commu­
nications are roughly forgotten. Nevertheless, Hauser’s approach is a 
usual one, and I am sure his book is now taken as a classical text-book 
in the field.
It is much more unusual to mix up both phylogenetic and cultural 
approaches of communication. To adopt that position means that for 
other species than humans, communicative competences are seen to 
have a functional plasticity that allows cultural non-trivial cognitive 
transformations. I do not wish to discuss the topic of animal culture 
here, a field of research that have been largely renewed during the last
years (Lestel, 2001 for a philosophical discussion), but to focus my 
argumentation on a neglected part of these researches —  namely the 
situation of animals living among humans, animals well adapted in 
human cultures. Domesticated animals, commensal animals or pets are 
quite good examples to discuss in that way, but the best one is still the 
example of the so-called “talking apes” in the USA. In that situation, 
apes that do not use a symbolic language are able to use it after 
humans have taught it to them. For the first time in the history of 
Nature, living beings are now able to use communicative devices 
taught by other creatures in order to communicate together. Two 
questions become crucial: what really happens in that operation and 
what does it mean from an evolutionary point of view?
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2. How apes acquire symbolic languages at the end 
of the twentieth century
Since the beginning of the sixties, there have been a few research 
programs aiming at teaching a symbolic language to non-human pri­
mates. Roughly, four different orientations have been adopted by 
scientists1 working in the field.
(a) The first one has been developed by Alan and Beatrix Gardner, 
from the University of Nevada at Reno, particularly with chimpanzee 
Washoe. It emphasized the use of ASL as a symbolic medium, and the 
necessity to establish close affective contacts between human re­
searchers and chimpanzees. Regular experiments were used to 
complete informal but rigorous training. Trainers could not speak 
English when chimpanzees are around for example. Extremely 
draconian criteria were also used to determine that a sign had been 
acquired by the chimpanzees.2 R. Fouts tried to get Washoe to teach 
ASL to another chimpanzee, namely adopted offspring Loulis, and 
they exchange signs among themselves without the presence of 
humans.3
Nearly all o f them were or are experimental psychologists. The only assured 
exception is Lyn M iles, who works with orangutan Chantek, and who is an anthro­
pologist by training.
Gardner et al. (1989) summarize 20 years o f research on A SL and chim panzees.
A good overview can be found in Fouts, Fouts 1989.
(b) The second orientation may be featured by David Premack’s 
research program at University of Santa Cruz and later at University 
of Pennsylvania. Premack emphasized the use of an artificial symbolic 
language, especially designed for the experiments, and on a strong 
separation between animals being tested and human experimenters.
(c) The third orientation has been adopted by Columbia psycho­
logist Herbert Terrace who drew a strong separation between humans 
and ape (Nim Chimsky) and used ASL taught in formal way (eight 
hours a day in a classroom of Columbia University).
(d) The fourth orientation is Duane Rumbaugh’s and Sue Savage- 
Rum baugh’s who have chosen both an artificial language (the Yer- 
kish, a special language designed by professional linguists4), and the 
convivial and “familial” approach already adopted by the Gardner. 
Three projects have done. The first one was the Lana Project, the 
second one the Animal Model project and the third one the project 
with the bonobos, in particular with Kanzi.
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3. Experiments on talking apes as experiments 
on human/animal hybrid communities of communication
These experiments on talking apes still wait to be interpreted. They 
are scientific studies whose meaning has to be explored, just as had 
the meaning of quantum mechanics in twentieth century physics. To 
describe these experiments only in terms of experiments in psycho­
linguistics (how far can an ape acquire a human language?) is to 
greatly impoverish what is at stake. In the coming paragraphs, I wish 
to indicate some fruitful trails from a biosemiotic point of view.
3.1. In these experiments, each ape has an history. “He” becomes a 
person. In that way, “he” becomes an “heteronomous strong subject”, 
who communicates to humans his desires, his fears and his joys. In 
natural settings, as described by field ethologists like Jane Goodall, 
Christophe Boesch, Tetsuro Matsuzawa and so on, these chimpanzees 
are “autonomous weak subjects”. The notion of heteronomous strong 
subject sounds like a very curious notion to the ears of western people 
whose cultural tradition is based upon the association of autonomy
4 For a summary of this work, cf. Rumbaugh, Pate 1984.
and identity. Transfers of affects and emotions are very strong. Hu­
mans may explore these apes’ subjective landscapes —  and the 
reverse is also possible. That knowledge is a sharing one, although not 
a symmetrical one. These apes become creatures for which humans 
have hopes, fears, joys, pains, etc. Empathy between humans and 
these primates allows a semiotic strong interaction. We have not paid 
enough attention to a growing practice, concerning wild animals as 
well as animals like talking apes: the possibility to feature some 
animals through their biography —  which means temporal coheren­
ces, behavioural idiosyncrasies and “mental states” (preferences, 
repulsions,...) that feature a given animal.
3.2. What is striking in these research programs is the fact that animals 
and human beings live together in strong communities that we can 
qualify as hybrid human/animal communities of sharing of meaning, 
interests and affects. These hybrid communities are first of all semio­
tic communities.
Changes in the conceptualisation of language are important to 
understand what I mean by semiotic communities, in particular fol­
lowing Bates (1979) who saw language as a tool to change a listener’s 
behaviour. In that way, language is defined more by what it allows 
one to do than by what it is. Then, S. Savage-Rumbaugh (1990) can 
explain that language is a communication system based on causes and 
effects. Subject learns how to use language, but also how the others 
use it. What is important is no longer the presumed intention of the 
speaker, but the interplay of actions generated at the interface between 
locutor and interlocutors. Language becomes not only a systems of 
signs, but also a process organizing the behaviour of several 
interacting individuals. What is needed is a definition of the speaker 
more than a definition of language. In that way, Savage-Rumbaugh no 
longer asks if chimpanzees can learn a language, but if they can 
become effective speakers. Language is not so much a tool to tell 
somebody else something5 but a semiotic tool to live together, and that 
is also true with animals living among humans.
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Let us assume that story-tellers and philosophers have a special status in the 
community.
3.3. It is fruitful to explain an important dimension of these hybrid 
semiotic communities through a new interpretation of the Turing 
Test6. Alan Turing, the designer of the test was one the brightest 
British mathematicians of the first part of the twentieth century and a 
founder of the new academic field of theoretical computer science. He 
kept in mind a basic question for a long part of his life, namely the 
question of how to know in which way a machine can be intelligent, 
and in which ways humans may have the possibility to discover it. To 
answer that question, Turing designed a test, the famous Turing test, 
in order to test the machine’s intelligence. A human H u in a room, has 
to make a decision to know where is another human H2 and the 
machine M. H2 and the Machine are each located in one of two other 
rooms. H\ is linked with the machine and the human only through an 
abstract channel, for instance a computer keyboard. H\ has to 
determine who is in which room through questioning M  and H2. If H\ 
confused H2 and M, through the answers to his questions, M is said to 
be an intelligent machine. In that way, Turing developed a cooptative 
approach o f intelligence: an intelligent creature is a creature that/who 
has been admitted in the community of the intelligent creature by 
another intelligent creature. The semiotic community does work in the 
same way: a creature is seen as a semiotic creature if it is allowed to 
become a member of the community of the semiotic creatures, i.e., if 
the creature is able to communicate with already admitted members of 
the community. It is not a vicious circle, because such admittance 
means a lot of work by both parts in the process, and some basic 
transformations and results. The notion of cross-fostering family, 
originally coined by the Gardner7, is important here. It refers to the 
situation in which members of a species raise offspring of another 
species —  here humans raising chimpanzee offspring. This means that 
belonging to a semiotic community requires learning (sometimes a 
cultural learning) and is not at all a matter of fact.
3.4. These experiments on talking apes lead to the still rather 
neglected questions concerning the ability of human language to 
modify an animal semiotic system. If these experiments clearly show 
that these apes really “talk”, they also clearly show that these apes do
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6 Turing (1959).
' But the first attempt has been done by the Kelloggs, in which the subjects are 
chimpanzees and the foster parents are human beings. Cf. Kellogg (1968).
not talk as humans do. The great missing dimension of the analysis of 
the talking apes experiments is precisely the silence on the essential 
role that humans play in the process by which some great apes acquire 
the use of a symbolic language. That dimension has been raised during 
the 70s and the 80s, but in a very narrow sense as an objection against 
these studies: it was the so-called “Clever Hans effect”. Shortly, that 
objection points to the possibility that unconscious signals were com­
municated by humans to animals that would explain the performance 
of the animal under observation. It must nevertheless be clear that 
even if the Clever Hans objection does not work,8 the role of humans 
is a basic one in the process through which great apes acquire an 
access to symbolic language. For instance, if apes are able to com­
municate with humans or with other apes through symbols, it has been 
humans that have imposed the conventions underlying their very use.
3.5. It must also be said that some transformations in the process of 
acquiring symbols are not well understood. One example refers to the 
natural vocalizations by Kanzi quite different from natural ones: Kanzi 
vocalizes more and he uses new sounds, unheard in zoos or natural 
settings for that species. Let’s keep also attention to the fact that some 
animals use to communicate together through symbolic devices 
learned from humans without their presence —  as Washoe and Loulis 
did.
The philosophical value of these experiments have been largely 
underestimated. Let us take only two questions which relates them to 
biosemiotics. Firstly, these experiments threw new light on the status 
of human being in the biosemiotic sphere, where he alone has a status 
of “universal interlocutor”. Secondly, these experiments open new 
ways to deal with origins of language.
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An elegant refutation have been given by experiments in which humans and 
chimpanzees were communicating together through computer keyboards which put 
away the possibility of any physical interactions between humans and animals (they 
were simply not present in the same room. Cf. Savage-Rumbaugh (1986).
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4: Human being as a universal interlocutor
4.1. Language has often been featured by philosophers as “the very 
proper” of human beings. For them, language allows humans to use 
self-interpretation and self-transformations that other animals lack and 
leads to the raising of a radical frontier that divides humans on the one 
hand and animals on the other.
4.2. It does not mean that animal communications are very primitive 
ones. Quite a few animals, for instance, have the astonishing ability to 
manipulate other’s semiotic systems and to develop what British 
primatologists R. Byrne and A. Whiten (1988) have called Machia­
vellian intelligence, which refers to surprisingly diverse behaviours 
used to manipulate communication.
4.3. These philosophers have nevertheless neglected another vision of 
language, not as the basic feature that divides humans and animals but 
as the ability that allows humans and other animals to get closer 
together. Through language, humans have the possibility to acquire 
knowledge on animal communications, to raise a cultural expertise on 
human/animal interactions and to devise strategies in order to commu­
nicate with animals. In that way, human symbolic language transforms 
humans in universal interlocutors (Lestel 2002) in the field of living 
beings. Such a situation is possible because both humans and other 
animals live in the same world. From an evolutionist point of view, we 
have met similar constraints, different to be sure, but which were of 
the same nature concerning subsistence and reproduction. Language 
enables humans to be highly efficient at capturing animals or also at 
developing a wealth of relations with them on many levels.
4.4. From the neo-Darwinian point of view of the evolution of 
intelligence, it is striking to realize that animal species that have 
highly developed semiotic competences and animal species that have 
highly developed technical competences are almost never the same. 
For instance singing birds and birds that build complex nests belong to 
different species. Only two exceptions break the rule: social insects 
and humans. Among these latter, what characterized humans is that 
they do not only build complex devices for communicating together 
but they also build special devices to communicate —  and that they
are the only species to do that. If human beings invent techniques to 
communicate with other humans, they also invent new technics in 
order to better communicate with non-human animals. This is a 
crucial point: Although some birds are able to imitate other’s semiotic 
systems — humans are alone in being able to cleverly use the semiotic 
systems of potentially all living animals —  and not only to blindly 
imitate them. Humans are therefore universal talkers.
4.5. Humans have also another unique semiotic ability: They alone are 
building tools that allow non human creatures using different semiotic 
systems to communicate together to communicate with them, as we 
saw in the case of talking apes. Thus, humans have developed an 
elaborated technozoo semiotics 9 Let us keep in mind the bells of the 
shepherds, etc. Such a trend is still alive. Brazilian artist Eduardo Kac, 
to name just one, have recently tried to design new semiotic devices in 
order to make humans able to communicate with bats.10
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5. Pleasure and evolution of communication
Whoever observes talking primates as I have done is necessarily 
struck by the intense pleasure these animals takes in communicating 
with humans through symbolic devices, which leads one to wonder 
what role such pleasure may have had in the origins of human 
language (Lestel 2002). Certain philosophical difficulties are usually 
underestimated whenever people try to build a theory of the origins of 
language, and I wish to discuss some of them and to suggest a new 
approach.
(1) Most theories of the origins of language take for granted that 
the structural properties that feature human language compared to 
animal communications are also the causes for the emergence of 
language. For example, it is because humans can tell stories through 
languages that language emerged as an evolutionary advantage.
The term has been coined by French artist Louis Bee who devoted his artistic 
activity to design material interfaces to make humans and animals able to communicate 
together.
That performance was called “Darker Than Night” and has been shown in a bat 
cave at the Blijdorp Zoological Gardens, Rotterdam, as part of the exhibition “Fables 
of a Technological Era”. On that performance, cf. Milevska (2000).
(2) All theories on the origins of language fail to take into account 
its historical dimension. There are no good reasons given in favour of 
the hypothesis that languages as we know them are only a result of a 
phylogenetical evolution —  on the contrary.
(3) Adaptative advantages attributed to language consider that 
language has to be thought of as a break away from animal commu­
nication. We must be careful about our reasonings: how do we deal 
with animal communication? Have we explored possibilities to think 
animal communication without reducing it to a kind of sub-human 
communication? Let’s take an example. Ethologists usually think of 
animal communication through the glasses of instrumental rationality: 
what do animals try to tell others in order to reach which goal? An 
alternative possibility is largely underdiscussed: animal communi­
cation does not convey any information to others, but is only a way by 
which the animal expresses its own affective situation. Not at all: “Be 
careful, predators!” but: “I am afraid because of predators”. In that 
way, animals have developed an emotional rationality (not an instru­
mental one), and the so-called messages by animals are taken as 
events by others.
(4) This leads more generally to the questions of knowing “who 
talks”? In particular are “subjects” necessarily talking subjects or 
might we observe “speechless subjects”?
(5) The broadly accepted assumption that the origin of language 
must be looked for in the functional utilities it provides have to be 
discussed. In this paper I wish to suggest another story which insists 
upon pleasure as obtained by language use rather than on strict 
functional utility. I shall put forward four arguments for this view. The 
first one will be behaviours that strike any observer of so-called 
“talking apes” namely the extreme pleasure taken by the primates 
under observation in the use of a symbolic language to interact with 
humans. The second one will be the possibility that emerge, from a 
neurophysiological point of view, that brain areas of language and 
pleasure are quite similar: around the Broca area. The third one will be 
the suggestion of the plausibility of an evolutionary scenario for the 
origins of language close to the scenario proposed by Darwin and 
Wallace to take into account the so-called “sexual selection”. The 
fourth one refers to the hypothesis by ethologists that close links exist 
between play behaviours and evolution of language.
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6. Conclusion
If biosemiotics is seen as the field of the emergence of meaning in 
natural world, we have to re-evaluate two major phenomena: inter­
species communications, and in particular the break that occurred with 
the human being as a creature capable of being a “universal inter­
locutor” for the first time, and the role of pleasure in the emergence of 
a complex semiotic natural system as language.11
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Общение между человеком и животным, 
язык и эволюция
В статье сравниваются разные исследовательские программы, занимаю­
щиеся обучением шимпанзе символическому языку. Рассматриваются 
две дихотомии: искусственный язык —  язык жестов; исследователи, 
решившие установить эмоциональную связь между собой и обезьяна­
ми, —  исследователи, видевшие в обезьянах лишь инструментальные 
средства. Делается вывод, что весьма интересные результаты были 
получены при использовании как искусственного языка, так и языка 
жестов, и особенно в условиях, когда между экспериментаторами и 
обезьянами существовала тесная связь. Эксперименты с говорящими 
обезьянами являются не столько психолингвистическими опытами (в 
какой мере животные могут научиться человеческому языку), сколько 
великолепными примерами коммуникационного сообщ ест ва  между 
людьми и большими обезьянами.
Inimese ja looma vaheline suhtlemine, keel, evolutsioon
Artiklis võrreldakse erinevaid uurimisprogramme, mis tegelevad sümbolilise 
keele õpetam isega šimpansitele. Vaadeldakse erinevusi kahe dihhotoomia — 
kunstlike keelte ja viipekeelte, ning nende uurijate, kes otsustasid kujundada 
emotsionaalse suhte enda ja ahvide vahel, ja  teiste, kes nägid ahvides instru­
mentaalseid vahendeid —  osas. Järeldatakse, et väga huvitavaid tulemusi 
saadi nii kunstlike keelte kui viipekeele korral, kuid eelkõige juhul, kui 
uurijate ja  loomade vahel oli eksperimendis tihe side. Eksperimendid kõnele­
vate ahvidega pole niivõrd eksperimendid psühholingvistikast (s.o. millises 
ulatuses suudavad loomad õppida inimkeelt), kuivõrd suurepärased eksperi­
mendid suhtlem iskooslusest inimeste ja  suurte ahvide vahel.
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On the zoosemiotics of health and disease
Aleksei Turovski
Tallinn Zoo, Paldiski mnt 145, 13522 Tallinn, Estonia 
e-mail: p.turovski@tallinnlv.ee
Abstract. The main feature of the signs of health in the animal habitus and 
behaviour can be characterised as the readiness to adequately (for a species) 
serve the need for impression (in animalistic elements of the Umwelt). The 
signs of disease, however multifarious and diverse, generally display certain 
lack of Umwelt-oriented attentiveness, alertness. Attention of deeply afflicted 
animals is strongly Innenwelt-oriented; and in some species a set of such 
signs, suggesting sickness or mortal disease is used as a set of traits in the 
mimicry of dying. The semiotic factors in health-disease relationships are 
apparently connected with intuition —  like responses creating in the 
semiosphere a structure of Umwelt-Innenwelt polarized tensions, important in 
ecological and evolutional developments.
Speak roughly to your little boy,
And beat him when he sneezes:
He only does it to annoy,
Because he knows it teases.
Lewis Carrol (1924: 71)
... but he (the dragon) was most unmistak­
ably alive, and proved it by having a hearty 
appetite and an evident enjoyment o f life.
G. K. Chesterton (1970: 203)
One of the generally shared human beliefs about the dangerousness of 
animals is that some healthy specimens of the best “armed” species, 
that is well equipped with harmful facilities, are the most dangerous 
ones. However, this notion is not always true, at least where the 
danger to modem men is concerned. It would be truer to notify that in
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the majority of situations, leading to encounters with humans, just the 
sick animals, whether injured, poisoned, traumatized to a certain 
degree, or afflicted by infectious disease would prove to be potentially 
the most dangerous ones due to the severe changes in their behaviour 
in the first place. A healthy tiger, panther, rattle snake, cobra, black 
widow spider (Latrodectes sp.), hornet etc are the most able experts in 
avoidance of humans even in anthropogenically stressed environment, 
to say nothing about the natural habitats. But the probability of 
undesirable contact with sick animals, e.g. injured snakes, poisoned 
wasps, ornithosis infected birds, plague afflicted rodents and a most 
striking example, I trust, with various species of rabies affected 
mammals, could be quite high, in the vicinity of nidus areas at least. 
The behavioural changes, induced and vectorized by pathogenic 
factors ranging from traumas to viruses and toxins, produce profound 
effects on the continuum of ecological interactivities including inter- 
and intraspecific competition, predator-prey relations, foraging stra­
tegies, mate choice, parent-offspring relationships etc. An excellent 
compendium on these and related topics is presented in the volume 
edited by Nancy E. Beckage (1997); and also in the monograph by 
Robert Poulin (1998) the theme of the significance of behavioural 
deviations resulting from parasite-host interactions in the evolutionary 
ecological aspects is presented very revealingly. However, the 
spectrum of behavioural shifts and deviations induced by and related 
to pathological events and developments ranges on a scale so large, 
that it presents an irresistable challenge: to try a semiotic approach to 
those phenomena that is to make a behavioural sign-structure analysis 
of ecological fitness in animal associations. It is quite obvious that the 
biological norm in case of any animal species is much larger than the 
veterinarian/medical one and the notion of an absolutely healthy 
animal or human being is just as formal as a notion of statistically 
average person. However we may presume that the signs of health are 
these pointing to a set of the traits of ecological fitness/suitability by 
ecoamplitudes, including physical strength and agility, full possession 
of specific forms of display such as adequate comfort behaviour, 
habitual appearance (high level of symmetry, specific pattern and 
brightness in coloration etc.) and rituals in sexual, territorial and social 
behaviour. In the semiosis-process the signs of health are multi­
functional factors which serve as means to attract and/or intensify, 
fortify and enhance the specific attention of cospecimens, of
specimens of ecologically favourable associated species (e.g., of 
mutualists), in comfort, parental, sexual, foraging and defensive beha­
viour. At the same time these signs are means to fortify the repulsion 
or at least the discouragement of intra — as well as interspecific 
predators and competitors in the same behavioural aspects as stated 
above. So, the main feature of the signs of health could be described 
as readiness to adequately serve the need fo r  impression (Turovski 
2000) in animal elements of the umwelt as a holistic semiosystem.
It seems that nothing so conclusive could be proposed as a general 
definition of the signs of disease. The majority of various maladies 
have so many different and variable symptoms, arranged in innumer­
able syndromes, the appearance of which depends on immuno- 
competence of the specimen — ability in its turn being dependent on 
the genotype, age, sex, individual phenotypical particularities con­
nected with learning, life history, climate, ration, etc. —  that even 
such features as general distress are not universal enough to describe 
them. And for all that, animals in the main part are able to detect and 
recognize some of the sick cospecimens, mainly as estranged weaks 
or, perhaps, even as alienated ones, and also the sick/deficient 
specimens of prey and/or competitor species. Moreover, many species 
seem to be able to recognize the signs of certain maladies, not just the 
morbidity or great tiredness but the actual olfactory, acoustical and 
visual symptoms. The ultimate signs of disease are, perhaps, the 
symptoms of dying and of great pain, signs displaying nearly total 
lack of umwelt-oriented attentiveness, alertness. Attention of such 
deeply afflicted animals is mainly Innenwelt-oriented. Specimens in 
such a state are usually avoided not only by cospecimens but also by 
young and specifically experienced predators and scavengers. This 
corresponds with various cases, which possibly could be considered as 
mimicry in which “the mimic” performs a display of violent con­
vulsions and spasms, revealing “total lack of attention” towards the 
outer world, so that the signs which the predator-selector recognises 
correctly as the marks of prey are inhibited in the filter of semiosis in 
the reverse feedback (Maran 2001) situation. Behavioural traits of this 
kind are observable in defence behaviour of some reptilians and 
mammals, including primates. Still, though a lot of examples are 
known of the mimicry of death (opossums, some snakes), in which 
mimics even produce highly specific odour (not of carrion, but of 
abnormally unclean and/or poisoned animal), I am not ready to
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declare, that the repelling behaviour described above, highly agonistic 
as it is, is definitely a “mimicry of dying” . However, mimicry of dying 
or/and dead takes place in the behaviour of small reptiles and 
mammals mostly in North and Central America, where the rattle 
snakes are (or used to be) in abundance. The behavioural display of 
violent convulsion and images of horribly twisted corps suggests acute 
toxicosis in prey bitten by a rattle snake. For properly (to a degree) 
experienced predators such pattern of prey behaviour points, perhaps, 
to the high probability of the presence of preying rattle snake in the 
vicinity, which means that it is on its way here in search for its prey. 
Certainly, the highly and specifically experienced predators could 
remind unimpressed by such a display. But in Australia and South 
Asia, where respectively, tiger snakes’ and cobras’ preying habits are 
of the opposite pattern (instant kill, especially in preying on birds), the 
cases of the mimicry of death in convulsions are rare.
I would like to propose two more forms of behaviour connected 
with the signs of disease to be considered as, probable, cases of 
mimicry, both in the field of intraspecific activities. The first case is 
the mimicry of the healthy behaviour of very young, performed by 
older offspring or even young adults, suffering from minor injuries, 
traumatic and shocking experiences and/or under stress caused by 
early stages of some infections. Such changes in the behaviour often 
gain convenient parental responses in bears, hyenas and primates, at 
least from natural mothers.
The second case represents the imitation of sickness, the actual 
simulation in order to attract more attention. A particular case I would 
like to describe in brief took place in Tallinn Zoo in 1998. The young 
female chimpanzee Quinsey (5 years) was playing with me trough the 
bars of her cage, when I was distracted by a colleague who addressed 
me with some question. My attention had been averted from Quinsey 
for some minutes when I heard her coughing. To the trained ear the 
sound was unmistakably artificial: she was pretending being unwell. 
When my attention was restored to her, the coughing immediately 
ceased. She was quite healthy at this time, but a fortnight before 
Quinsey really had had a cold in her head and enjoyed a lot of very 
profitable attention from all of us. I checked on her “cleverness” from 
time to time for two months on and she never failed to use the trick, 
though all the time she was in splendid health. Certainly we cannot
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call every case of imitational behaviour by higher primates “mimicry”, 
but in the case with Quinsey I certainly performed a dutiful “dupe”.
Much more complicated forms of, so to say, “induced or inflicted 
conspicuity” can be found in the field of deviations in the habitus and 
behaviour of hosts, which are caused by specific activities of some 
parasites and result in the increase in the attractiveness of hosts either to 
predators (fish diplostomosis, gigantism in snails, parasitized by some 
trematods etc.) or to sexual partners (human and other species tuber­
culosis, for instance). It is a real challenge to recognize the unfit and 
unsuitable sexual partners, offspring (killed or abandoned if re­
cognized), prey or leaders, whose incompetence is due to some disease. 
The ability to perform this kind of recognition and thereby to avoid or 
escape the dangers of contagious infections is connected with 
experience/learning in higher vertebrates at least, but in most successful 
individuals it seems to be based on some special kind of alertness, 
resembling very much the intuition as it is defined by H. Eysenck:
a mode o f  cognitive functioning located at the op p osite  end  o f  a continuum  
from logical thinking, characterized by speed  and su ddenness o f  reactions, 
small number o f  relevant facts known or considered , fee lin gs o f  certainty  
about the conclusions reached, reliance on u n con sciou s p rocesses, not 
following the rule o f  log ic , and relying on unusual associa tions and an alog ies. 
(Eysenck 1995)
In the encounter with a sick animal there often is still some short time 
to make intuitive decision on the following course of action; besides, 
such time exists for both parties of the contact. In many cases of 
predator — prey encounters the prey at least does not have time for 
anything else than impulsive actions and that even if the prey is lucky. 
So, the semiotic factors connected with health-disease relationships 
and related to intuition-like responses could, perhaps, play a consider­
able part in evolutional processes.
The signs of health displaying appeals, directed and addressed into 
umwelt and the signs of disease, searched for and defied by umwelt, 
concealed or very intricately used by the carrier or inducer, apparently 
create in the semiosphere a polarized structure of highly potent 
tensions significantly important in all aspects in ecological develop­
ments, offering special interest from evolutional aspect.
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К зоосемиотике здоровья и болезни
Основной чертой знаков здоровья в облике и поведении животных 
является готовность адекватно (для вида) удовлетворять потребность 
впечатления животных элементов среды (Umwelt). Знаки болезни при 
всем их разнообразии совокупно являют общую недостаточность внима­
ния к знаковым сигналам внешней среды (Umwelt). Внимание серьезно 
больных животных мощно ориентировано на сигналы самого организма 
(Innenwelt). Ряд видов использует знаки, указывающие на болезнь как 
набор признаков в мимикрии умирания. Семиотические факторы во 
взаимоотношениях “здоровье-болезнь” явно связаны с реакциями типа 
интуиции, создавая в семиосфере структуру напряжений, поляризо­
ванных по оси “U m w elt-Innenw elt”, важную в экологических и эволю­
ционных процессах.
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Tervise ja haiguse zoosemiootikast
Loomade välimuses ja käitumises on peamiseks tervise märke iseloom us­
tavaks jooneks valmisolek adekvaatselt (antud liigi jaoks) rahuldada omailma 
loomse osa muljete tarvet. Haiguse märgid, kogu oma mitmekesisuse juures, 
ilmutavad üldiselt haige looma tähelepanu puudulikkust ümbruse märkide 
suhtes. Tõsiselt haigete loomade tähelepanu on valdavalt suunatud organismi 
sisekeskkonna (subjektiivse siseilma) signaalidele-märkidele. Rida liike 
kasutab haigusele viitavaid märke kui tunnuste komplekte suremise mimikris. 
‘Tervis-haigus’ suhete semiootilised tegurid on ilmselt seotud intuitsiooni 
tüüpi reaktsioonidega, mis loovad semiosfääris “välisilm -siseilm ” pingete 
teljestiku, mõjutades ökoloogiliste ja evolutsiooniliste protsesside käiku.
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Does “quorum sensing” imply 
a new type of biological information?
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Abstract. When dealing with biological communication and information, 
unifying concepts are necessary in order to couple the different “codes” that 
are being inductively “cracked” and defined at different emergent and “de- 
emergent” levels of the biological hierarchy. In this paper I compare the type 
of biological information implied by genetic information with that implied in 
the concept of “quorum sensing” (which refers to a prokaryotic cell-to-cell 
communication system) in order to explore if such integration is being 
achieved. I use the Lux operon paradigm and the Vibrio fischeri -  Euprymna 
scolopes symbiotic partnership to exemplify the emergence of informational 
contexts along the biological hierarchy (from molecules to ecologies). I 
suggest that the biosemiotic epistemological framework can play an integra­
tive role to overcome the limits of dyadic mechanistic descriptions when 
relating the different emergent levels. I also emphasise that the realisation of 
biology as being a “science of sensing” and the new importance that is being 
ascribed to the “context” in experimental biology corroborate past claims of 
biosemioticians about a shift from a focus on information (as a material agent 
of causality) towards a focus on the world of signification.
Introduction
The debate on the concept of “biological information” has so far 
proceeded in an inductive manner, different concepts having been 
developed autonomously at specific levels and applications. The only 
epistemological tool that has been used across the different instances 
and subdisciplines is the mathematical theory of information. But the
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specific level that has received most attention is probably the genetic 
level instituting the long debated concept of genetic information in 
which the mathematical theory of information in the end showed up to 
have little application. One problem may be the specification of the 
emergent levels that proceed from, and simultaneously surround, the 
genetic one. In a “scalar” view, the next step is that of regulation, in 
which different kinds of “information” enter into the scene and 
interact with the genetic level (and will have to interact with other 
emergent levels).
In a penetrating analysis by Sahotra Sarkar it was implied that after 
50 years of debate on the “information” concept in molecular biology 
what in reality has survived is the stereochemical specificity suggested 
by Pauling and others at the end of the 1930s (though with many 
antecedents; Kay 2000: 43), according to which biological interactions 
are mediated by a precise “lock-and-key” mechanism between the 
shapes of the molecules (Sarkar 1996: 190).
But as mentioned above, problems arise with signal transduction 
networks and regulation, where we can see the unconscious emer­
gence of a concept of “natural regulation”. By that I mean that “regu­
lation”, as the mechanism that orchestrates and directs (i.e. interprets) 
the signals represented by molecules that bind to each other in specific 
ways when their concentrations are statistically relevant, starts to look 
as something that exists, whereas nobody knows where it exists.
When it was thought that the information “problem” was solved 
and put aside with the cracking of the “genetic code”, biologists began 
talking again about cracking other “codes”. In this spontaneous induc­
tive strategy (within the “spontaneous semiotics” in the life sciences 
described by Emmeche 1999: 274), different types of “information” 
emerge which may not have a clear conceptual link with previous 
concepts of biological information. So the need for unifying concepts 
prevails together with the lack of proper interfaces to couple the 
different “codes” that are being inductively “cracked” and defined at 
the different emergent and “de-emergent” levels. The informational 
terminology continues its exponential growth, but now, as biosemio- 
ticians had foreseen, we perceive an incipient trend that moves away 
from a focus on information to a focus on signification (Hoffmeyer, 
pers. comm.).
As an example, I will consider the broad line of research that is 
currently being developed around the concept of “quorum sensing
which refers to one of the many transcription regulation systems in 
prokaryotes, one which is coupled to intercellular communication 
mediated by signal molecules that are thought to constitute inter- 
bacterial communication codes. The dynamics involved in the evolu­
tion of this phenomenon represents an intriguing instance of emer­
gence of informational contexts along the biological hierarchy from 
molecules to ecologies, evidencing that a linear mechanistic causality 
does not suffice to couple the different emergent levels. Insistence 
upon a reductionist explanation would require at least consideration of 
the code-dual nature of life (Hoffmeyer, Emmeche 1991). To 
overcome the ambiguous “spontaneous teleology”1 so frequent in 
biology, a semiotically informed approach will be needed.
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The Vibrio fischeri paradigm
The model organism from which the “quorum sensing” concept 
derived was the bacterium Vibrio fischeri (sometimes Photobacterium  
fischeri in the literature). This bacterium came to light (literally!) by 
studying a species of squid, Euprymna scolopes, which swims in the 
surface of the ocean by night, searching for food. To any predator 
below, the squid appears as a very dark object moving against the very 
bright background of the moon. Quite a dangerous situation for the 
squid which “to solve this problem”, is said to “have evolved” a light 
organ in which it cultures a very pure, very dense population of 
V. fischeri.
This bacterium produces an enzyme called luciferase catalyzing a 
light producing reaction which makes the squid glow with an intensity 
and wavelenght reminiscent of moonlight (blue-green light, 495 nm). 
This renders the squid invisible to predators below by erasing the 
shadow that would normally be cast as the moon rays strike the squid 
from above — a sort of camouflage known as counterillumination. 
The mutualistic advantage is that by glowing, the squid escapes
I use here “spontaneous teleology” in analogy to “spontaneous semiotics”, in the 
sense that although the word teleology seems to be anathema in life sciences, in their 
everyday language scientists customarily endorse organisms and evolution with 
ideological characteristics, which are often also anthropomorphic. So it is very com­
mon to find descriptions like: “to solve this problem, the squid has evolved a light 
organ”.
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getting eaten and in turn it provides food and shelter to the bacterial 
colony, which will be kept away from  other competing bacteria 
(Ruby, Lee 1998; M cFall-Ngai 1999; Visick, M cFall-Ngai 2000).
W hen V. fischeri is inside the squid’s light organ the cells reach a 
critical concentration at which it starts producing luciferase. When 
free living in the “outer” environm ent and at low cell density, bio­
lum inescence becom es an expensive luxury for the bacteria and light 
production is quickly m inimised (Greenberg 1997: 371).
The question here is, how can the bacterium  (or its metabolism) 
know, or better yet, sense that it is inside a light organ and therefore it 
is time to activate the genes that produce luciferase?
A small diffusible signal m olecule produced by the individuals of 
the colony serves as the crucial element. The concentration of this 
m olecule inside the bacteriae depends on population density and will 
eventually trigger a m odulation of the phenotype (Swift et al. 1999: 
291). This is what has been called “quorum  sensing”2. The word 
“quorum ” is a legal term that refers to the num ber of members of a 
group required to be present at a meeting in order to legitimise a given 
decision. Quorum  sensing can be represented as a triadic sign process 
as shown in Fig. 1.
A lthough there are many exam ples of environmental cues (in­
cluding the concentration of different extracellular substances) that 
can be transduced as a signal that triggers a metabolic response, 
quorum  sensing refers specifically to those cues that build up as the 
consequence of cell density.3 L et’s now take a quick overview of the 
m olecular model for this process.
2 The term first appeared in a Journal of Bacteriology minireview written by Clay 
Fuqua, Steve Winans and E. Peter Greenberg in 1995. It originated with Winan’s 
brother in law, a lawyer who was trying to understand what the researchers were 
talking about (Greenberg 1997: 371). Ever since it rapidly became standard in the 
scientific literature.
3 As early as 1975, shortly before his death, biochemist and biophysicist Gordon 
M. Tomkins sketched a model for the evolution of biological regulation and the origin 
of hormone-mediated intercellular communication. He claimed that “Since a particular 
environmental condition is correlated with a corresponding intracellular symbol, the 
relationship between the extra- and intracellular events may be considered as a 
‘metabolic code’ in which a specific symbol represents a unique state of the 
environment”. He further argued for an apparent generality of such a code. (Tomkins 
1975, Kilstrup 1998). In fact, quorum sensing seems to be just a specific case of 
Tomkins’ metabolic code.
Signal Population
concentration density
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phenotype
Figure 1. The quorum sensing sign triad. The concentration of a small diffusible 
signal molecule inside the bacteria reflects population density and may eventually 
trigger a modulation of the phenotype. Or, in other words, the concentration of the 
signal molecule acts as a sign in that it provokes the formation of a changed 
phenotype of the population, i.e. an interpretant, which relates to population 
density in a way echoing the way the concentration of the signal molecule itself 
relates to population density.
The Lux operon
In V. fischeri, the genes that encode the ingredients o f luciferase and 
other substances necessary for the biolum inescence reaction are 
contained in the lux operon, consisting of (a) luxA and luxB which 
encode the alfa and beta subunits of the enzyme luciferase, (b) luxC, 
luxD and luxE which encode components of the fatty acid reductase 
complex, i.e. the enzyme which catalyzes the synthesis o f the 
necessary aldehyde substrate for the luciferase, and (c) luxG which is 
a gene with unknown function and w ho’s presence does not seem  
necessary for bioluminescence.
The products of theses genes constitute the phenotype that is to be 
regulated by quorum sensing (biolum inescence). In addition, the 
operon contains two other genes necessary for quorum  sensing: luxl 
and luxR (Salmond et al. 1995; Sitnikov et al. 1995; G reenberg 1997; 
Swift e/ al. 1999).
The three main components of the quorum  sensing system  are 
produced by the very same operon that they have to regulate (in fact 
quorum sensing was originally known as “autoinduction”):
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(1) The signal-m olecule: a low m olecular weight molecule of the 
acyl-hom oserine lactone (AHL) family, and specifically in the case of 
V. fischeri, N -(3-oxohexanoyl)-L-hom oserine lactone, or OHHL for 
short. N otice that this signal-m olecule is not itself directly encoded by 
the operon but it is the “product” of a process catalyzed by the direct 
“gene product” .
(2) The signal-generator: an enzyme encoded in the luxl gene (and 
thus called Luxl protein) which in turn catalyzes the synthesis of the 
signal-m olecule from  different precursors that come from other 
biosynthetic pathways.
(3) The response-regulator: encoded in the luxR gene (and thus 
called LuxR protein) which binds the signal-molecule to form a 
com plex that acts as the transcription activator that in turn binds DNA 
near the Lux promoter, and so doing paves the way for the RNA 
polym erase, i.e., the enzyme which is actually producing the RNA 
transcript of the whole operon.
W hen the local concentration of signal-molecule (OHHL) is low 
the m ajority of binding sites at the response-regulator (LuxR) mole­
cules are left open, and the luxR protein will then take on a confor­
mation that cannot bind to the regulatory site in DNA. As a result very 
little luciferase can be made. W hen the local concentration of signal- 
m olecule is very high the response-regulator binds the signal in such a 
way that a conform ation change is induced in the regulator which in 
turn enables it to bind to the specific site in the DNA and turn on 
transcription of the whole operon at a higher or more efficient rate (by 
enhancing the RN A  polym erase binding).
But before the operon is turned on, how can Luxl (the signal- 
generator) and LuxR (the response regulator) be made so that the 
operon can be turned on? A pparently the operon is never completely 
“ shut o f f ’. LuxR is consistently transcribed at a low level so that there 
is always some m olecules around to affect regulation, and there is 
always a basal level o f Luxl being made that guarantees low con­
centrations of signal-m olecule. W hen these low concentrations add up 
as the consequence of many cells getting close together (as when 
inside the squid’s light organ) the binding of the two molecules 
increases, establishing a positive feedback loop that amplifies the 
signal and results in full production o f the bioluminescence 
ingredients (Salm ond et al. 1995; Sitnikov et al. 1995; Greenberg 
1997; Swift e t al. 1999).
It seems as if every time a regulatory netw ork is elucidated it is 
always discovered that there is further regulatory com plexity. There is 
always integration of different regulatory m echanism s depending 
upon many different cues like for exam ple nutritional status, environ­
mental stress, surface viscosity, cell density and many others, in order 
to elicit a complex phenotype. Not to mention the regulation of inter­
connected pathways like for instance those that originate the pre­
cursors from which the signal-generator produces the signal-m olecule. 
In fact there is already mounting experim ental evidence, for exam ple 
in the production of many virulence factors by the bacterium  Pseudo- 
monas aeruginosa, for a “multilayered hierarchical quorum  sensing 
cascade” (Latifi et al. 1996: 1144).
If we say that these signals are part o f triadic sign-relations we can 
see here how the semiosphere unfolds itself in a myriad of inter­
connected signals (signs) and pathways of immense com plexity (H off­
meyer 1996). In the cellular processes with which we are concerned 
here, the cues involved in the regulation of the netw ork are both 
endosemiotic and exosemiotic in nature.
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Microbiologists learned to turn their attention 
to the “context”
In 1992 it was found that the same signal molecule (OHHL) that was 
responsible for the regulation of synthesis o f luciferase in Vibrio 
fischeri, was also responsible for the regulation of synthesis o f the 
carbapenem antibiotic in the terrestrial plant pathogenic bacterium  
Erwinia carotovora. The significance of this discovery lay in the fact 
that up to that moment OHHL-mediated autoinduction was considered 
to be uniquely connected with biolum inescence in the m arine 
bacterium and its close phylogenetic neighbours. The fact that two 
such different organisms share a common signalling m olecule (and 
mechanisms) led researchers to believe that they had stum bled upon a 
bacterial language of communication mediated by OHHL, and/or 
structurally similar molecules, which might be far m ore w idespread 
than originally supposed (Salmond et al. 1995: 615; Swift et al. 1999* 
291).
But that was not all. In experimental settings it was found that 
mutants of Erwinia carotovora  that were unable to m ake carbapenem
228 Luis Emilio Bruni
antibiotics on their own could do so w hen cross-fed with a second 
strain of m utants. The second strain of E. carotovora  was supplying a 
signalling m olecule which triggered antibiotic synthesis in the first 
group. This discovery hinted at the possibility that there could also be 
“cross-talk” , i.e.: that signal-m olecules produced by one species could 
be detected by the metabolic m achinery of a different species. In fact, 
sim ilar cross-talk was later observed in relation to the swarming 
m otility behaviour of m ixed colonies of Pseudomonas putida and 
Serratia liquifaciens. Swarm ing is one of six described forms of 
bacterial surface translocation and it has been characterised in detail in 
Serratia liquifaciens (Eberl et al. 1996; Eberl et al. 1999). Needless to 
say the term  swarming comes by analogy to the well known behaviour 
of bees. Contrary to swimming, that can be achieved by individual 
cells, swarm ing colonies can be seen as specialised cells organized in 
subpopulations com m unicating through quorum  sensing signal mole­
cules. It is considered an im portant social phenom enon since cultures 
o f different species in certain conditions might be able to collaborate 
in the process of surface colonisation. Such collaboration of two or 
m ore species o f bacteria for the achievem ent of swarming has been 
observed in experim ental settings in which one species differentiates 
into swarm ing mode (long hyperflagellated cells organized in an 
outer, m otile layer), while the other(s) produces a surfactant to 
condition the surface for better motility. This may very well involve a 
species that emits a signal that triggers a response in another species in 
order to create a “com m unity phenotype” (Eberl et al. 1996; Eberl et 
al. 1999: 1708).
D uring the 1990s the list o f Gram -negative bacteria that possessed 
quorum  sensing systems expanded and so did the list of phenotypes 
regulated in this m anner and the family of hom oserine lactones that 
serve as signal m olecules (Salm ond et al. 1995; Swift et al. 1999). 
A lthough presenting some differences, Gram -positive bacteria are also 
know n to possess quorum  sensing regulation systems, i.e. cell-density 
dependent phenotypes (K leerebezem  et al. 1997). Some phenotypes 
include a range of virulence factors and multiple exoenzymes, 
antibiotic production, conjugation, biofilm  form ation, and swarming 
motility.
O ne may w onder how these signals could evade detection for so 
long. R esearchers now adm it that the exchange o f external signalling 
m olecules betw een single celled organism s was unexpected and that
therefore nobody was looking for them. For decades, m icrobiologists 
had been isolating cells out of the culture m edium  in which they had 
grown and throwing that medium away together with the signals. That 
is why some bacteria would loose their pathogenicity in the experi­
mental settings. It was the context that was being thrown away!
A neodarwinian point of view may lead us to think that every time 
we encounter a so-called antibiotic in nature we have before us a case 
of biochemical warfare. Perhaps this is not som ething we should take 
for granted. For example, it has been dem onstrated that one o f the 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa quorum sensing signals (3-oxo-C12-H SL) 
could also be part of the set of virulence phenotypes exhibited by this 
opportunistic human pathogen, in the sense that it has been proven to 
have a direct effect upon the immune system, impairing the host’s 
response to bacterial infection (Swift et al. 1999: 306; Pesci, Iglewski 
1999: 152; Wu et al. 2000: 2482). If this m olecule was not know n to 
be also part of a signalling system, we could easily conclude that it 
was exclusively a virulence factor, a weapon. The same can be valid 
about many antibiotics that may turn out to be not ju st weapons, but 
also communication devices (Cundliffe 2000: 410-413).
In a narrow “struggle for life” view, it may also be tem pting to 
think of a sort of semiotic warfare, like for exam ple when Vibrio 
anguillarum, a fish pathogen that inhabits the same ecological niche 
as some Aeromonas species, produces an A H L (3-oxo-cl0-A H L ) 
presumably to outcompete the Aeromonas species by blocking the 
latter’s quorum sensing systems (Swift et al. 1999: 307). The signal- 
molecule of the V. angillarum  competes for the binding sites in the 
Aeromonas species’ receptors, i.e.: as an antagonist o f the Aerom onas 
signal-molecule, thereby inhibiting the physiological activity o f its 
quorum sensing circuit. Perhaps more illustrative would be a case of 
inter-kingdom semiotic warfare. The red m acroalga D elisea pulchra  
produces a range of 14 different halogenated furanone com pounds that 
are structurally similar to the acyl hom oserine lactone m olecule 
tamily. These furanones specifically inhibit the quorum  sensing- 
dependant swarming motility of Serratia liquefaciens, which is a 
deleterious bacterial trait for the alga since it is related to biofilm  
formation and colonisation (Givskov et al. 1996; Rice et al. 1999). In 
other words the alga reduces the levels o f bacteria on its surface 
through molecular mimicry, i.e. by producing signal analogues, icons, 
which interfere with the bacterial endogenous signals (in fact
Does “quorum sensing ” imply a new type of biological information ? 229
230 Luis Emilio Bruni
m olecular mim icry —  structural and/or functional —  has become a 
popular entry in biology journals).
B ut there is not only semiotic warfare. As in sym biosis in general, 
there are plenty of exam ples of m utualistic interactions via quorum 
sensing, not only in the symbiosis bacteria-higher organism, but also 
in bacterial interspecies com m unication, or cross-talk, as the example 
previously m entioned in relation to swarming motility behaviour in 
m ixed colonies. There is also evidence that some bacteria may become 
virulent in response to cell signals from  quite unrelated bacteria in the 
environm ent and different species have been reported to team up and 
com m unicate in order to coordinate their pathogenic response (Eberl 
1999: 1708-1710). This simply means that any assessment of an 
organism ’s virulence m ust take into account the context and the 
likelihood of signalling m olecules being present, i.e., an assessment of 
the semiotic niche (Hoffm eyer 1996: 59).
Thus, it is not surprising that from the different applications of 
quorum  sensing currently being explored, the m ost promising one has 
to do with its inhibition given that signalling-molecules in quorum 
sensing modes trigger the expression of a wide range of pathogenicity 
determ inants in many organism s that infect plants and animals. The 
alleged advantage of using quorum  sensing for the bacterial colony is 
to avoid a prem ature detection by the host’s immune system, which 
w ould give the host a chance to overcom e the incipient colony. 
Instead the colony “quietly” grows until a sufficient number of cells 
have built up to release the pathogenic response when it is too late for 
the im m une system to react. By studying m olecular mimicry, like that 
developed by the alga D elisea pulchra, it m ight be possible to develop 
m ethods for blocking the signals so that organisms remain harmless 
and never express their pathogenic determinants. In this strategy one 
m ight see the beginning o f a post-antibiotic age in which we would 
attem pt to discipline bacterial pathogens by understanding their 
“language” . The great advantage over antibiotics is that quorum 
sensing inhibitors do not inhibit bacterial growth. They only interfere 
with the expression of virulence and colonisation and therefore there 
is no selective pressure to “evolve” resistance. Furthermore, since the 
m olecules are diffusible, the signals are not stopped by physical 
barriers (they penetrate cells, organs and even biofilms) (Givskov 
1996; R ice 1999).
AHLs are not the only signalling m olecules for bacterial cell-cell 
communication. There are many other peptide pherom ones and also 
other bacterial signal systems which cross-talk are very com m only 
being reported. Certain cross-talking signals have also been identified 
in biological systems as different as bacteria and m am m als (e.g. cyclic 
dipeptides found in marine bacteria have been found in m ammalian 
systems as neurotransmitters) (Rice et al. 1999: 28).
It is becoming apparent that quorum  sensing is ju st part o f a 
complex regulatory network, where additional environm ental inform a­
tion is transduced through other pleiotropic regulators of gene expres­
sion. Some systems are very specific while others are more 
promiscuous in their interactions with different types of signals. But it 
is now commonly accepted that the many cell to cell com m unication 
and environmental sensing systems in bacteria constitute a com plexity 
of codes and languages. And it has been suggested that these are new 
codes to be cracked. The title of the review article by Salm ond and his 
collaborators (1995) may be representative for the mood: “The 
bacterial ‘enigma’: Cracking the code of cell-cell com m unication” .
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The emergence of semiotic networks
Once more we find ourselves surrounded by concepts that imply an 
unacknowledged semiotic understanding of nature. Regarding the pro­
cesses described above, the literature is full o f words like com m u­
nication, sensing, code and language.
Strangely however, I have not found equally often the word “infor­
mation”, although it is implicit. Maybe the reason is that biological 
information is tacitly accepted to be exclusively genetic inform ation,
i.e. specification of amino acid sequence. But in this new context, 
what is it that one can communicate? what is it that a code hides? what 
can be conveyed through language? and what can be sensed from  the 
environment?
One exception in the quorum sensing literature that tries som ehow 
to define “information” is the paper by K leerebezem  et al. (1997) that 
concentrates on quorum sensing in G ram -positive bacteria, in which 
the phenomena presents some differences relative to its equivalent in 
Gram-negative bacteria. In Gram-positive bacteria the “m echanism ” is 
more similar to the more common two-com ponent signal-transduction
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system s being routinely characterised in m olecular biology. In this 
system  the signal m olecule does not bind the regulator directly in 
order to change its conform ation so it can activate DNA transcription. 
Rather, in this case the signal m olecule (a secreted peptide phero- 
mone) “is recognized by the input domain of a typical sensor compo­
nent o f a two-com ponent signal transduction system. Such two- 
com ponent regulatory systems, consisting of a sensor and response- 
regulator protein which use phosphorylation as a means to transfer 
information, form  a major m echanism  of signal transduction in 
bacteria and play a key role in many of the changes in cellular 
physiology that result from changes in the environment” (Kleere- 
bezem  et al. 1997: 896, my italics, L. B.).
H ow does this type of information relate to other types of bio­
logical inform ation like for instance the “genetic information” implied 
in the Lux operon, or the information that allows a predator to 
swallow a squid (the shadow), or that which allows the squid to avoid 
the form er (counterillum ination)?
Biology, lacking a unified paradigm  to deal with all these com­
m unication codes, languages and sensing, and being so committed to 
physical reductionism , can hardly come up with a coherent picture of 
all these semiotic processes across the different emergent levels of 
organisation. The result is that as the details of the dyadic 
“m echanism s” of the myriad signal-m olecule cocktails that constantly 
and dynam ically poke into, or bind to, receptors are increasingly 
described and dissected, it becom es extremely complicated to explain 
the em ergence of novel semiotic contexts by the addition of such 
mechanism s.
In 1962 the A ustrian-A m erican biochem ist Erwin Chargaff noticed 
that although biological inform ation might explain the highly specific 
relations betw een nucleic acid and protein, scepticism remained as to 
w hether it would give any insight into the equally specific relations 
betw een cells and m ulticellular communities: “If there was no 
continuous ‘chain o f inform ation’ from the lowest level to the highest, 
he argued there was not justification in claim ing that ‘DNA is the 
repository of biological inform ation’” (Sarkar 1999: 199). Perhaps his 
intuition anticipated the kinds of problem s such a limited concept of 
biological inform ation would im pose upon a science that could not 
refrain itself from  talking about com m unication and sensing in 
virtually all o f its subdisciplines and in all the hierarchical levels
under its lens. W hat C hargaff called the “chain o f inform ation” could 
not work in a dyadic mechanical frame of causality, but w ould have to 
be redefined as the em ergence of integration levels, and, w hile at a 
given level there may be a myriad of dyadic causal relations, the 
emergence process is mediated by triadic causality (in this sense, 
should emergence and semiosis be considered the same thing in living 
systems? see Emmeche 2000).
As shown by Sarkar (1999), the genetic code cannot in itself 
account for the dynamics of gene expression, control and regulation. 
In this context, “information” simply means the specification o f the 
amino acid sequence of the protein and the physics o f the folding o f a 
protein is also supposed to be taken care o f by the am ino acid 
sequence, i.e., folding is believed to be implicitly determ ined by the 
sequence (although recent findings seem to conflict with this universal 
hypothesis, see Eder, Fersht 1995).
In his notion of “information as specificity” Crick (1958) dis­
tinguishes only two types of specificity: (1) the specificity o f each 
DNA sequence for its complementary strand, as m odulated through 
base-pairing, and (2) the specificity of the relation between D N A  and 
protein, modulated by “genetic inform ation”, understood as the 
specification of a protein sequence, i.e. the linear amino acid residue 
sequence of a protein from a DNA sequence as a process of 
“translation”, i.e. the triplet-amino acid specificity. How ever, from  
this last specificity emerges a new one: the gene-enzym e specificity. 
Once we have proteins, new instances of “lock and key” m echanism s 
emerge: enzyme-substrate, antibody-antigen, signal m olecule- 
receptor, activation complex-DNA, and so on. And the sim ultaneous 
and complex “activation” of an indeterminate num ber of these “lock 
and key” mechanisms determine the em ergence of new inform ational- 
semiotic contexts and new and more com plex “lock and key” 
mechanisms and specificities like for exam ple host-sym biont and 
organism-niche.4 We encounter em ergent processes in which new 
levels and kinds of signification in biological processes appear. And 
these new levels of signification are not always specified by the 
precedent lower hierarchy process. As with many em ergent properties,
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4 This relates to the “principle of correspondences” as discussed in Uexküll et al. 
(1993 12) which states that “in the sphere of living things each affordance presupposes 
j counteraffordance — that is, it can be realized only through an interaction”.
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one can not exclude the existence also of some kind of downward 
causation (Cam pbell 1974).
To visualise this process let us go back to the 3 main molecular 
actors in the quorum  sensing system  o f V. fischeri. The signal- 
generator, the LuxI protein, possesses specific functional domains (or 
active sites) that serve to synthesise the signal-m olecule starting from 
two specific substrates that m ust be selected and recruited from those 
existing in the cellular pool. It is believed that a region (in the C- 
term inal dom ain) is involved in the selection o f the right acyl chain 
that will give its specificity to the signal-m olecule, while another 
region (in the N-term inal domain) contains the active site where the 
precursors are jo ined together (Sitnikov, 1995: 809; Greenberg, 1997: 
374).
The response regulator, the LuxR protein, to which the signal- 
m olecule binds in order to form  the com plex that activates tran­
scription of the operon, is a m odular protein with individual functions 
carried in specific regions. The С -term inal dom ain contains both the 
DN A  binding and transcriptional activation functions. The N-terminal 
domain carries several functional sites, and this is the binding zone for 
the signal-m olecule. In the absence of the signal-m olecule, it appears 
that the N-term inal blocks the ability of the С-term inal to bind the 
specific site on D N A  and activate transcription. B inding of the signal- 
molecule to the N-term inal releases the inhibitory effect by unmasking 
the D N A -binding and transcriptional activation functions of the C- 
terminal domain (Salm ond et al. 1995: 617; Sitnikov 1995: 806; 
G reenberg 1997: 373).
The specificities of the acyl-hom oserine lactone signal-molecules 
can be better appreciated if we see them  as a family o f molecules. The 
several m olecules identified so far in G ram -negative quorum  sensing 
systems share a com m on structure. They are small m olecules that have 
a fatty acyl group (an acyl chain) linked to a m odified amino acid 
(hom oserine lactone). The chain length vary in different signalling 
m olecules and it is this feature that gives its specificity to the signal- 
m olecule. They all appear to be able to diffuse through the membranes 
o f bacteria. Some signals appear to be unique to one species while 
others are shared by several. Som e species produce a single or few 
signalling m olecules, others produce a range. D ifferent signal-mole­
cules differing only in the length o f their acyl side-chains may be 
synthesised by a single luxl hom ologue. And m ore interesting, the
structures of the signal-molecules from two different bacterial species 
can be identical but the corresponding LuxI synthetases that produced 
them may exhibit only 21% identity. It is therefore not possible to 
predict the identity of the AHL signal m olecule(s) from  the sequence 
data of a given LuxI homologue suggesting that the “shape” in the 
lower level process is not always the only im portant factor for the new 
emergent level (in this case the signal-molecule) (Salm ond et al. 1995; 
Sitnikov 1995; Greenberg 1997).
The relative concentrations of the signals and their activities may 
vary according to the context, so that the right cocktail o f signals 
triggers the right response. The threshold concentration o f signal- 
molecules necessary for transcription of a specific set o f genes also 
varies with the species. This means that the specific threshold con­
centration is a significant aspect of the sign (see Fig. 1). Or, in other 
words, it is the simultaneous and complex “activation” of an indeter­
minate number of “lock and key” mechanisms that determ ines the 
emergence of new informational contexts and new and more com plex 
“lock and key” mechanisms. Every new emerging “state” constitutes a 
difference that can be sensed by some system with interpretative 
capacity.
In 1950 geneticist Hans Kalmus claimed that since the action of a 
particular gene was sometimes felt in a distant cell, genes acted more 
like a “broadcasting system” than “wired telecom m unication” (Sarkar 
1999: 203). DNA digitally encode for an analog, i.e., a protein. This 
analog by binding or not binding a correspondent protein (or nucleic 
acid), that is, by being or not being (there), may also becom e a digital 
message. But the simultaneous expression of a set o f genes may 
constitute itself an analogical message (with its respective context). 
This type of message is not itself specified by digital DNA. In this 
sense Kalmus’ “broadcasting system” “irradiates” an analogical m ulti­
dimensional wave rather than the linear digital impulses of wired 
telecommunication. In a reductive perspective, this could be viewed as 
the emergence of new analogical signs (properties, contexts, pieces of 
information) by the aggregation of digital symbolic signs. By the same 
token, the analogical mode (the bulk of information) influences the 
existence of digital information in a sort of downward causation. Also, 
such analogical compound effect may constitute a “quasi-digital” 
piece of information to a higher level of aggregation (“to be or not to 
be"). Just as in human language larger narratives represent a kind of
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analogical inform ation that em erges from  the underlying digital code 
(written language), larger aggregates o f digital inform ation become 
analogical when its com plex interactive dynam ics becom e explicit. 
This dynam ic up-and-dow n causality m ediated by signs is an onto­
genetic historical continuum  that oscillates w ithin the boundaries of 
the code-dual nature o f organism s and ecosystem s (Hoffmeyer, 
Em m eche 1991).
L et’s briefly continue the road “up-scale” in the ontogenesis of the 
squid-bacterium -association. It has been suggested that the 
population-dependent regulation of gene expression can be viewed as 
an exam ple o f m ulticellularity in prokaryotic populations. Quorum 
sensing is nearly always sym biosic since in m ost known cases the 
colony that coordinates the sim ultaneous expression of a given 
phenotype is a sym biont of a higher organism  and very often the cell- 
density-dependent phenotype is related to the colonisation and/or the 
interaction with the host. This m akes this phenom enon quite an 
interesting case for exploring the em ergence of sem iotic networks and 
the interrelation of inform ational contexts at different levels of 
com plexity. It also raises interesting questions about coevolution of 
the host-sym biont specificity. “Specificity in this association [squid- 
bacterium ] is achieved through a reciprocal dialogue between the host 
and sym biont in a series of stages that ultim ately result in the 
establishm ent of a stable relationship that endures throughout the 
lifetim e of the host” (Visick, M cFall-N gai 2000: 1779).
E scaping the egg-hen paradox, the first two signs o f this dialogue 
are the reciprocal presence of two “analogs” : the squid and the 
bacterium  (or rather a small colony o f it). A gainst all odds this 
encounter ineluctably takes place. O f the estim ated 1 million bacteria 
present in 1 ml of seaw ater in the squ id ’s environm ent, only 0.1% are 
V. fischeri. It has been calculated that as a result o f seaw ater flushing 
into and out o f the squid during its ventilation process, only an 
average of 1 V. fischeri cell would enter and exit the body cavity every
0.3 second. H ow ever not a single aposym biotic specimen (squid 
w ithout light organ sym bionts) has ever been detected (Visick, 
M cFall-Ngai 2000: 1779f). This record o f success in colonisation 
against all odds means that the “reciprocal d ialogue” is a very precise 
and concrete one. The fact that w hen V. fischeri is absent, or too low 
in num ber, the light organ rem ains uncolonised even with high 
num bers of nonspecific bacteria in the environm ent, indicates that
there is a “host-im posed” positive selection for V. fischeri (M acFall- 
Ngai 1999: 242).
When a juvenile squid hatches from  the egg, it does not contain 
any symbionts. It needs to acquire the symbionts from  the sea water. 
By cultivating and expelling symbionts into the environm ent, the 
squids is said to “horizontally” transmit the sym biont from  one 
generation to the next (Ruby, Lee 1998: 807). A few hours after the 
squid is hatched, symbiotic colonisation rapidly begins. A fter contact, 
both organisms induce each other into a series of m orphological and 
developmental changes which result in the enhancem ent o f the 
association (Visick, M cFall-Ngai 2000: 1779).
Before undergoing the developmental changes that take place 
exclusively in the presence of the bacteria, and which lead to the 
mature functional organ, the juvenile squid is able to develop its (still 
virtual) light organ all “by itse lf’, but only to a point in which it is 
primed for the interaction. In order to develop the particular features 
that allow the squid to use and “m anipulate” the light, it needs the 
presence of the bacteria. The underdeveloped organ constitutively 
“comes” with some features to make sure it collects the needed 
bacteria. It has two ciliated epithelial fields each consisting of a layer 
of cells on the surface of the organ that extends into two long 
appendages. It is believed that the function of these ciliated fields is to 
harvest and recruit the V. fischeri to initiate the symbiosis. A fter 
colonisation (and following specific signals) the ciliated fields are lost 
through a process of apoptosis (cell death and tissue collapse). The 
bacterium is also thought to play an active role in its own “recruit­
ment" process since it has been dem onstrated that nonm otile 
V. fischeri (either nonflagellated or flagellated but defective in m otili­
ty) cannot initiate colonisation (Visick, M cFall-Ngai 2000: 1780).
There are many different factors that determ ine and assure the 
symbiont-host specificity. Each of these “specificity determ inants” , 
which give each organism its “symbiotic com petence” , may belong 
either to the symbiont or to the host. Each determ inant works through 
a particular specificity but it is the collective and m utual interaction of 
all of them that determines the com pound sym biont-host specificity.
Some of these determ inants include physical and chem ical barriers 
in the path that leads to the organ and inside the organ itself, which 
only V. fischeri can overcom e (Visick, M cFall-Ngai 2000: 1781). The 
host “creates” a habitat in which only V. fischeri is able to initiate and
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m aintain a stable association. O ther determ inants include adaptations 
o f the host im m une system to recognise the bacteria as “s e lf ’. Upon 
entering the light organ the sym bionts interact with a population of 
m acrophage-like cells (which are part o f the squid’s immune surveil­
lance system). It has not been clearly established whether the 
m acrophage-like cells engulf nonspecific bacteria (thus helping 
V .fischeri) or w hether they instead provide a m echanism  to control 
sym biont num ber (and thus symbiosis health), or both (MacFall-Ngai 
1999: 242; Visick, M cFall-Ngai 2000: 1782).
W hile som e V. fischeri cells may have contact with host macro­
phage cells, the majority of the symbionts in the population are 
eventually found in intimate association with the epithelial cells lining 
the crypts inside the organ. This association between the bacteria and 
the squid’s tissue is m ediated by a specific receptor-ligand “lock and 
key” that assures that the right symbiont binds to the epithelial cells 
(M acFall-Ngai 1999: 246; Visick, M cFall-Ngai 2000: 1782).
Several hours after the bacteria have entered the light organ, the 
sym bionts are induced to change; they loose their flagella and 
decrease their individual size while the population increases rapidly 
resulting in a high cell density. This is how 12 hours after the hatching 
o f the juvenile squid, what is apparently the most relevant product of 
the association emerges: light.
A lthough dark bacterial mutants (defective in structural luxA or in 
quorum  sensing regulatory luxl and luxR genes) commonly arise 
spontaneously in lab-culture, o f the hundreds of analysed bacterial iso­
lates from  the light organs of E. scolopes o f all ages, no non- 
lum inescent strains have been found! (Visick, M cFall-Ngai 2000: 
1783). Since lum inescence requires an alleged 20% of a cell’s meta­
bolic capacity, neodarw inian m echanism s dem and that a strong selec­
tive pressure m ust be present to m aintain this trait.
If biolum inescence is the raison d ’etre o f the symbiosis from the 
squid’s point o f view, there m ust be a sophisticated and stringent 
m echanism  to ensure that only lum inescent V. fischeri can establish or 
continue the sym biotic relationship. It is believed that one possible 
m echanism  may involve direct sensing o f light by the squid (Visick, 
M cFall-Ngai 2000: 1783). The light sensing capability o f the squid 
points also to other directions in the sem iotic network. W ith the first 
day light each m orning, the squid expels 90% of its organ’s bacteria 
into the sea in a delicate balance that avoids unhealthy overgrowth
without completely elim inating the symbiont population. By doing so, 
the squid gets rid o f the unnecessary cell-density-dependant b iolum i­
nescence during the day, and it “horizontally” provides sym bionts to 
future generations. This pattern of behaviour is not a “program m ed” 
circadian rhythm but depends on the animal response to the cue 
constituted by increasing day-light.
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Final remarks
The intention of this paper was to point out that a m echanical dyadic 
explanation of signalling molecules suffices only at a given hierarchi­
cal level. But the subsequent relevance of these events (up or down 
scale) cannot be coupled or grasped through that kind of explanation. 
The significance of a biosemiotic kind of explanation is to put these 
isolated events into a hierarchical and evolutionary perspective which 
may make better sense when seen within a triadic logic (Salthe 1993). 
Evolution of light production cannot easily be accounted for by the 
working of the Lux operon and its evolution through a neodarw inian 
mechanism. When seen as the aggregation and em ergence o f new 
specificities that constitute new semiotic networks, the coevolutive 
nature of the association and thus of the Lux operon becom es evident.
The specific advantage to V. fischeri occurs only in its m utualistic 
relation to the squid. The squid not only utilises the bacteria's light 
emission as a source of camouflage, but it has itself evolved to take 
full advantage of such light source. The squid’s light organ develops 
only in the presence of its specific lum inescent partner; it is in an 
immature state until the bacteria have successfully colonised it. N ever­
theless the immature organ and its predisposition to follow the 
developmental path induced exclusively by that specific sym biont 
must be somehow inherent in the squid’s genom e and in the fertilized 
egg as “tacit knowledge” (Hoffmeyer, Em m eche 1991: 137). This 
developmental path makes sense only in relation to the light produced 
by the symbiont. W ithin a few weeks after the bacteria colonise the 
squid, the fully developed light organ is present. The m ature organ 
possesses four structures to specifically-manipulate the use of the light 
source provided. It has a reflector tissue to direct the light em ission, a 
transparent lens type structure, a shutter m echanism  (constituted by a 
black ink sack) to control the intensity of emission and it has yellow
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filters to shift the w avelength o f lum inescence closer to that of the 
m oonlight and starlight (M acFall-N gai 1999: 247).
It is generally supposed that biolum inescence has evolved indepen­
dently many tim es in som e thirteen different phyla (ranging from 
bacteria to unicellular algae, coelenterates, beetles and fishes). This is 
reflected not only in the gene and protein structures, but also in its 
biological, biochem ical and functional diversity, as well as its 
sporadic phylogenetic distribution (Hastings 1998). It is usually infer­
red that the functional im portance of biolum inescence is the fact that 
another organism  detects and responds to the light. It has also been 
suggested that biolum inescence did not originate until after organisms 
possessed photoreceptors, given the fact that in a neodarwinian con­
text there would be no selective advantage to producing light if 
nothing was able to detect it. So the evolution of the lux operon 
quorum -sensing sem iotic network does not involve only cell-to-cell 
com m unication, or the evolution of the squid’s own photoreceptor to 
control its light organ, but of course it involves also the predator 
w hose photoreceptor do not perceive the “difference” because of the 
cam ouflage.
This brings me back to the question of my title: does quorum 
sensing imply a new kind of biological information? Maybe not. 
B iochem ical specificities, w hether nucleotide to nucleotide, triplet- 
am ino acid or response regulator-signal molecule, when seen in a 
hierarchical and em ergent triadic perspective are just differences that 
m ake a difference to a system with interpretative capacity. The 
realisation of biology being a “science of sensing” in which being or 
not being makes a difference —  a “being” that is susceptible of 
m im icry —  supports without any doubts the claim  that there is an 
ineluctable trend in biology that shifts the attention from information 
as a material agent o f causality towards the world of signification. 
This could have profound pragm atic consequences in a time in which 
biotechnology is considered to be the industrial use of “biological 
inform ation” . A sem iotic approach may turn out to be quite relevant 
w hen characterising the causal links that go from  molecules to 
ecosystem s, from  labs to the environm ent.
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Представляет ли “чувство сообщества” собой новый тип 
биологической информации?
При описании биологической коммуникации и информации необ­
ходимы унифицирующие понятия, чтоб соотносить разные “коды”, 
которые индуктивно “открывают” и определяют на разных уровнях 
биологической иерархии. В статье сравнивается биологическая инфор­
мация генетического типа с информацией типа “чувство сообщ ества” 
(указывающее на прокариотную межклеточную коммуникацию). 
Использование в качестве примера парадигмы Lux-operon и симбио­
тической системы Vibrio fischeri -  Euprymna scolopes  позволяет описы­
вать появление информационных контекстов на уровнях биологической  
иерархии (от молекул до экологии). Утверждается, что эпистемоло­
гическая сетка биосемиотики может обладать интегрирующей силой, 
способной преодолеть границы диадного механического описания при 
сопоставлении разных уровней организации. Подчеркивается, что 
реализация биологии в качестве “науки ощущений” и учитывание важ­
ности “контекста” в экспериментальной биологии подтверждают  
утверждения биосемиотиков о переключении внимания с информации 
на мир означивания.
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Kas ‘kvoorumitaju’ kujutab endast uut tüüpi 
bioloogilist informatsiooni?
Bioloogilise kommunikatsiooni ja informatsiooni käsitlemiseks on vajalikud 
ühendavad mõisted, et seostada erinevaid “koode”, mida induktiivselt 
“avatakse” ja määratletakse bioloogilise hierarhia erinevail tasandeil. Artiklis 
võrreldakse geneetilise info tüüpi bioloogilist informatsiooni ‘kvooriumitaju’ 
(mis viitab prokarüootsele rakkudevahelisele kommunikatsioonile) tüüpi 
informatsiooniga. Kasutades näitena Lux-operoni mudelit ja Vibrio fisch eri -  
Euprymna scolopes sümbiootilist süsteemi, kirjeldatakse informatsiooniliste 
kontekstide ilmumist läbi bioloogilise hierarhia tasandite (m olekulidest 
ökoloogiani). Mööndakse, et biosemiootika epistem oloogiline raamistik võib  
omada integratiivset rolli ületamaks diaadilise mehhanistliku kirjelduse piirid 
erinevate organisatsioonitasemete seostamisel. Rõhutatakse, et bioloogia  
realiseerimisel “tajumisteadusena” ja “konteksti” tähtsuse arvestamine eks­
perimentaalses bioloogias kinnitavad biosemiootikute varasemaid väiteid 
tähelepanu nihkumisest informatsioonilt tähendusmaailmale.
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Abstract. Pragmatics, i.e., a system of values (or goals) in agent behavior, 
marks the boundary between physics and semiotics. Agents are defined as 
systems that are able to control their behavior in order to increase their values. 
The freedom of actions in agents is based on the distinction between macro­
characters that describe the state or stage, and micro-characters that are 
interpreted as memory. Signs are arbitrarily established relations between 
micro- and macro-characters that are anticipated to be useful for agents. Three 
kinds of elementary signs (action, perception, and association) have been 
developed in agents via evolution and learning to support useful and flexible 
behaviors. The behavior of agents can be explained, predicted, and modified 
using the optimality principle, according to which agents select those actions 
that are expected to increase their value. However, agents may select actions 
based on their own model of the world, which have to be reconstructed in 
order to predict their behavior. Pragmatics in agents can be induced, learned 
from individual experience or natural selection, or adopted.
Introduction
Charles Peirce (1955) viewed a sign as a triadic relationship betw een a 
sign vehicle, an object, and interpretant, which is a representation of 
the object. For example, smoke is a sign vehicle, fire is an object, and 
the idea of fire that appears in the m ind of the interpreter after seeing 
the smoke is the interpretant. The relationship betw een a sign vehicle 
and an object is arbitrarily chosen, i.e. it does not follow  from  their 
physical properties or interactions. A sign vehicle may resem ble an 
object (i.e., an icon) but this resem blance is not necessary, it is 
optional.
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The Peircean triadic schem e o f a sign w orks well for hum an signs 
and even for anim al signs in zoosem iotics (Sebeok 1972). Animals 
have brains and obviously can interpret sim ple signs similar to 
hum ans. B ut brain is not the only organ that can interpret signs. Sign 
com m unication can be found in plants, cells, and even molecules 
(Uexkiill 1982, Sharov 1992). These are non-m ental signs, and they 
are of m ain interest for biosem iotics, because biosem iotics attempts to 
understand the origin of signs and their evolution towards mental 
signs. The idea of non-m ental interpretation of signs can be found in 
the w ritings of Peirce (1955). But only recently after advances in 
m olecular biology it becam e clear how vast, com plex, and meaningful 
is the inform ation coded in a DNA. W e looked for alien intelligence 
on other planets, but it appears that a kind of alien intelligence exists 
in our own bodies. It uses the genetic language for communication, 
which we mostly do not understand. Thus, the thesis of Dawkins 
(1986) that there are no creative and intelligent agents in nature 
besides hum ans may be wrong.
The m ajor problem  with non-m ental signs is to determine the 
boundary betw een sign interpretation and other interactions of objects 
(i.e., the boundary betw een semiotics and physics). Several answers 
have been proposed.
1. A ccording to a pan-sem iotic approach, any physical interaction 
is semiotic. For exam ple, according to D eely (1992), a bone of a fossil 
anim al is a sign vehicle that points to the original animal, and the rock 
form ation in which the bone was fossilized is the interpreter. There is 
no doubt that any physical interaction can be used by human inter­
preters to determ ine past events, but the claim  that rocks themselves 
are interpreters seems questionable.
2. A ccording to a biological approach, a particular class of living 
systems is capable of interpretation. For exam ple, Sebeok (1972) con­
sidered anim als as interpreters o f signs. Uexkiill (1982) and Hoff­
m eyer (1996) considered living cells as minimal interpreters. Ac­
cording to H offm eyer (1996), neither viruses nor genes are inter­
preters; they only carry inform ation that becom es interpreted by living 
cells. The first problem  with this biological approach is that artificial 
non-cellular interpreters are not considered. But robots can perceive 
signals from  the outer world and modify their actions accordingly in 
the same way as anim als do. Second, evolutionary systems (evolving 
lineages) do not fit to H offm eyer’s biological definition of an inter­
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preter. I agree with Hoffm eyer that a single virus does not interpret 
anything, but a population o f viruses is capable o f perception (via 
natural selection) and interpretation (Sharov 1998). In the same way, a 
population of genes can be viewed as an interpreter, which follow s 
from the “selfish gene” idea of R ichard D aw kins (1976).
3. According to a system theory approach, interpretation is per­
formed by self-reproducing systems. I have been supporting this 
approach (Sharov 1992, 2000) and tried to overcom e several problem s 
associated with it. The first problem  is that som e systems do not 
reproduce but are definitely capable of sign interpretation. For 
example, a mule can interpret signals at the organism , cellular, and 
molecular levels. Robots can interpret prim itive signals also. The 
second problem is that primitive self-reproducing systems (e.g., pat­
terns in cellular automata) are not agents because they do not control 
their actions. And, as we will see below, only agents can use signs.
4. According to a pragmatic approach presented in this paper, the 
necessary attribute of a sign is its anticipated usefulness for some 
agent. Pragmatics, which deals with usefulness, values, and goals, is 
definitely outside of the domain of Newtonian physics. The success of 
the Newtonian physics is largely due to the idea that dynamics can be 
separated from pragmatics. For example, the trajectory of a falling 
rock does not depend on the goals o f a person who threw it. But 
physics is not sufficient for solving problems related to econom y, 
evolutionary biology, artificial intelligence, and biosem iotics, where 
the pragmatic aspect of agent behavior is very important. I believe that 
pragmatic/semiotic methods will be useful in these areas.
Agents
I suggest to replace the notion of interpreter in sem iotics by the notion 
of agent. The term “interpreter” is anthropom orphic and does not 
imply any active feedback to the world, whereas the term  “agent” 
refers to active interaction with the world and can be applied to a wide 
variety of systems: organisms, lineages, robots, and even com puter 
programs. I define agents as systems that are able to control their 
behavior in order to increase their values or achieve goals.
Agents cannot function without signs, which are responsible for 
storing the information on agent preferences, perceiving the environ-
248 Alexei A. Sharov
ment, and controlling the behavior. Sign relationships are set arbitra­
rily depending on the needs of agents who use them. A rbitrariness (or 
freedom ) in agents can not be distinguished from  random ness unless 
an agent has values or goals. This is the main reason w hy semiotics 
should be linked with pragm atics. Notions of probability and random­
ness w ork well with passive system s that do not learn from  their expe­
rience. But only agents, who can control their actions, exhibit ar­
bitrariness. O bviously, the probability theory is too sim ple to describe 
agents.
Som ebody may argue that the possibility of an agent to perform 
alternative actions can be detected if we change the environment. 
Then arbitrariness of actions can be determ ined without using prag­
m atics. I think that there is a hidden fault in this logic. A system that 
perform s differently in various environm ents does not necessary 
responds actively to the environm ent. It may happen that the environ­
m ent sim ply induces these changes in a system, which remains 
entirely passive by itself. For exam ple, w ater takes the shape of a 
vessel but it does not respond to vessel’s shape. In other words it does 
not select a shape that will fit this particular vessel. W e know this 
from  the fact that w ater fills the vessel w ithout any learning. In 
contrast, when an agent happens to be in a new environm ent, it goes 
through a learning period trying various actions until it finds a 
satisfactory one.
B ut how do we distinguish learning from  other transition pro­
cesses? W ater does not fill the vessel instantly; instead there is a 
process of change that ends when the system reaches a stable state. 
This process can be easily confused with learning. The difference 
betw een transition processes and learning is that the system re­
m em bers the results o f learning and selects the appropriate action 
faster when exposed to the same environm ent or situation repeatedly. 
But w ater does not fill the vessel faster after it is poured into the same 
vessel many times.
A gents are autonom ous systems because they control their own 
behavior. But the degree of autonom y, which can be defined as the 
proportion o f behaviors that are learned and controlled, may be 
different. Some agents (e.g., hum ans) are highly autonom ous, and 
others (e.g., robots) are only slightly autonom ous. But analogous to 
the G ödel’s theorem, it is im possible for a system to be fully auto­
nom ous; i.e., it can never control all its behaviors. To control a
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behavior, the system should first develop a representation (form a­
lization) of this behavior, but not all behaviors can be formalized.
Freedom in agents is based on a limited causal determ inism , which 
means that the dynamics of an agent is not fully determ ined by its 
state. Also there should be a kind of “mem ory” that controls agen t’s 
behavior but it is not included into the description o f state. Thus, all 
characters of an agent can be separated into two groups (Sharov 
1992):
(1) macro-characters that correspond to agent’s structure, pheno­
type, or hardware, and
(2) micro-characters that correspond to agent’s memory, genom e, 
or software.
The dynamics of macro-characters is determined by its m acro-state 
except certain unstable points where the trajectory bifurcates, and the 
direction can be affected by micro-characters. The idea of the role of 
bifurcations in the dynamics of living organisms goes back to W ad- 
dington (1968). If we do not distinguish between macro- and m icro­
characters, then there would be no control of actions, no freedom , and 
hence no agents.
Signs
I consider signs as relations between micro- and m acro-characters that 
are anticipated to be useful for agents. Peirce did not distinguish 
between micro- and macro-characters in his theory of signs; thus, it 
may be difficult to compare his definition of a sign with mine. But 
some similarity can be found. According to my definition, a sign is 
triadic because it is not just a relation between a micro- and m acro­
characters, but a relation that is anticipated to be useful for an agent. 
Thus an agent can be viewed as an object for the sign relation. A t a 
closer look, living activities of an agent can be classified into various 
functions, and these functions are often focused on specific objects 
(e.g., parts of the body, food items, enemies, etc.). Then, sign relations 
can be associated with particular functions and objects rather than 
with an abstract usefulness for the whole agent.
Elementary signs can be classified into three categories (Fig. 1):
(1) Action sign is a relationship between a m icro-character and an
action (function) that changes macro-characters. For exam ple, a
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gene is a m icro-character that is responsible for som e metabolic 
function.
(2) Perception sign is a relationship betw een a m acro-character of an 
agent or state o f the environm ent and a m icro-character. For 
exam ple m am m als can m easure the concentration of C 0 2 in their 
blood.
(3 ) Association sign is a relationship betw een two or m ore micro­
characters. For exam ple, perception o f a signal can be associated 
with a specific action sign.
Figure 1. Action, perception, and association signs in agents.
In this classification I com bined the perception of the environment 
with the perception of agen t’s state because sim ple agents do not 
recognize the existence of the environm ent. They treat the environ­
m ent as a part o f their ow n m acro-state. For exam ple, an agent may 
have a therm oreceptor that m easures body tem perature, but it may be 
unaw are that body tem perature is the sam e as in the environment. 
A dvanced agents distinguish environm ental characters as those that 
are not affected by their activity. H ence, they can recognize which 
receptors m easure the internal state, and which m easure the environ­
ment.
Peircean signs can be represented by a com bination of elementary 
signs (Fig. 2). In this exam ple, the visual perception of a smoke is the 
im m ediate interpretant, which activates the sm oke concept (the 
second-level interpretant). A t this point, the object is recognized as 
sm oke and the fire concept (the third-level interpretant) is activated 
via the association sign. Finally, the fire concept may materialize in 
fire-related actions.
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Figure 2. A combination of elementary signs that form a Peircean sign.
The arbitrariness of actions and perceptions in living organism s exists 
both at the individual and evolutionary levels. Anim als have control 
over their immediate perceptions, e.g., changing their field o f view. 
But they cannot increase the sensitivity of their sense organs, or 
change the spectrum of perceived signals. However, sense organs may 
change in the evolutionary time scale.
Evolving lineages should be viewed as agents in w hom  m icro­
characters are preserved from one generation to another via inheri­
tance. Besides fast actions and perceptions at the level o f individuals, 
lineages have a long-term “perception” in the form  of natural selection 
(Sharov 2000). Perception in individual organisms is based on a 
selective excitation of receptors. W hen some photoreceptors in the eye 
become excited, we see an image that gives us inform ation about the 
environment. In the same way, selective survival of organism s pro­
vides information for the lineage on what genom es are m ost success­
ful in a given environment. Natural selection is often erroneously 
compared with a passive sieve. This is a misleading m etaphor because 
living systems develop mechanisms that control their variability, 
avoid death, and ensure reliable reproduction. The evolution of 
adaptability (Conrad 1983) is not com patible with the sieve metaphor. 
However, natural selection is a very ineffective way of collecting 
information. Each bit of information literally cost lives. Individual 
perception is a mechanism that substitutes natural selection and makes 
life more efficient.
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Values
If a system  prefers some actions over others then preferred actions 
have higher values for this system  than those that are rejected do. In 
other words, the behavior of an agent is consistent with its values (or 
goals). D ue to this consistency we are able to recognize agents and to 
distinguish them  from  m ere stochastic systems.
V alue has a circular definition: it is proportional to the rate of 
value generation. C ircular definitions are not necessary corrupt 
because m athem atics can easily handle equation where the same 
variable is present both in the left and right side. If a state has a high 
value then it will generate even m ore additional value in the future 
com pared with states that have a lower value. In Fig ЗА, values are 
consistent with dynam ics because all preferred transitions increase the 
value. In Fig 3B, values are not consistent with dynamics because 
state b has a sm aller value than state d , but in the future it generates 
m ore value than state d.
B ecause agents have control over their transitions, their values 
depend on their knowledge. In Fig 3C, an agent a can change into d 
but it does not know a transition to state b. If it learns how to reach the 
state b, then it will prefer the transition to b over the transition do d\ 
and its value will increase due to this knowledge. Values are 
consistent with behaviors that are selected by the system, rather than 
with objective dynam ics based on laws of physics. Thus, knowledge 
represented by a system of signs may increase the value of the system.
Figure 3. Consistency of agent values with preferred transitions between states.
Value = size o f  a circle 
------► Preferred transition
C> Rejected transition 
Unknown transition
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In an isolated system, values o f individual com ponents (stages or 
states) can be estimated using linear algebra. For exam ple, if  the 
dynamics of an age-structured population is described by a liner 
differential or difference equation with matrix A, then reproductive 
values of organisms at each age are equal to the com ponents o f the left 
eigenvector of matrix A (Pielou 1974). This method for value estim a­
tion works both in economy and in biology. Fisher (1930) was the first 
to discover the similarity of these two disciplines that are both focused 
on pragmatics. An organism is like a business project; it requires an 
initial investment in the form of an egg, parental care could be an 
additional investment. Then an organism produces progeny, which is 
equivalent to the profit from a business project. The value o f a 
business project or an organism is the left eigenvalue of the matrix for 
system dynamics and estimated using the same equation. In econom y 
it is called “present value” and in biology it is called “reproductive 
value”.
The calculation of values may become more com plicated in non­
linear systems. If may require linearization at an appropriate time 
scale, at which the dynamics becomes more or less stationary. In 
cyclic populations, some behaviors may be beneficial at low popula­
tion density and harmful at high density. The true value of each 
behavior can be estimated only by averaging its outcom es over large 
time periods
Optimality principle
Values can be used to explain, predict, and modify agent’s behavior 
based on a set of assumptions called “optimality principle” . The m ost 
simple formulation of this principle is that an agent selects a behavior 
that generates maximum value. The role of signs is to help agents to 
select best actions. Thus, the optimality principle is based on sem iotics 
rather than physics.
Consider a question “why a caterpillar turns into a butterfly?” 
Evolutionary biologists will answer that a caterpillar turns into a 
butterfly because a butterfly can lay eggs. But this answer is not 
satisfactory because it only leads to another question: “why butterflies 
have to lay eggs?” The correct answer is that a caterpillar turns into a 
butterfly because the reproductive value of a butterfly is higher that
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the reproductive value of a caterpillar. D eveloping into a butterfly is a 
way to increase organism ’s value. O f course, an individual caterpillar 
does not have m any other options rather than to develop into a 
butterfly. The only other option would be to die. But the lineage of 
butterflies may have m ore freedom: it may generate a mutation so that 
the caterpillar will turn into a different kind of butterfly. It may also 
control the rates of developm ent, diapause, and other life-cycle 
characteristics.
Now let us consider another question: “why butterflies lay eggs?” 
The reproductive value of a butterfly may decrease after laying an 
egg. Then, why to produce it? The answer is that we need to count the 
sum  o f values of all products, i.e., the value of the butterfly plus the 
value o f an egg. If this sum is greater than the value of the butterfly 
before egg laying, then the production of an egg is justified.
The optim ality principle can be form ulated in a variety of ways 
from  “hard” to “soft” . The hard optimality principle assumes that 
systems select their best action within given constraints based on the 
true m odel of the world that coincides with our (human) model of the 
world. Thus, the behavior that is optimal from our point of view is 
really optimal for the agent. The hard optimality principle is easy to 
apply and it works fine in many cases. However, its assumptions are 
too strong and may be not satisfied in many systems. The soft 
optim ality principle assum es that a system selects an acceptable action 
based on its own local understanding of the world and its control 
abilities. W e (researchers) also have a limited and local understanding 
of the world. And it may happen that the agent, whose behavior we 
study, understands the situation better than we do. The soft optimality 
principle is definitely more universal, but also it is more difficult to 
use because it requires the reconstruction of agent’s model of the 
world. This can be done if we read the optimality principle backwards: 
we observe agen t’s behavior and then predict a world model in which 
this behavior is optimal.
A gents interpret signs because they anticipate to increase their 
value. By anticipation I do not necessary mean an emotional state of 
an organism , but rather an evolutionary-confirm ed association 
betw een a sign and additional value obtained from its interpretation. 
For exam ple, male moths are attracted to the pherom one emitted by a 
fem ale, and this behavior increases their chances to mate. Thus, the 
interpretation o f pherom one signals increases the reproductive value
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of male moths. Perception signs also increase the reproductive value 
not via immediate actions, but because the agent may be able to 
perform additional activities in the future based on obtained 
knowledge about its environment. Some agents are able to produce 
signs anticipating to get additional value in the future. Fem ale moth 
emits pheromone to increase mating chances.
Sources of agent pragmatics
Agent’s system of values (pragmatics) can com e from  the follow ing 
three sources (Fig. 4).
1. It can be induced by another system. For exam ple, parents 
induce inherited behaviors in their offspring. In some cases a non­
parent can induce pragmatics. For example, larvae of parasitic wasps 
can change the hormonal status of their hosts in a way that is 
beneficial for the parasite. Viruses induce a different behavior in their 
host cells. Induced behavior in man-made autom ata fits into this 
category too.
2. Pragmatics can be learned from  experience. There are two levels 
of learning: simple learning is based on tries and errors, and more 
effective learning can be done using models. Simple natural selection 
and simple conditioning correspond to the try/error mode of learning. 
Multilevel selection and conditioning correspond to m odels of 
different degree of sophistication.
3. Finally, pragmatics can be adopted from  other systems. The 
difference from induced pragmatics is that here an agent has a choice 
which system of values to select. In other words, pragm atics is 
accepted consciously. For example, if a person becom es a m em ber of 
some organization he/she often accepts the pragm atics of this 
organization.
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Figure 4. Sources of pragmatics in agents.
Pragm atics o f any system may be partially induced, partially learned, 
and partially adopted. These portions do not necessary generate a 
consistent system of values. If values do not match, then the system 
may represent different agents at the same time. For example, an 
anim al has its own pragm atics learned during its lifetime; but it also 
behaves according to the values of the lineage tested over long 
evolutionary times.
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Прагматика и биосемиотика
Прагматика, т.е. система ценностей (или целей), которая проявляется в 
поведении действующего [agent], проводит границу между физикой и 
семиотикой. Агенты дефинируются как системы, способные контроли­
ровать свое поведение с целью увеличения собственной ценности. Сво­
бода действия агентов основывается на различии между макровсойст- 
вами, характеризующими положение или уровень и микросвойствами, 
которые интерпретируются как память. Знаки —  арбитрарно уста­
новленные связи между микро- и макросвойствами, причем пред­
полагается их полезность для агента. В ходе эволюции и обучения у 
агентов выработались элементарные знаки трех типов (действие, 
ощущение и ассоциация) для обеспечения полезных и гибких способов  
поведения. Поведение агентов можно объяснить, предсказать и 
модифицировать в соответствии с приципом оптимальности, согласно 
которому агенты выбирают такие действия, которые предположительно 
увеличивают их ценность. Но агенты могут выбирать действия и в 
соответствии с собственной моделью мира, которую нужно см оде­
лировать для предсказания их поведения. Прагматика агентов может 
быть индуцирована, выучена в ходе индивидуального опыта или 
естественного отбора или заимствована.
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Pragmaatika ja biosemiootika
Pragmaatika, s.t väärtuste (või eesmärkide) süsteem, mis avaldub toimija 
[agent] käitumises, tähistab piiri füüsika ja sem iootika vahel. Toimijad 
defineeritakse kui süsteemid, mis on võim elised kontrollima oma käitumist 
enese väärtuse suurendamise eesmärgil. Toimijate tegevusvabadus põhineb 
eristusel ühelt poolt olukorda või taset iseloomustavate makro-omaduste ja 
teisalt mäluna tõlgendatavate mikro-omaduste vahel. Märgid on arbitraarselt 
loodud suhted mikro- ja makro-omaduste vahel, millest eeldatakse, et need on 
toimijatele kasulikud. Evolutsiooni ja  õppimise käigus on toimijatel arenenud 
kolm e liiki (tegevus, taju ja seostamine) elementaarsed märgid kasulike ja 
paindlike käitumisviiside tagamiseks. Toimijate käitumist on võimalik sele­
tada, ennustada ja modifitseerida vastavalt optimaalsuse printsiibile, mille 
järgi toimijad valivad selliseid tegevusi, mis eeldatavasti suurendavad nende 
väärtust. Ent toimijad võivad valida tegevusi vastavalt oma maailmamudelile, 
mis tuleb nende käitumise ennustamiseks rekonstrueerida. Toimijate prag­
maatika võib olla indutseeritud, õpitud individuaalse kogemuse või loodus­
liku valiku käigus, või üle võetud.
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Abstract. We propose a general model that integrates meta-system transition 
theory with biosemiotics on the basis of an “evolvable window” metaphor. 
The evolution of the “window” proceeds via meta-system transitions, during 
which new windows are created iteratively on the “inner” side of the pre­
existing ones, generating a “telescope” growing inwards starting from the 
“outside”. The tendency of “inwards growth” of the “telescope” can be 
explained in terms of the following circular causality: (1) the tendency leading 
from unity towards individualisation, (2) individual learning providing a basis 
for more complex semiotic interactions, (3) creation of additional, non­
conflicting “values” leading to habit formation, (4) strong control bringing 
forth a unification at a higher (meta-system) level. Using the proposed meta­
phor we hope to provide clarity to the fluctuation between objectivity and 
subjectivity inherent to the circular causality loop described above.
Introduction
Different authors have argued that there is an evolutionary trend 
towards increasing complexity by m eta-system  transitions (Turchin 
1977, 1995, Heylighen 1999, Karatay, D enizhan 1999). The general 
ideas underlying such arguments have previously been proposed as 
the “meta-system transition theory” .1 On a different but related track, 
there is a growing field called biosem iotics, which among other things
For an extensive review and references, see the Principle. Cybernetica Web 
(http://pespmc 1 .vub.ac.be/DEFAULT.html).
em phasises the evolutionary trend tow ards increasing semiotic inter­
actions —  or the “unfolding of the sem iosphere” (Sharov 1992, Hoff­
m eyer 1996a, 1997a, 1998a). In spite of the fact that they are closely 
related in their focus of interest, proponents of the two fields seem to 
rem ain rather unaw are of each o ther’s works. In agreement with 
A lexei Sharov (1998), we believe that a m erger of these two 
approaches can be prom ising with respect to the construction of a 
generalised m odel of biological evolution, particularly in dealing with 
issues like sym biosis and sym biogenesis (for a good review, see 
M argulis 1998), evolution of m ulticellular organisms, evolution of 
cellular differentiation and com plex physiological systems, such as the 
im m une system  and the nervous system  in higher organisms, etc.
A ccording to Peirce the word “symbol”, to which he attached the 
signification of a sign, has the m eaning of a convention or a contract 
in its original use in Greek (Peirce 1998: 9). In our opinion, the closest 
link betw een biosem iotics and m eta-system  transition theory is related 
to the establishm ent of objectivity during meta-system transitions 
through conventions, which result from and further the mediatory role 
of the (growing) signs.
The route towards a meta-system transition
W e propose an evolutionary m odel driven by meta-system transitions 
going through the follow ing circular causality loop (Figure 1):
(1 )a  w ell-accepted tendency of nature leads from unity through 
proliferation/ reproduction tow ards individualisation,
(2) individual learning provides a basis for more complex semiotic 
interactions,
(3) creation o f additional, non-conflicting “values” by those semiotic 
interactions leads to habit form ation,
(4) in the long run, stabilised habits lead to strong control, which 
brings forth a unification at a higher (meta-system) level on which 
evolution proceeds according to (1).
The first step consists in the proliferation/reproduction of evolving 
agents follow ed by the achievem ent o f some inter-agent difference (in 
the context o f biological evolution, agents refer to organisms). This 
difference can either arise by intra-group variation —  say genetic and 
blind —  or by independent evolution o f agents, which later on take
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part in a symbiosis (actually, this possibility is not m entioned by 
Turchin). Such diversification from  unity to individualisation has a 
fundamental role in evolution and it may ultim ately be related to the 
symmetry-breaking tendency in the universe ever since the big bang 
(Hoffmeyer 1998a).
1. From unity 
towards
individualisation
through 
proliferation
2. More com plex  
semiotic interactions
through individual 
learning
at a higher meta-system 
level via strong control
3. Habit formation 
due to non-conflicting  
“values”
Figure 1. Meta-system transition by intra-group variation.
Following this first step, some of those different —  or individua­
lised — agents may form semiotic interactions. U nder suitable con­
ditions, especially when there is complementarity between partici­
pants, it is likely that some of those semiotic interactions prove to be 
synergetic due to mutual benefits of the participants, thus conferring 
selective advantage upon them (Campbell, H eylighen 1995). In other 
words, cooperative interactions may evolve when the participating 
agents receive additional, non-conflicting “values” from  those inter­
actions (Sharov 19972).
At this point, m aintenance of the stability o f the synergetic 
interactions gains importance. There is a continuing threat from  the
2 Sharov, Alexei 1997. Signs and values. 
http://www.gypsymoth.ento.vt.edu/~sharov/biosem/txt/isas98.html.
“others” who do not participate in the alliance, such as parasitic neigh­
bours (in case of sym biosis) or parasitic variants (in case of intra­
group variation). Thus, the synergetic interaction can only be stable if 
a boundary or a surface (either physical or semiotic and usually 
selectively-perm eable) is drawn separating the inside (the self) and the 
environm ent (non-self). H ere, the environm ent is meant to denote in a 
very broad sense every external thing that the system is in semiotic 
interaction with. It m ust be noted that this point of view stresses the 
subjective side of the system. M aybe a more suitable term instead of 
the environm ent is umwelt (Uexkiill 1982), which refers to the 
subjective universe of an organism. A  more detailed discussion of 
these issues will be given in the next section.
So long as its stability is m aintained by an encapsulating surface, 
the sem iotic (and synergetic) interaction can go on to become an even 
strengthening habit (Hoffm eyer 1998). In the long run, the habit 
shapes the participants more and more strongly due to the pheno­
m enon of dow nw ard causation (Emmeche 1997). This eventually 
drives the participants even more com plem entary to each other.
The final step in the route to a meta-system transitions is the 
em ergence and grow ing stronger of shared control, eventually making 
the participants lose their autonom y and integrate into a unified, 
coherent agent, a new self. Loss of autonom y as outlined will make it 
very unlikely that inter-dependent participants can quit the alliance 
and revert to their earlier, relatively autonom ous states. This comes 
close to the m odel suggested for the easier acceptance of additional 
com ponents (in mutants, during developm ent) than component 
deletions (Saunders, Ho 1976, 1981). An integration of this scale must 
surely include the precise control over the reproduction of the 
em ergent whole. The m eans of such control can be genetic, as in the 
case o f social insects (Cam pbell 1983, Cam pbell, Heylighen 1995) or 
mem etic  (Dawkins 1976) at biological and post-biological levels, 
respectively. But in any case it can be safely accom m odated under the 
term  semiotic.
Now, the new  agents can proliferate/reproduce as in the first step, 
thus closing the circular causality loop.
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Stability and nested, selectively permeable surfaces
In a certain sense, biology has always been a science of com plexity 
(Emmeche 1997). Attempts to com prehend living things with reduc­
tionist, mechanistic models have been, for the m ost part, unsuccessful. 
20th century science has gradually come to recognise that self-refe- 
rence and (operational) closure are essential in understanding life 
(Schwarz 1997).
Yet, for a more complete picture, one should consider the im per­
fectness of that closure, too. In the words of C laus Em m eche (2000: 
195), when “used and defined in the biological realm, [... closure] is 
not merely informational, or organisational, but also m aterial and 
energetic, and thus biologic closure is never perfect” .
Also, the issue of “other reference” is o f crucial im portance in 
addition to self-reference (M erleau-Ponty 1945, H offm eyer 1996b).
An encapsulating surface, selectively perm eable as it usually is, 
not only contributes to the maintenance of the stability but also 
provides a means of interaction between the “inside and the outside” . 
Organisms can hardly be thought of in isolation from  their “extended 
phenotypes” (Dawkins 1999, Karatay, Denizhan 1999). Furtherm ore, 
this consideration is likely to be valid for each level of their nested, 
hierarchical organisation.
The existence of other-reference opens a door for the em ergence of 
“objectivity” through inter- (or meta-) subjectivity. The m eta-system  
transition offers a mechanism for the establishm ent of “objectivity” by 
confining the semiotic relations of agents to a set o f conventions valid 
within the meta-system. The hence established objectivity is solidified 
via the further development of shared control. A lthough this process 
limits the semiotic freedom of the participating agents, it also creates a 
totally new meta-system level where the emergent, new agents can 
exercise their semiotic freedom. The scene is ripe for the repetition of 
the above sequence of events, but this time among the em ergent new 
agents.
In summary, successive meta-system transitions lead to the origi­
nation of more complex, swarm-like agents (or agents like swarm s o f  
swarms —  Hoffmeyer 1997b) in the universe. This in turn leads to the 
unfolding of both the sem iosphere and the biosphere. A visual 
metaphor of this process may be a “widening spiral” of evolutionary
expansion, which can be causally linked to the “law of maximum 
entropy production” (Sw enson 1989).
T he scenario described above gives a general account of how 
initially autonom ous agents can spontaneously form  a cooperative 
interaction that eventually results in a m eta-system  transition, which 
produces a new, presum ably m ore com plex agent at a higher meta­
system  level. This actually seem s to be a recurring m otif in evolution 
that has given rise to m ost novelty and com plexification. The succes­
sive repetitions of the m eta-system  transition produces nested, 
encapsulated structures —  or surfaces inside surfaces (Hoffmeyer 
1998b) —  that retain the unity of a single agent or organism.
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The “window”
The existence o f an organism  depends on its producing the “correct” 
actions as a response to external perturbations which make a diffe­
rence for the organism  (Bateson 1979). In that sense, such pertur­
bations can be said to be “interpreted” by the organism. Such an inter­
pretation is at the core of biosem iotics. A way of describing such an 
interpretation is to say that the organism  “sees” its environment 
through a “w indow ” , which stands for the totality o f its semiotic 
interactions.
Keeping in m ind that the organism  consists of a nested hierarchy 
of sub-system s form ed by consecutive meta-system transitions, it 
should be asked which hierarchical level is first affected by an 
external perturbation. W e claim  that the external perturbation first 
affects entities at the lowest level (in the biological context this can be 
the m olecular or sub-cellular level) and “makes a difference”, i.e. is 
“interpreted” . This, in return, constitutes a perturbation for the next 
hierarchic level and so on.
This consideration leads us to the conclusion that the semiotic 
interpretation goes “upw ards” through successive meta-system levels. 
In o ther words, the living system  “sees” its environm ent “through” the 
sequence o f its low er m eta-system  levels.
D epending on w hether one is interested in the morphological, 
systemic or sem iotic aspects o f this process, different representations 
can be em ployed (Figure 2). It should be noted that although (un­
avoidably) sim ilar graphical tools are used in the different represen­
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tations, these designate different levels o f abstraction. For instance, 
while the outer boundary in the m orphological representation stands 
for the cell membrane, the outer boundary (dashed line) in the 
systemic representation symbolises the “w holeness” of the cell as an 
organisation and includes relational constraints in addition to physical 
ones.
m orphological 
representation  
o f  a cell
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Figure 2. Different representations of a cell.
The semiotic representation in Figure 2 gives a more detailed look at 
what we have referred to as a “window” . The window consists of 
different layers of “lenses” . If for the sake of convenience we should 
continue with the cell example, the small “lenses” at the bottom  row 
represent the semiotic functions of the ion channel or m em brane 
receptor molecules. Each of these lenses can be considered as different 
selective filters for the incoming perturbation (p). For exam ple, an 
extra-cellular signalling molecule (such as a lipid-insoluble horm one), 
upon binding to a membrane receptor, changes the conform ation of 
the intra-cellular side of the receptor, which in turn triggers a cascade 
of intra-cellular reactions resulting in a perturbation on the organelle 
level. In that sense, a “lens” at a given level has the task of 
transforming a received perturbation p  into a higher level one, p ’. In 
view of this cascade structure, the “window” m ight better be described 
as a “telescope”.
Although it is not shown in the simplified representations in Figure
2, it should also be noted that the virtually infinite diversity of small 
perturbations entering the telescope is reduced through this cascade of
diversity is strongly rem iniscent of, if not principally identical to, the 
phenom enon of “com plexity reduction” in the theory of Niklas 
Luhm ann regarding social systems (Luhm ann 1987).
The evolution of the “window”
N ow that the basics of what is m eant by a “window” are given, an 
attem pt can be m ade to explain the em ergence of its telescopic 
structure during the course of evolution on basis of meta-system 
transitions.
The telescopic structure appears as new lenses (representing the 
unified cognition of the agent/organism  at the innermost end) emerge 
and are added to the inner side of the sequence of pre-existing layers 
of lenses through consecutive meta-system transitions. Obviously, the 
telescope has a tendency of growing inwards (Figure 3).
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Layers that formed during earlier 
meta-system transitions
Figure 3. How the “telescope” grows.
This kind o f m echanism  for the evolution o f the “window” is 
consistent and sim ultaneous with the previously described circular 
causality loop that leads to m eta-system  transitions (see step 4, above).
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In fact, an essential elem ent o f that “unification” is the creation of 
a new lens at the inner side of the pre-existing telescope, representing 
the unified cognitive self o f the em ergent agent.
It should also be pointed out that the innerm ost layers o f the 
telescope do not emerge in their full-fledged stable form. Rather than 
that they are “soft” at the time of their em ergence, allow ing the 
organism to leam about and adapt to different possible states o f its 
environment. Only when (and if at all) this organism  gets integrated 
into an even higher-level meta-system, its environm ent is stabilised 
rendering the maintenance of the learning capability unnecessary. 
Consequently, the “soft” innermost lenses of the once autonom ous 
organism lose their adaptability, i.e. the organism  is specialised and 
takes its place in the division of labour within the new m eta-system  it 
has been integrated into.
Although the metaphor of an evolving window or more precisely 
an inward-growing telescope can be applied to other evolutionary 
processes like individual, social or technological evolution, one should 
be aware of the specific conditions of those fields. For instance, in the 
case of social evolution it might not be appropriate to speak of a real 
meta-system transition (Campbell, Heylighen 1995). In our opinion 
social systems are more likely to be found at the 2nd or the 3rd stage 
of the 4-staged causality loop given above.
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Эволюция “окна”
Мы предлагем обобщенную модель, интегрирующую теорию превраще­
ния метасистем и биосемиотики, используя метафору “открывающего 
окна”. Эволюция “окна” происходит посредством превращения мета­
систем, в ходе которого неоднократно создаются новые окна на “внут­
ренней” стороне уже существующих, создавая таким образом “те­
лескоп”, который растет “снаружи” внутрь. Склонность “телескопа” 
“расти внутрь” можно в терминах циркулярной каузальности объяснить 
как: 1) тенденцию, которая ведет от общности к индивидуализации, 2) 
индивидуальное обучение, которое создает основу для возникновения 
более сложных семиотических связей, 3) оформление новых, неконф­
ликтных “ценностей”, которое приводит к возникновению привычек, 4) 
сильный контроль, что приводит к унификации на более высоком (мета- 
системном) уровне. С помощью предлагаемой метафоры мы надеемся 
внести ясность в флуктуацию между объективностью и субъектив­
ностью, что характерно для описаннного выше круга циркулярной 
каузальности.
“Akna” evolutsioon
Me pakume välja üldise mudeli, mis integreerib meta-süsteemide muundu­
mise teooria biosemiootikaga, kasutades “areneva akna” metafoori. “Akna” 
evolutsioon toimub läbi metasüsteemide muundumise, mille käigus luuakse 
uusi aknaid korduvalt juba eksisteerivate “sisem isele” küljele, luues nii “tele­
skoobi”, mis kasvab “väljastpoolt” sissepoole. ‘T eleskoobi” kalduvust “kas­
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vada sissepoole” võib selgitada tsirkulaarse kausaalsuse terminites järgnevalt: 
(1) suundumus, mis viib ühtsusest individualisatsioonile, (2) individuaalne 
õppimine, mis loob aluse keerukamate sem iootiliste seoste tekkeks, (3) uute, 
mittekonfliktsete “väärtuste” kujunemine, mis viib harjumuste tekkele, (4) 
tugev kontroll, mis toob kaasa ühtlustumise kõrgemal (meta-süsteemi) ta­
sandil. Kasutades esitatud metafoori, loodame me tuua selgust objektiivsuse 
ja subjektiivsuse vahelisse fluktueerumisse, mis on sisemiselt omane ülal­
kirjeldatud tsirkulaarse põhjuslikkuse ringile.
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Abstract. Any living system possesses internal embedded description and 
exists as a superposition of different potential realisations, which are reduced 
in interaction with the environment. This reduction cannot be recursively 
deduced from the state in time present, it includes unpredictable choice and 
needs to be modelled also from the state in time future. Such non-recursive 
establishment of emerging configuration, after its memorisation via formation 
of reflective loop (sign-creating activity), becomes the inherited recursive 
action. It leads to increase of complexity of the embedded description, which 
constitutes the rules of generative grammar defining possible directions of 
open evolutionary process. The states in time future can be estimated from the 
point of their perfection, which represents the final cause in the Aristotelian 
sense and may possess a selective advantage. The limits of unfolding of the 
reflective process, such as the golden ratio and the golden wurf are considered 
as the canons of perfection established in the evolutionary process.
Semiotic causation of evolution
The living process is self-referential: living system in its developm ent 
and reaction to external stimuli makes an internal choice by reducing 
indeterminacy of the potential field in interaction with the environ­
ment (Igamberdiev 1992, 1993). In other words, the system m easures 
itself as embedded into the recognised part of the environm ent, the 
Umwelt. This reflective action is based on the semiotic structure of 
living system, which includes the inherited description with rigid
gram m ar and flexible com binatorial rearrangem ents generating possi­
bilities o f internal choice. The inherited description itself can evolve 
tow ards incorporation of environm ental inputs as recognised (i.e. 
signified) by the system. Thus evolution of biological systems is 
sem iotically constrained ( ‘sem iokinesis’) (Igam berdiev 2001): it in­
cludes the recognition and signification of external stimuli within the 
internal structure of biosystem . Recognition and adequate reacting on 
external inputs will be a final cause of evolution, the point of 
attraction for evolutionary m ovem ent of the system.
A ccording to A ristotle, any m ovement is constrained by four 
causes. The m aterial cause corresponds to an uncertain potential field 
from  which the system  evolves (the timeless matter). The formal cause 
is the structure of the system inherited from the time past. The 
efficient cause will represent non-equilibrium  input to the system, an 
action in the time present. The final cause is the state in time future to 
which the m ovem ent is attracted. Such subdivision of causes is an 
intrinsic property of the description of the temporal appearance of 
spatial objects. The final cause will represent an optimal state of 
biosystem  in a given environm ent, changed by inclusion of modified 
system  into it, with the maximal fitness. It will mean an observability 
of environm ental inputs as a possibility to recognise them (via 
adequate reacting on them, i.e. imprinting and encoding). Evolution 
m oves towards incorporation of all potentially being observable and 
this corresponds to the process of adaptation via complication of 
organisation of living systems.
The self-referential living system originates as divided into phe­
notype (dynam ical image) and genotype (embedded set of symbols). 
External influences are non-digitally recognised (imprinted) by the 
m etabolic system of phenotype. The digital genetic information forms 
an internal program m able structure of biosystem. The encoding digital 
system  is not static —  it exists as a set o f possible superpositions. 
Thus living system possesses the trinitary semiotic structure including
(a) the m etabolic netw ork based on specific recognitions (imprints),
(b) the genom e as a signifying em bedding within the metabolic net­
work, and (c) the superposition of genom e rearrangements as a 
potential w hole of the system.
The evolutionary increase of com plexity becomes possible when 
the genotype appears as a system distinct from the phenotype and 
em bedded into it, which separates energy-degenerate rate-independent
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genetic symbols from the rate-dependent dynam ics o f construction 
that they control (Pattee 2001). The flexibility of genetic system  is 
based on induction/repression of genes and on com binatorial re­
arrangements of the genetic material. W hat is not recognised at time 
present (outside the limits of metabolic and genom ic flexibility) may 
be evolutionary incorporated when new structures arise (new reflec­
tive configurations are established) and the non-observable transform s 
into the observable. This corresponds to a m etasystem  transition 
(Turchin 1977; Sharov 1999) being possible if the system is redundant 
(both in the phenotype, which gives rise to new m etabolic pathw ays 
under the efficient cause —  and in the genotype, which m em orises 
this).
Self-reproducing systems have to contain complete descriptions of 
themselves (Neumann 1966). According to Kolmogorov (1965), the 
complexity of an object (system) 5 is a minimal length of a program  p  
for the universal Turing machine T that would print out a detailed 
description of this object. Increasing this length for the digital internal 
description of living system will correspond to an increase of its 
complexity. A newly generated structure being defined just in the pro­
cess of its establishment cannot be computed from the state existing at 
time present/past. It therefore cannot be recursively deduced from  the 
previous state and therefore evolution cannot be predicted un­
ambiguously. But it could be forecasted from the time future, i.e. from  
the most optimal configuration that could be achieved in the concrete 
context situation. This optimal configuration will represent an A risto­
telian final cause for the evolutionary process. The process of 
movement will be attracted to this point (or the set o f points in a 
general case).
Heredity as a memory
Biological system is able to recognise certain environm ental inputs 
and incorporate their images into its internal structure (Barham  1990). 
The flexibility of metabolic system means that it responds to changing 
environment by redistribution of fluxes within it, e.g., the externally 
caused excess of metabolite A triggers the em ergence of reaction for 
which A is a substrate (Kampis 1996). M em orisation of this redistri­
bution will occur in the genetic system, e.g., via specialisation of
different isoenzym es specifically catalysing appearing metabolic 
fluxes (Igam berdiev 1999a). This will lead to the growth of comple­
xity of the genetic system. Thus living organism s as self-modifying 
system s utilise (via m em orisation) these persistent shifts in their 
defining interactions and variable com position (Kampis 1996).
M em orisation of the changes in metabolic systems provides new 
broader lim its of adaptation. It occurs via the formation of self-reflec­
tive loops, i.e. m appings between the newly appeared feature and 
certain genetic elements. The latter will acquire a property to reflect it 
(via com binatorial events) after which the non-recursive process 
becom es recursive. In accordance with the Baldwin effect, the changes 
in the organism  precede the changes in the hereditary system that fixes 
them  (Baldwin 1896). This corresponds to the Baerian theory of 
evolution (Baer 1864; Kull 1999). The process of adaptation via 
recognition (semiotic fixation) of new environmental inputs means 
that living systems themselves form their adaptive niches in the course 
o f evolutionary process of increasing their complexity. Since the 
connection of the signifiant and signifie is arbitrary, the formation of 
new structures appears as a casual, we cannot predict (recursively 
follow ) it. In other words, it will be formed via language game — an 
open process w ithout fram es (W ittgenstein 1953).
The language gam e however has restrictions implied by the 
structure of genetic system. These restrictions, following Chomsky 
(1965), we can define as the universal or generative grammar. It will 
be a com putational system restricting the field of non-computable 
events. In general, gram m ar is a com putational system that mediates a 
m apping betw een the signifiant and the signifie. Chomsky (1965) 
introduced the concept o f preform ed linguistic theory denoted as uni­
versal gram m ar, i.e. a system that specifies a form of concrete gram­
m ar and provides a strategy for selecting such a concrete grammar. 
This universal gram m ar in living systems has high generative capacity 
and includes constraints o f the genetic code, together with constraints 
o f rearrangem ent of the genom ic system such as splicing, sticking and 
insertion/deletion (G eorgescu 1997). These constraints allow ob­
taining universal com putability m odels (language generating devices 
equivalent in pow er with Turing m achines) (Paun, Salomaa 1997).
The universal gram m ar will be a formal cause for concrete 
gram m ar generation: com binatorial events will provide a search space 
for choosing o f appropriate grammar. Probably the universal grammar
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includes to some extent the m echanism  of internal evaluating input 
sentences, not only in conscious beings but also in all living systems. 
This will provide deviation from random ness in evolution o f sem iotic 
system e.g. in the case of directed mutations. The ways o f such 
evaluation may include some possible selections in the potential field 
before reduction in the whole system operating as a quantum  m echa­
nical observer (Ogryzko 1997). The whole of the system  in this 
approach will correspond to the set o f all its potential superpositions. 
This set will be a semiotic interpretant o f the system ’s adaptive 
behaviour: by genomic reconstruction the system fits to the acquired 
change in the set of imprints (metabolic organisation) thus in­
corporating it. Evolutionary reconstruction of the genom e thus inter­
prets the acquired change by memorising it and allowing its use when 
it is necessary.
Formal incorporation of the final cause into 
the description of biological evolution
In physics, in frames of the anthropic principle, the final cause means 
observability, thus a framework is needed to explain observability of 
the world. The approaches to describe evolution of the system towards 
observability are based on understanding of quantum  m easurem ent (as 
opposed to the classical measurement of external objects) as a m ea­
surement of the environment together with em bedded measuring 
system, which cannot be separated from it. The assimilated part of 
environment as recognised by the system can be defined as the 
Umwelt. Recognition of new observables during this m easurem ent 
will generate a simultaneous complication of the measuring system 
itself and the Umwelt, it will correspond to the G ödelian enum eration 
within sets and lead to the possibility of m easurem ent of a newly 
formed system plus environment (Igamberdiev 1998, 1999b). 
Although the measurement itself is not recursive, it will generate 
enfolded embedding structures viewed as appeared in the continuous 
recursive embedding process after it takes place. The appearance of a 
new description means that the system memorises its optimal state in 
the concrete environment, i.e. it measures not the external environ­
ment, but itself plus the environm ent (itself em bedded into the 
environment). This is the difference of the quantum  measurem ent
from  the classical m easurem ent, which views the environment as 
external: the system  views itself as em bedded into the Umwelt, the 
recognised part o f environm ent. It should have a memory as a distinct 
set (em bedded set) which will constrain its movement (as a formal 
cause). A ttraction to the most optim al states (canons) takes place 
during the recursive em bedding. These m ost optimal states will 
include fundam ental values (constants) inherent for the unfolding 
process.
For the description of observable world, which consists of the 
system s perceiving both outer objects and an inner self, an apparatus 
of the set theory was applied (Bounias, Bonaly 1997a). A special type 
of sets (closed sets) exists upon intersection of topological spaces 
owning different dim ensions. This intersection will incorporate a 
contradiction (fixed point) in the description. Fixed points will gene­
rate internal choice accounting for the biological self. This description 
provides theoretical justification for the existence of memory. The 
closed sets in this approach are similar to the monads of Leibniz 
(1965) which constitute and observe the Universe. The empty set will 
correspond to a vacuum  that is still not allotted by features (Bounias, 
Bonaly 1997b). The memory appears as a ‘sign-creating activity’ 
(H egel 1971), linking sets with different dimensions.
A  concept with em phasising the fixed point as a central element of 
the contradictory structure uniting parts and a whole was applied to 
biological systems by Gunji et al. (1996, 1999). Following this 
approach, an uncertainty in interaction between biosystem and en­
vironm ent is reduced via form ation of a self-reflective loop, which 
leads to establishm ent of em ergent computation such as primitive 
recursive functions. Tim e in this approach separates contradictory 
statem ents allowing them  to appear in a sequential order. In this 
m odel, all interactions encom pass the notion of detection. The latter 
can be expressed as a process generating a contradiction. The process 
o f internal choice in the course of adaptation includes inducing a fixed 
point and addressing a fixed point. It can be compared to indicating an 
elem ent with indicating a set consisting of elements, that is, to 
R ussel’s paradox. Evolution as a formation of reflective loops during 
m easurem ent is generally relevant to resolving a paradox or a logical 
jum p.
D ubois (1997) introduced a concept o f the incursive computation, 
in the sense that an autom aton is com puted at the future time t+1 as a
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function of its neighbour autom ata at the present and/or past time 
steps but also at the future time t+J.  The developm ent of this concept 
for inclusion of multiple states led to the concept o f hyperincursion, 
which is an incursion when several values can be generated at each 
time step. The series of incursive and hyperincursive actions will 
produce fractal patterns defined by functions of the past, the present as 
well as the future states. External incursive inputs cannot be trans­
formed to a recursion. But they can be internalised and thus 
transformed to recursive inputs via self-reference (as being m em orised 
in the system as signs). Interference of inputs in fractal generation 
gives rise to various fractal patterns with different scaling symmetries. 
These patterns have however some fundamental symmetrical rules at 
different scales, corresponding to potential existence of certain canons 
in incursive computation. Hyperincursion means superim position of 
states similar to that in quantum computation (Dubois 1998). In 
incursive and hyperincursive fields (which are viewed as hypersets,
i.e. sets including themselves), undecidabilities and contradictions 
occur (in the Gödelian sense): the fractal machine operates in a non- 
algorithmic way and the formal system cannot explain all about itself 
(undecidability). The transformation of a non-local incursive system 
to a local recursive system leads to a folding of each autom aton to the 
other ones from the future time to the present time. W e will show later 
that the internal evolutionary process can be modelled as a function of 
the system’s state at time past, present and future with fundam ental 
consequences for biological perfection.
Perfection and final cause
The newly generated structure attains the value in changed U m w elt 
This means that it is embedded in a whole system interacting with the 
environment as a part o f a new established harmony. This is possible 
if a new configuration fits to a certain canon. O rganism  constructs 
itself via certain harmony principles, used also for pragm atic goals 
• Lyubischev 1973, 1982). The problem  of form  is generally not only 
pragmatic: it needs aesthetic criteria, primary and absolute to any 
concrete adaptive harmony. According to Lyubischev (1973: 46), 
evolution passes through the change of canons. “A small deviation 
from the canon is a cacophony, while a significant deviation can lead
us to a higher canon, to a new degree of beauty” . Evolution of canons 
includes the period o f initial primitivism (simplicity of form, 
brightness and contrast o f colours), the classical period with most 
harm ony and finely balanced forms and colours, and finally the 
m anieristic period with some unusual and unbalanced structures. Style 
unity is the highest level o f wholeness non-reducible either to the 
adaptive harm ony or to the correlation between parts.
Interaction betw een the whole and the parts can be viewed as an 
intersection of the sets with different dimensions forming a contra­
diction in the sense o f R ussel’s paradox (the fixed point) (Bounias, 
B onaly 1997a). This intersection may represent a harmony or a dishar­
mony, depending on how parts are observed within a whole observing 
it. A  harm ony appears as a threshold for establishing a connection 
betw een local and global periods of iteration in recursive embedding 
(M ignosi et al. 1998). W hen viewed as a recursion (reflected from 
incursion), the preceding m otif unit is transferred into the subsequent 
one by a certain fixed similarity transform ation g: Sk+I = g(Sk). The 
resulting dom ains (having certain quantitative values) are 
hierarchically em bedded into one another and function at every level 
with different clock time periods (Petukhov 1989). The limit of 
actualisation fits optim ality of the structure being actualised thus it 
provides the existence of most optim al solutions for design.
In internal evolutionary process, which includes formation of self- 
referential loops, the evolving state is determined by the two (in the 
sim plest case) contradictory values of the system separated by time 
interval, and the value in time future acquired after addressing them. 
A ddressing the fixed point m eans that the two contradictory 
statem ents taken as sequential values separated by time interval and 
equally probable are com posed to get the third statement. Thus the 
next statem ent (quantitatively m odelled as having correspondent 
value) is com posed from  the two previous statements when they are 
m em orised w ithin the reflective loop: Fn+2 = Fn + Fn+]. This formula 
corresponds to the Fibonacci series if neighbouring elements are just 
natural num bers. This will lead to im portant evolutionary con­
sequences: in the transform ation o f a non-local incursive system to a 
local recursive system, certain recursive limits (e.g. the golden ratio, 
<2n = F n+i/F n at n grow ing to infinity) will appear as fundamental 
canons of perfection form ed as m em orisation within reflective loops.
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Other useful series appear when three neighbouring elements Fn, 
Fn+i, Fn+2 are taken as lengths of three sequential segments (as 
appeared in the sequential past (r—1), present (/) and future (f+1) 
times). In this case we get the golden wurf
Wn = (Fn+Fn+1)(/rn+1+Fn+2)/[Fn+1 *(Fn+Fn+]+Fn+2)]
as a limit of the recursive process when n increases to infinity 
(Petukhov 1989).
The golden ratio and the golden wurf constants represent funda­
mental values of infinite recursion when the next element is formed by 
the operation on the two previous sequentially appearing elements 
memorised within the reflective loop. They always occur in morpho­
genetic patters appearing as limits of the infinite process of recursive 
embedding arising from the reflective action (internal quantum 
measurement).
The classical description of evolutionary process views the latter as 
occurring in the external Newtonian time. The real evolutionary 
process forms time by itself — it appears as a tool for the separation 
of contradictory statements in the infinite embedding process. The 
Newtonian external time occurs when the internal incursive/ 
hyperincursive process is transformed (via memorisation in self- 
reflective loop) to recursive rules. Thus originally time is a semiotic 
phenomenon. This view arises to Aristotle who defined in Physica 
(IV, 12) that there is the time (external) which is measured and the 
time (internal) by which an observer measures. Evolution in the 
semiotic time represents a contradictory process of growing 
complexity, which includes both fundamental principles of perfection 
of canons regarded as its nomogenetic laws in the sense of Berg 
(1969) — and free creativity for their construction based on internal 
choice in the sense of Bergson (1917).
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Семиотические основания возрастания сложности 
в процессе биологической эволюции
Любая биологическая система включает внутреннее описание самой 
себя и существует как суперпозиция различных возможных реализаций, 
которая подвергается редукции в ходе взаимодействия с окружающей 
средой. Процесс этой редукции не может быть рекурсивно выведен из 
состояния системы в настоящем времени, но включает непредсказуемый 
выбор и требует моделирования с учетом предполагаемого состояния в 
будущем времени. Подобное нерекурсивное установление возникающей 
конфигурации после запоминания посредством формирования рефлек­
тивной обратной связи (создающая знак деятельность) становится 
наследуемым рекурсивным действием. Это ведет к увеличению слож­
ности внутреннего описания, представляющего законы генеративной 
грамматики системы и определяющего возможные направления откры­
того эволюционного процесса. Состояния биологических систем в 
будущем времени могут определяться с позиции их совершенства,
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представляющего конечную причину в Аристотелевском смысле и 
облающего селективным преимуществом. Конечные пределы развития 
рефлективного процесса, такие как золотое сечение и золотой вурф, 
рассматриваются нами как основные каноны совершенства, устанавли­
вающиеся в ходе эволюции.
Bioloogiline evolutsioon — semiootiliselt piiratud 
keerukuse kasv
Iga elav süsteem kannab endas enesekiijeldust ja eksisteerib kui selle 
kirjelduse erinevate võimalike realisatsioonide superpositsioon, mida piiravad 
või vähendavad suhted keskkonnaga. Seda vähendust pole võimalik rekur­
siivselt tuletada olem asolevast seisundist lähtudes, kuna ta sisaldab ka ette- 
määramatuid valikuid —  modelleerimisel tuleb seega arvestada ka tuleviku 
seisundeid. Mitterekursiivselt tekkiv uus konfiguratsioon areneb päranduvaks 
ja rekursiivseks toimimiseks pärast mällujätmist reflektiivse tagasiside tek­
kim ise kaudu (mis loob tegevuse märgi). See omakorda viib süsteemisisese 
kiijelduse keerukuse tõusule, mis vastavalt generatiivse grammatika reeglitele 
määravad avatud evolutsiooniprotsesside võimalikud edasised suunad. Bio­
loogiliste süsteemide tulevikuseisundeid on võimalik hinnata nende täiuslik­
kuse suhtes —  see on lõpp-põhjuseks Aristotelese tähenduses ning võib kanda 
ka valikulisi eeliseid. Reflektiivsete protsesside arengu piirväärtusi (näiteks 
kuldlõiget ja  kuldpööret) vaadeldakse kui evolutsiooniprotsessides püstituvaid 
täiuslikkuse kaanoneid.
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Biosemiotic knowledge — a prerequisite 
for valid explorations of extraterrestrial 
intelligent life
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Abstract. The scientific search for extraterrestrial intelligent life is probably 
one of the most ambitious projects ever taken in biology. The article discusses 
methodological problems associated with the search. It is emphasized that 
investigators of extraterrestrial intelligence, in contrast to investigators of 
terrestrial matters, have no valid pre-understanding of their subject matter. In 
this barren setting, utilization of semiotic knowledge is shown to be a 
prerequisite for achievement of valid data. Owing to methodological short­
comings, it is concluded that the NASA funded project SETI (Search for 
Extraterrestrial Intelligence) has little if any relevance for the detection of 
intelligent life in other worlds.
It is a capital mistake to theorise before one 
has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts 
to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts.
Arthur Conan Doyle (1976: 3)
Intelligent life in other worlds has been a major theme of 20 th century 
science and popular culture. For a long time inadequate technology 
and immense spatiotemporal distances hindered proper scientific 
investigations of the universe, and human ideas of extraterrestrial 
intelligent life were based largely on theories abducted from ambi­
guous and sometimes irreproducible observations (Dick 1996). Much 
of this changed during the latter half of the 20 th century with the
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advent of more sophisticated technology and scientific methodology. 
A new discipline, astrobiology, evolved to study life’s origin, evolu­
tion, distribution and interactions. The subject’s current scientific 
credibility is reflected by an increasing number of papers in leading 
journals and by the recent establishment of two new journals, Astro­
biology and International Journal of Astrobiology. In addition, the 
NASA Astrobiology Institute, a partnership between the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and a number of 
academic research organizations in the USA, was recently established 
to promote, conduct, and lead integrated multidisciplinary astrobio­
logy research.
Whereas the improbability of extraterrestrial life has been pro­
claimed by biologists of many stripes, some scientists believe on 
statistical grounds that life has arisen independently several places in 
the universe. For example, Robert Bieri (1964: 277), who holds an 
extreme Panglossian and deterministic view of evolution, believes that 
extraterrestrial intelligent beings will evolve by necessity and that they 
“will look an awful lot like us”. In contrast, the evolutionary biologist 
Ernst Mayr (1988: 67-74) holds a probabilistic view and denounces 
Bieri’s idea of a straight line from the origin of life to intelligent man. 
Mayr pictures evolution as a branching tree full of chance nodes and 
makes clear how incredibly improbable it is that intelligent life, as we 
know it, has appeared. Mainstream biology of today endorses the 
probabilistic view, holding the deterministic view as misguided.
The scientific search for extraterrestrial intelligent life is perhaps 
the most ambitious initiative ever undertaken in biology. As of today 
there are no certain observations of life beyond Earth, and some 
scientists therefore claim that astrobiology in reality is a subject 
without subject matter. However, encouraging scientific observations, 
especially concerning probable presence of microbiological life in 
space (Thomas-Keprta et al. 2001), have motivated further explora­
tions. Ever increasing technological sophistication combined with 
research funds of astronomical proportions and an almost obsessive 
wish to learn whether we are alone in the universe or not may well 
turn astrobiology into the major scientific enterprise of this millen­
nium.
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Appropriating unknown life forms
Rationality and methodology are intimately connected; to be rational 
in science is to select good means to pursue scientific goals. Thus, 
before approaching their subject matter rational scientists set out to 
validate the methods used for their investigation. This enterprise is 
made explicit when they design experiments to discriminate among a 
set of competing hypotheses, during which care is taken to include 
relevant negative and positive controls that may serve as a frame of 
reference for the experiment. It is central to experimental methodo­
logy that controls and other background knowledge of the subject 
matter are not independently tested in the experiment. Rather, 
scientists try to find auxiliary assumptions that they have good reasons 
to believe are true regardless of what the experimental observations 
may bring to bear on the hypotheses (Sober 1999).
A challenge for investigators of extraterrestrial intelligent life is 
that they, in contrast to investigators of terrestrial matters, have little 
valid pre-understanding of their subject matter. Even though the 
physical properties of the elements and the laws of physics may be 
regarded as universal (Wilczek 2002), astrobiologists have no 
scientifically grounded idea of what physical realizations intelligent 
life in other worlds may have. Since there is no assurance that life 
beyond Earth will be Earthlike, terrestrial biological principles and 
data do not necessarily provide valid information when inferring life 
in other worlds (Conrad, Nealson 2001). Paradoxically, extrapolation 
of terrestrial principles to other worlds may preclude any chance of 
finding new principles of life.
The unavailability of valid background knowledge of extrater­
restrial intelligent life makes it irrational to proceed further with a 
scientific practice that relies explicitly on such knowledge. It is there­
fore necessary to establish a basis for investigations of extraterrestrial 
life that does not rely on ontological claims. In an ontologically barren 
setting it is appropriate to investigate whether founding principles can 
be grounded in epistemology — whether it is time to invoke and 
revitalize the Cartesian epistemic cut. When confronting a world full 
of untruth and scepticism, Rene Descartes (1968) sought and found in 
the existential cogito ergo sum a first principle that he could utilize as 
a basis for his further studies. Although Descartes (1968: 54) believed 
that “the things we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are all
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true”, he also realized that “there is nevertheless some difficulty in 
being able to recognize for certain which are the things we see 
distinctly” . By the latter qualification he acknowledged uncertainties 
as regarding the status of auxiliary assumptions.
Unlike Descartes’ principle the founding principle in studies of 
extraterrestrial intelligence can not be grounded in an existential 
claim. The existence of extraterrestrials is, after all, what astrobiology 
pursues. It therefore seems reasonable to look for a founding principle 
in the practice and methods used to appropriate unknown life forms.
It is conceivable that an essential characteristic common to all 
kinds of intelligent life will be transfer of information through com­
munication. Even though this would appear rational, science has no 
idea of what kind of communication extraterrestrials engage in. 
Science should therefore be cautious not to dismiss as ill adapted any 
of the imaginable physical realisations that extraterrestrial commu­
nication channels and sense organs may take. There may be multiple 
realisations of the same communication channel, as is known from 
terrestrial biology where eyes have evolved independently at least 40 
times during evolution (Mayr 1988). Furthermore, extraterrestrials 
may have sense organs that are quite unimaginable to humans. Man’s 
limited abductive powers were illustriously revealed during the expli­
cation of the lateral lines in fishes: “The fact that man does not have 
this sense organ himself, and had not perfected artificial receptors in 
any way analogous, was a handicap in the attempt to understand the 
organ” (Williams 1966: 11).
The kind of anthropocentrism discussed in the previous paragraph 
may be a hinder to man’s endeavour to obtain a deeper understanding 
of communicative life. It would thus appear necessary to transgress 
the constraints imposed by anthropocentrism and substitute it with a 
broader biocentric perspective. Jakob von Uexkiill (1982) made an 
attempt at this when he used the term umwelt to depict the subjective 
features of an animal’s environment. An animal’s umwelt includes all 
the meaningful aspects of the world it inhabits. Various species of 
animals, like rat and man, will by consequence have different um­
weiten. A similar insight was captured in Martin Heidegger’s (1962) 
distinction between two types of being, being-in (with a hyphen) and 
being in. Whereas the common understanding of being in is of 
something physically enclosed, being-in is not a physical property but 
relates to the organisms concerned dealings with its surroundings.
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Heidegger holds that biology, which is concerned with causal 
explanations, can not study the way life is lived. Life is to be under­
stood as a practical activity and not as a scientific entity or process 
defined in biochemical terms. A condensed and clear exposition of 
these thoughts were captured in a famous aphorism by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1953: 223) who stated that if a lion could talk, man 
would not be able to understand her. The combined insights of 
Uexkiill, Heidegger and Wittgenstein allow us to conclude that two 
species with homologous sense organs that perceive the same physical 
stimuli may still inhabit different lifeworlds. The possibility of 
achieving meaningful communication with extraterrestrial intelligent 
life having other evolutionary trajectories and umweiten than human 
beings should therefore, accordingly, be very small.
One can of course argue that terrestrial animals are neither 
conscious nor intelligent, thereby being irrelevant to discussions of 
extraterrestrial intelligence. However, this counterargument misses the 
point since the issue addressed by Uexkiill, Heidegger and Witt­
genstein is philosophical, not scientific. The issue at stake concerns 
scientific methodology, not ontology. Whether animals have con­
sciousness or not is therefore only indirectly relevant. Even so, 
scientific elucidation of animal consciousness may have bearings on 
the philosophical question. As it is, animal consciousness is a matter 
about which science is very vague. Donald Griffin, who discovered 
how bats navigate in the dark using their own sonar, recently stated 
when discussing animal consciousness: “In the face of very weak 
evidence we scientists tend to make very strong, negative statements 
[...] when we really don’t know” (Vines 2001: 50). Furthermore, he 
proclaimed that the key to understand the minds of other animals lies 
in the communication systems, but that it is “very, very difficult to get 
convincing evidence” (Vines 2001: 51).
Unprejudiced information about other life forms can only be 
appropriated by using a scientific method that does not rely on 
specific physical realisations of that life. I believe that this metho­
dological demand can be met by combining sound biological prin­
ciples with semiotics. Tonnessen (2001: 689), although sceptical to 
''peculations about what may constitute universal characteristics of 
living beings, likewise argues that “one should presume that semiosis 
is a universal characteristic of living beings, because without semiosis, 
there can be no recognition”. A main advantage when utilising
biosemiotics to study communication is that semiotics, although 
relying on the physical attributes of objects, is not dependent upon 
their specific physical realization. According to Peirce (1998) semiotic 
communication involves the sign, the object that the sign refers to, and 
the interpretant. For something to be a sign it must be understood as 
such —  a sign is a sign only in context. Signs must be interpreted in 
relation to each other in a context, otherwise they may not even be 
acknowledged as signs. It is a fundamental principle in Peirce’s 
semiotics that indexical and iconic signs, and especially symbolic 
signs, have no meaning in isolation. The puzzles connected with 
background knowledge are therefore explicitly taken care of and 
acknowledged by biosemiotics.
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SETI —  a misguided scientific approach
Communication with extraterrestrial intelligence poses semiotic 
problems of both philosophical and physical character. If the semiotic 
problems are not explicated and solved at the philosophical level, 
solving the technological problems may be a futile endeavour having 
no bearings on the problem at hand. Such reasoning sets the back­
ground for my own scepticism towards the evidential bearings of one 
of the most ambitious astrobiological projects ever, the NASA funded 
project SETI (Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence). SETI has 
consumed enormous amounts of resources in an attempt to get in 
contact with extraterrestrials. Since the early 1960s SETI has dealt 
with the communicative problem in two ways. First by sending a 
message into deep space that would allow any intelligent extra­
terrestrial to figure out that it was produced by intelligent designers, 
and second by scanning the night sky for narrow-band radio emissions 
hoping to detect signs of intelligent life elsewhere in the universe. 
SETI concentrated on listening for electromagnetic signals in the 
centimetre waveband, the reason being purely practical since that is 
where the background noise from the universe and the Earth s 
atmosphere is lowest (Dick 1996).
The SETI engineers search for radio emissions, not because this is 
an a priori sign of intelligence, but because they know the sorts of 
mechanisms that are needed to produce radio waves. It thus appears
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that fundamental semiotical problems are relayed to the background 
because of the practical convenience of radio waves. The earthcentric 
presumptions of the SETI project was explicitly articulated when the 
journal Nature on October 21, 1993 on the front page asked “Is there 
life on Earth?”, a question that was answered in the affirmative by 
Carl Sagan et al. (1993) in the same issue. Carl Sagan and the other 
scientists reported results obtained from experiments performed in 
December 1990 when the Galileo spacecraft flew within 960 km of 
Earth. As Galileo passed by the Earth it made a series of observations 
to test its onboard instruments. It detected abundant oxygen in the 
Earth’s atmosphere. In addition, narrow-band radio transmissions 
from Earth were detected. Taken together, this evidence implied that 
not just life, but intelligent life existed on Earth. Although the 
experiments were technically successful, it is arguable whether the 
experiments have any relevance for the detection of intelligent life in 
other worlds. Rather, it can be argued that the only conclusion that can 
be drawn from the experiment is that creatures on Earth send radio 
signals that can be received in space. That the same creatures are 
intelligent can not be inferred from the experimental data without a 
concomitant background knowledge that explains how narrow-band 
radio transmissions are generated and by whom.
The biological rationale for the SETI project can be found in 
certain assumptions derived from an interpretation of evolutionary 
theory explicated and defended most vehemently by Richard Dawkins 
(1983: 35). He claims that “The Darwinian law [...] may be as uni­
versal as the great laws of physics”, and holds that complex structures 
found anywhere in the universe are/were either alive or are/were 
artefacts created by something that is/was alive. According to this 
theoretical framework one can envision extraterrestrial radio signals as 
artefacts generated by humanoids on other planets (H\). Although 
evolutionary theory is opposed to the design argument for explaining 
biological diversity, the theory is not opposed to deployment of the 
design argument for explaining artefacts. As such, the design argu­
ment is valid for scientific inference. Radio signals could therefore be 
looked upon as valuable signs of meaning in the universe. However, 
when regarded as a scientific hypothesis, I hold that we have little 
reason to believe H ] rather than the opposite hypothesis —  that the 
signals are not generated by humanoids on other planets (Я2). Since 
there are no valid data to support the hypotheses, both hypotheses
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have identical likelihoods, ^(signal | я , )  = ^(signal I H2). It is only 
earthcentric background knowledge that inclines us to believe that the 
likelihood of H j is higher than H2.
Although not explicitly acknowledged, the SETI project appears to 
be based on the abandoned deterministic model of evolution, not the 
endorsed probabilistic model. For example, SETI implicitly expects 
that humanoids are equipped with receivers among their sense organs 
that respond to the same auditory signals that humans do. Further­
more, since the reception of any message is dependent on prior 
knowledge of the possibilities, it is expected that humanoids have a 
similar evolutionary history to the one that occurred on Earth. I find 
both assumptions incomprehensible, and consequently find the 
utilization of radio waves as means for contact with extraterrestrial 
intelligence dubious also from an evolutionary angle.
Concluding remarks
At face value the SETI project, by focusing on signs of meaning in the 
universe, may be regarded as a project testing the hypothesis of 
universal Darwinian evolution (Dawkins 1983). The investigations 
may also seem to have bearings on the biosemioticians’ claim that life 
is based entirely on semiosis, on sign operations (Hoffmeyer 1996; 
Emmeche 1998). Finally, the SETI project may be looked upon as a 
test for the claim of universal biosemiotics. However, given the 
philosophical and semiotic criticisms raised against the SETI project I 
find it rather unlikely that the results of the project will have any 
bearings on the issues raised. The several unjustified background 
assumptions of the SETI project need to be thoroughly discussed and 
revised before any scientific meaning can be bestowed to data. These 
discussions should be conducted on a biosemiotic footing.
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Необходимость биосемиотического знания 
при поисках внеземного разума
Научный поиск внеземного разума один из самых амбициозных 
проектов, когда-либо предпринятых в биологии. Данная статья рассмат­
ривает связанные с этим проектом методологические проблемы. 
Подчеркивается, что искатели внеземного разума не обладают, в 
отличие от исследователей земных материй, нужным предварительным 
знанием об объекте своего исследования. В качестве предпосылки полу­
чения заслуживающего доверия результатов автор видит использование 
семиотической методологии. Делается вывод, что финансируемый 
НАСА проект СЕТИ (Поиск внеземного разума) не может из-за своих 
методологических недостатков иметь успех при поиске внеземного 
разума.
Biosemiootilise teadmise tarvilikkus maavälise mõistusliku 
elu usaldusväärseil otsinguil
M aavälise elu teaduslik otsimine on tõenäoliselt üks ambitsioonikamaid pro­
jekte, mis bioloogias kunagi ette võetud. Siinne artikkel arutleb otsingutega 
seotud m etodoloogiliste probleemide üle. Rõhutatakse, et maavälise mõistus­
likkuse otsijad ei oma, erinevalt maiste asjade uurijatest, arvestatavat eel­
teadmist oma uurimisobjektist. Selle piirava teguri tõttu nähakse semiootilise 
m etodoloogia kasutuselevõttu kui eeldust usaldusväärsete tulemuste saa­
miseks. Järeldatakse, et N A SA  poolt finantseeritud projekt SETI (Maavälise 
m õistuslikkuse otsing) ei saa tänu metodoloogilistele puudujääkidele olla 
maavälise mõistusliku elu otsim isel kuigi edukas.
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Abstract. Any attempt to develop biosemiotics either towards a new biolo­
gical ground theory or towards a metaphysics of living nature necessitates 
some kind of naturalization of its semiotic concepts. Instead of standard 
physicalistic naturalism, a certain kind of semiotic naturalism is pursued here. 
The naturalized concepts are defined as referring only to the objects o f  our 
external experience. When the semiotic concepts are applied to natural pheno­
mena in biosemiotics, there is a risk of falling into anthropomorphic errors if 
the semiotic concepts remain mentalistic. It is suggested that there really is an 
anthropomorphic error or “hidden prototype fallacy” arising from Peirce’s 
prototype for semiosis: the research process of an experimental scientist. The 
fallacy lies in the concept of the object of representation —  it is questionable 
whether there are any objects of representation for bacteria and whether the 
DNA-signs have any objects. The conclusion is that Peircean semiotic 
concepts are naturalizable but only if they are based on some more primitive 
concept of representation. The causal origins of representations are not 
relevant, only their anticipative consequences (i.e. meaning).
Three possible roles of biosemiotics in biology
The paradigmatic examples of semiotic phenomena are signs mediated 
by human languages and thought. To talk about biosemiotics is to 
make a hypothesis that the anthropocentric concepts of semiotics are 
also applicable in the non-human domain that is studied within the 
biological sciences. Because human beings are just one species of
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living beings, biosemiotics can be seen as a generalization or 
extension of semiotics. When semiotics is generalized into biosemio­
tics, it has at least three possible roles in biology:
1. We can use (originally) anthropomorphic semiotic concepts (like 
sign, interpretation or agent) merely as metaphors and analogies 
that make biological phenomena more comprehensible or lively in 
popular texts —  or that give new insights for new biological 
hypotheses and experiments.
2. We can see the value of biosemiotics as an alternative philosophy 
o f biology, an alternative way to integrate “folk biology” and 
“scientific biology” (cf. Emmeche 2000: 188), or as an alternative 
metaphysical interpretation of biological phenomena.
3. We can see it (in its present state) as a potential ground for a new 
ground theory o f biology, a theory in which the vertical and 
horizontal aspects of biosemiosis1 are integrated.
The first role is so obvious and common that no one should have 
much against it. However, if biosemiotics merely adheres to this role, 
we cannot expect much progress in characteristically biosemiotic 
thought. Metaphoric talk is often fruitful at the beginning of a new 
research program, but if the meanings of the concepts used are not 
defined more precisely, it will rather die out than survive as a scien­
tific research program. Thus, I suggest that biosemiotics should be 
developed to fulfil either the second or the third role (or both) — 
otherwise, it will eventually become either extinct or assimilated into 
other approaches in vitiated form. Its most fruitful novel ideas will be 
hijacked into other programs closer to the mainstream and afterwards 
it can be passed over because “it says nothing new”.' On the other 
hand, metaphoric talk p e r  se is inescapable, all our concepts, even the 
most “scientific” ones, are based on metaphors.3 My concern here is 
what kind of experience the biosemiotic metaphors are based on, what 
kind of hidden or implicit presuppositions are smuggled into bio-
1 Cf. “dual code theory of life” (e.g., Hoffmeyer, Emmeche 1991: 126; Hoffmeyer 
1996: 32).
2 If the main goal of biosemiotic talk is not in science but in politics, journalism, or 
applied ethics (or in religious apology), then biosemiotics understood as weaving fancy 
stories about biological phenomena may be powerful enough.
3 Not only our concepts but also our theories are based on metaphors and even 
whole paradigms are often symbolized by a specific term that guide the interpretation 
(e.g., the selectionist paradigm of evolution). Cf. Emmeche, Hoffmeyer (1991: 8-9) 
about “the levels of metaphorical ‘signification-lransfer’ in science”.
semiotic concepts within these metaphors. I will conclude that some 
of these hidden presuppositions are not justified if we are to make 
natural science or general metaphysics of living nature.
Here I mostly discuss the second and the third roles and suggest 
that a certain kind of naturalization o f  the sem iotic concepts of 
biosemiotics might be beneficial in both cases. By naturalization, I do 
not refer to standard physicalism but rather a certain kind of “public 
accessibility” of the objects of semiotic concepts. Physicalistic natu­
ralism would mean a reduction to non-semiotic (i.e. “reduction to 
secondness”) with the consequence that biosemiotics would be driven 
into the first role. I am looking for a new (or at least a different) kind 
of naturalism, a semiotic naturalism  that would preserve the (origi­
nally non-naturalistic) idea of purposive (or end-directed) habitual 
action (i.e. thirdness or loosely taken final cause), but considers it as a 
natural phenomenon. Most of the argumentation in this paper does not 
directly concern biosemiotic “theory” but its methodology. Some 
consequences to biosemiotic theory are illustrated in the last section.
Naturalistic methodology for biosemiotics 
1. Concepts and objects of experience
In order to create a proper method for the naturalization of our con­
cepts, we need to consider how our concepts refer to nature. Concepts 
can be divided into two classes:
1. natural concepts that refer only to the objects of our external 
experience, and
2. mentalistic concepts that are comprehensible only through 
reference to some objects of internal experience (or “inner sense”).
Semiotic naturalism would mean primarily the naturalization o f  all 
mentalistic concepts that are used in biosemiotic theory. This means a 
certain kind of re-definition of mentalistic concepts as natural 
concepts, i.e. concepts whose comprehension is not dependent on the 
objects of internal experience. This re-definition should be extensive 
rather than restrictive or eliminative —  the extension of a concept 
should be enlarged in the naturalization.
Objects of external experience are objects that the experiencing 
person can assume to have been analogously experienced by any other
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person who has similar cognitive and perceptual capacities. If I see a 
flying bird, it is reasonable to suppose that other people (if there were 
any) could see the same object regardless of possible differences in 
background knowledge about birds. A fellow observer might even see 
it as an airplane although I consider it an eagle. What qualities or pro­
perties are connected to the object perceived may vary in the inter­
pretations of the sensation, but whatever they are, they are connected 
with the same event or occasion of the object.
O bjects o f  internal experience (or inner sense) are objects (or 
events) to which no one else but the person actually experiencing them 
can have access except mediately, somehow through the internal 
experience of that experiencing person. Others can have access to 
these objects only by drawing an inference from externally per­
ceivable signs (words, gestures, readings of measuring devices, etc.) 
that are intentionally or non-intentionally communicated. Internal 
experience refers to subjective objects. Some examples of the objects 
of internal experience and mentalistic concepts might be:
(1)The concept of experience is in itself a mentalistic concept. The 
qualitative content of any experience in itself is always an object of 
internal experience (regardless of whether this experience is 
external or internal).
(2) The concept of pain is a mentalistic concept. A feeling of pain is 
internal experience —  it refers to the “state of one mind/body” that 
no one else but the person in pain can directly experience.4
(3) Most commonly, the use of the concept of consciousness or self- 
awareness is mentalistic —  it is ultimately understood through our 
subjective and internal experiences of being aware of oneself. The 
self-awareness of another person cannot be directly perceived, only 
inferred.
(4) Likewise, such semiotic concepts as “interpretation”, “sign” or 
“representation”, “reference”, and “meaning” in their normal use 
are ultimately (or originally) mentalistic concepts.
The main reason why the naturalization of mentalistic concepts would 
be beneficial is purely methodological, not metaphysical. Although
4 A doctor can never be absolutely sure if his patient is just pretending to feel pain; 
only the patient himself has direct access to his own pains. It is also impossible to 
compare the amount of pain between two different persons. What the doctor can do is 
only to interpret external signs, like the account of the patient and other externally 
perceptible symptoms in the patient.
the concepts refer only to the objects of external experience in 
semiotic naturalism, no physical theory about (the composition of) the 
objects of external experience is necessarily assumed. Regardless of 
whether such concepts as pain or consciousness should (or can) be 
naturalized, I have no doubt that they are real concepts (as well as 
useful). They refer to real phenomena and they are certainly necessary 
in successfully directing our everyday action. The benefit of naturali­
zation is, most of all, communicational, to make the meanings of the 
concepts used clearer and intersubjectively controllable. The natura­
lization of semiotic concepts is set to diminish the tacitness of 
subjective assumptions included in what Claus Emmeche (2000) calls 
experiential biology.5 Mentalistic concepts involve the risk of 
producing an anthropomorphic error, to predicate qualities peculiar to 
humans (or even only to myself) to natural phenomena. (This error is 
relative to ego-, ethno-, and logo- or “ratiocentric” errors.6) It can also 
be called a hidden prototype fallacy  in the sense that Emmeche (2000: 
190) has presented — the “hidden prototype” of semiotic perspective 
just appears to be mental and intellectual. It seems to me that much of 
the opposition and hostility of typical natural (or medical) scientists to 
the biosemiotic approach originate in suspicion about this kind of 
hidden prototype fallacy.
2. The “hidden prototype” of semiotic perspective
The intellectual “hidden prototype” of biosemiotic approach dates 
back to the Peircean origin of semiotic concepts like representation, 
semiosis, etc. Peirce’s semiotics, semeiotic, was a theory of logic, a 
normative science of self-controlled thought, although logic, for
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“(...] experiential biology. This includes the domain mentioned above as folk 
biology (common, conventional, public, everyday notions of plants and animals) plus 
the subjective field of our own experiences of what it means to be a growing, feeding 
organism, a moving feeling animal, a sensitive human being. [...] first and foremost, 
experiential biology includes a kind of subjective and qualitative knowledge of the 
tcchng of life, of sentience, of the moods of passive laziness or active engagement, and 
so on” (Emmeche 2000: 189).
11 would be better to call these “ego-, ethno-, and logo- or ratiomorphic" than 
-centric errors. While anthropomorp/t/c error (in the above mentioned sense) can be 
avoided by naturalization (although not all anthropomorphisms are necessary errors), 
ururopocentrism, peculiarly human interest, cannot be completely avoided.
Peirce, included most of what is nowadays studied under the 
disciplines of methodology, epistemology, and philosophy of science. 
The relation of logic (semeiotic) to other sciences is studied under 
Peirce’s classification of sciences (Figure 1). This classification is not 
a mere typology, but is hierarchically ordered:
I would classify the sciences [...]  in the order of abstractness of their objects, 
so that each science may largely rest for its principles upon those above it in 
the scale while drawing its data in part from those below it. (EP 2.35, 1898)
298 Tommi Vehkavaara
- A) Science of Discovery
Science of Research, Heuretic Science
— (Al) Mathematics
— (All) Cenoscopy - Philosophia prima
(Alla) Phenomenology - Phaneroscopy
— (Allb) Normative Sciences
— (Alibi) Esthetics - Axiagastics
— (Allbii) Ethics - Practics
— (AJIbiii) Logic - Formal Semiotic (Semeiotic)
— Stecheotic - Speculative/Universal/Philosophical Grammar
— Critic - Critical Logic
*— Methodeutic - Speculative/Universal/Philosophical Rhetoric 
(Objective Logic)
L  (Alle) Metaphysics 
L  (AI1I) Idioscopy - Special sciences
(AlHa) Physical Sciences
- Physiognosy
— Nomological Physics - Sciences o f  Physical Laws
— C lassificatory Physics - Sciences o f Physical Kinds
— Chrystaltography
— Chem istry 
Biology
L— D escriptive Physics - Sciences o f Individual Physical Objects
(A lllb) Psychical (or Human) Sciences
- Psychognosy
— Nomological Psychics - Psychology
— Classificatory Psychics - Ethnology
— Special Psychology
— Linguistics
— Ethnology
*— Descriptive Psychics - H istory
B) Science of Review - Retrospective Science - Philosophia ultima
-C) Practical Science - Arts
- e.g. engineering, medical sciences, science o f morality (i.e. ethics in common sense)
Figure 1. Peirce’s outline classification of sciences (-1903, EP 2.18).
It is essential that logic cannot be dependent on metaphysical 
principles, like Peirce’s “objective idealism” (cf. footnote 14), or on 
the principles of special sciences including biology, although these 
sciences may offer data for the abductive and inductive inferences 
drawn within logical science. Biosemiotics cannot be pure logic 
according to this classification, because it has real subject matter, 
living systems on earth. It must be either metaphysics, e.g. the study 
of logical phenomena appearing in metaphysics (or general nature) of 
living things (cf. the second role of biosemiotics), or natural science , 
e.g. the study of logical phenomena appearing in experimentally 
accessible living nature (cf. the third role of biosemiotics).
The form of Peirce’s triadic concept of sign or representation was 
discovered from the point of view of thought thinking o f  itself, 
thinking how its representamen refers to its object (this falls more or 
less within the discipline of Critic or Critical Logic in Figure 1). In 
this introspective8 point of view, the interpretant mediates the relation 
between the representamen and its object (cf. Peirce’s “On a new list 
of categories”, EP 1.1-10, 1867). In this philosophical and introspec­
tive perspective, the subject matter of study, thought, is necessarily a 
conscious human thought-sign although it is intended to be considered 
in a very abstract manner. If biosemiotic concepts are based on that 
perspective, anthropomorphic error is more than likely. Therefore, I 
suggest that the semiotic concepts of biosemiotics should be based on 
the phenomenology of the other one9 rather than on introspection (the 
self-reflective analysis of internal experience). What the phenomenon 
means, signifies, etc .fo r  us should not be the object of study but rather 
the way it is meaningful, significant, accessible etc. for the “other 
one”. This “other one” in focus can be called the object-agent. We as
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It can be noted that in biosemiotics, the division between subclasses of 
physical” and “psychical” sciences becomes exceeded — biosemiotics is about 
biological phenomena, but on the other hand, it studies “mind” or “thought” (i.e. 
psychics”) in nature by applying semiotic concepts in biology.
I use the term “introspection” here to mean a kind of self-observation as a method 
of study. Introspection understood as a search for intuitively self-evident truths was 
heavily criticized by Peirce (e.g. in Articles 2 and 3 (1868) in EP 1).
The phrase “phenomenology of the other one” is borrowed from Donald T. 
Campbell (1969), the founder of (modern) evolutionary epistemology. Campbell more 
often used the term “epistemology of the other one” — phenomenology is preferred 
here because the word ‘epistemology’ refers more narrowly to some knowledge-like 
cognition.
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readers, writers, observers, researchers, etc. can respectively be called 
m eta-agents (Figure 2). If the concept of agent is found useful in 
biosemiotics, agents should be considered as object-agents, not as 
meta-agents. Meta-agents are considered in methodology (as in this 
paper) or epistemology. The distinction between meta-agent and 
object-agent is only methodological and comparable to distinction 
between meta- and object-language in classical logic.
Figure 2. The phenomenology of the other one, ‘a thought (meta-agent) thinking 
of the other one’s thought (i.e. thinking of the representation of the object-agent)’.
In the “phenomenology of the other one”, both the object-agent and 
the objects of the phenomenon that the object-agent experiences must 
be possible objects of our external experience. This is not yet 
necessarily naturalistic, because the concept of agent may be (more­
over, is usually) taken as an intuitive mentalistic concept. If we are to 
make a naturalistic “phenomenology of the other one”, the conception 
of what makes the object-agent a real agent, cannot be conceptually 
dependent on our internal self-experience or our subjective feelings 
“of what it means to be a growing, feeding organism, a moving feeling 
animal, a sensitive human being” (Emmeche 2000: 189). The naturali­
zation (or alternatively, the elim ination) of the concept of the semiotic 
agent is essential for biosemiotics.10 Intuitive feelings that this or that
10 There have been a number of different more or less naturalistic accounts of 
defining the concept of living agent by Mark Bickhard, John Collier and Clifford 
Hooker, Claus Emmeche, Jesper Hoffmeyer, and Stanley Salthe, to mention only a few 
(I happen to know best). These definitions and characterizations contain such defining 
concepts as anticipation, autonomy, autopoiesis, process or topological closure,
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is apparently an agent are not enough —  what is needed is formal (i.e. 
non-substantial) and naturalized criteria for agentiality. In order to 
avoid anthropomorphic error, the vague pre-model of agent could be 
organism rather than conscious human subject (even though it may 
later appear that not all organisms are agents).
In his logic Peirce also included the point of view of “the pheno­
menology of the other one” (although he does not use the term), “a 
thought (meta-agent) thinking of other thought” (and not itself), which 
meant thinking of the whole development or course of this “object- 
thought”. (This is the point of view in Peirce’s M ethodeutic, see 
Figure 1.) A whole chain o f signs, a whole semiosic process, was put 
under the observer’s eyes, i.e. was considered as an object of a 
representation of a meta-agent. Therefore, it is convenient to call this 
objective logic (as Peirce occasionally did), a study of life o f  signs. At 
the point of view of “methodeutic” or objective logic, it is the repre- 
sentamen that mediates between the object and the interpretant (at the 
“object-level”). Although the objective logic means the adoption of 
the point of view of an external observer or experimenter, Peirce’s 
methodeutic (and philosophy as a whole) is not naturalistic in the 
sense of semiotic naturalism. He was still talking mostly about pheno­
mena for us, i.e. for me and for others like me. One reason why natura­
lization obviously was not the central purpose of Peirce is that his 
central (and not at all “hidden”) prototype for semiosis was clearly a 
research process o f an honestly truth-seeking experimental scientist 
(cf. Peirce’s papers about his pragmaticism, e.g. Articles 24—28 in EP 
2).
Still, the point of view of objective logic (i.e. of a meta-agent) 
made it possible to continue the generalization and abstraction pro­
cesses of the concepts of sign and semiosis to be applicable to wider 
and wider domains. One common line of interpretation is that Peirce
cohesion, (self)-functionality, inside-outside -asymmetry, self-organization, self-main- 
tenance of far-from-equilibrium system, etc.
Although the distinction between meta-agent and object-agent is methodological, it 
must be noted that the concept of the (object)-agent is not necessarily appropriate at all. 
It may appear that it is not naturalizable or that agential semiosis is only a narrow 
special type of all semiosic processes which is not the sufficient object of study for the 
general biosemiotics. However, if agential theorizing brings some positive results, it 
may be easier to draw some implications (whatever they are) to classic existential- 
philosophical questions like “what is man”, “what is the meaning of life”, “how should
I behave” etc.
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eliminated the need for the concept of semiotic agent (that is 
erroneously associated with Peirce’s notion of “interpreter”) and that 
his concepts of sign, mind, and thought are therefore essentially non- 
agential concepts. I doubt if he ever tried to do it, or if he tried, he did 
not succeed in it (see the next section). W hether successful or not, the 
quest for abstract or naturalistic objective logic leads to a shift from 
logic to metaphysics, or even further to special sciences, because some 
kind of pre-conception about the real nature o f  mind or thought which 
is observed must be assumed. This question, which contains the 
question about the agentiality of mind (cf. footnote 10), is essentially 
either metaphysical or “idioscopical” (see Figure 1). Consequently, 
objective logic can be seen as an intermediate between the logical 
science of methodeutic and the real sciences of metaphysics and 
idioscopy (i.e. special sciences).11 As I see it, the central research area 
of biosemiotics could be described as being objective logic understood 
as a theory of mind operative in nature (regardless of whether the 
“mind” is considered agential or not). Some support can be found in 
Peirce’s writings. In his most abstract characterization, Peirce con­
cluded that mind (as an object of external experience!) should be
12found (loosely speaking) in any end-directed system:
Mind has its universal mode of action, namely, by final causation. The micro- 
scopist looks to see whether the motions of a little creature show any purpose. 
If so, there is mind there. [...] But the being governed by a purpose or other 
final cause is the very essence of the psychical phenomenon, in general. (CP 
1.269, 1902)
Without the naturalization of semiotic concepts, it may be possible to 
effectively study the horizontal biosemiosis of object-agents (like
11 The table of contents of Peirce’s famous “Carnegie application” (Peirce 1902) 
also supports this hypothesis (see http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ 
L7 5/Ver 1 /toe. h tm).
12 However, note following rejection: “[...] if the thermometer is dynamically 
connected with the heating and cooling apparatus, so as to check either effect, we do 
not, in ordinary parlance, speak of there being any semeiosy, or action of a sign, but, on 
the contrary, say that there is an ‘automatic regulation’, an idea opposed, in our minds, 
to that of semeiosy” (CP 5.473, 1907). This mentalistic common sense( !) intuition 
about “semeiosy” (i.e. thought) can be taken into account by insisting that a system has 
to be end-directed for the system itself, i.e. at the “'object-level”. This means that the 
system must have at least some control over its ends — it must be capable of 
modifying its own ends (cf. the final chapter).
primates) that appear similar enough to us. But with naturalization, it 
is possible to study also the possible agents not so sim ilar to us, like 
ants (or colonies of ants), amoebae, bacteria. Moreover, it will be 
possible to study whether and in what conditions such “may-be- 
agents” as populations, lineages, ecosystems, and perhaps even self­
controlling man-made machines and devices like thermostats13, are 
real agents. A naturalized conception of mind or thought must be 
closely interlinked with the naturalized concept of the semiotic agent 
(although the naturalized concept of mind may appear to be definable 
independently of the concept of the semiotic agent).
It is a big step from the study of “mind in me” to the study of 
“mind out there”. The application of the concepts of the former in the 
latter is the potential source of an anthropomorphic error —  Peirce 
himself was aware that it is a risky move (CP 2.111-115, 1902). In 
biosemiotics (and in related research areas) there have been a number 
of fairly successful attempts at the complete naturalization of central 
semiotic concepts. Mind, thought, or agency is considered in terms of 
anticipation, closure and self-organization. Purposefulness, intentio­
nally, or finality, in turn, is considered in terms of function or self­
functionality, and further on of self-maintenance of far-from-eauilib- 
rium systems. (Cf. Bickhard 1998a, 2000, and Emmeche 2000 .)1
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Many self-controlling man-made machines can be said to use kinds of 
representations in their functioning, although no thermostat (etc.) can be said to be an 
autonomous agent in itself.
This kind of naturalizing interpretation may also give a promising perspective to 
Peirce’s objective idealism if someone (like Collier 1999: 123) has trouble with it. 
Objective idealism can be characterized by the doctrine of objective logic: “that ideas 
really influence the physical world, and in doing so carry their logic with them” (Peirce 
1902, Memoir §33). Objective idealism falls to materialism if only the “’mind” or 
"thought” in nature are studied and described within naturalized concepts, i.e. with 
concepts that refer only to the objects of external experience (of us as meta-agents). 
Peirce’s rejection of materialism is compatible with this interpretation, because his 
rejection was only a rejection of mechanical materialism (cf. EP 1.292, 1891), not of 
materialism that confronts chaotic and self-organizing phenomena, like self- 
maintaining far-from-equilibrium systems, etc.
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Although I expect the concepts of agent and mind are naturalizable 
along Peircean lines, I see more trouble with the concept of sign itself. 
I have a suspicion that there is a hidden anthropomorphism in the 
Peircean concept of the object o f representation. This anthropo­
morphism does not necessarily make any error in anthroposemiotics 
or even in the zoösemiotics of relatively “intelligent” animals, like 
primates etc. Problems emerge when the concept of the object of 
representation is applied to biosemiotic agents not so similar to us.
In anthroposemiosis Peirce’s description of the more detailed 
structure of sign in objective logic makes sense. The structure of sign 
considered in objective logic or methodeutic includes further division 
of both objects and interpretants (Figure 3). The immediate object 
(iconicity, indexicality or symbolicity in case) is the ground of 
representation, the way in which a sign refers to its real or dynamic 
object in the mind of a scientist.15 The dynamic object, which must 
have been a real effective cause of the sign, is not present (like the 
immediate object) but represented in the sign. The immediate 
interpretant includes (at least) the immediate feeling of recognition of 
representamen being a sign .16 The dynamic interpretant is the next 
real sign in the chain, the actual result of “interpretation” that is 
further interpreted as the semiosis proceeds. The final interpretant is 
the conclusive interpretation about what was the real object of the sign 
(and if it is achieved, it will be adopted as a new “embodied belief’ or 
“habit of mind”).
The hidden anthropomorphic error in semiotics
15 Compare following quotes: “The sign stands for something, its object. It stands 
for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have 
sometimes called the ground of the representamen.” (CP 2.228, 1897) and “The 
Mediate Object is the Object outside of the Sign; I call it the Dynamoid Object. The 
Sign must indicate it by a hint; and this hint, or its substance, is the Immediate Object.” 
(EP 2.480, 1908).
16 Cf. the quote: “The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced 
by it. [...] This ‘emotional interpretant’, as 1 call it, may amount to much more than 
that feeling of recognition; and in some cases, it is the only proper significate effect 
that the sign produces” (CP 5.475, 1907). Emotional interpretant can be held a 
psychological counterpart of the immediate interpretant.
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DO = Dynamic Object
10 = Immediate Object 
R = Representamen
11 = Immediate Interpretant 
DI = Dynamic Interpretant 
FI = Final Interpretant
\
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FI = Habit
Figure 3. Thought (the chain of signs) as an object in Peircean objective logic.
It is essential that the sign be treated as a representation and not as a 
perceived (or sensed) thing in itself — it must be recognizable as a 
representation that represents something (its object) that is not present 
or otherwise directly sensible. Any sign has causal effects that are not 
its interpretants (i.e. further signs that refer to its object) — the whole 
point of semiotics is to make a distinction between mediately directed 
effects (thirdness) and brute reactive effects (secondness) .171 may get 
cancer because of watching TV but the cancer (and my death) cannot 
be said to be the final interpretant of the signs I was interpreting (but 
just a brute effect of radiation).
This nevertheless does not imply that brute reactive causality could not be 
involved in sign-mediated processes.
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1. Are there any objects for bacterial agent?
Unlike in anthroposemiosis, the situation is different if we move on to 
consider a bacterial agent that is “the hidden prototype of a basic 
biosemiotic system” according to Emmeche (2000: 194). We can take 
a look at the widely used case that Jesper Hoffmeyer (1997, 1998) has 
also used as an example of horizontal biosemiosis: a directed move­
ment, chemotaxis of Eschericia coli (Figure 4).
Figure 4. “Bacterial chemotaxis as a case of semiosis. Left: a graphical 
representation of the triadic Peircean sign-relation. Right: The flagellar movement 
seen as an interpretant of the degree of saturation of chemoreceptors at the 
bacterial surface. Due to the regulatory activity of an elaborate system of cellular 
proteins flagellar movements come to represent the chemical environment in the 
same way that saturation of chemoreceptors represent this same environment” 
(Hoffmeyer 1997).
I have no doubt that the behavior of E. coli is purpose-oriented (self­
functional) and sign-directed, but certain non-desirable conclusions 
will follow if we think that the nutrition gradient is the object of a 
chemical sign —  a sign interpreted by the bacteria concluding 
appropriate flagellar movements. The problem is that there is no 
immediate object, no ground of representation fo r  the bacterium. At 
first glance, it looks as if there were an indexical sign relation because 
the assumed object and the sign are causally related (they are in a real 
relation). However, in order to be a real or dynamic object of the 
representation, nutrient molecules should have had a role in the 
formation of the “interpretive” structure that the chemoreceptors are 
part of, i.e. in the formation of the “habit of bacterium”. In this case, it
Sign Object
Saturation Nutrient 
of receptors gradient
Interpretant Flagellar
movement
happens to be plausible that this habit is really an adaptation “for 
eating”, but it doesn ’t need to be that —  it might as well be an 
exaptation (i.e. adaptation for some other function, or not adaptation 
at all, cf. Gould, Vrba 1982: 6 ) while still fulfilling the function of 
eating. If this latter possibility were somehow the case, the connection 
between the “interpretive” structure (habit) and the object would be 
accidental and not causal as was required. Moreover, for the 
bacterium, it does not even matter what the origin of its structure is —  
it would have same properties in either case. Its functionality in the 
future, i.e. the functionality of its future interpretation is all that is 
significant for the bacterium (and even for the whole lineage). Thus, it 
is more plausible to conclude that a nutrition gradient is the object 
only for us meta-agents, not for the bacterium —  it is our choice 
(corresponding to our anthropomorphic intuition) to call it the object 
of sign. The bacterium does not know anything about what satisfies its 
hunger — it does not need to care about that. But whether its hunger is
satisfied is significant for the future generations, it is the existential
18 ^
condition of the bacterium.
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2. Are there any objects in vertical biosemiosis?
The situation is even worse if we consider vertical biosemiosis. What 
is the object of a DNA-sign, how distant a past should be included in 
it? (Moreover, in contrast to the case of E. coli, it is more complicated 
to determine what the real object-agents of DNA-signs are. Are they 
cells, organs, organisms, populations, lineages, or are there no such 
object-agents at all?)
If we look back to the early 1990s, to Hoffmeyer’s and Emmeche’s 
(1991) formulation of signs mediating vertical biosemiosis (Figure 5), 
they may paradoxically point at the right direction. Although there are 
certain terminological confusions —  they are not Peircean signs as 
stated — the content of the idea seems to me better than a few years
14 However, I do not want to suggest that past history does not matter for the whole 
process of semiosis and habituation (cf. the end of the final chapter). The point is that 
to expect that there always would be a real object for the object-agent is to fall into the 
adaptationist fallacy, to cook up “just so stories”. The logic is the same as in 
sociobiology in the 1970s and 80s (cf. Gould 1978; Lewontin 1979; Gould Lewontin 
1979).
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ago (Vehkavaara 1998). If we transform those “signs” closer to Peir- 
cean terms (objects should be renamed as interpretants and inter- 
pretants as interpreters or agents), we find that there are no Peircean 
objects o f  representation  in the scheme.
Sign Object
Interpretant
OntogeneticDNA trajectory
Fertilized egg
niche DNA
Lineage
Figure 5. Signs of vertical semiosis in the dual-code theory of biosemiosis 
(according to Hoffmeyer 1993: 19-22).
If we compare them with Alexei Sharov’s (1998) suggestion (Figure 
6 ) which is more faithful in words to Peirce’s terminology, we can 
find some degree of arbitrariness in the choice of the objects of 
representations.19 Why are they only ancestors that are determined as 
objects of a DNA-sign, why not the environments of ancestors as 
well? I suggest that this arbitrariness is a sign that they, as here 
presented, are not signs in themselves, i.e. for object-agents, but only 
fo r  us meta-agents. The determination of what the real object of a sign 
is should not be a matter of meta-agent’s choice (or knowledge), the 
property of being an object of a sign needs to be a real property. It 
should be determined at the “object-level” (i.e. from the point of view 
of an object-agent). Otherwise, there is not much that we are justified 
to say about the origins of life, mind, language, consciousness, etc. 
(unless we adopt Bishop Berkeley’s solution and count on the 
existence of God as a meta-agent).
14 Also, the proposed representamen (differential reproduction) does not differ 
from the proposed interpretant (change in gene frequency) in the “back-translation 
from analog to digital” (Figure 6B). They are the same process but only described in 
different terms (cf. Vehkavaara 1998: 212).
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A В (Representam en)
(Object) (Representamen)
Ancestor DNA
(Object) Differential
Environment reproduction
Descendant
(Interpretant)
Interpreter: Cell
Gene frequency 
(Interpretant)
Interpreter: Lineage
Figure 6. Signs of vertical semiosis (according to Sharov 1998: 407, from Vehka-
vaara 1998).
The conclusion, however, is not that I would like to put the Peircean 
concept of representation out of office. The Peircean object of 
representation is a real concept, but only in context with sufficiently 
complex-structured object-agents — agents that have an Umwelt 
constructed of phenomenal objects. To be the basic concept of 
representation for biosemiotics, the Peircean concept of sign is still 
too anthropomorphic.20 It must be based on a more primitive concept 
of representation. One promising candidate is Mark Bickhard’s model 
of interactive representation (see Bickhard 1993, 1998b). The causal 
origin of a representation is not important for the object-agent, only its 
possible consequences (i.e. its potential interpretants, its meaning).
Despite the skeptical conclusion about the significance of histori­
city for the concept of representation, it does not mean that historicity 
is not essential in the formation of semiotic agents. The most 
promising feature in biosemiotics (e.g. in the dual code -theory of life) 
is how “horizontal” and “vertical”, “synchronic” and “diachronic” , 
"structural” and “dynamical” , or “developmental” and “evolutionary” 
perspectives are bound together. My suggestion is that representations 
and purposes or ends should be considered separately. Although the 
causal origins of representations are not relevant, the origins of the 
ends or purposes that are embodied in the (physical) structure of the 
object-agent and according to which those representations are 
interpreted are crucial for the object-agent. It may be most crucial
:<l However, it is much less anthropomorphic than the dyadic sign of structural
semiotics (semiology etc.).
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whether the end that an agent is pursuing is “its own” or “foreign”, 
due to the manipulation of other agents (cf., e.g., parasitic relations).
This separation, where roughly stated the future is reserved for the 
concept of representation and the past for the end or purpose, also 
points the way in which the biosemiotic approach could be extended 
to artificial systems, i.e. machines and robots. Wherever there is a 
control system, there can be said to be a representation at work. A 
mere thermometer does not yet represent anything in itself, but if it is 
connected to some heating or cooling apparatus in such a way that we 
get a thermostat, it starts to represent the temperature for the system. 
But it makes no sense to call a thermostat an agent, the goal or 
purpose of a thermostat is set from outside the system —  the purpose 
of a thermostat is not its own but that of its constructor. This applies 
both to mechanical thermostats and to the internal thermo-regulation 
systems of mammals. As hinted in footnote 12, a genuine semiotic 
agent should be able to control its purposes, it must be some kind of 
open self-organizing system so that it has at least some self-organized 
purposes “of its own”. Only after we build a robot that starts to find 
new ways of re-building itself in order to “stay alive”, have we created 
real artificial life. But should we ever build it if we could — what 
other human purposes but curiosity could such a creature ever fulfil, a 
creature whose purposes were no more in human control?
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Зачем и как натурализировать семиотические 
концепты для биосемиотики
При любой попытке развивать биосемиотику —  в качестве новой биоло­
гической т еории-основы, или в сторону метафизики  живой природы —  
нужно каким-либо образом натурализировать семиотические концепты. 
Вместо стандартного физикалистского натурализма здесь исходят из 
определенного семиотического натурализма. Натурализированное 
понятие дефинируется как понятие, которое означает только объекты 
наш его внеш него опыта. Когда семиотические концепты используются 
в биосемиотике при изучении явлений природы, возникает риск допус­
тить антропоморфистские ошибки, если семиотические концепты ос­
таются ментальными. Считается, что ошибка, вызванная антропомор- 
физацией, или “скрытая ошибка прототипа” действительно существует 
и исходит из прототипа пирсовского семиозиса, которым является 
исследовательский процесс ученого-экспериментатора. Ошибка кроется 
в концепте объекта репрезентации —  остается под вопросом, су­
ществуют ли объекты репрезентации для бактерий или соответствуют 
ли знакам ДНК какие-либо объекты. М ожно сделать вывод, что пир- 
совкие семиотические концепты можно натурализовать, но только в том 
случае, если они исходят из более примитивной концепции репрезен­
тации. Причинное происхождение репрезентаций при этом несу­
щественно, зато важны предполагаемые результаты (напр, значение).
Miks ja kuidas naturaliseerida biosemiootika 
jaoks semiootilisi kontsepte
Iga katse puhul arendada biosemiootikat —  kas kui uue b ioloogilise alus- 
teooria, või kui eluslooduse metafüüsika suunas —  on vaja mingil viisil 
naturaliseerida semiootilisi kontsepte. Standardse füsikalistliku naturalismi 
asemel lähtutakse siin teatavast sem iootilisest naturalism ist. Naturaliseeritud 
mõiste on defineeritud kui mõiste, mis tähistab üksnes objekte m eie välises 
kogemuses. Rakendades biosemiootikas sem iootilisi kontsepte loodusnäh­
tustele, peitub siin risk teha antropomorfistlikke vigu, kui sem iootilised  
kontseptid jäävad mentalistlikeks. Siinkohal arvatakse, et antropomorfisee- 
rimisest tulenev viga ehk ‘prototüübi vaijatud eksitus’ on tõesti olem as, ja see 
tuleneb Peirce’i semioosi prototüübist, milleks on eksperimentaalteadlase 
uurimisprotsess. Eksitus peitub representatsiooni objekti kontseptsioonis —  
on küsitav, kas bakteri jaoks on olemas mingeid representatsiooni objekte, või 
kas DNA-märkidele vastavad mingisugused objektid. Võib järeldada, et 
Peirce’ilikud semiootika kontseptid on küll naturaliseeritavad, kuid üksnes 
juhul, kui nad lähtuvad veelgi primitiivsemast representatsiooni kontsept­
sioonist. Representatsioonide põhjuslik päritolu ei ole siinkohal oluline, küll 
on seda aga nende poolt ennustatavad tulemid (st. tähendus).
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Abstract. This paper sketches a network of analogies reaching from linguo- 
semiotics (including theory of reference in analytical philosophy of language) 
to biosemiotics. It results in the following proportion: attributive use of  
referring expressions : referential use of referring expressions : ‘generative’ 
use of referring expressions = signifying : referring : ‘poetic pointing’ = 
‘functional’ sem iosis: ‘adaptational’ sem iosis: semiosis in the narrow sense.
Can the essence of life — or, at least, our concept of life —  be under­
stood in a semiotic framework? An obvious difficulty for such an 
enterprise seems to be the problematic character of the extension of 
the semiotic concepts outside of the realm of the human. Any talk of 
life in semiotic terms is often regarded as merely metaphorical2: 
semiosis or signs in a proper sense presuppose consciousness, that is, 
human agents.
This paper aims at suggesting that the plainly metaphorical 
character of the attribution of semiosis to life could be avoided by 
means of a network of analogies extending from within the human 
realm to life in general. First, a fragment of a theory of referring will 
be sketched, providing a distinction between uses of referring expres-
' Private address: Nelgi 34-20, 11211 Tallinn, Estonia.
However, the metaphorical character of some conception need not imply its 
inferiority. For a discussion of the constitutive role of models, analogies and metaphors 
in science see Emmeche, Hoffmeyer (1991).
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sions. Then, an analogy will be suggested, extending the form of this 
distinction to a distinction of reference from some similar linguose- 
miotic relations. And finally, the analogy will be extended to yield a 
general semiotic distinction between types of semiosis involving both 
anthropo- and biosemiotics.
Referring
In analytical philosophy of language, referring (also called denoting3) 
is usually construed as a relation4 between a linguistic expression (the 
referring expression) and an existing5 object referred to (called the 
reference of the referring expression). O f course, referring expressions 
have to be provided by a certain language.6 Further, it should be noted 
that in the relation of the referring expression and its reference, the 
first member may be construed either as a type or as a token. The 
referring expression can be regarded to be a type when its reference is 
determined plainly by its linguistic form. E.g., whenever the referring 
expression ‘2+2’ is used in the language of arithmetic, its reference is
4. In general, however, the reference of a referring expression depends 
on the context of its use. Every token (i.e., occurrence) of a referring 
expression is involved in a certain act of referring along with a certain 
use of the expression. Think about the variety of (deictic and anapho- 
rical) referring uses of the expression ‘this’ and the huge amount of 
the possible references of its tokens.
3 These terms sometimes are experienced to have different nuances of meaning, 
see footnote 8, below.
4 The nature of this relation is described as “standing for” or “picking out”.
5 The existence of an object is not clearly defined. One can speak of present 
physical existence (as of the Pope), present mental existence (as of my present thought 
that semiotics lacks enough system), past or future physical (or mental) existence (as of 
my grandparents or grandchildren), or abstract existence (as of numbers according to 
Platonist philosophy of mathematics, or meanings (senses) and concepts according to 
Frege (1892a, 1982b)). Fictional objects (like unicorns or Shakespeare’s Hamlet) 
usually are regarded as non-existent, but one also may speak of their fictional 
existence. The author of this paper holds that in an adequate theory of referring, 
referring expressions refer to objects in some model.
The linguistic resources underlying a referring expression vary. Typically, 
referring expressions are nominal phrases ( ‘my home’), proper names ( ‘Italy’) or 
pronouns ( ‘this’).
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A class of referring expressions is constituted by what Russell 
(1905) introduced as “definite descriptions”.7 A definite description is 
meant to determine its reference by specifying a condition met by 
precisely one object, which is the reference. E.g., the expression ‘the 
present President of France’ refers to the unique object being at 
present (September 7, 2001) the President of France —  a person called 
Jacques Chirac. Donnellan (1966) distinguishes between the “attribu­
tive use” and the “referential use” of definite descriptions. In the 
attributive use, the reference is strictly determined by its fitting the 
description, i.e., meeting the specifying condition. In the referential 
use, the definite description merely has to identify the reference, 
independently of its meeting the description or otherwise. Donnellan 
uses an example which goes as follows. At a party I introduce a 
person to my friend, saying “That man drinking martini is married to 
Jane” and pointing to a drinking man sitting in the corner. Now, in all 
probability, I succeed in referring to the right person even if he, in 
fact, is drinking water. So, a definite description is used to refer to its 
reference in a non-attributive way, the referential way. In another 
example by Donnellan, Mr Smith has been brutally murdered. 
“Smith’s murderer must be insane, “a woman who knew him com­
ments. Whoever murdered Smith is insane because Smith was a very 
kind man. Here the definite description ‘Smith’s murderer’ is used 
attributively. Later on, Jones is on trial, charged with Smith’s murder. 
His behaviour in the court is very queer, and people say: “Smith’s 
murderer must be insane.” Whoever the real murderer may be, here 
the expression ‘Smith’s murderer’ refers to Jones; this definite 
description is used referentially.
Attributive use and referential use are not restricted to definite 
descriptions. They also can be distinguished in the case of proper 
names. Knpke (1980: footnote 3 of the main text) gives the following 
example. Two men are watching a remote man whom they hold to be 
Jones. “What is Jones doing?” “He is raking leaves.” But in fact the 
distant man is Smith, and the name ‘Jones’ here refers to Smith. The 
name ‘Jones’ here is used referentially.8
7 Russell himself denied that definite descriptions really were involved in the 
relations of referring (“denoting”).
K Kripke opts for reserving the term ‘referring’ to the ‘attributive’ use of names (in 
this example Jones, in this use, refers to Jones, and in general, V ’s reference is x) and 
wonders if he should use the term ‘denoting’ instead.
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How general can we make the distinction between the attributive 
use and the referential use of referring expressions? Are there any 
limits in terms of the appropriate type of expressions, or again, in 
terms of what causes the possible apparent inadequacy of the referring 
expression in the case of the referential use?
The proposal of an answer to be given in this section proceeds 
from the assumption that the relation of referring relates a referring 
expression to an object in a model9 in the user of the expression or in 
the audience, and not to a “real” object.10 Then, for the definite 
descriptions the following distinctive criterion is suggested: in the 
case of a model switch (transition from one model (source model) to 
another (target model)11), in the attributive use, the reference of the 
expression in the target model is the object fitting the description12 in 
the target model; in the referential use, the reference of the expression 
in the target model is the same as in the source model.13 A model 
switch can occur both as a change in actual beliefs and as a consi­
deration of a possibility held to be counterfactual and a switch from 
one possibility to another.
Reconsider the example about Smith’s murderer. The standard 
interpretation of the attributive use (in principle shared by Donnellan
9 By a model, a stock of potential objects along with a system of potential beliefs 
about them is meant. The objects and beliefs in a model are potential in the sense that 
the objects need not be meant to be real and actual, and the “beliefs” need not be 
believed but they could be believed or “as i f ’ (fictitiously) believed. The ways objects 
may be constituted in models is precisely the subject matter of the classification of the 
uses of referring expressions.
10 An independent argument for this assumption is that such a relation lacks the 
“mystical” character of a relation between a referring expression and its “real” 
reference. Besides, this assumption renders the theory of referring less complicated and 
more natural, and unties it from metaphysical problems.
11 The typical instances of model switch are change in beliefs (some actual 
belief(s) become(s) disbeliefs) and/or vice versa) and consideration of possible worlds 
(construed as modifications of the actual world by counterfactual conditions as in 
Kripke (1980)) held to be non-actual (transition from the actual world to another 
possible world; both worlds are represented as models).
12 Target models without a unique object fitting the description are excluded in the 
attributive use.
13 Target models in which this object does not exist are excluded in the referential
use.
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(1966)14) presumes that the expression ‘Smith’s murderer’ refers to 
Smith’s actual murderer in the actual world and to Smith’s murderer 
in any possible world in which someone else (a definite person) 
murdered Smith. According to my own interpretation, in the case of 
the attributive use, “Smith’s murderer” refers to Smith’s murderer in 
any model in which a definite person murdered Smith. And in the case 
of the referential use, “Smith’s murderer” refers to a certain person 
who, in some model, murdered Smith. In Donnellan’s example, the 
model switch in the case of the attributive use must be based on the 
woman’s presumption (probably as a belief) that a definite person 
murdered Smith (otherwise she probably would not have said 
“Smith’s murderer” not mentioning that Smith could not have been 
murdered or that there could be more than one person participating in 
the murder). This presumption need not specify who the murderer is, 
and leaves room for different models based on mutually incoherent 
versions. Switching between those models shifts the reference of 
“Smith’s murderer” according to the model’s version. And in the case 
of the referential use, the model switch is based on the belief that 
Smith’s murderer is Jones. Should this belief be replaced with an 
alternative belief, a model switch would occur, not affecting the refe­
rence.
The concepts of attributive use and referential use could be 
generalized, rendering them independent of the linguistic form of the 
referring expression and reasons of model switches: independently of 
the linguistic form of the referring expression, it is used attributively if 
after a model switch its reference is meant to be the object fitting the 
description in the target model and it is used referentially if after a 
model switch its reference is meant to be the object fitting the 
description in the source model. The generality of this formulation is 
limited by the requirement that the referring expression imply a 
definite description, or in other words, specify a condition uniquely 
determining its reference.
Reconsider Kripke’s example. When two men speak about Jones 
raking leaves they have a model in which the man they are watching is 
Jones. In the case of a model switch to a model in which the man 
watched is Smith, in the target model “Jones” does not pick out the
14 Admittedly, Donnellan (1966) attributes the attributive use of definite descrip­
tions to Russell (1905), thus involving Russell’s denying of definite descriptions as 
referring expressions.
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man they are watching because he is not Jones. “Jones” is used 
referentially because after the model switch it cannot be used to refer 
to the person meant. Further, “Jones” implies a specifying condition 
because otherwise there would be no criterion for telling that the man 
watched is not Jones.15 Here we have another formulation of a general 
definition of the attributive use and the referential use of referring 
expressions: a referring expression implying a definite description is 
used attributively if it can be used to refer to the reference meant after 
any model switch with a target model in which there is precisely one 
object fitting the description, and is used referentially if there is a 
model switch with a target model in which this expression cannot be 
used to refer to the reference meant.
The attributive use and the referential use of referring expressions 
allow further interpretation: they correspond to different ways of 
identification of objects in models. The attributive use corresponds to 
a functional way of identification: the object meant is the object 
having such and such function (under the presumption of the unique­
ness of such an object). We also can say that this is a conceptual way 
of identification because the reference is determined by its concept. 
Then the model simply declares an object by its definite description. 
The referential use corresponds to a way of identification such that the 
identity of the object referred to is independent of descriptions picking 
it out in one or another model, concepts we have of it, and functions 
we mean it to fulfil. What counts is the object itself: its identity is 
borne by itself, and not by our concept of it. So in the case of the 
attributive use, the reference as an object through models is tied to a 
concept, whereas in the case of the referential use, the reference as an 
object is free from any particular concept, though in any given model 
it can be picked out by some concept.
Can an object in a model be even more independent of and free 
from the referring expression? I am going to introduce such a use of 
referring expressions —  the “generative” use. In the case of the gene­
rative use, an object in a model is introduced or “generated” or 
declared implying no definite description or specifying conception. 
Instead, the identity of the object is meant to be maintained without 
any identifying character or essential property, and it can be identified
15 Kripke (1980), in fact, deals with in proper names used referentially, but only 
regard to model switches due to transition from the actual world to possible worlds, not 
due to changes in beliefs.
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only by a “name”16. The generative use of referring expression is quite 
frequent in mathematics where often objects are introduced in such a 
way: “let A be a set consisting of a  and b ”. In a model, the elements a  
and b are created, and they are created as different though there is no 
other means of distinguishing them than their different names V  and 
‘6’.17 We also may imagine a world containing several exactly similar 
physical objects with symmetrical relations to each other. Then the 
names identifying them are used generatively. Such names need not 
have the linguistic form of a constant or of a proper name: any 
expression, in principle, may be used creatively.
So we have built a base for analogies: the attributive use, the 
referential use and the generative use of referring expressions.
Signifying, referring and beyond
Let me take the next step: constructing an analogy within linguo-
semiotics.
I proceed from the distinction between signifying and referring.18 
In signifying, the role played by models in referring, is played by 
languages. A signifying expression signifies an item in a language. So 
the signifying/referring distinction reduces to the language/model 
distinction. I am going to describe this distinction in analogy with the 
distinction between the attributive use and the referential use of 
referring expressions.
Leaving aside the communicative aspect, a language belongs to a 
signifying subject just as a model belongs to a referring subject. A 
model contains objects meant to be independent of and free from the
16 Unlike the names in Kripke (1980), these names do not imply distinctive marks 
in the actual world (neither in some possible world), as a person’s precise date and 
place of birth.
17 What if we introduce a relation R such that aRb holds, whereas bRa does not 
hold? The relation R also is introduced generatively. What beyond its name 
distinguishes it from the relation Q such that bQa holds, whereas aQb does not hold 
(for unambiguity, let aRa, bRb, aQa and bQb hold)?
Ih This distinction is not received. Sometimes what I call referring is referred to as 
signifying. My points of departure in fixing this distinction are Saussure’s (1916) use 
when he introduces the terms ‘signifier’ (significant) and ‘signified’ (signifie), the 
concept of referring in analytical philosophy of language, and my proposal to take the 
references to belong to models (above, previous section).
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linguistic form of referring to them. However, they need some 
referring expression in order to be identified. A language contains 
items meant to be tied to the linguistic forms signifying them as the 
sides of a sheet of paper or a coin are tied together (the relation 
between the signifier and the signified as described in Saussure 
(1916)).
How is the analogy structured? In distinguishing between the 
attributive use and the referential use of referring expressions, we 
referred to the degree of the tiedness of the objects referred to to the 
referring expressions. In distinguishing between the signifying relation 
and the referring relation, we compare the degree of the tiedness of the 
objects referred to their referring expressions and the degree of the 
items signified to their signifying expressions. So far, we have two 
degrees of tiedness. The first degree of tiedness is “like a sheet of 
paper”. It applies to the way signifiers are related to their signifieds 
with regard to their unconcern in extralinguistic reality, and to the way 
referring expressions used attributively are related to their references 
with regard to their unconcern in the identity of the references. The 
second degree of tiedness could be called “one-end looseness”19. It 
applies to the way referring expressions are related to their references 
with regard to their concern in extralinguistic reality accessible via 
models20, and to the way referring expressions used referentially are 
related to their references with regard to their concern in the identity 
of their references accessible via definite descriptions.
So signifying and referring stand in the same “proportion”21 as the 
attributive use and the referential use of referring expressions. To 
complete the analogy, it remains to find a linguosemiotic relation 
similar to signifying and referring and analogous to the generative use 
of referring expressions. The third degree of tiedness, characteristic of 
the generative use of referring expressions, could be called “floating 
looseness”22.
14 In the referential use, the identity of an object is tied only to its definite 
description in one model.
20 Concerning referring, extralinguistic reality is linguistically describable, that is, 
representable by models. Models are limited in that they are meant to consist of really 
or fictionally existing objects.
21 If the relation between A and В is analogous to the relation between С and D 
then we could say that A and В stand in the same proportion as С and D, or, A.B=C:D.
22 In the case of the generative use of referring expressions, the identity of an 
object referred to is not earthed by any definite description in any model.
The reference is generated along with the referring expression 
referring to it, that is, its name. Analogously, in the case of the third 
degree of tiedness between linguistic expressions and their content, 
using language is a creative activity with regard to reality. The 
linguistic expressions ‘poetically point’ to the reality being created, a 
reality not captured in models. The successive loosening of the tie 
could be illustrated by telling that, typically, signifying centres around 
words, referring centres around sentences, and poetic pointing centres 
around texts. Further specification of the relation of poetic pointing 
transcends the limits of this article. However, following the leading 
idea of this article, new concepts can be introduced by means of 
analogy, placing them into blanks in proportions. So, poetic pointing 
could be introduced as the missing member x  in the proportion:
attributive use : referential use : generative use = signifying : referring : x.
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Life
Now we are approaching the central concern of this article: how can 
life be understood in a semiotic framework? Let me start from the 
conclusion: two types of biosemiosis are related to anthroposemiosis 
as the first, the second and the third members of our proportion.
How is floating looseness characteristic of the human realm? All 
anthroposemiotic means, including languages and models, belong to 
humans in a peculiar way. They depend on being maintained by 
humans, having no independent existence. They are untied from the 
humans’ physical existence. I call the types of semiosis corresponding 
to one-sided looseness and to “like a sheet of paper”, adaptational 
semiosis and functional semiosis. The life of the subject of adapta­
tional semiosis (the adaptational subject) is constituted by its efforts to 
survive. It adapts itself to its environment by changing its properties. 
Its properties constitute a “natural model” (in contrast of the model 
proper, not reducible to properties, as described above in the context 
of referring). The life of the subject of functional semiosis is 
constituted by functional circles (Uexküll 1973, 1980, 1982, 1992).23
23 For my interpretation of the functional circle see Luure (2001).
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It has no properties it can change, and so all meanings belong to its 
life as its reverse side.
The functions fulfilled by semiotic, non-bodily “expressions” 
belong to properties in the case of the adaptational subject and to parts 
(a reverse side is a part) in the case of the functional subject. 
Functioning and adaptation are aspects of life, also belonging to 
humans. Therefore, in a broader sense, these biosemiotic functions 
also belong to anthroposemiotics, the proportion “functioning : 
adaptation : expression” being part of the anthroposemiotic network of 
analogies.
Concluding comments
After suggesting this network of analogies I would like to sketch its 
further connections.
The nodes of the proportions here have the metaphorical names 
“like a sheet of paper”, “one-ended looseness” and “floating loose­
ness” . Perhaps no straightforward unambigous formulation can be 
given to them, and perhaps their logical foundations coincides with 
that of Peirce’s (1998) categories of Firstness, Secondness and Third­
ness. They stand in proportion with Type One, Type Two and Type 
Three in Luure (2001) where the number of nodes is extended to six.
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К понимаю жизни: транссемиотические аналогии
В статье начертана сеть аналогий, простирающаяся от лингвосемиотики 
(включая теорию референции в аналитической философии языка) до  
биосемиотики. Получается следующая пропорция: атрибутивное 
употребление референтных выражений: референциальное употребление 
референтных выражений : “генеративное” употребление референтных 
выражений = означение (сигнификация) : референция :“поэтическое 
указывание” = “функциональный семиозис”: “адаптационный 
семиозис”: семиозис в узком смысле.
Elu mõistmise poole: transsemiootilised analoogiad
Artikkel visandab analoogiate võrgustiku, mis ulatub lingvosemiootikast 
(sealhulgas osutusteooriast analüütilises keelefilosoofias) biosemiootikasse. 
Tulemuseks on järgmine proportsioon: osutavate väljendite atributiivne 
kasutus : osutavate väljendite referentsiaalne kasutus : osutavate väljendite 
“generatiivne” kasutus = tähistamine (signifitseerimine) : osutamine : 
"poeetiline viitamine” = “funktsionaalne semioos” : “adaptatsiooniline 
semioos” : semioos kitsas mõttes.
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A sign is not alive — a text is
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Abstract. The article deals with the relationships between the concepts o f life 
process and sign process, arguing against the simplified equation o f these 
concepts. Assuming that organism (and its particular case —  cell) is the 
carrier of what is called ‘life’, we attempt to find a correspondent notion in 
semiotics that can be equalled to the feature of being alive. A candidate for 
this is the textual process as a multiple sign action. Considering that biological 
texts are generally non-linguistic, the concept of biotext should be used 
instead of ‘text’ in biology.
If we put together many branches and great 
quantity of leaves, we still cannot under­
stand the forest. But if  we know how to walk 
through the forest o f culture with our eyes 
open, confidently following the numerous 
paths which criss-cross it, not only shall we 
be able to understand better the vastness 
and complexity o f the forest, but we shall 
also be able to discover the nature o f the 
leaves and branches o f everyr single tree.
U. Eco (1990: xiii)
In this note I would like to pay attention to the importance of non­
oversimplification in applications of semiotic concepts in biology. 
This infers from the threshold of the type of diversity (the categorised
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diversity) that the contemporary biology describes as characteristic to 
all living systems.
There is not only Floyd Merrell, who has written about “the Life ~ 
Signs equation” (Merrell 1996: 315n l).! Particularly in that part of 
semiotics which is strongly influenced by Peircean ideas, the 
expressions like ‘living signs’ have become quite frequent in recent 
years. Another factor behind these claims is the influence of bio­
semiotic studies, including its basic assumption that semiosis and life 
are coextensive.2 That the issue is not of secondary importance for 
semiotics, is evident from Thomas A. Sebeok’s statements:
I postulate that two cardinal and reciprocal axioms of semiotics —  subject, as 
always, to falsication —  are: (la ) The criterial mark of all life is semiosis; and 
(lb ) Semiosis presupposes life. [ ...]  Further semiosic unfoldings —  such as 
the genesis o f ordered oppositions like self/other, inside/outside, and so 
forth —  derive from, or are corollaries of, the above pair of universal laws. 
(Sebeok 2001: 10-11)
The idea about the identity of life and semiosis, no doubt, has been a 
productive core hypothesis, considerably assisting in the attempts to 
find a correspondence between biology and semiotics. In a more 
detailed analysis, a question arises, whether biology itself can learn 
anything from these ideas; e.g., whether it may be possible to give a 
more profound description to the concept of life using its semiotic 
features.
The claims above can be easily interpreted as if a sign, being an 
element of life, is itself alive. Still, one has to keep in mind that the 
problem of elements in sign science is very different from the problem 
of elements in chemistry.
A discussion about the relationship between the concepts of ‘life’ 
and ‘sign’ is complicated due to the fuzziness of the ‘life’ concept 
altogether. A collection of life definitions provided by Barbieri (2001: 
235-242) perfectly demonstrates the diversity of these definitions. 
However, the problem is inescapable for biology, and I suggest that a 
semiotic approach will be very helpful in achieving a more clear 
understanding (if not a solution) of it.
1 See also Merrell 1992, 1994, 1998, 1999.
2 See Deely 1992 on a discussion of this statement.
3 The problem of defining life as a semiotic phenomenon has been extensively 
analysed by Emmeche (1998, 2000).
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Biotext
Sign, however an absolutely necessary element of any semiotic 
system, still cannot be taken as a fundamental semiotic unit, because 
sign cannot exist as a single sign —  sign is always a part of a bigger 
system, sign is always accompanied by another sign(s). This is not 
because signs always just happen to be placed not far from each other 
and in multitude, but because it belongs to the very nature of sign to 
be ‘a part o f ,  to be a meron,4 At least in some traditions in semiotics, 
this bigger system can be called ‘text’.
Comparing the above statement (that sign cannot exist as a single 
sign), by analogy, to a biological key idea that the minimal living unit 
is cell, one may conclude that the same should be applicable here —  
‘cell cannot exist as a single cell’. However, this comparison is not 
exact, and not true. Because, the cell, on the one hand, being “the 
simplest entity to possess real semiotic competence” (Hoffmeyer 
1997: 940), on the other hand always includes a whole multitude of 
signs.
This contradiction can be solved if to speak on ‘semiosis’ instead 
of ‘sign’ (as actually is the case in most biosemiotic writings): cell is a 
minimal semiosic unit.5
Semiosis is — according to its common definition —  the action of 
signs, the sign process. “According to Peirce, semiose is a continuous 
process that is based on the interpretation of one sign through another. 
Jakobson described this process as translation” (Krampen et al. 1987: 
244). Since semiosis is not an action of just one sign, since semiosis 
involves always a multitude of signs, it is a textual process like 
translation is. In this way, it has to be concluded that semiosis is not 
an action of a sign, but an action of signs, and accordingly a more 
complex structure than that of a single sign has to be present in a 
simplest semiosic system. If to call this text, one should consider that
4 On the biological interpretation of this statement, see Kull 2000, Emmeche 2002.
This, again, raises the problem of intracellular semiosis in prokaryotes. If a 
closure is required for the minimal semiosic unit, then we still can speak about its 
parts, merons (and, accordingly, signs), but without a possibility to add a lower level of 
semiosis. Prokaryotic cell is a minimal organism. In such an interpretation, we can 
even find a fit to Lotman’s view that sign communication assumes the impenetrable 
elements for which the physical contact becomes insufficient (Lotman 1984: 216).
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it may be a non-linguistic text, and therefore it is more proper to call it 
a biotext.
If so, then the following conclusion becomes necessary —  the 
basic semiosic unit is biotext. Each text is a composition of signs, 
however, signs are nothing more than functional parts of text that 
cannot exist without or outside a text.
This can be seen as a reference to a contradiction between the 
Peircean (or American) and Saussurean (or French, or European) 
traditions in the development of semiotics throughout the last century. 
This is a contradiction between ‘sign semiotics’ and ‘text semiotics’ 
(M. Lotman, 2002).
W hether ‘text’ is a proper term in this status, is of course discuss­
able, because a common interpretation of this term assigns to text the 
stability, linearity, and fixity. However, e.g., J. Lotman’s usage of the 
term is much more general when he writes, for instance, about “iconic 
(spatial, non-discrete) texts” (Lotman 1990: 77).
Sign becomes a meaningful entity only due to its relationship to a 
sign process, semiosis. Accordingly and analogously, text can be seen 
as a semiotic entity only if a textual process is considered — a text 
interpretation, a translation in any of its forms.
Thus, in analogy with the term ‘semiosis’ for sign process, we 
seem to require a term for text process. On the one hand, this may be a 
false conclusion, because semiosis always assumes the participation of 
number of signs, semiosis already is a textual (s. I.) process. If single 
signs can be distinguished, then, in contrary, semiosis never concerns 
only a single sign. Therefore, it seems that there is no need for an 
additional term. On the other hand, it is possible to distinguish 
between semiosis that occurs in particular parts of a text, and the 
semiosis of the whole text. This is the process in which the whole text, 
including its multiple codes and levels, in toto, interprets itself. The 
whole text process, or total interpretation (or perhaps total translation, 
according to Torop 1995), is what also occurs, for instance, when a 
new organism is bom. ‘Giving birth’ means that a complete set of 
conditions and patterns is created ( ‘transferred’) that guarantees the 
independent life for a new organism. This is the same as in case of 
total translation, when the life of a text can be transferred into the life 
of a new text. Quite often, the term semiosis has been used in so 
general meaning that the total text interpretation has also been termed 
with it. However, it seems to be reasonable —  in order to leave less
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place for misunderstandings —  to distinguish between semiosis as an 
‘organ’ process,6 and ‘something else’ as an ‘organism’ process. This 
‘something else’ being equal to —  life.
A comparison between the concepts of biological function and sign 
action (Emmeche 2002) demonstrates that the functional differen­
tiation within a self-referential system is equivalent to the appearance 
of signs. This is because the functional differentiation means the 
existence of other-reference. Moreover, “it is the stable integration of 
self-reference and other-reference which establishes the minimum 
requirement for an umwelt and thereby sets living systems apart form 
all their non-living predecessors” (Hoffmeyer 1999: 156). Without 
functional differentiation there is no signs (like Lotman expresses it —  
in case of identical partners, there is nothing to communicate about). 
Therefore it is reasonable to say that an organism is always a biotext.
Speaking in this way on semiosis of biotexts, it leads to at least an 
interesting research program to apply the concepts and tools of holistic 
biology in text analysis. Several notions, like, e.g., archetype, 
homology, analogy, etc., are already in use in both areas.
Organism as a self-interpreting biotext
In case of single (simple) tokens, their recognition is based primarily 
on the existing categories an interpreting system possesses for signs. 
Therefore, a token is recognised as a representative of a category, and 
accordingly, its individuality becomes lost in transmission. Categori­
sation is a phenomenon that is always accompanying sign processes; it 
is a precondition of the existence of codes.7
In case of compound tokens, their recognition is also a compound 
process. The particular combination of the element signs in the 
compound token may be unique, therefore the recognition process can 
also leave a unique trace.
Since compound token is not the same as a set of signs, one has to 
ask what turns it into one sign. Another aspect of the nature of the 
compound signs is that there is more than simply a recognition that 
occurs in the compound sign interpretation.
It becomes interesting to note here that if there is a correspondence between 
‘sign’ and ‘biological function’, then ‘organs’ can be seen as ‘categories’.
7 On the role of categorization, see also Stjernfelt 1992.
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A remarkable idea of Jakob von Uexkiill concerns the distinction 
between the two kinds of signs —  M erkzeichen and Wirkzeichen.s The 
former ones are related to perceptual categories, whereas for the latter 
ones the operational (effectual), or motor categorisation takes place. A 
code between perceptual and operational categories makes it possible 
for a compound sign to become one whole sign. This occurs if several 
perceptual categories converge in one operational category. A similar 
idea has been proposed by Gerald Edelman by his concept of senso- 
motor categorisation. Mechanism like this means that a principal 
difference is achieved from just an automatic response to certain 
factor in environment —  this is an ability to recognise individuality. It 
is a process of interpretation, which, as we saw, requires more than a 
single sign process —  it deals with text (Kull 1998).
Operational categories are the categories of behavioural acts, of 
body movements, etc. In case of humans, the operational categories 
can be those of spoken words.
Due to the complex inner structure of organism, consisting in a 
large number of cells and many tissues, all being in a communicative 
relationship, there can be the perception-operation cycles that are 
entirely embedded in the body. This means, inside the body a 
sequence of perception-operation-perception-operation may include 
several sequential systems of communication. Accordingly, several 
levels of categories and categorisation can be developed between the 
perceptual and the effectual ones. Which means the development of 
internal texts, the models.
Biosemiotics means biology
It is appropriate to remind here few form ulations by T. A. Sebeok.
The aim of biosemiotics is to extend the notions of general semiotics to 
encompass the study of semiosis and modeling in all species. The premise 
which guides biosemiotics is, in fact, that the forms produced by a specific 
species are constrained by the modeling system(s) which has evolved from its 
anatomical constitution. The aim of biosemiotics is to study not only the 
species belonging to one of the five kingdoms, Monera, Protoctista, Animalia,
8 Uexkiill 1928. It should be mentioned that Uexkiill’s terms like ‘Empfindungs­
gruppe’, 'Gegenstandkerne’, etc. (e.g., Uexkiill 1907) can be put into correspondence 
to ‘categories’ in our sense.
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Plantae, and Fungi, but also to their hierarchically developed component 
parts, beginning with the cell, the minimal semiosic unit. [...] In a phrase, the 
target of biosemiotics is the semiosic behavior of all living things. (Sebeok, 
Danesi 2000: 15)
The basic claim of Sebeok, that the semiosic phenomena begin with 
the first cell, is certainly consistent with the view of many biologists 
that cell is the elementary unit of being alive —  a fundamental state­
ment in biology since mid 19th century. This also means that the 
simplest mechanism of sign can be found in a system which has at 
least the complexity of living cell.9
The next statement above says that the sign relationship, which is 
constituted by a modeling system, evolves from the anatomical 
constitution of cellular life. I would state it more broadly, using the 
term morphology instead of anatomy —  the morphological units of 
living systems are semiosic.
In order to understand the nature of organic forms, we need to 
consider that these forms are very weird if we would like to get them 
from the mixing of non-living particles. A key to decipher the 
diversity of organic forms, both the inter-organismal and intra-orga- 
nismal, is (according to a biosemiotic approach) to look at these as 
communicative forms, as the forms which are a result of catego­
risation, of various types. Then, for instance, biological species appear 
as categories in inter-organismal semiosis, and tissues as categories of 
intercellular communication within a multicellular organism. These 
principal objects of biological research being semiosic in their nature, 
we have to conclude that whole biology unavoidably becomes 
influenced by the understanding of semiosis.
When looking at biology as a whole, we can recognise a meta- 
semiosic process in it, as represented in Fig. 1 via two capacious 
triads. It shows morphology and biological systematics as dealing with 
main intra-organismic and inter-organismic communicative structures, 
or categories, respectively. Physiology and ecology represent the 
synchronic, developmental biology and evolutionary biology the 
diachronic dimensions. However, of course, these can be interpreted 
also as the three dimensions of sign in the Peircean sense. Or, as a 
great chain of semiosis with alternating endosemiotic and exosemiotic 
steps.
9 For an analysis of this statement see Emmeche 2000.
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ecology evolutionary
biology
systematics
taxonomy
physiology developm ental
biology
morphology
meronomy
Figure 1. A metasemiosic structure of biology, with endosemiotic (left) and 
exosemiotic (right) domains.
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Знак не живой. Текст — живой
В статье анализируется соотношение жизненного и знакового процессов, 
при этом подвергается критике их простое приравнивание. Исходя из 
положения, что организм (и его простейшая разновидность —  клетка) 
является носителем качества, называемого “жизнь”, в статье предприни­
мается попытка найти семиотическое соответствие свойству быть живым. 
Кандидатом на роль такого соответствия может быть текстуальный 
процесс как знак. Учитывая нелингвистичность биологических текстов, в 
биологии можно было бы заменить понятие “текст” на “биотекст”.
Märk ei ole elus. Tekst küll
Artiklis analüüsitakse eluprotsessi ja  märgiprotsessi mõistete vahekorda, kriti­
seerides nende lihtsat võrdsustamist. Eeldades, et organism (ja selle lihtsaim 
erijuht —  rakk) on ‘eluks’ nimetatava kvaliteedi kandja, püütakse leida 
sem iootilist vastet, mis oleks võrdsustatav elusolem ise omadusega. Sellise 
vaste kandidaadiks võib olla tekstuaalne protsess kui mitmene märk. Silmas 
pidades bioloogiliste tekstide mittelingvistilisust, tuleks bioloogias kasutada 
bioteksti mõistet teksti asemel.
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Tractatus Hoffmeyerensis: 
Biosemiotics as expressed 
in 22 basic hypotheses
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Abstract. This paper briefly outlines the main ideas o f biosemiotics in 22 
hypotheses, with special regards to the version of it claimed by Jesper 
Hoffmeyer.
In honour ofT. Sebeok (1920-2001)
In this paper,1 I shall attempt to summarize the basic ideas of the 
nascent science of biosemiotics in 22 brief statements. Generally, it is 
based on ideas circulating in the biosemiotic community,2 but with 
special reference to the version developed by the biochemist and 
semiotician Jesper Hoffmeyer, the founder of the Copenhagen school 
of biosemiotics. Still, the position presented here does not hesitate to 
draw conclusions and involve corollaries not explicitly stated by 
Hoffmeyer, in which he might not agree. In so far, the hypotheses are 
the author’s responsibility — they should be seen as a vademecum of 
a Hoffmeyerian biosemiotics, according to me.
1) Signs and life are coextensive.3
' The article is a tribute to Jesper Hoffmeyer’s 60th birthday February 21st 2002.
: On the history of biosemiotics, see Kull 1999.
3 This idea is of course the core idea of biosemiotics and has been forcefully 
claimed by Thomas Sebeok, cf. e.g. “... semiosis is at the heart of life ...” (Sebeok
2) As biology is a historical science (maybe even the historical 
science par excellence), (1) calls for a natural history of meaning4.
3) As biology is a structural science (maybe even the structural 
science par excellence), (1) calls for an inventory of biology’s struc­
tural concepts.5
4) If we accept punctuated equilibrium as a basic structure in 
biological evolution,6 we should expect the semiotic evolution to 
follow the same structure, hence displaying a ladder of increasingly 
complex sign types.
5) The basic forms of biological signs are those exchanged 
between the organism and its environment, its Umwelt, in an Uexkiill 
functional circle, Wirkzeichen and Merkzeichen respectively.7
6) The umwelt, in sufficiently complex life forms, is not gene­
tically determined through and through, but must be formed in the 
individual case selecting paths in its own chreod landscape under 
impression of the interaction with the particular surroundings.
7) Such an experience-based umwelt makes possible genetic assi­
milation (Waddington), because individuals with better genetic bases 
for coping with the particular surroundings will have a selection ad­
vantage. This so-called Baldwin effect will be especially efficacious in 
social animals where one individual may learn such umwelt compe­
tences from others.9 Thus the species’ virtual reality as represented by 
its umwelt’s set of inner representations of typical, merely potential
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1991: 85), “semiosis is the criterial attribute of life” (Sebeok 1991a: 124), or “semiosis 
presupposes life” (Sebeok 2001).
4 Hoffmeyer draws this conclusion in his 1992 and takes it further in his 2001b.
5 Biology thus forms a crucial part of the “structural ontology” claimed by Jean 
Petitot (e.g., 1992). I have myself (1999) tried to sketch a network of those concepts.
6 This premiss rests, of course, upon Stephen Jay Gould’s concept of punctuated 
equilibrium (Gould 1972).
7 This idea in Uexkiill (1928, 1982) has formed a core idea in biosemiotics and is 
widely discussed in a special issue of Semiotica (ed. K. Kull), 134(1/4) (2001), 
including Hoffmeyer 2001.
8 Hoffmeyer gives this idea in (2001: 388) in a Waddingtonian conceptual appa­
ratus: the Umwelt is taken to be constructed ontogenetically in a chreod of branching 
possibilities formally analogous and correlated to that proposed by Waddington to 
explain the epigenesis of the organism.
9 The Baldwin effect is nicknamed after the American psychologist J. M. Baldwin 
(1902) who pointed out such a non-Lamarckian mechanism for inheritance of acquired 
properties. Deacon (1997) takes up the idea and applies it to the proposed co-evolution 
of language and brain in early hominids.
relations in the organism’s surroundings, may become genetic 
reality — “only the well-prepared will profit from chance”.10
8) Generally, any new such habit taken exposes the organism to 
new challenges in a never-ending chain of interpretations.11
9) The role of selection remains decisive, but basic biological 
phenomena like multiplication12 as well as order13 are prerequisites to 
selection and hence cannot be products of it. Multiplication and order 
are inherently meaningful.
10) Both are thus more primitive than genes and pertain to the ana­
logous side of the organism’s double code (which is a not so lucky 
expression as only the former of them is really, strictly speaking, a 
code): digital, genetic information on the one hand, and analogical, 
morphological information on the other, provided by the cell’s archi­
tecture and metabolism as well as multicellular structure and commu- 
nication.
11) Another prerequisite to the functional circle is organism’s 
character as an agency equipped with a point-of-view. This may be 
defined as a “stable integration of self-reference and other-refe- 
rence”15 (the former maintaining and defining the self as such; the 
latter facilitating its orientation and survival in its umwelt).
12) Agency presupposes, in turn, the existence of an inside-outside 
defining boundary, a membrane, characterizing all life forms (except 
for certain marginal parasite types like virus). Membranes thus make 
possible the crucial organism-environment asymmetry — facilitating 
the constrained traffic across the membrane boundary in the form of 
signs.16 Autocatalytic closure of chemical reaction loops in the pri­
mordial soup17 thus needs a further topological membrane closing in 
order to result in organisms. The controlled traffic across the membra­
ne permits the emergence of strictly constrained “inner outsides” (due 
to perception in a broad sense of the word) in the organism as well as
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10 Hoffmeyer 2001; Pasteur’s bonmot is quoted from p. 393.
" Hypothesis (8) is a slightly abbreviated Hoffmeyer quote (from 2001: 392).
I:> Hoffmeyer (1999: 332), referring to Rod Swenson (1999).
13 The argument that self-organized order is logically anterior to selection is made 
by Kauffman, e.g. 2000.
14 Hoffmeyer, Emmeche 1991.
15 Hoffmeyer 1999: 332.
16 Hoffmeyer 1999: 333-336; 1998; 2001.
17 Kauffman 2000.
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“outer insides” (due to its interaction with and influence on specific 
aspects of the environment).
13) Such signs embed the organism in its ecological umwelt 
comprising other organisms with umweiten. A mutualism much more 
widespread than strict symbiosis18 thus forms what Uexküll calls “a 
natural symphony” of mutual communication between species as well 
as between them and their surroundings.
14) Such communication necessarily involves, for economy rea­
sons, categorical perception. Slightly different phenomena are functio­
nally perceived as being the same type.19 This is probably the lowest 
or simplest semiotic phenomenon, based on the differently shaped 
“active sites” on the outside of macromolecules, which may be recog­
nized by these sites on other molecules.20 By the same token, other 
molecules with the same sites may “fool” the process in question. This 
is the biochemical foundation of biological indeterminacy or semiotic 
freedom, but it requires a cyclical teleological (functional, final, 
purposeful, metabolic, homeostatic, or whatever predicate you prefer) 
process in order to display its possibilities.21
15) Biology is thus impossible without the Aristotelian quartet of 
causes.22 Final causes should not, however, be identified with 
purposes (which form a special subset of them), but should be 
identified as all processes which are attracted by a future state. 
Future states being general only (Peirce), final causes may make use 
of representation of such states by means of types.
16) As we only know rather complicated life forms (cells internally 
consisting of organelles which are probably formerly symbiotically 
living organisms), these primitive semiotic processes also characterize 
the cell’s internal metabolism.24
18 Hoffmeyer 1999: 123-125.
19 Stjernfelt 2001.
20 Prodi 1988, Stjernfelt 1992.
21 Cf. the “metabolic” tradition in biology emphasizing the importance of cyclic 
metabolisms, running from Kant (organisms as circles on the causal chain), via 
Uexküll (functional circle) to Kauffman (metabolism defined by thermodynamic work
cycles).
22 Cf. the argument for the importance of the formal cause (cyclic formal causes 
including final causes) in Thom 1989.
23 The idea is Peirce’s, cf. Hoffmeyer 2002.
24 Cf. Sebeok’s neologism “endosemiotics”.
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17) The role of the genes seems to be that of controlling epigenetic 
and metabolic processes in the organism (not that of creating or 
determining them through and through). This points to the fact that 
genes may be a special and successful example of a more general 
notion of “scaffolding”,25 that is, stabilization and channelling of 
(a segment of) metabolism. Other such scaffoldings could be cell 
architecture, organ structure, language, writing...
18) At the upper end of the natural history of meaning we find 
animals with central nervous systems which have taken the bases of 
meaning in categorical perception to form very complex semiotic 
abilities. The increasing indeterminacy — or, semiotic freedom26 — 
can be expressed as the emergence of sign types increasingly loosened 
from their basis in particular sign tokens. Higher animals may not only 
recognize tokens as instantiation of types, they may make use of these 
types to symbolize, to reason, argue, use diagrams. Probably, the 
special human privilege is abstraction, making it possible for us to 
make explicit and contemplate such types, reasonings, diagrams with 
any particular token placed in brackets and thus facilitating control, 
experiment, and quick development of these signs.27
19) Biosemiotics thus assumes a distinction between the issue of 
signs and that of consciousness. Sign process are taken to be possible 
without consciousness, and as the existence of signs may be inferred 
from the external behaviour of a process, the establishment of qualia 
consciousness in a system has — not yet, that is — any methodology.
It seems to be a tendency, though, that complex signification proces­
ses are increasingly facilitated by consciousness, maybe as a special 
type of neural scaffolding.
20) The interrelated web of biosemiotic concepts used here — 
membrane, sign, active site, function, metabolism, organism, umwelt, 
niche, and so on — forms a regional ontology (Husserl) of biology and 
semiotics,28 and any biology, even the most would-be reductionist
"5 Hoffmeyer’s notion, cf. Hoffmeyer 2001.
6 Hoffmeyer uses both terms, cf. 1999: 338; 1992.
27 Deacon (1997) sees symbols as the human semiotic privilege; Stjernfelt (2001) 
proposes a specific subclass of symbols: abstractions.
28 The idea of regional ontologies is first proposed by Husserl in the 3rd Logical 
Investigation (1980). Barry Smith has taken this as a basis for a general “fallibilistic 
apriorism” finding the ontological foundations in all special empirical sciences (1996), 
and has made explicit aspects of the ontology of umwelt and niche concepts in general 
(1998a; 1998b; 2001).
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versions, must willy-nilly make use of some versions or other of them." 
Such concepts provide the structural inventory called for in (3).
21) Biosemiotics does not entail vitalism, as it does not suppose 
the existence of elan vital, unknown organic force fields or the like. 
Neither does it entail any kind of subjectivism or relativism; even if 
every single organism and species has got its own point-of-view, this 
does not entail scepticism as those points-of-view may be compared 
and evaluated. Rather, biosemiotics entails idealism in a certain use of 
the word — not referring to the world being created by a subject or 
anything of the kind, but referring to the reality of ideal objects (like 
those conceptual networks of (20)). A special kind of ideal object here 
deserves mentioning, that of possibilities. Possibilities must assumed 
to possess real existence, including the idea of a fitness space of all 
possible genomes,30 the idea of virtuality in nature,31 the idea of 
tendencies in development and evolution, and, correlatively, the 
possibility for final causes to prefer one tendency over another. Thus, 
biosemiotics entails an ontological revolution admitting the indispens­
able role of ideality in this strict sense in the sciences.
22) To close the biosemiotic circle: real possibilities are also what 
make signs possible: any sufficiently complicated sign refers to a
29
29 This goes against the argument of T0nnessen (2001) which claims that universal 
concepts of biology is impossible, because we could imagine forms of life completely 
different from the ones we know. This fallacy is so widespread that it must be co­
untered here. It has exactly the same form as the argument against cultural universals: 
“we could imagine cultures which were completely different from ours”. The fault lies 
in the word “completely”: if a thing differs completely from another, we do not know 
anything about it at all. Consequently, we do not know if it is a life form, a culture, or 
something else. The argument thus boils down to the idea that we can imagine 
something that we can not imagine. But this cannot form the basis of an argument. Any 
argument against this list must be based on empirical (actually existing life) ob­
servations or on a priori reasoning (using the concepts). Thus, any imaginable biology 
will use the concepts listed here. There may exist life forms very different from what 
we know, and they will probably enrich the list and give rise to a sophistication of it.
30 Kauffman 2000, cf. his concept of “adjacent possible” of a system, that is, the 
sum of states which at any time t is at a distance of one chemical reaction from the 
actual state. Kauffman’s adventurous idea (and candidate to a 4th law of thermo­
dynamics) is that the biosphere invades this “adjacent possible” with maximum speed, 
thus at any instant covering more and more real possibilities.
31 Hoffmeyer 2001a.
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bundle of merely possible actual objects later in a functional circle,32 
that is, to a possibility, sometimes real, sometimes not.
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Tractatus Hoffmeyerensis:
Biosemiootika väljendatuna 22 alushüpoteesi kaudu
Artikkel esitab biosemiootika põhiideed 22 hüpoteesi kaudu, tuginedes ee l­
kõige Jesper Hoffmeyeri töödele.
Tractatus Hoffmeyerensis:
Основы биосемиотики в 22 гипотезах
Статья излагает основы биосемиотики в 22 основных гипотезах, кото­
рые опираются, в основном, на работы Еспера Хоффмейера.
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Habit formation as symmetry breaking 
in the early universe
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Abstract. This paper tries to combine Peirce’s cosmology and metaphysics 
with current understanding in physics of the evolution of the universe, 
regarded as an ongoing semiotic process in a living cosmos. While the basic 
property of Life is viewed as an unexplainable Firstness inherent in the initial 
iconic state of the vacuous continuum we shall consider and exemplify two 
sign developing processes: (a) the transition from icon to index is considered 
as a symmetry breaking emergence o f order actualising one among the possi­
bilities of the iconic vacuum; (b) the transition from index to symbol, regarded 
as a habit formation — an adaptation of the surroundings to the order that has 
emerged. While the iconic state is characterized by fractal self-similarity the 
transitions to index and symbol are modelled by the mean field theory o f 
second order phase transitions.
1. Prebiotic life?
Normally, in biology, the concept of life is considered a property of 
organisms. E.g., the recent discussion of life on Mars is based upon 
findings in meteorites from Mars of certain Iron compounds that are 
known to be formed by the metabolic activities of bacteria known 
from Earth. Thus, signs of life are identified with traces of organisms. 
It is also clear from current understanding of physical cosmology that 
the universe has evolved through a long period before even the pre­
sently known chemical elements were formed, — much less orga-
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nisms. So, speaking of prebiotic (i.e. pre-organismic) life may seem 
like a contradiction in terms. However, trying to put a definite mark 
on the time-axis saying life begins at this point, e.g. where we find the 
first traces of prokaryotic cells, the basic building blocks of life, will 
immediately lead to conceptual difficulties. Clearly, such a cut in time 
can be nothing like a mathematical Dedekind-cut separating the one­
dimensional continuum of time in two disjunct sets. If life starts at 
time t there must have been some sort of prebiotic life acting at time t 
minus epsilon. The first eukaryotic cell was preceded by a (in fact, 
very long) period of prokaryotic life. A period of trials and errors 
finally succeeding in making the crucial inventions leading to 
eukaryotic cells (such as the symbiotic inclusion of prokaryotic units 
like mitochondria). But the prokaryotic cells are also organisms, and, 
hence, living entities. So, what we have, tentatively, marked as the 
beginning of life turns out to be a later state in the evolution of 
organisms from inorganic matter. The same difficulty will turn up 
however we try to define the beginning, unless we push it as far back 
as to the initial cosmic event where matter and time is bom.
In this paper I want to discuss the pre-biotic (pre-organismic) state 
of the universe in terms of Peircean semiotics and metaphysics. This 
implies that the narrow, dualistic distinction of existence vs. non­
existence (of life) has to be replaced with the wider framework of 
Peirce’s three ontological categories:
1: possibility, being 
2: actuality, existence 
3: generality, reality.
In this connection the first category is especially important because it 
allows us to consider life as an internal quality o f matter, endowed 
with being, although it has no external, organismic manifestations and 
no individual existence, like chance, that also belongs to the first 
category. Similarly, Edwina Taborsky (2002) considers energy as a 
firstness that manifests itself only when it is encoded as mass. So, the 
viewpoint is that an organism is an encoded form o f life, just like mass 
(e.g. an atom) is an encoded form o f energy.1
1 Thanks to Edwina Taborsky, who, in a private discussion, agreed with this 
formulation.
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2. Tohu Bohu, and the continuum of possibilities
Trying to understand life as a Peircean Firstness is no explanation, for 
firstness is the category that cannot be explained, only explained 
away, i.e. as soon as we try to describe it in positive terms we are 
already speaking about second- and thirdnesses. We may say that life 
is an internal quality of matter and think, e.g., of the silent life of 
mitochondria in body cells, but in doing so we presume that these 
internal organs posses the same inner quality of “extended living 
feeling” (CP 6.143). The problem is, then, that although pure firstness 
is utterly undefineable, every account in Peircean terms of the natural 
history of semiosis has to depart from there. Quoting Peirce (Letter to 
Christine Ladd-Franklin, August 29, 1891):
I may mention that my chief avocation in the last ten years has been to 
develop my cosmology.This theory is that the evolution o f the world is 
hyperbolic, that is, proceeds from one state of things in the infinite past, to a 
different state of things in the infinite future. The state o f things in the infinite 
past is chaos, tohu bohu, the nothingness of which consists in the total absence 
of regularity. The state of things in the infinite future is death, the nothingness 
of which consists in the complete triumph of law and absence o f all 
spontaneity. Between these, we have on our side a state o f things in which 
there is some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some degree o f  
conformity to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to the growth of 
habit. The tendency to form habits or tendency to generalize, is something 
which grows by its own action, by the habit of taking habits itself growing. Its 
first germs arose from pure chance. There were slight tendencies to obey rules 
that had been followed, and these tendencies were rules which were more and 
more obeyed by their own action. There were also slight tendencies to do 
otherwise than previously, and these destroyed themselves. To be sure, they 
would sometimes be strengthened by the opposite tendency, but the stronger 
they became the more they would tend to destroy themselves. As to the part of 
time on the further side of eternity which leads back from the infinite future to 
the infinite past, it evidently proceeds by contraries. (CP 8.317)
The state of TOHU BOHU — (a Hebrew concept) can thus be con­
sidered as an unlimited sea of unactualized possibilities, — virtual 
fluctuations, or a “zero collection” of potential properties of the origi­
nal vacuum. But the vacuum is not a pure firstness (not 1-1, firstness 
as firstness, but rather 3-1, thirdness as firstness, as Taborsky2 puts it,
2 See the fn. 1; also Taborsky 2002, and Peirce (CP 1.366 and 1:473).
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because it involves the continuum). A comment by the leading expert 
on Peirce’s philosophy of continuity, Hilary Putnam, will elucidate 
this. Putnam wrote3:
Dear Ken,
Peirce’s point, as I read it, is that in the continuum of pure possibilities, 
Secondness, that which resists —  here, actuality or ‘existence’ as opposed to 
possibility —  stands out as a discontinuity. If this is right, then the point is to 
contrast existence with the continuum of possibilities, and not Secondness 
with Firstness and Thirdness.
(A pure unactualized possibility has no ‘quality’, and is thus not a First, 
although the continuum of possibilities is an instance of Thirdness par 
excellence.) If this is right, the zero collection cannot be a First, nor can it be 
‘Firstness’ either. So the remaining interpretative problem is this: is the 
‘possibility’ represented by the blackboard ‘germinal’ (the empty collection) 
or ‘developed’ (the continuum)? On the basis of my comments on the last two 
lectures in Reasoning and the Logic of Things, I think it has to be the latter, 
since the appearance of Secondness, in those lectures, seems in some sense 
(temporal? or is that only our mode of representing it?) to ‘come out o f  the 
continuum at a certain stage.
But these are dark matters!
We can picture the “sea of possibilities” as consisting of domains or 
islands of different and shifting feelings.4 Near criticality where the 
feelings become self-sustaining the domains will have a fractal shape. 
The Harter-Heightway twindragon (Mandelbrot 1977: 66) shown in 
figure 1 illustrates the iconic semiosis on this level. Self-similarity and 
other-similarity being the dominant force linking signs.
3 Posted by Ken Ketner to the discussion forum peirce-l on June 5, 2001. Cf. 
Putnam 1992.
4 “Feelings”, according to Peirce, are intensive qualities like temperature and 
pressure (firstnesses) having spatial extension (CP 6.133).
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Figure 1. Twindragon made by recursive programming (level 18; P. V. C.).
3. Sign classes and emergence of order
The categories of Peirce are inclusive such that secondness includes 
firstness and thirdness includes secondness and firstness. In this way 
we arrive at the six classes discussed by Taborsky (Fig. 2).
We have already seen that the initial Tohu Bohu state can be 
discribed as 3-1 Thirdness as firstness. Here we have reversed the 
numbers to 13 — the first of third. Semiotic evolution proceeds by 
successive actualizations (1 to 2) and generalizations (2 to 3) starting 
with the qualisign (11) through (12) etc. and ending with the symbol 
(33) (or mind as Taborsky calls it). Interpreting Putnams remark such 
that the initial state is (13) rather than (11)5 we only have three classes 
left, (13), (23) and (33), so I choose to call them simply icon, index, 
and symbol.6
5 The leftover physical theory of evolution from the qualisign (11) to the icon of 
the continuum (13) may be contained in the modern Af-theory of superstrings.
6 Instead of iconic, indexic, symbolic, legisigns.
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We looked at the iconic state through the twindragon of figure 1 
where the different domains or islands of feeling associate by simi­
larity to self and others.
(33)
sym bol
(23)
index
(13)
icon
(22) 
indexic sinsign
( 12) 
iconic sinsign
( 11)
qualisign
Figure 2. The 6 classes o f signs.
The next step to consider is the transition to the indexic state when the 
symmetry is broken such that one particular feeling or internal order 
begins to monopolize the picture to the exclusion of all others. This is 
a critical transition well known from physics of second order phase 
transitions from disorder to order. The most well known example is 
the condensation of vapour to form droplets of liquid. The symmetry- 
breaking event is here the formation of a surface, i.e. a discontinuity of 
density separating the rarefied vapour from the denser liquid7 This 
separation of the inside from the outside of a bubble is an example of 
the ontological cut discussed by Taborsky. It seems relevant to bio­
logy because it resembles the formation of a cell-membrane. When 
lipid molecules having a hydrophobic end and a hydrophilic end are 
suspended in water they will tend to reorient themselves to be parallel 
and form a closed membrane around a bubble of water. In both cases 
of droplet-formation there will be an ordering field  — a surface 
tension acting to amplify the symmetry breaking operation of the 
surface or membrane. The idea of an order parameter that creates an 
ordering field  which, in turn, facilitates growth of the order parameter 
is in physics summarized in the so called mean field theory o f (2nd 
order) phase transition. An example is the Curie-Weiss theory of the
7 See the discussion in Christiansen 2000.
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transition from paramagnetism to ferromagnetism summarized in the 
positive feedback loop on Figure 3.
Figure 3. Positive feedback look illustrating the Curie-Weiss mean field theory o f  
ferromagnetism.
Well above criticality the system exhibits a linear relation between the 
magnetization M and the magnetic field H:
M  = x H
where x  is the paramagnetic susceptibility:
X = C/T,
С being the material-specific Curie-constant and T the absolute tempe­
rature. This describes the statistical balancing between the ordering 
coupling to the magnetic field (Q  and the disordering thermal motion 
(T). The order parameter M  is assumed to create an internal ordering 
field Hi that combines additively with the external field He the whole 
diagram of figure 3 corresponds to the equation
Af = (С / Г) (Яе + AM) 1
Solving for M we get
M = C H J ( T - T c) 2
where Tc = CA is the critical temperature.
Thus, for T above Tc we have paramagnetic behaviour with a 
slightly enhanced susceptibility. At Tc, however, it becomes possible 
to have a non-vanishing order parameter M — a spontaneous magne-
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tization — even in the absence of an external ordering field He. Below 
Tc the linear model of figure 3 does not apply.
What really happens at and below the critical temperature is hard 
to describe quantitatively. At Tc the domains are characterized by 
fractal self-similarity and long-range correlations. Averages of powers 
of the mean field are unequal to mean values of the same powers of 
the field. So called renormalization theories have shown that the mean 
field description is correct in four dimensional euclidean space 
(wherever that may be), but the case of three dimensions defies 
description, except for the transition to superconductivity, where the 
mean field theory happens to be nearly exact8 (as well as for gravita­
tional collapse, sec. 6). In all cases the disorder-order transition is a 
bifurcation, i.e. there is more than one way in which the order 
parameter can be stabilized below Tc and a symmetry breaking ran­
dom choice determines the outcome. For the ferromagnetic transition 
the order parameter M  is a vector that can point any direction in space, 
but below Tc the spontaneous magnetization must point in a certain 
direction dependent on which domain happened to be dominating for 
the ordering field at the transition. The random choice made at Tc 
serves in this way to establish a habit that cannot be broken once it is 
formed. According to Peirce’s cosmology, as outlined, e.g. in the pre­
viously quoted letter to Christine Ladd-Franklin even the fundamental 
laws of nature have a history of being formed in this way as habits 
based on an initial random choice, and the element of chance still 
prevails such that none of these laws are obeyed exactly. Habit forma­
tion is then the finishing step of natural semiosis, the step from index 
to symbol of figure 2. In the following section we shall briefly con­
sider some important symmetry breaking and habit forming transitions 
in the prebiotic (pre-organismic) state of the physical universe.
A habit is formed as an attractor of a dynamic system, and its 
realization is always accompanied by energy dissipation and entropy 
production.
8 As demonstrated by the striking success of the phenomenological theory of 
superconductivity by the Soviet physicists L. D. Landau and V. L. Ginzburg, (Ginz­
burg, Landau 1950).
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4. The first flash
The energy in our present universe is divided among several fields and 
their quanta of excitation, i.e., particles. The main division is between 
matter-fields and electromagnetic radiation, carried by massless 
photons. The quanta of the matter-fields can be divided in two main 
types: Fermions obeying Pauli’s exclusion principle with half-integer 
spins, and massive bosons with integer spins. Besides, the main part of 
the mass is believed to be associated with “dark matter” of an un­
known nature. The known Fermion fields include six types o f quarks 
(u, d, s, c, t, b) and six types o f leptons (e, Ц, r, and their neutrinos ve, 
vM, vt).9
These particles interact in four ways, weak, strong, electro­
magnetic, and gravitational carried by bosons, resp. (massive vector 
bosons and the scalar Higgs-particle (undetected), gluons (8 kinds), 
massless photons, and gravitons).
The graviton has not been detected but is known to be without 
charge and mass and to have spin 2. The absence of mass of the 
photon and the graviton explains why electromagnetism and gravi­
tation have infinite range. On the other hand, the weak interaction is of 
very short range, which means that its quanta — the vector bosons (W 
and Z) must be rather heavy10 (about 100 GeV, confirmed by experi­
ments at CERN). The finite rest-mass of the vector bosons has pre­
sented a big problem for the standard model, according to which they 
should be massless. The problem was solved by postulating the 
existence of the Higgs-boson. These particles are assumed to form a 
Bose-condensate with a definite value of the scalar Higgs-field, H). 
Just like the condensate of electron-pairs in superconductors give the 
photons a finite range, the Я-field interacts with the vector bosons and 
give them a finite range. In the absence of a Я -field there would be no 
way to distinguish between the weak and the electromagnetic inter­
actions, so Я may be considered a symmetry breaking ordering field 
just like the mean internal field in the Curie-Weiss theory of ferro­
magnetism (Figure 3). According to the so-called inflation-theory by
9 It is tempting, therefore, to use the six classes of signs (Figure 2) as a key to 
classification of elementary particles. This line of thought will be pursued in a 
forthcoming paper by the author.
Iu The range of a force field mediated by boson-quanta is inversely proportional to 
the mass of the bosons.
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Alan Guth the nucleation of Я  is a very violent event that creates the 
universe by an anormous blow-up of an initial small domain of non­
vanishing Я. We can picture the vacuum-energy as a function of Я 
like shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Vacuum potential P  as function of the Higgs-field H.
The potential has a minimum for H = 0 corresponding to the initial 
vacuum state before inflation (sometimes called the false vacuum). 
However, there is a lower minimum at a finite value of Я, separated 
from the first minimum by a potential-barrier. This barrier will 
prevent transition to the lower minimum until some fluctuation lifts 
the system over the barrier. A thermal fluctuation presupposes that the 
temperature has a finite value in the false vacuum, which may be a 
dubious assumption, but even at zero temperature the system may 
penetrate the barrier by quantum mechanical tunnelling. The vacuum 
potential P is an even function of Я, so there is a symmetry breaking 
in the choice between a positive or a negative value of Я. As soon as a 
domain of the system penetrates the barrier there will be enough 
energy released to help the transition spread as an avalanche to the 
whole potential universe like the growth of crystallization spreading in 
a super-saturated solution or a supercooled liquid from a single crystal 
germ. The transition creates a lot of entropy, the universe blows up by 
more than fifty orders of magnitude and is born in a very hot state
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after about 10 s. This state after inflation is then the starting point 
(time zero) of the standard “big bang” model of evolution.
5. Subsequent symmetry breakings
Just after the inflation period the universe is a very hot fireball with all 
kinds of particles and a temperature of more than 1015 К sufficient to 
produce free vector bosons and Higgs particles. But the state is 
cooling rapidly under adiabatic expansion, and as soon as the Higgs 
field settles down the previous symmetry between electromagnetic 
and weak interactions is broken to the habit of the force-laws known 
today. Another symmetry that is rapidly broken is the symmetry 
between particles and antiparticles. In the initial fireball there must 
have been a small random surplus of particles over antiparticles, and 
this difference will prevail after the pairwise annihilation processes, 
such that all antimatter has disappeared, except for anti-quarks in 
compounds like mesons and hadrons. Most quarks are soon bound in 
stable triplets to form hadrons, i.e. protons and neutrons. These two 
nucleons, the building blocks of all the nuclei of chemical elements 
are balanced by the ß-process
n_e +p +v 3
whereby a neutron n decays to a proton p, an electron e, and a neutrino 
v, and the reverse process. The neutrinos only interact weakly, 
through this process, with other particles, and, as they are nearly 
massless11 and, therefore moving with near-light-speed they disappear 
from every finite part of the universe after a couple of minutes, so that 
the balance of the reactions (3) gets frozen and the n/p-ratio becomes 
fixed — another habit-forming symmetry-break has occurred.
11 Recent experiments in Japan have shown that at least one of the three kinds of 
neutrinos (vc, vM, and vT) have restmasses about 10 eV, 0.002% of the electron’s mass.
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The expansion of the initial fireball is in the standard Big Bang model 
described as nearly adiabatic, i.e. without entropy production. Ac­
cording to thermodynamics, however, no habit formation (i.e. no evo­
lution at all) can take place without entropy production, so the use of 
the word adiabatic just means that the entropy produced after inflation 
is very small compared to the entropy produced in the first flash of 
inflation. While Boltzmann and other pioneers saw the concept of 
entropy as signifying the heat death of the universe the current view is 
closer to Peirce’s vision of a heat birth and a cold death. The 
expansion may be described by an increasing scale factor ^(t) that 
stretches everything proportional to the distance from every arbitrary 
chosen “centre”. During inflation ^(t) had an exponential increase, but 
afterwards it is replaced with a much slower power-law increase. The 
wavelenghts of the photons in the radiation field are stretched in the 
same proportion as all other distances, so the temperature of the 
background radiation decreases inversely proportional to ^(t).
In the beginning phase when the radiation is still hot enough to 
ionize hydrogen the matter will exist as a plasma with the charged 
particles, electrons and protons uniformly dispersed in electromag­
netic radiation. The photons cannot reach far before they are absorbed 
by the charged particles, so the universe is opaque. The matter 
particles (e and p) cannot clump together because they are continually 
scattered by photons. Gravitation is in a slumbering state of Peircean 
firstness, because the uniformity of matter distribution makes it pull 
equally in all directions, cancelling itself out in every point. The next 
significant symmetry breaking occurs after about 300,000 years when 
the temperatur drops below the ionization point of hydrogen. When 
the matter gets bound to the atoms of electrically neutral atoms of 
hydrogen and helium it ceases to interact with the photons, and the 
universe becomes transparent. A homogeneous distribution of neutral 
matter is unstable under gravitational collapse, so a randomly formed 
lump of greater density will attract surrounding matter and create an 
increasing ordering field of gravity, enhancing the lumping tendency 
as described by the mean field theory of figure 3. Thus, the symmetry 
breaking gravitational collapse leads to the formation of galaxies and 
stars. The concentration of matter creates entropy and rises the 
temperature of matter compared to the continually expanding and
6. Entropy and gravity in the ageing universe
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cooling radiation field. With light emitting stars on a dark background 
the universe is beginning to look familiar and the stage is set for a 
biochemical and organismic evolution. However, the biosemiotic 
perspective of symmetry breaking and habit formation still applies.
7. Concluding remarks
The point of view in this paper is that modem theories of the physics 
of the early universe fits together with Peirce’s cosmology to contri­
bute to the biosemiotic natural history of signification. This should not 
be regarded as a reductionistic attempt to place physics as a basis for 
biosemiotics but rather as an elaboration of the idea that physical 
cosmology needs a semiotic perspective in order to enter a fruitful 
dialogue with biology and other sciences. In accordance with scien­
tists like Manfred Eigen and Ilya Prigogine I believe that evolution of 
living signs is indeterminate but inevitable and if it seems too radical 
to regard life as a first, an internal quality of matter, I ask for a better 
view that doesn’t make it seem utterly strange that the universe has 
evolved to produce humans and other sign using creatures.
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Привыкание как ломка симметрии 
в раннем универсуме
В статье делается попытка связать космологию и метафизику Пирса с 
распространенным в современной физике пониманием эволюции уни­
версума, рассматривая ее как семиотический процесс в живом уни­
версуме. Если считать главным свойством жизни необъяснимую  
Первичность, которая исходит из первичного иконического состояния в 
пустом универсуме, то можно выделить два процесса развития знака: а) 
переход от икона к индексу как возникновение упорядоченности  
посредством ломки симметрии (которая актуализирует одну из воз­
можностей иконического вакуума); б) переход от индекса к символу, что 
являет собой привыкание (habit) —  адаптацию окружения к по­
явившемуся порядку. Если иконическое состояние характеризуется 
фрактальным  самоподобием, то переходы к индексу и символу модели­
руются теорией фазовых переходов второго порядка.
Habitueerumine kui sümmeetria murdumine 
varases universumis
Artiklis püütakse seostada Peirce’i kosm oloogiat ja  metafüüsikat praeguse 
füüsikalise arusaamaga universumi evolutsioonist, vaadeldes seda kui se­
m iootilist protsessi elavas universumis. Kui pidada elu peamiseks omaduseks 
seletamatut Esmasust, mis pärineb algsest ikoonilisest seisundist tühjas 
kontiinuumis, saab vaadelda kahte märgi arenguprotsessi: (a) üleminek ikoo­
nilt indeksile kui sümmeetria murdumisega korrastatuse teke, mis aktuali- 
seerib ühe ikoonilise vaakuumi võimalustest; (b) ülem inek indeksilt süm­
bolile, mis on habitueerumine —  ümbruse adapteerumine ilmunud korrale. 
Kui ikooniline seisund on iseloom ustuv fraktaalse enesesam asusega, siis 
üleminekud indeksile ja  süm bolile on modelleeritavad teist järku faasiüle- 
minekutena.
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Energy and evolutionary semiosis
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Abstract. This paper sets up a thought-experiment that examines the transfor­
mation of energy into codified mass. This transformation is understood as a 
semiosic action of interpretation. The semiosic action is analyzed within five 
“predicate” or “verbal modes” which establish different processes of transfor­
mation or interpretation. These “predicate modes”, which are sign processes, 
take place in different areas of reality, the external realm and the internal 
realm. The external realm is composed of discrete objects and their inter­
actions. Its processes are examined within classical mechanics and this paper 
posits a semiosic codification that is unique to these external processes. The 
internal realm is a holistic endoperspective with no recognition of discrete 
objects. Its processes are examined within quantum and field processes and 
this paper posits a semiosic codification that is unique to the internal 
processes. However, rather than promoting one or the other realm as a valid 
interpretation of reality, this paper suggests that both the external and internal 
energy-mass processes are necessary components of our universe.
Introduction
I begin with a hypothesis, a speculation, a phantasia, for it is “thought 
and ideas, not formulae, [that] are the beginning of every physical 
theory” (Einstein, Infeld 1961: 277). This paper outlines a “thought- 
experiment” on the semiosic nature of energy and mass.
I begin with a hypothesis that the basic reality of our universe is its 
nature as a dyadic spiral of energy and mass. The famous theory of 
relativity informs us of the transformative identity of mass and energy 
but it is a postulate of this paper that energy does not exist in our
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universe ‘per se’ but only in its nature as mass, which is to say, within 
the restrictions and constraints of codification. Energy can be 
understood as a force of pure potentiality for the actualization of itself 
as mass. It is difficult to initially describe energy in any more detail 
than that, because as pointed out, energy in our universe, due to the 
asymmetrical force of the Big Bang, cannot exist by itself as that pure 
potentiality. It is doomed, in a sense, to an infinite process of constant 
transformation of itself as mass. But we must acknowledge this primal 
dyad because the transformative motion between the potential and the 
actual is the basis of all abiotic and biotic processes in our universe. 
Aristotle pointed out that our sensual experience provides us with one 
account of nature that focuses on the “immediate material substratum 
of things which have in themselves a principle of motion or change” 
(Physics Bk П, Ch. I. 193a30) and it is our analytic capacities that 
provide us with knowledge of this “principle of motion or change”, 
which is the other part of the dyad, the abstract “shape or form” of 
these material things, which “has not yet its own ‘nature’, for no 
universal attribute is a substance” {Metaphysics Bk VII, Ch. 13, 
1038b35).
It is a further postulate of this paper that the architecture of this 
transformation is semiosis or codification, which operates within a 
series of ontological and epistemological cuts that initiate and increase 
asymmetrical gaps between energy/mass which are then mediated by 
increasingly complex semiosic relations or codifications. Codes, 
which are actions of measurement, organize energy into mass. They 
do this by establishing patterns of relations for that mass/energy, with 
the result that one encoded or actualized mass/energy is differentiated 
from other encodements of mass/energy. We can understand these 
processes of measurement as processes of interpretation. Therefore, 
energy that is codified should be understood in this constrained state 
not simply as “matter” which by itself is a meaningless term but more 
accurately as “information” because this energy is then capable of 
informing on and about other forms of energy-as-matter, by relating 
its codes, its organizational properties, to these other forms of coded 
energy. These processes of associative measurement do not neces­
sarily involve a deliberative or conscious interaction. Mind, the logical 
and communal action of measurement, operates to transform energy to 
mass or information but it is not essential that Mind is human or 
conscious. There is a need “for mentality to be ‘ontologically
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fundamental’ (Penrose 1997: 176). This process of the codification of 
energy to informed mass is known as semiosis. Semiosis is not 
confined within language or human or biological consciousness but 
begins at the primal level of energy
Codification and the asymmetrical cuts
What is codification? It is a referential system that measures energy. 
In this action of measurement, it organizes energy within patterns that 
enable that energy to exist as mass, as existential “stuff’ within parti­
cular times and spaces, which means that this mass is both diffe­
rentiated from and related to, other mass. The energy of a hydrogen 
atom is organized differently from that of an oxygen atom. Is the 
organizational pattern ontologically separate from the energy? This 
question has been debated for centuries. Platonism views the organi­
zational code as a Form and sets it apart as an ideal memory. The 
materialized version of this pure Form can be a mimetic clone, a 
dialectical analogy, or even, a crafted symbol. But, the original Formal 
Cause, as ideal memory, remains separate from the Material Cause; 
the code is separate from matter. However, in disagreement, Aristotle 
said that “to reduce all things thus to Forms and to eliminate the 
matter is useless” (Metaphysics 1036b20). The Aristotelian concept of 
codes and energy merges them, for “matter [...] is something that can 
never exist without quality and without form” {De gen. 320b 15). To 
again quote Aristotle, “what desires the form is the matter” (Physics 
192a20). This is not merely a classical conclusion. Modem researchers 
concur that “the cohesion between the measuring and the measured 
energy flows thus turns out to be a principal characteristic of energy 
dissipation and conservation” (Matsuno 1998: 67). However, the 
debate is by no means complete for there is still strong support for the 
Form, the primal code, to be considered as ontologically separate from 
mass. It is an axiom of this paper, that the Aristotelian relational 
architecture is more robust than the Platonic and that codification can 
never be separate from matter, and therefore, that mass can never exist 
as pure energy. Therefore, energy, as potentiality, can be understood 
to have “intentionality”, it desires and requires measurement so that it 
can be actual. How does codification operate in such an architecture?
Information or “mass” is a codified microstate of energy; it is 
energy in a state of “informing” by means of measurement, which is 
to say, by means of a referential system (the Form) whose logical 
properties of ordering energy provides for the establishment of other 
relations with other forms of matter. Measurement or referential 
relations organizes energy such that it operates within systemic 
relations with other orders of energy/mass. This means that the trans­
formation of energy into mass or information requires separate levels 
for processing. This does not mean that each level can exist ‘per se’ as 
in a Platonic architecture but that these levels (form and energy) 
filiated as they are, must be differentiated. Free energy, which is to 
say, energy with limited relations, must somehow be differentiated 
from the referential codes, which is to say, the habitual relations, in 
order for the two to even interact with each other. That is, metalevels 
are a basic necessity for coupling or relations of referentiality to occur, 
such that energy can exist as mass, as information. This requires a 
series of ontological and epistemological differential cuts that act to 
increase asymmetry of energy which is then mediated by semiosic 
relations. A “cut” is a process that, by virtue of measurement, 
separates energy/mass into different zones of relational capacities.
The first cut sets up an ontological reality of internal and external 
zones. This means that there is a “mass” that is differentiated in time 
and space from another mass. This sets up an external realm and an 
internal realm. These two realms, the external and the internal, operate 
within different modes of codification. Second, within both these 
internal and external areas, there will also be an epistemological codal 
cut that sets up formal laws, i.e., synchronic memory, which is 
differentiated from the short term singularities, the actualizations of 
this memory, which emerge within local or initial conditions. These 
differentiations of energy/mass into distinct zones of operations 
(internal and external; memory and instantiations) will also produce 
energy/mass whose interactions will evolve in hierarchical comple­
xity. This is achieved by increasing the asymmetry of those cuts. The 
subsequent codal relations required to mediate the cuts will increase in 
complexity. The physico-chemical realm of basic semiosic codifica­
tion is found within atomic and chemical processes; the biological is 
more complex and is found within organic processes; and the con­
ceptual, the most complex, is found within human symbolic processes. 
Measurement or codification of energy to mass occurs in all three
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realms and therefore, it is an axiom of this paper that semiosic 
processes are operative in all three realms (Taborsky 1999).
Semiosic zones of codification
Codification into discrete particles and their relations operates within a 
complex architecture that generates a series of increasingly complex 
cuts of energy/mass into asymmetrical sections. The most basic cut is 
ontological, the distinction between an instantiation and its environ­
ment. This cut measures mass into zones of the external and the 
internal. This has been defined as “the Heisenberg cut” (Matsuno 
1999, Primas 1993, Atmanspacher 1994, 1999). This cut, with its 
distinction between an object and its environment, sets up a dualism 
that sees both the internal and the external as separate domains of 
codification.
Codification in the external zone ignores what is going on inside 
an object and considers that entity only from the ontological separa­
tion of an observer or other’s stance. Measurements and interactions 
of mass in this zone refer only to these externally measured units as 
modular and impenetrable except by division into discrete parts. This 
sets up a basic mechanism “with matter and force as our fundamental 
concepts” (Einstein, Infeld 1961: 53). This is the familiar Newtonian 
mechanical exoperspective and it enables a world operating within 
interactions of electromagnetic attraction and repulsion. The internal 
codification, on the other hand, operates completely internally, with 
no recognition of otherness. This permits a holistic endoperspective, a 
state “prior to object-subject bifurcation, in which the so-called 
external world becomes totally deprived of its ontological solidity” 
(Atmanspacher, Dalenoort 1994: 1). Internal measurement and 
interactions of mass are uncertain and amorphous because they lack 
reference to a distinct “other” reality with the result that discrete 
descriptions and therefore avoidance, are impossible (see Matsuno, 
Paton 2000; Matsuno 2001, Atmanspacher 1999). Measurements 
within the internal zone permit non-local correlations, i.e., the non­
local EPR interaction, while measurements within the external zone 
lose that holism “and objects and disentangled observers can be 
distinguished” (Atmanspacher 1999: 129). It is an error, I feel, to 
define these two zones as simply objective and subjective, for the
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latter term introduces a conscious and personal, individual intentio­
nally  that my analysis rejects. Measurements within the external zone 
are made within classical mechanics and measurements within the 
internal zone are made within quantum field mechanics irrespective of 
the size of the system and the state of consciousness.1 My point is that 
classical and quantum mechanics are not ideological and oppositional 
perspectives about our universe, with ourselves choosing between 
them, but are real processes of measurement of energy/mass and both 
are required within the ontological nature of a complete energy/mass 
codification.
A second cut, the epistemological, divides both the external/ inter­
nal, or classical/quantum measurements into “both facts and models'" 
(Atmanspacher 1994: 15, emphasis in original). Using other terms, 
this is the familiar mind/body distinction and has been described as 
“the Cartesian cut” (Matsuno 1999, Atmanspacher 1994, 1999, Primas 
1993) although we remember its identity from the Platonic/ Aristo­
telian arguments on Form and Matter. These measurements establish 
material singularities and a formal or mental model of cohesive 
identity. That is, “the elements of res cogitans are non-material 
entities like ideas, models, or concepts [and] the elements of res 
extensa are material facts, events or data” (Atmanspacher 1999: 128). 
The formal model, as a mental (again, not necessarily human) process, 
is encoded digitally while the informal singularity is encoded 
analogically. Mental computation provides holonomic or synchronic 
constraints of communal norms that resist the dissipative forces of the 
non-holonomic atomistic expressions which confront this synchronic 
resilience.
What we have set up is an architecture for a dynamical measure­
ment operating within a series of ontological and epistemological cuts. 
If we postulate a universe that began in a pure symmetry of mass/ 
energy and moved into asymmetrical gaps between mass and energy, 
then, what are the interactions that are made possible by the conco­
mitant requirement for mediation of these cuts? In order of extremes, a
1 This zone should be more accurately understood to operate within aspects of 
relativity or field theory rather than totally within quantum mechanics. My model does 
not use Bohr’s concept of the elementary particle as measured by a macroobserver on 
micromatter but uses the concept of the elementary nature of the relational interaction. 
However, it denies the relativity view that matter is independent of measurement. 
These details will be examined in a forthcoming paper.
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re ational interaction will be iconic, indexical or symbolic. An iconic 
or mimetic relation is operative where the differentiations in codi­
fication established by the measurement cuts are slight, where there is 
a mere relation between the sign and the thing signified” (Peirce 
1.372). Indeed, the relation subsequent to the cut is “a mere quality” 
(Peirce 2.243) for the separations have been amorphous and perme­
able. A wider or more intense cut will enable a discrete separation and 
a subsequent indexical relation which must be, to acknowledge the 
actual physical separation, itself an “actual existent” (Peirce 2.243). In 
an indexical relation, the two discrete entities are linked by a “direct 
physical connection” (Peirce 1.372). The most asymmetrical cut will 
enable a symbolic relation, involving an “imputed character” (Peirce 
1.558) which is a relation linking these discrete entities that requires a 
conscious and referential intentionality. The symbol has no links, 
either mimetic or physical, with its interpreted meaning, other than a 
consciously assigned relation. As such, the symbolic relation permits 
the most plastic and innovative relations for such relations exist 
entirely by “the fact that it is used and understood as such” (Peirce 
2.307). I am postulating that symbolic semiosis is only operative 
within the human realm. On another point, it should be noted that 
asymmetry increases the reaction time to establish a relation. Iconic 
measurements can establish relations rapidly for there is little to 
differentiate and recognize; the indexical requires the establishment of 
a physical bond and increases the reaction time; the symbolic, which 
is arbitrary and learned, and implies subjective intentionality, requires 
the longest reaction time. These temporal discrepancies cannot be 
overlooked in a consideration of the entire semiosic architecture.
The semiosic categories
I will introduce the three basic modes or categories of codification. 
The semiosic process should be understood as a dynamic and 
relational rather than a nominalist action; that is, the sign should not 
be understood as one image substituting for another image. The sign is 
a relational process and acts as a full sentence. The sign, whether 
acting as an icon, index or symbol, is to be understood not as a thing 
or noun, but as a “thing-in-relation-to-other-things”. The noun-part 
and the predicate-part together make up the sign (Taborsky 2001) and
the sign establishes both particle-mass and relational-mass. Let us now 
consider the basic modal categories in which this sign, as an action of 
establishing relations between mass, operates. These modal categories 
are a Firstness of holistic possibility, a Secondness of individuality 
and a Thirdness of normative habits of the community. These are only 
the basic modes; in the interpretive actualization of energy to mass, 
these modes will readily combine and become more complex.
Firstness is a relation of feeling, quality, chance, immediacy, “an 
instance of that kind of consciousness which involves no analysis, 
comparison or any process whatsoever, nor consists in whole or in 
part of any act by which one stretch of consciousness is distinguished 
from another” (Peirce 1.306). Any experience that is codified within a 
state of Firstness is completely internal and has no capacity to refer 
itself to an external object/model for comparison. As an experience it 
is in a continuous state of emergence, lacking the capacity to move 
itself into discrete singularities. It should be clear that “the internal 
perspective is fundamentally distinction-free, i.e., no object can be 
distinguished from anything else” (Atmanspacher 1994: 15). Mass 
encoded within Firstness is obviously so elementary that it is both 
noun and predicate, particle and wave at the same time. Its properties 
are homogeneic and operative within coupling bonds that set up 
reversible and symmetrical links that tend to maintain an equilibrium 
of energy to mass transformation. This mode of codification is unable 
to implement recording or descriptive systems, which are referential 
codes that integrate random sensory-motor stimuli to provide the 
stability of a synchronic memory. As Gödel pointed out, a system 
cannot prove its own consistency but requires a formal reference. Can 
we imagine our early universe in such a random state? Unlike energy 
in a state of Secondness, if not picked up by more stable codal 
processes, the energy in this amorphous indeterminate state does not 
dissipate to a less complex mass; it simply remains in this isolate 
internal zone as an infinite “potential”, which is continuously distri­
buted throughout the cosmos. Without the constraints of definitive 
measurements and a referential memory to stabilize any relations, this 
mode of codification enables energy to saturate its internal phase 
space, which we might describe as a state of pure feeling. Therefore, 
Firstness, as a codal process, sets up rapid non-reflexive relations with 
no descriptive capacity but with a capacity for expansive exploration, 
i.e., a radiant energy.
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econdness is the basic mode of our sensate and conscious 
experience, in the sense that it describes both physical and mental 
awareness of evident differentiations in our external environment. 
Secondness is the collapse of the expansive symmetry of Firstness, it 
is the compression of the energy of Firstness within asymmetrical 
constraints which transform this energy to insert mass with observable 
differences. Secondness acts within the irreversible selection of a 
specific path, where a “choice”, random or intentional is made, and 
that particular instantiation or fusion of mass emerges as diffe­
rentiated, externally, from another mass. With its focus on proximate 
cause and effect, energy coded within Secondness acts as the “mutual 
action between two things regardless of any sort of third or medium, 
and in particular regardless of any law of action” (Peirce 1.322). 
Secondness refers to “such facts as another, relation, compulsion, 
effect, dependence, independence, negation, occurrence, reality, 
result” (Peirce 1.358). The key to mass codified within Secondness is 
its discrete closure, as operative within the Heisenberg cut, and this 
cut is ratified as a closure by a link, a predicate relation -  whether it is 
an iconic, indexical or symbolic link — to another object. Therefore 
energy encoded as mass within the semiosic process of Secondness “is 
a real thing or fact which is a sign of its object by virtue of being 
connected with it as a matter of fact” (Peirce 4.447). Therefore, this 
mass is contextualized to its local context and we can assign a definite 
quantitative and qualitative description to its identity. With an obvious 
reference to classical physics, Peirce states that
there has been during the nineteenth century a decided leaning o f scientific 
opinion to discredit any other sort of action in the external world than that of 
dynamical force; to understand a dynamical force to be a purely brute force 
with no element of inherent reasonableness in it, but merely to be the only 
force that scientific research could discover. (Peirce 6.329)
So too, Einstein gives an example of a simple mechanical view, of 
“two particles with forces acting between them’ (Einstein, Infeld 
1961: 53). In Newtonian mechanics, the inertial mass operates in an 
inertial frame. This is an externalist or non-interpretive mechanical 
interaction and we should remember that these discrete instances are 
brittle, contextually bound to initial conditions and without, them­
selves, the stability of memory.
Thirdness is the key mode. Thirdness is a mode of mediate mea­
surement that we have, as a result of the Cartesian and Newtonian 
focus on the immediate physical orientation of discrete elements 
ignored and indeed denied for years. However, “there is some essen­
tially and irreducibly other element in the universe than pure dyna­
mism or pure chance [and this is] the principle of the growth of prin­
ciples, a tendency to generalization” (Peirce 6.322, 6.585). Thirdness 
is a process of synchronic codification, operative both externally and 
internally, that transforms the multiplicity of diverse sensory-motor 
data into cohesive “habitual” diagrammes of communal knowledge. 
Thirdness works to glue, to bind, to relate, to establish relationships 
and connected interactions. It takes descriptive codes of mass from the 
diverse instantiations of our internal and external experiences and 
“translates” them into a syncretic diagramme or Laws of relations of 
these descriptions such that subsequent local instantiations, within 
Firstness and Secondness, can emerge as versions or representations 
of these communal Laws. Thirdness is a “matter of law, and law is a 
matter of thought and meaning” (Peirce 1.345). It is therefore, a 
process of the mind, the other side of the Cartesian cut, res cogitans, it 
is the process of assimilating, the “power of taking habits” (Peirce 
1.390). Paton calls such a process of developing this epistemological 
coherence “glue” (Paton, Matsuno 1998). This is a succinct image of 
its powers as a resilient dynamics of a force enabling evolutionary 
cohesion.
370 Edwina Taborsky
The Architecture
We now have the basic codal categories of Firstness, Secondness and 
Thirdness. However, as examined by Peirce (for example, in 1.365- 
367; 1/383; 1.413; 1 526-544) these basic modal categories will 
operate as both “genuine” or pure and as “degenerate” or mixed. This 
will increase the complexity of relations and therefore interpretations 
that the sign is able to produce. I am going to set up a dyadic archi­
tecture that incorporates both the genuine and degenerate semiosic 
processes. I will further differentiate these semiosic actions into those 
that can take place in the external realm and those that can take place 
in the internal realm.
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6 external realm operates within two semiosic realities, two 
di ferent ways of measuring/codifying energy. One measurement 
produces the singularities; this is discrete mass in a state of inertia 
independent of any motion. And, there is kinetic energy, the “energy 
of motion that is separate from the inert mass. The first two laws of 
thermodynamics, conservation of mass and conservation of energy, 
operate separately in this realm. Mass and motion are separate. How­
ever, if we consider the singular mass, and locate ourselves within it, 
then, a very different mode of energy/mass relations becomes evident. 
The internal semiosic processes are the inclusive mass/energy 
relations that take place within a singular mass. Because these pro­
cesses are completely internal, we must understand them as operating 
not within a singular entity but within a unity. Mass operates very 
differently within a unity rather than as a singularity. Internally, we 
have, not two separate processes, that of the external rest-mass and 
kinetic energy, but a unity of processes within relativistic mass- 
energy, where energy and mass are both understood as relative to each 
other and are therefore, constantly transforming into each other. 
Therefore, the two thermodynamic laws operate together in this realm. 
What we must also consider is that this dyadic architecture of two 
realms, the external and the internal, is not adversarial and dispensable 
but indispensable, because the codal actions within each realm provide 
different properties and enables the entire system to develop a 
dynamic flexibility and adaptive capacity.
Based on the Peircean complexity and interdependency of genuine 
and degenerate modal categories, I suggest six basic codal predicate 
operations; that is, six different semiosic processes that encode energy 
to mass, within these ontological and epistemological cuts. They are:
Firstness-as-Firstness [ 1 -1 ] This develops a pure possibility.
Secondness-as-Firstness [2-1] This develops a probable existent. 
Secondness-as-Secondess [2-2] This develops an irreversible existent. 
Thirdness-as-Firstness [3-1] This develops a law of probabilities,
o f  possib ilities.
T hirdness-as-Secondness [3-2] T his develop s a law  o f  actual
ex istences.
Thirdness-as-Thirdness [3-3] T his d evelops pure m assless M ind.
The point is, these six different predicate codal processes are not all 
found within the same zone of operations. They operate, quite
exclusively, in either the external or internal realms. In the external 
zone, the operative codes are: Secondness-as-Secondness [2-2] and 
Thirdness-as-Firstness [3-1]. In the internal zone, the operative codes 
are: Firstness-as-Firstness [1-1], Secondness-as-Firstness [2-1] and 
Thirdness-as-Secondness [3-2]. The final semiosic predicate, 
Thirdness-as-Thirdness [3-3] is pure Mind, which is massless, and I 
will leave its complex examination for another paper.
A brief point that will also be glossed over in this paper, is that 
epistemologically, Thirdness will always be encoded within a digital 
measurement and Firstness/Secondness within an analog measure­
ment. Temporally, the digital code operates in past/future time and 
acts as a future-oriented cohesive pattern of habitual interactions. The 
analog code sets up a local and irreversible once-only mass. The 
haecceity or contextualized “thisness” in current time is the essential 
demarcation of an analog code. The digital abstracts information from 
the local contexts and sets up an interpretation that is general enough 
that an analog instantiation can replicate that interpretation, as a 
“this”, but as related to another place and another time. However, 
mass that is codified within a digital mode cannot, in its nature as a 
formal abstraction, ever be completely articulated within these analog 
instances. This “blind spot” provides the analog with an expansive 
freedom of exploration. The two sides of this epistemological cut, the 
digital and the analog, mind and matter, together provide important 
features for a complex system.
Let us now move to a closer examination of the semiosic 
architecture. The ontological cut has the physical consequence of 
differentiating mass/energy into external and internal zones.
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The external zone
This is the realm of individual experiences, the world of distinct 
boundaries, filled with objects and the actions that go on between 
objects, that is, “the ideas of causation and of statical force” (Peirce 
1.325). We are familiar with its classical mechanics, with the action 
and reaction of units whose properties are separate and independent of 
the properties of other systems. How can we semiotically describe this 
external zone? We have three categories of codification to work with: 
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. And, we have two asymmetries
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th mec*iated with semiosis, the asymmetries developed by
°  °8^cal and the epistemological cuts, 
ogically, in this realm the semiosic sign process must 
pro uce a clearly differentiated noun and a predicate. In this case, in 
the external realm, the noun to be produced is inert mass, a “thing”, 
and the predicate is the classic Newtonian electromagnetic force of 
attraction and repulsion between these noun-objects. Epistemolo- 
gically, the semiosic process must provide a synchronic formal set of 
rules governing the operations of these objects and their interactions. 
There are two sign processes in this realm. These can be described, 
semiosically, as that of pure Secondness or “unalterable fixity” 
[Secondness-as-Secondness: 2-2] and the stochastic average 
[Thirdness-as-Firstness :3-l].
Codification of energy to mass within the category of pure Second­
ness produces inert mass, a mass that is differentiated into discrete 
closures, whether micro or macro objects, all operating within the 
famous law of non-contradiction, as either “similar” or “dissimilar”. 
The differentiation is so distinct that there is no need for a “time gap” 
of reflexion and analysis. This is why we say that the classical realm is 
“mechanical”, lacks emotion, subjectivity, imagination, connection, 
freedom; it is entirely predictable, and the universe, if understood only 
within this realm, concludes that “all phenomena can be explained by 
the action of forces representing either attraction or repulsion, de­
pending only upon distance and acting between unchangeable 
particles” (Einstein, Infeld 1961: 65). Obviously, our world cannot 
operate only with these random objects flying around; there must be 
rules for their interaction and their continuity.
The epistemological cut, acknowledging a differentiation between 
immediate point and progressive time, must provide a set of formal 
measurements to act as a descriptive memory, to provide a synchronic 
continuity of reproduction. In the external realm, this synchronic force 
is provided by the statistical average, which develops as an objective 
abstraction from the discrete events, to provide a habitual commo­
nality” that enforces continuity of reproduction by its enforcement of 
habits, routine characteristics of interaction and organization. This 
Thirdness-as-Firstness process sets up a prototype model, an “associa­
tion by resemblance” (Peirce 1.383) to provide a normative overview 
which acts to inhibit random interactions. The generation of normative 
habits in this zone is a features-extraction top-down process. This
cohesive memory, a statistical probability, constrains instances by its 
exclusion of the marginal instances from its normalizing template. 
Essentially, this overview collapses or crumples discreteness into a 
flat generality. A question to answer is — does this cohesive process 
require a human agent as its collator and enforcer? The answer is, no, 
for a process such as natural selection achieves the same result, with 
its focus on the average and its indifference to the marginal. What is 
missing from this particular process of generalization, this Thirdness- 
as-Firstness, is the ability to insert deviations into that cohesive 
normative set of habitual relations; that is, deviation is not incorpo­
rated into the cohesive ontology but is entropically dissipated. A codi­
fication that acknowledges only habitual relations, that rejects diver­
gence, is unable to evolve that blueprint and accept entirely new 
entities. Evolution is not possible using codal relations that are only 
external.
These two classical mechanical forms of measurement, however, 
are vital. What they provide is, first, the integrity of mass, encoded in 
its crisp “thisness”. These instances interact without knowledge of 
their identities beyond a physical attraction or repulsion. The cohe­
sion, the normative glue that sets up the laws by which these discrete 
entities interact is, as noted Thirdness-as-Firstness [3-1], which is to 
say, it is an overview, a blueprint, a statistical average which flattens 
differentiation and ignores deviations. Given these two codifications 
of mass-as-particle and mass-as-blueprint, what can we conclude 
about this external realm? This realm operates with a clear separation 
of the two thermodynamic laws, that of conservation of mass and 
conservation of energy. The inert mass, the discrete entities, are going 
to increase the asymmetry between energy and mass because of the 
electromagnetic frictional property of avoidance. Entropy, a dissipa­
tion of mass to energy, will increase. How can the system deal with 
this? Second, the external mode of cohesion acts as a “negative habit” 
(Peirce 1.390), where the law, that statistical average, will forget and 
flatten (by ignoring its relevance) peripheral behaviour. These two 
negative relations increase the asymmetry of the energy-to-mass ratio 
and the system will struggle to rehabilitate itself, it will dissipate as 
much energy as it can to decrease this asymmetry, reduce uncertainty 
and attempt to increase its mass. The escalating entropic release of 
energy by the external zone could be called “the principle of forget­
fulness” (Peirce 1.399), for it is here that the external realm actually
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loses its rigidity, its closures, its self-absorbed isolation. It begins to 
“dissolve in doubt” and works rapidly to resolve this fuzziness by, as 
noted, increased reproduction of its mass-to-mass by rapid regene­
ration and an increase in diversity of mass forms. It’s a relentless 
battle. However, the external realm’s battle between the two laws of 
thermodynamics is assisted by the internal realm.
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The internal zone
Internal measurements, which take place within a unity, cannot use the 
same semiosic measurements that are used by the external realm, for 
those measurements refer to singularities and pluralities, which are 
collections of singulars. Internal measurements operate within the 
processes of quantum theory.2 This zone is richer in relations than the 
external zone for, as noted, an identifying factor of the internal realm 
is the lack of singularities, of mass encoded as inert in Secondness-as- 
Secondness [2-2]. Energy is operating, in the internal realm, within a 
complex entanglement of relations rather than the Newtonian electro­
magnetic attrraction-repulsion between discrete particles of mass. 
There are three types of measurement and therefore, three types of 
relations: two are analog, Firstness-as-Firstness [1-1], Secondness-as- 
Firstness [2-1] and the digital is Thirdness-as-Secondness [3-2].
The first action of codification is an inclusive sweeping “take-all” 
gathering of energy, a relation that establishes this internal unity, 
within the code of pure Firstness-as-Firstness [1-1] as a state, “not an 
event, a happening, a coming to pass” (Peirce 1.307) but a pure state 
“which is in its entirety in every moment of time as long as it endures” 
(Peirce 1.307). This sets up an iconic codification of inclusion that 
accepts as simultaneous in space and time all forms of mass/energy. 
As noted, in the internal realm, energy and mass are not distinct, but 
are transformative versions of each other. Mass could, theoretically, 
stay this way in an eternal mist of cosmic energy/mass potentiality. 
The reason it does not do so is because the first ontological cut has 
established an asymmetry of energy properties in our universe, an 
asymmetry between mass and energy, and this has resulted in a dyadic 
reality of external and internal realms. Because of this complementary
2 This includes quantum field  theory and quantum m echanics.
co-existence of energy/mass as both external and internal, the internal 
energy/mass will be contextualized, its properties will “be conceived 
in a relational way as they depend on a changing material context” 
(Kampis 1994: 103). That is, the internal energy/mass must be moved 
into an external existence as inert mass, distinct from kinetic energy, 
because of the co-existence of the external realm. How do the two 
realms meet?3 The second codification in the internal zone is a 
borderline, a membrane codification, one that operates as the media­
tion between the internal and external zones. This borderline measure­
ment, an absolutely vital process, has properties that are external, i.e., 
Secondness, and properties that are internal, i.e., Firstness. It is an 
action of Secondness-as-Firstness [2-1] and operates as a mode of 
prescission, a highly charged force of attraction, which focuses 
“attention to one element and neglect of another” (Peirce 1.549). It 
operates as an attractor funnel, ready to attract, bond and confine itself 
within the precise existent codes of the external realm and yet also 
exploratory due to its internal vagueness. We can certainly say, 
because of this indexical link with the external realm, that this border­
line codal process will also be affected, in some way, by the external 
cohesive central tendency of Thirdness-as-Firstness [3-1] as well the 
internal cohesive codal properties of Thirdness-as Secondess [3-2]. It 
is probably one of the key codal relations.
As for the internal synchronic code, we find that it operates by a 
process very different from the external cohesive process. Mass, in 
both its vague amorphous forms of 1-1 and 2-1 is not stabilized by 
being transformed to inert mass, with crisp forms referenced to that 
“higher-being” representational codal system as found within classical 
mechanical codification, but is stabilized by being actually physically 
linked, as mass/energy, as a network of plastic relations encoded as 
Thirdness-as-Secondness [3-2]. These relations operate as an indexical 
rather than a metastatistical intentionality of synchronicity. Internal 
synchronic continuity sets up a network of physical relations that link 
each mass-energy interaction to another mass-energy interaction. As 
we saw, within the external zone, Thirdness acts as a normalizing 
memory, a judgmental descriptive agent, rejecting and effectively 
starving deviants into dissipation. Internally, Thirdness is holistically
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temporal disparities; that is, the codifications take place in different modes of time (See 
Matsuno 1998).
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inclusive, physically linking without discrimination or judgment all 
and every action of codification. In this internal zone there is no such 
thing as the peripheral and the irrelevant, no such thing as true or 
false. They are all “part of the operative community”. Unlike the 
external, it cannot dissipate energy outside its boundaries. Internal 
wave/particle processes may reduce to less complex forms but they 
remain within the holistic network. Without the capacity for discrimi­
nation, it cannot select its future and therefore it too, like the external, 
is unable to evolve.
The complex semiosic architecture
There are therefore, two realms by means of which energy is mea­
sured as mass or what we may consider “informed mass”, i.e., infor­
mation. The external classical mechanics measures energy to mass 
within a process that views matter and energy as two realities, and 
references the bits of matter to an abstract template that describes and 
thereby constrains how these bits interact. The functional units are the 
singular unit (along with kinetic force) and a developed blueprint of 
the “most common” of these collective instances. The capacity of this 
external zone of measurement to provide a predictive stability, to 
“describe all natural phenomena in terms of simple forces between 
unalterable objects” (Einstein, Infeld 1961: 54) is unparalleled. 
However, we are well aware that the mechanical view is incomplete. 
The internal quantum process sets up an inclusive network of emotive 
ties but is incapable of providing analysis or reflexion on these 
processes. The functional units are amorphous excitations and a 
spatial pattern of the actions of these excitations that spreads across a 
field, i.e., the functional units are a spatially distributed activity 
pattern, not the individual instance or the number of instances. The 
capacity of the internal zone of measurement for inclusive acceptance 
of all variations is equally unparalleled.
These two realities, the external and internal zones, are antithetical 
to each other. How does one deal with contradictory worlds? Some 
have rejected the one in favour of the other. One level is real and the 
other a figment of our imagination — and which is the real and which 
the fictive has been a matter of intense debate, whether between the 
symbolists and connectionists in artificial intelligence or the moder­
nists and postmodernists in social theory. What if, rather than the one 
or the other of these zones, we postulate that our world necessarily 
requires both? How can we have one world operating with processes 
that are contradictory to each other?
The solution to the “problem” of the two worlds may be an 
endorsement of both their differential separation along with their 
associative filiation. Together and only together, they provide the 
capacities for a generative and exploratory transformation of energy to 
mass, creating closures as actual “bits” of informed, i.e., con- 
textualized mass, dissolving these closures and generating new clo­
sures, not haphazardly, but within the workings of an exploratory and 
evolutionary logic and pragmaticism. If we accept that “the emergence 
process is itself the result of the binding of two dynamical regimes, 
the endo-regime which is synergetic in nature, and the exo-regime of 
complex interactions” (Farre 1998: 685), then, we must both insist on 
and aggressively research the nature of this binding. What new 
understandings would be required to break with the established view 
which sees these two worlds as separate and non-dialogical? We 
advocate an architecture somewhat like a Möbius strip, where the 
boundaries of these two realities or worlds are filiated, as in a double­
helix, without denigrating the integrity of each string. The external 
provides relations that generate discrete entities and a cohesive 
metareference that focuses on the strengths of the majority and 
dissipates the nonessential. The internal provides relations that pro­
mote expansion and exploration and a cohesive network that enables 
an unrestricted inclusion of all variations. What is of interest is that 
the external becomes another system’s internal; the internal becomes 
another system’s external. This means that the external and internal, 
the classical and quantum, are not exclusionary but are co-existent.
Additionally, this architecture operates within a world made up of 
three different semiotic realms, the physico-chemical, the biological 
and the socioconceptual (Taborsky 1999). Each realm operates within 
both ontological and epistemological cuts and, at the least, five diffe­
rent modes of codification operate within each realm within a constant 
dialogical discourse. This means that, in total, we will have a complex 
“buzz” of semiotic complexity within the cosmos. In the physico­
chemical realm, the codal relations are primarily iconic and therefore 
encodements are unable to clearly differentiate type from token, or 
template from instance. The physico-chemical realm operates
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smoothly, with limited temporal or spatial gaps. This enables a 
universal spread of these physico-chemical properties but prevents 
variation and evolution. In the biological realm, the codal relations are 
predominantly indexical, and therefore, tokens are variations of types. 
Temporal and spatial gaps appear. This enables the biological realm to 
produce diversity and variations according to the local ecology and 
evolution, as historic irreversibility, appears. In the socioconceptual 
realm, the relations are symbolic and the tokens are metaphors of the 
types. This enables the social realm to create its own types and tokens, 
its own relations, and permits an explosion of innovation, while at the 
same time, it inserts the requirement of conscious and ethical choice.
There is one further mode of codification that we have so far 
neglected, and that is pure Thirdness, genuine Thirdness-as-Thirdness 
[3-3]. Does it exist? “There is no absolute third, for the third is of its 
own nature relative” (Peirce 1.362). I see this as pure mind, without 
mass. However, pure mind does not exist per se but as a cohesive 
logic of relations, a force of mediative attraction focused on the future 
and on final causality. Pure Thirdness is Final Cause, a “sense of 
learning” (Peirce 1.387). The community of users will acknowledge 
that its analog instances will of necessity “be pragmatic”; that is, they 
will be “ethical”, they will be “right” over time. This also means that 
the community acknowledges that there is no final state for the world 
is constantly collaboratively both “flexing its muscles” and 
interpreting the ethical feasibility of its actions.
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Энергия и эволюционный семиозис
В статье ставится гипотеза о массе как о кодированной энергии. Со­
ответствующий процесс превращения рассматривается как семиозисное 
действие интерпретации. Семозисное влияние анализируется в пяти 
“предикатах” или “вербальных типах”, которые создают разные про­
цессы превращения или интерпретации. Эти являющиеся знаковыми 
процессами “типы предикатов” имеют место в разных ареалах реаль­
ности, как во внешнем, так и во внутренном. Внешний ареал состоит из 
дискретных объектов и связях между ними. Происходящие там 
процессы изучает классическая механика, и в данной статье отмечается 
их уникальная семиозисная кодифицированность. Внутреннее про­
странство является холистической внутренной перспективой, в которой 
не различаются дискретные объекты. Эти процессы изучаются в рамках 
понятий кванта и поля, и в этих процессах также отмечается их уни­
кальная семиозисная кодифицированность. Вместо предпочтения одной
части другой в качестве единственной интерпретации реальности, в дан­
ной статье советуют рассматривать как внешние так и внутренние про­
цессы энерги/массы в качестве необходимых составных универсума.
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Energia ja evolutsiooniline semioos
Artiklis püstitatakse mõtteeksperiment, mis vaatleb massi kui kodeeritud 
energiat. Vastavat muundumisprotsessi käsitletakse kui sem ioosilist mõju —  
interpretatsiooni. Sem ioosilist mõju analüüsitakse viies “predikaadis” või 
“verbaalses tüübis”, mis loovad erinevaid muundumisprotsesse või inter­
pretatsioone. Need märgiprotsessideks olevad “predikaadi tüübid” leiavad 
aset reaalsuse erinevatel aladel, nii sisem ises kui välim ises alas. V äline ala 
koosneb diskreetsetest objektidest ja nendevahelisest seostest. Sealseid prot­
sesse uurib klassikaline mehhaanika, m illele käesolev artikkel omistab neile 
omase unikaalse sem ioosilise kodeerituse. Sisem ine ruum on holistlik sise- 
perspektiiv, milles diskreetseid objekte ei eristata. N eid protsesse uuritakse 
kvandi ja välja mõistete raames ja käesolev artikkel näeb ka neis unikaalset 
semioosilist kodeeritust. Selle asemel, et eelistada üht või teist ala kui 
reaalsuse ainukehtivat interpretatsiooni, soovitab käesolev artikkel nii väliseid  
kui sisemisi energia-massi protsesse käsitleda universumi vajalike koostis­
osadena.
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Obituary: Thomas A. Sebeok
N ovem ber 9, 1920 -  D ecem ber 21, 2001  
Jesper Hoffmeyer
Thomas Albert Sebeok, Distinguished Professor Emeritus o f Anthropology, 
of Linguistics, o f Semiotics, and o f  Central Asian Studies at Indiana U ni­
versity, Bloomington, was born on Novem ber 9, 1920, in Budapest, Hungary, 
and died peacefully at his home in Bloom ington, Indiana, on Decem ber 21. 
The oeuvre o f Sebeok comprises more than 600 articles and books2 and 
reaches far outside the core discipline o f general sem iotics, which he h im self 
pioneered.
In the context o f the present volum e the most overwhelm ing and epoch- 
making achievement o f Sebeok’s work was his creation o f  the new field o f 
biosemiotics. And, at least according to George Vlahakis, Sebeok was also 
himself “most proud to having brought into being a group o f  theoretical 
biologists and semioticians to pursue this field o f  investigation [b iose­
miotics]”.3
Sebeok’s life was decisively influenced by the second world war. He left 
Hungary in 1936 to study at M agdalene C ollege, Cambridge University, and 
his father advised him not to return to Budapest. Instead he immigrated to 
USA in 1937 and only after the war he learned that his w hole family had been 
destroyed. Sebeok became a citizen o f the US in 1944. He earned a bachelor’s 
degree at the University o f  Chicago in 1941 and a master's degree in 1943 and 
doctorate in 1945 at Princeton University.
Sebeok’s connection to Indiana University started in 1943 when he began 
work in the Army Specialized Training Program in foreign languages, which 
after a while he directed him self. He then created Indiana University’s 
renowned Department o f Uralic and Altaic Studies. He was offered the
1 Author’s address: Department o f  B iological Chemistry, U niversity o f  
C openhagen, Solvgade 83, DK 1307, Copenhagen K, Denmark; e-mail:
h offm ey er@ m erm a id .m o lb io .k u .d k
2 S eb eok ’s bibliography has been published in D eely  1995.
3 In the Obituary, distributed by Indiana University, Bloom ington, D ec. 21, 2001.
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directorship o f the Research C enter fo r  A nthropology, Folklore, and  
Linguistics, which would later (in 1956) be transformed into the famous 
Research C enter fo r  Language and Sem iotic Studies (RCLSS). For 35 years 
RCLSS remained one o f the most influential academic institutions in the 
world o f sem iotics, with Thomas A. Sebeok as its Director.
A ll o f this was little known to me when I first met Sebeok at a meeting on 
psycho-neuro-im munology in 1990 in the little village Tutzing in the neigh­
bourhood o f München. A s I would later learn Sebeok nourished a lifelong  
interest in biology, and kept a huge library on subjects related to animal 
communication. As early as 1963 he had coined the term zoosem iotics 
signifying that sem iotic branch concerned with the study o f animal sign use, 
and in 1976 he observed that ethology is “hardly more than a special case of 
diachronic sem iotics” (Sebeok 1985 [1976]): 156). This interest in life 
science also brought him to the work o f Jakob von Uexküll, whom, as he 
often told, he had first read in an awful English translation. His suspicion that 
the translator rather than the author was to blame was confirmed as soon as he 
got his hands on J. v. U exküll’s own writings in German language. Sebeok  
successively spent much effort to reintroduce this “neglected figure in the 
history o f sem iotics” (Sebeok 1979: 187) and to produce better English 
versions o f U exkiill’s work (Uexküll 1982, 1992). This also brought him his 
friendship with Jakob von U exküll’s son, Thure von U exküll, then still a 
professor in medicine at Ulm University.
Shortly before the day I met these two, each in his ow n way, stately men 
for the first time, I had managed to start the publication o f a new magazine in 
Danish language by the name O M verden, which is a literal translation o f the 
German term Um welt, meaning simply surroundings. Obviously, this name 
was meant to allude to the particular sense given to the term Um welt by Jakob 
von Uexküll, and I had sent a copy o f the first issue o f the magazine to T. v. 
Uexküll. N ow , among the hundreds o f participants arriving at the reception 
for the psycho-neuro-im munology conference in Tutzing I easily spotted 
Sebeok in the company o f  U exküll who carried the title page o f OM verden  
very visible in his jacket.
I think this meeting signalled the beginning o f a new phase in the creation 
o f biosem iotics as a scientific field. And again, as in several other cross- 
disciplinary endeavours, Sebeok's skills not only as a creative originator but 
also as the natural centre for a w ide com m unicative network o f  people with 
very different backgrounds, was absolutely essential for the development 
which follow ed from this event. Although the meeting in Tutzing was of 
course in itself very interesting from a sem iotic point o f  view , I guess it was 
perhaps more or less a pretext for bringing us all to southern Germany. The 
real formative event for the biosem iotics field was rather the meeting 
organized by Jörg Hermann in Glotterbad, a psycho-somatic clinic situated in 
the northern fringes o f the Schwartzwald mountains, which took place
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im m e lately after the Tutzing meeting. Present at this occasion was a number 
o f medical doctors, biologists and sem ioticians. A new meeting was 
summoned the next year and I think these early Glotterbad meetings were 
perhaps especially important because they left an impression on everybody 
that biosem iotics was now for real.
Still, the rapid growth o f  the biosem iotics field throughout the next decade 
would not have been possible without Sebeok’s relentless support and 
engagement. A s the co-editor (with his w ife Jean Umiker-Sebeok) o f  the 
yearbook The Sem iotic Web he was responsible for the first volum e dedicated 
solely to biosem iotics, and as the editor in ch ief o f  Sem iotica  he not only was 
able to assure the publication o f high quality biosem iotics papers but he also 
made it possible to publish a special issue (actually a w hole volum e) on 
biosemiotics follow ed by a volum e on the legacy from Jakob von Uexküll 
(Hoffmeyer, Emmeche 1999; Kull 2001; Sebeok, Um iker-Sebeok 1992). 
Without Sebeok’s enormous influence and prestige to pave the way, the 
growth o f biosem iotics might w ell have been seriously hampered through the 
usual territorial defense mechanism released more or less automatically in 
academia whenever som ebody attempts crossing the Cartesian divide.
But perhaps Sebeok’s importance for the developm ent o f  m odem  
biosemiotics was played out most significantly behind the scene. At the 
occasion o f the American Semiotic Society’s 25th annual meeting at Purdue 
University October 2000, titled S eb eo k ’s Century, John D eely held the 
inaugural speech in which he put it very precisely when he said; “Sebeok not 
only uses the internet, he is the internet” (quoted by memory). Sebeok would  
answer your e-m ails, often within a few  minutes, and at nearly all times day 
or night. I remember sending him an e-m ail at 10 a.m. in Denmark, which 
was answered half an hour later, i.e. 3 .30  Indiana time. Since everybody I 
have talked to tell similar stories, the burden o f his comm unicative effort 
must have been enormous. It’s hard to im agine anybody to take over this 
essential component o f Sebeok’s heritage, and I am afraid the only thing one 
can suggest is that we all try to seriously upgrade our comm unicative efforts.
One could not stay close to Sebeok without becom ing impressed by the 
remarkable force o f  his intellect, the intensity o f his commitment, and his all- 
embracing know ledge and humour. The spring o f  anecdotes which spiced his 
talks seem ed inexhaustible. But perhaps most im pressive of all was the 
glimpses o f  warmth which were never far away. To have known his friend­
ship is one o f  the dearest thing in my life.
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